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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
GEOPOLITICAL ACCOUNT OF IRAN’S TIES WITH NON-STATE ACTORS 
UNDER THE SHAH: 1958-1979 
by  
Arash Reisinezhad 
 Florida International University, 2017 
 Miami, Florida  
Professor Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Major Professor 
Late in 2004, King Abdullah of Jordan coined a controversial phrase that still 
dominates the heart of the geopolitics of the Middle East: The Shia Crescent. “If pro-Iran 
parties or politicians dominate the new Iraqi government, a new ‘crescent’ of dominant 
Shia movements or governments stretching from Iran into Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon could 
emerge to alter the traditional balance of power between the two main Islamic sects and 
pose new challenges to U.S. interests and allies. What the King of Jordan saw as a threat, 
Iran saw as the bedrock of its newfound regional power. However, what the King of Jordan 
and his Arab-Sunni aides downplayed was Iran’s ties with non-Shia groups, ranging from 
Sunni parties to secular and even non-Muslim groups. More importantly, they neglected 
Iran’s presence in the Middle East before the 1979 Islamic Revolution. In fact, the seeming 
omnipresence of Iran’s proxies in the Middle East is not a recent, nuanced phenomenon; 
rather, it dated back to the Shah’s foreign policy in making connections with both the Iraqi 
Kurds and Shia Lebanese. While much ink has been spilled on Iran’s foreign policy under 
the Islamic Republic, there has been a void in analysis of Iran’s ties with Non-State Actors 
(NSAs) in the pre-1979 Revolution Era.  
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From this point of view, the present study is an attempt to set forth a new 
understanding of the emergence and fluctuation of Iran’s ties with NSAs at the heart of the 
Middle East during the Shah’s era. I will accomplish this by identifying the Iran-NSA 
relationships within an examination of the larger historical context of state-NSA 
relationships in the region. Here, the story of the evolution of Iran’s ties with NSAs can be 
narrated as the unfolding of constant interaction between states and non-state forces in the 
Middle East. Analyzed from this perspective, my research examines the actors, processes, 
and mechanisms that Iran has used to construct ties with NSAs from 1961 until 1979. 
“What actors and processes at what levels of analysis and through what mechanisms have 
constructed Iran’s ties with NSAs?” This is the central question that guides the analytical 
narrative in the present survey. Therefore, the dependent variable for this research is the 
evolution of Iran’s ties with NSAs, while the intervening variable is a set of actors and 
processes that has brought about such sub-state ties. In this framework, the proposed work 
will undertake these main tasks: 
A) Tracing the history of the ebbs and flows within Iran’s ties with non-state actors 
through a geopolitical lens.  
B) Explaining how Iran’s ties with non-state actors unfolded and understanding why 
Iran’s proxies evolved in the way they did.  
C) Assessing the broad contours of the evolutionary trajectory of Iran’s ties with NSAs 
and its possible future path(s) for the geopolitics of the Middle East and its regional 
balance of power. 
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I. Introduction 
“We should combat to and contain the threat in the East coast of the Mediterranean 
to prevent shedding blood on Iranian soil.” These words were uttered by Colonel Pashaie, 
head of the Middle East Directorate of SAVAK, Iran’s National Intelligence and Security 
Organization, to weaken the rising Pan-Arabism in the Middle East in the aftermath of the 
Iraqi coup of 1958. It was the beginning of the Green Plan strategy in Southern Lebanon. 
Iran’s Green Plan planted the seed of Iran’s connections with a marginalized Shia 
community in Lebanon. With charismatic, Iranian-born Seyyed Musa Sadr’s departure to 
the south of Lebanon, Tehran’s relations with the Lebanese Shia hit the new course.  
Pahlavi Iran also sided with the Iraqi Kurds against Iraq. The Iraqi coup of 1958 
toppled the pro-Western monarchy and established a Pan-Arab, pro-Moscow republic on 
Iran’s western borders. Within this context, SAVAK was instructed by the Shah to build a 
strategic connection with the Kurds in Northern Iraq. Led by Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the 
Kurdish guerrillas tied down the Iraqi Army and turned Baghdad away from posing a threat 
to Iran’s western provinces and the Persian Gulf.  
Contrary to popular opinion regarding the Shah’s foreign policy, the U.S. did not 
initially side with Iran’s strategy towards the Kurds in the period between 1961-1972. 
Despite maintaining close ties with the Shah, the White House did not share his threat 
assessment towards Iraq. It was only after the Tehran summit of 1972 that President 
Richard Nixon instructed CIA covert cooperation with SAVAK in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
Iran’s strategic connections with the Iraqi Kurds and the Lebanese Shia ushered in 
a strategy towards non-state entities in the Middle East. It was the beginning of ‘Iran’s non-
state foreign policy’—a specific foreign policy intended to build connections with political 
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and militant groups and movements. Non-state foreign policy refers to connections 
between a state and a political-militant non-state actor. This policy relates to how a state 
builds and manages ties with a non-state actor(s) through mechanisms beyond the common 
foreign policy. Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran has heavily relied on its non-
state foreign policy. In addition to revolutionary Iran, the non-state foreign policy has been 
implemented by the Soviet Union in support for communist parties, leftist movements, and 
liberation militias during the Cold War. Other countries, like China, Cuba, and more 
importantly, the U.S. have followed the same policy.  
Almost a half-century later, Iran’s non-state foreign policy expanded to an 
unprecedented level. Late in 2004, King Abdullah of Jordan popularized a controversial 
phrase that still dominates the heart of the geopolitics of the Middle East: The Shia 
Crescent. “If pro-Iran parties or politicians dominate the new Iraqi government, a new 
‘crescent’ of dominant Shia movements or governments stretching from Iran into Iraq, 
Syria, and Lebanon could emerge to alter the traditional balance of power between the two 
main Islamic sects and pose new challenges to U.S. interests and allies.” In Sunni Arab 
leaders’ eyes, the Shia Crescent has been shaped around the armature of strategic 
connections between Iran and Shia non-state entities. However, this outlook failed to 
recognize the significance of the roots of Iran’s non-state foreign policy in the Middle East 
before the Islamic Revolution of 1979. In reality, Iran’s non-state foreign policy emerged 
in the midst of the Cold War. After the Iraqi coup of 1958, Mohammad-Reza Shah Pahlavi 
tried to preserve Iran’s national integrity by making connections with regional non-state 
entities. 
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Significance of the Study 
Pre-revolutionary Iran’s support for non-state entities was not limited to the support 
for the Iraqi Kurds and the Lebanese Shia. The Shah backed the royalist Mutawakkilite 
forces against the Soviet-backed, pro-Nasser Republicans in North Yemen in the 60s. In 
the last months of his reign, he began siding with Afghan Mujahedin against communist 
Kabul and the Red Army in Afghanistan. The Shah financially and logistically supported 
a remote western-backed UNITA in fighting with the Soviet-backed MPLA in Angola. He 
also supported the Polisario Front in Western Sahara. Despite their significance, the Iraqi 
Kurds and the Lebanese Shia played major parts in Iran’s non-state foreign policy. First, 
connections with the Iraqi Kurds and the Lebanese Shia are still significant. Since the 
Islamic Revolution, Iran has sided with the Lebanese Shia and the Iraqi Kurds against its 
regional foes Israel and Baath Iraq. Second, the Iraqi Kurds and the Lebanese Shia were 
geographically and culturally closer to Iran. Shia Islam has been the predominant religion 
in Iran since the early 16th century. The Kurds are an Iranian ethnic group whose culture 
and language are much closer to the people living in modern Iran than to Turks or Arabs. 
Third, both the Iraqi Kurds and the Lebanese Shia have affected Iranian society and 
domestic politics. The Kurdish separatism in Iraqi Kurdistan could have spillover effects 
on Iran’s Kurdistan since Iran has been prone to Kurdish irredentism. Iranian leaders have 
suppressed Kurdish separatism in Iran while at the same time siding with the Iraqi Kurds. 
In the pre-revolutionary era, several Iranian revolutionaries were trained on military bases 
in the south of Lebanon. On top of that, religious networks between Seyyed Musa Sadr, 
the leader of the Lebanese Shia, with the Shia Marja, including Ayatollah Khomeini, had 
tremendous effects on the dynamics of the Islamic Revolution of 1979.  
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          Iran’s connections with political-militant non-state entities in the Middle East has 
been at the heart of international and regional security policy for more than three decades. 
Interestingly, while the Islamic Republic’s support for non-state entities in the Middle East, 
like Hezbollah, has framed the country as an allegedly top state ‘sponsor of terrorism’, the 
Shah’s support for the Iraqi Kurds and the Lebanese Shia was never framed as a significant 
threat to international peace and security. The breadth and depth of these ties, along with 
Iran’s geostrategic location and its antagonistic relationship with the United States over the 
last three decades, have given rise to a body of literature on various aspects of Iran’s foreign 
policy. While much ink has been spilled on Iran’s foreign policy, there has been a void in 
the analysis of the country’s ties with non-states entities. Despite their profound impact on 
the power arrangement of the region and on U.S. national security, these connections have 
been partially unknown to Western audiences. In fact, the sensitivity and complexity of the 
issue, as well as the lack of access to Iranian sources and officials, have caused most experts 
to avoid dedicating extensive efforts to the matter.  
Background 
The current literature on Iran’s ties with non-state actors could be classified in four 
categories. The first category focuses on regional political-militant groups and only 
indirectly and superficially addresses their ties with Iran. The main goal is to unravel the 
hidden black box of the socio-political context, internal power struggles, decision-making 
processes, and institutional arrangements of each non-state entity.1 The second category 
                                                
1 “Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God, From Revolution to Institutionalization” by Eitan Azani; 
“Hezbollah” by Naim Qassem; “Hezbullah’s Documents: From the 1985 open letter to the 2009 Manifesto” 
by Joseph Alagha; “Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God” by Matthew Levitt; 
“Hamas” by Beveley Milton-Edwards and Stephen Farrell, and “The Brotherhood: America’s Next Great 
Enemy” by Erick Stakelbeck. 
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includes literature on Iranian foreign policy in general, and on Iran’s regional or relations 
with great powers and the U.S. in particular.2 However, this specific literature has 
downplayed Iran’s non-state foreign policy by reducing Iran-U.S. relations to accounts of 
the coup in 1953 and the turmoil of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and framing Iranian-
American ‘special relations’ as a direct path from the coup to the revolution. Such an overly 
simplistic narrative neglects the crucial period between those two momentous events. The 
third category looks at terrorism and terrorist networks, considering Iran’s ties with these 
groups highly suspect. Blinded by the condemnatory rhetoric, these textbooks frame Iran’s 
non-state connections as the source of instability in the Middle East.3 The last category 
focuses on Shiism and Shia groups and communities as well as Kurdish communities. 
These books are notable for taking a longer view of the history of Shias and the Kurds.4 
Similarly, relations with Iran are merely secondary topics in this category.  
Goals and Contributions 
This work sheds new light on the emergence and fluctuation of Iran’s connections 
with non-state entities in Iraq and Lebanon during the Shah’s era. The dissertation is not 
                                                
2 “After Khomeini” by Anoushirvan Ehteshami; “Reading in Iran Foreign Policy After September11” by 
Abbas Maleki and Kaveh Afrasiabi; “Iran in World Politics: The Question of the Islamic Republic” by Arshin 
Adib-Moghaddam; “Reflections on Iran’s Foreign Policy and Ideology and Pragmatism in Iran’s Foreign 
Policy” both by Rouhollah Ramazani; “The Treacherous Alliance” by Trita Parsi; “The Eagle and Lion” by 
James Bill; “Iran” by Brzezinski et.al; “The Great Satan vs. the Mad Mullahs” by William Beeman; and “The 
Persian Puzzle” by Kenneth Pollack.  	
 
3 “Jihad Ultimatum” by J. D. Randall; “The Axis of the Evil” by Shaul Shay, and “Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, 
and Global Jihadi: A New Conflict Paradigm for the West” by Dore Gold and Daniel Diker 
 
4 “The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future” by Vali Nasr; “The Shi’a Worlds 
and Iran” edited by Sabrina Marvin; “Shiism and Politics in the Middle East” by Laurence Louer; “A Modern 
History of  the Kurds” by David McDowall, “Invisible Nation: How the Kurds’ Quest for Statehood Is 
Shaping Iraq and the Middle East” by Quil Lawrence; “The Kurds: A People in Search of Their Homeland” 
by Kevin Mckiernan; “No Friends But the Mountains: The Tragic History of the Kurds” by John Bulloch. 
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intended to cover different aspects of Iran’s foreign policy under the Shah’s reign; rather, 
it examines institutions within the Pahlavi regime that implemented Iran’s non-state foreign 
policy. The present dissertation also narrates the story of Iran’s non-state foreign policy by 
focusing on specific geopolitical and geocultural threats and opportunities that pushed 
Tehran to build strategic ties with the Iraqi Kurds and the Lebanese Shia in the period 
between 1958 and 1979. This is the central task that guides the analytical narrative in the 
dissertation. 
The present dissertation contributes to the literature in multiple ways. First, it traces 
the ebbs and flows within Iran’s non-state foreign policy under the Shah’s reign. The 
primary focus is on the relations between a state, Iran, with non-state actors, the Iraqi Kurds 
and the Lebanese Shia. Therefore, it is not about internal politics during pre-revolutionary 
Iran. Second, this dissertation challenges the widespread view of Iran’s non-state allies as 
only allied after the Islamic Revolution of 1979 by highlighting Pahlavi Iran’s role in 
shaping Iran’s non-state foreign policy. It illustrates how the expansion of Iran’s 
connections with non-state actors was established for the first time by the Pahlavi regime. 
Third, the dissertation provides yet another example of how the course of the Cold War 
and the Middle East politics were forged by one of the super-powers’ allies in the Third 
World, i.e., Iran. The Shah, as a Third World leader, actively contained threats by 
manipulating the superpowers. With its detailed investigation of Iran’s non-state foreign 
policy, the dissertation shows that Iran and the U.S. had significant tensions over the 
Kurdish War in a period between 1961-72. Therefore, the present dissertation fleshes out 
our understanding of Iran-America relations and recasts the question of U.S.–Iranian 
relations at its zenith in the 60s and 70s. Fourth, this dissertation puts emphasis on the 
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significance of militant-political non-state entities in the world, in general, and in the 
Middle East, in particular. The proliferation of these entities in the Middle East has 
challenged pivotal assumptions of realism and eroded the state-centric international politics 
and traditional Westphalian nation-state claim on sovereignty. Ranging from social 
movements and guerrillas to semi-state actors, non-state actors acted within and upon the 
international system. Therefore, the present study will be a step towards a better 
understanding of the relation between states and non-state entities. Fifth, the dissertation 
challenges the dominant view of Iran’s foreign policy decision-making processes. The 
dominant view on pre-revolutionary Iran has framed Iran’s foreign policy as the Shah’s 
foreign policy. Conversely, the present dissertation shows that other institutions, especially 
SAVAK, played a key role in shaping the trajectory of Iran’s non-state foreign policy in 
Iraqi Kurdistan and Southern Lebanon. Sixth, the present dissertation assesses the 
trajectory of Iran’s non-state foreign policy by highlighting geopolitical/geo-cultural 
threats and opportunities, rather than focusing on ideology, in the evolution of Iran’s non-
state foreign policy. Seventh, this dissertation does not focus just on politics and political 
issues. Rather, it is a multi-disciplinary study, tackling different domains of social science. 
Along with politics, it demonstrates the significance of culture and religion to investigate 
how connections with Iran affected the solidarity of non-state entities’ communities. 
Lastly, the dissertation is a historiography. It provides a theoretical plot to narrate a story, 
a story of the history of Iran’s non-state foreign policy under the Shah’s reign.  
Theoretical Framework 
It is tempting to capture Iran’s non-state foreign policy in terms of Iranian leaders’ 
power ambitions. It could be also explained as some mere ethnic or religious formula. 
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According to this narrative, Iran’s support for the Iraqi Kurds against Iraq could be 
considered as another course of a long-standing rivalry between the Iranian and the Arab. 
As a constitutive ethnic group of the Iranian people, the Kurds have been culturally and 
linguistically affiliated with the Iranian civilization. Iran’s assistance to the Shia in the 
south of Lebanon could be also explicated as an example of long-running tension between 
the Shia and Sunni variants of Islam. With its overwhelmingly Shia population, Iran has 
been the Shia hub in the Islamic world. From this point of view, Iran’s culture and religion 
could be introduced as determinant drives in shaping ties with the Iraqi Kurds and the 
Lebanese Shia. One could also emphasize on Baghdad-Tehran and Cairo-Tehran 
competition for regional hegemony as driving forces in prompting Iran to side with the 
Iraqi Kurds and the Lebanese Shia. Since both Iran and Iraq possessed vast oil reservoirs 
and were seeking to influence oil policy in their favor, an economic-energy competition 
could be considered as a final source of Iran’s non-state foreign policy. At the same time, 
Pahlavi Iran was the U.S. major ally in the Cold War era while Baghdad, on the whole, 
oscillated between the Soviet camp and neutrality.  
Though significant, a cursory survey reveals that there have been a number of 
factors, rather than a single one which influenced the formation of Iran’s non-state foreign 
policy. Like other states of the region, Pahlavi Iran encountered major ‘threats’ and 
‘opportunities’ that had decisive ramifications for the formation of Iran’s ties with non-
state entities in the Middle East. Such a coherent system of threat-opportunity interplayed 
on three ‘levels’ of international, regional, and domestic. Iran’s domestic institutional 
arrangement under the Shah’s reign was added to the crosscutting complexities of 
domestic, regional, and international levels of threats-opportunities. From this perspective, 
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the present theoretical framework is at the same time based on a geopolitical and an 
institutional narrative of Iran’s non-state foreign policy.  
Pahlavi Iran’s internal institutions underscored the complexity of continuity and 
change of the evolution of Iran’s non-state foreign policy. Institutions are recognizable 
patterns of rules and practices. Each institution includes “the formal and informal 
procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of 
the polity” that generates the socio-political changes.5 New Institutionalism highlights the 
key role of institutions in sociopolitical changes. The present study utilizes Historical New 
Institutionalism which focuses on interactions among institutions in a polity as ultimate 
reasons behind specific historical junctures. Therefore, major transformations in the 
trajectory of Iran’s non-state foreign policy occurred within institutional arrangements in 
different historical stages.  
Geopolitics deals with relationships among geography, power, and world order, 
stressing the role of geographical constraints and opportunities in the conduct of politics. 
A set of threats and opportunities convinced Iran to build its connections in Northern 
Mesopotamia and the eastern coast of the Mediterranean. This set of threats and 
opportunities had political, cultural, and economic aspects. From this perspective, 
Mohiaddin Mesbahi’s theory provides a robust framework for the evolution and dynamics 
of Iran’s non-state foreign policy. This framework offers a ‘tripartite’ view of the 
international system “with three interrelated yet distinct structures, namely the coercive-
                                                
5 Hall, Peter and Rosemary C. R. T Taylor, Political Science and the Three New Institutionalism. (1996), 
XLIV, p. 938. 
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military, the normative-social, and the economic.”6 Along with geographical factors, each 
state experiences the symbiotic impact from interactions with tripartite domains and forces. 
Lastly, the nature and scope of each domain is different. As Mesbahi asserts, “each 
structure deals with the state in a manner most conducive to its own elemental attributes, 
extracting and re-prevailing identity. Thus, for example, within the coercive structure, it is 
the unitary state which is being dealt with and taken into consideration, while in the 
social/normative and economic/developmental structures, the state, no matter how resistant 
and how insistent on its unitary nature and sovereignty, will be dealt with and interacted 
with in its composite form, displaying and exposing its inner components including socio-
cultural and economic groupings and associations.”7 In short, three domains of geopolitics, 
geoculture, and geoeconomics are embedded in three levels of international, regional, and 
domestic. 
From this perspective, the Middle East during the Cold War possessed three clearly 
interrelated, yet distinct, domains of geopolitics, geoculture, and geoeconomy. It had been 
riven with powerful premodern religious-cultural-ethnic divisions. It also contained 
distinctive ideological features that caused the emergence of potent geocultural forces in 
the region. With its enormous oil fields, the disputes over oil prices, and oil pipeline routes, 
the region had become an integral part of the global economy and shaped the geoeconomic 
forces. Lastly, the geostrategic location of the Middle East and its vicinity to one of the two 
                                                
6 Mesbahi, Mohiaddin, Free and Confined: Iran and the International System. (Spring 2011). Iranian Review 
of Foreign Affairs, 5 (2): 9-34. 
 
7 Mesbahi, Mohiaddin, Free and Confined: Iran and the International System. (Spring 2011). Iranian Review 
of Foreign Affairs, 5 (2): 9-34. 
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super-powers, internal territorial disputes, and power and status rivalries among the 
regional states had constituted major geopolitical forces in the Middle East.  
The Middle East during the Cold War can be described with this tripartite 
arrangement. As a perfect example of a conflict formation in the Cold War era, the Middle 
East had autonomous regional and domestic levels of security. The insecurity of ruling 
elites domestically played a significant role in shaping the dynamics of (in)security in the 
region.8 Crafted out of the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, the Middle Eastern 
countries(except for Iran) were postcolonial insecure regimes, lacking simultaneously state 
identity, national identity, and regime identity. The lack of a strong state in the region 
spilled over into regional security politics that had emerged since the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire. It was driven by a complex agenda of ideological competitions, 
longstanding religious-ethnic division, oil rival policies, border disputes, and power status. 
The Middle East had been subject to continuous and heavy impact of the international Cold 
War rivalry. Before then, its regional state system had been shaped through the British and 
French interventions. In the aftermath of the World War II, the Middle East soon became 
the third battleground in the Cold War, after Europe and Asia. Heavily manifested in 
intense patterns of ‘enmity-amity,’9 like Iranian-Arab and Shia-Sunni enmities, the 
regional dynamics were so vigorous and durable that neither the U.S. nor the USSR had 
effective control over the region.  
                                                
8 Buzan, Barry and Ole Waver Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security. (Cambridge 
University Press, 4 Dec 2003). p. 187. 
 
9 Buzan, Barry and Ole Waver Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, (Cambridge 
University Press, 4 Dec 2003). 
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Consequently, this theoretical framework demonstrates critical historical junctures, 
forces (internal/ external), and actors (decision-makers/elites/institutions) that played key 
role in the trajectory of Iran’s non-state foreign policy. The present theoretical template 
also demonstrates that the roots and effects of Iran’s non-state foreign policy could be 
traced to three ‘domains’ of geopolitical, geocultural and geoeconomic, and at the same 
time, on three ‘levels’ of international, regional, and domestic. 
Methodology and Sources 
The present dissertation employs a ‘historical analysis’ approach to Iran’s 
connections with non-state entities. In the part of this work aimed at tracing the evolution 
of Iran’s non-state foreign policy in the Pahlavi era, I have used three types of sources. The 
most important types of data are declassified documents related to Iran’s engagement in 
Iraqi Kurdistan and the south of Lebanon. Most of these materials were gathered from 
major archival collections in both the U.S. and Iran.  
On the Iranian side of the story, the dissertation is heavily based on major 
documents obtained from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and SAVAK, gathered from 
Markaz-e Amouzesh va Pajooheshhay-e Beynolmelali-e Vezarat-e Omour-e Kharejeh 
(Center of International Research and Education of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 
Markaz-e Asnad- Enghelab-e Eslami (Islamic Revolution Document Center), and Sazman-
e asnad va Ketabkhane Melli-e Jomouhori Eslami (National Library and Archives of 
Islamic Republic of Iran). Additionally, the dissertation relied on published government 
documents, including Imam Musa Sadr be Ravayat-e Asnad-e SAVAK (Musa Sadr 
according to SAVAK Documents, 3 volumes), Hezb-e Democrat-e Kurdestan-e Araq be 
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Ravayet-e SAVAK (Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party according to SAVAK) and Ravabet-
e Iran va Araq be Ravayat-e SAVAK (Iran-Iraq Relations According to SAVAK).     
Other than these Persian documents, the biographical interview accounts collected 
by Harvard University’s Iranian Oral History Project and The Foundation for Iranian 
Studies contained significant insights into the Shah’s threat assessment and decision-
making processes. For media accounts of the post-Revolution era, I have used Iranian 
government-affiliated websites, newspaper archives, and news websites. Besides, there 
have been several Persian sources which show the Shah’s view towards non-state foreign 
policy. These include the diaries of Assadollah Alam, the Shah’s closest advisor, former 
prime minister, and Minister of the Imperial Court, which shed light on the Shah’s day-to-
day ruling over the country. Other memoirs include Colonel Isa Pejman, head of the section 
of ‘Kurdistan’ in SAVAK, and Major General Mansour Qadar, former ambassador to 
Beirut. Other important sources are memories of Iranian revolutionaries, including Sadegh 
Tabatabaie, Seyyed Musa Sadr’s nephew and first deputy of prime minister after the 
Revolution.  
In the U.S., I gathered documents from the National Archives in College Park, 
Maryland. I have also used documents from the Richard Nixon Presidential Library’s 
online website10 and the Gerald Ford Presidential Library’s online website.11 The 
dissertation benefited from published government documents, including Foreign Relations 
of the United States-Historical Documents (FRUS), CIA: The Pike Report, Public Papers 
of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower 1953 and Gerald R. Ford 1976-77, the Cold War 
                                                
10 Available at https://www.nixonlibrary.gov. 
 
11 Available at https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/collections-digital.aspx. 
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International History Project (CWIHP) at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars, Israel State Archives Online Collection, and Special Collection: A Life in 
Intelligence—The Richard Helms Collections (CIA-Helms). I also collected the National 
Security Archive documents from George Washington University (GWU),12 the CIA 
Records Search Tool (CREST) at the National Archives in College Park, the FOIA 
(Freedom of Information Act) Electronic Reading Room,13 and the history collection of the 
Office of Central Interlligence Agency.14 
The dissertation addresses Iran’s non-state foreign policy in a period between the 
Iraqi coup of 1958 and the collapse of the Pahlavi regime in 1979. In order to analyze the 
evolution and dynamics of Iran’s non-state foreign policy under the Shah’s reign, the 
dissertation adopts a chronological structure. This is done in seven separate chapters. 
Chapter 1 examines driving forces behind the evolution of Iran’s connections with the Iraqi 
Kurds and the Lebanese Shia. This chapter contains three sections. The first section 
assesses geopolitical and geo-cultural threats that convinced the Shah to build connections 
with non-state entities in Iraq and Lebanon. The second section tackles regional and 
international opportunities that urged the Shah to implement Iran’s non-state foreign 
policy. The third section demonstrates the vital role institutions played in the evolution and 
dynamics of Iran’s non-state foreign policy. The rest of the chapters, from the second 
chapter to the seventh, trace historical fluctuations of Iran’s ties with non-state actors in 
different epochs, each containing two sections: one focused on Iran’s relations with the 
                                                
12 Also available at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu. 
 
13 Available at http://www.foia.cia.gov. 
 
14 Available at https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/intelligence-analysis/history. 
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Iraqi Kurds and the other focused on Iran’s relations with the Lebanese Shia. The second 
chapter begins with the historical background of Iranian-Iraqi Kurdish and Iranian-
Lebanese Shia connections before the Iraqi coup of 1958. The third chapter provides a 
detailed account of how Iran constructed networks with the Iraqi Kurds and the Lebanese 
Shia between 1958 and 1963. The fourth chapter focuses on Iran’s massive support of the 
Kurds in fighting with the Pan-Arab regime of Baghdad as well as the Shia in challenging 
Nasserism in the Levant in the years between 1963 and 1968. The fifth chapter details 
another course in Iran’s non-state foreign policy when the Shah began to scale back his 
support of Iran’s non-state allies in a period between 1968 and 1974. The sixth chapter 
shows how Tehran terminated its ties with the Iraqi Kurds and the Lebanese Shia between 
1975 and 1977. Finally, the last chapter relates to Iran’s unsuccessful efforts to revive its 
connections. The conclusion wraps up the account of Iran’s ties with the Iraqi Kurds and 
the Lebanese Shia. Systematically and methodically constructed, these chapters trace the 
first-hand history of Iran’s connections with the Iraqi Kurds and the Lebanese Shia in the 
pre-revolutionary era. 
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II. Chapter 1 
Driving Forces 
 
The evolution and trajectory of Iran’s non-state foreign policy under the Shah’s 
reign were mainly shaped by a set of geopolitical and geocultural threats and opportunities 
in international, regional, and domestic areas. The strategic connections between Pahlavi 
Iran with the Iraqi Kurds and the Lebanese Shia were forged to contain Iran’s enemies. At 
the same time, specific opportunities facilitated the formation of Iran’s non-state foreign 
policy. Furthermore, a constellation of institutional arrangements within Pahlavi Iran was 
responsible for shaping the dynamics of Iran’s non-state foreign policy. 
The present chapter comprises three parts. The first part focuses on international, 
regional, and domestic threats--both geopolitical and geocultural threats—that convinced 
Iran to forge its non-state foreign policy in Iraqi Kurdistan and Southern Lebanon. The 
second part highlights specific regional and international opportunities that provided a 
fertile ground for Iran to shape its strategic connections in Iraqi Kurdistan and the south of 
Lebanon. The last part puts emphasis on the major political institutions of the Pahlavi 
regime that were responsible in crafting Iran’s ties with the Iraqi Kurds and the Lebanese 
Shia. Systematically intertwined, these three parts constitute a complex of driving factors 
that determined the formation of Iran’s non-state foreign policy. 
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A. Threats 
“Well, this greater freedom has rekindled the unholy alliance of the red and the black in Iran and abroad. But 
we will continue our policy because the pillars that hold this country, propped by the Shah-People Revolution 
and the Rastakhiz Party of the nation, are strong and will not be harmed by the last gasps of this moribund 
unholy alliance. This caravan shall never come to a stop. Let the dog bark; the moon shall beam on,” The 
Shah said in a speech to the Iranian women.15 
 
“I know I am spending money on the army a lot. But what should I do? Is it acceptable to be beaten by Iraq?” 
the Shah told Assadollah Alam in January 1971.16 
 
Threats are about state survival and security. Threat-construction processes are at 
the core of the national security. When an issue is framed as posing an existential threat to 
a state, it justifies the use of extraordinary measures to deter or handle it.17 Located at a 
geostrategic position, Iran had been historically subject to regional threats. The Shah’s 
authoritarian style of government, Iran’s oil rentier state, and Iran’s multi-ethnic-religious-
linguistic society had nurtured domestic threats. On top of that, the Cold War and 
neighboring with one of the two superpowers, the USSR, added an international level of 
threats to Pahlavi Iran’s national security. These threats interplayed in a tripartite domain 
with geopolitical, geocultural and geoeconomic effects, putting Iran’s national integrity, 
identity, and economy in danger. Brought up or intensified by geography, geopolitical 
threats are political-military threats that endanger the survival and physicality of the state. 
They are traditional threats that push the state’s securitization. The main referent object in 
the domain of geopolitics has traditionally been the state. Caused or intensified by 
geography, geocultural threats are ideological-cultural-normative threats that endanger 
                                                
15 The Rastakhiz Party was established by the Shah in 1975. Kongereh-ye bozorg-e zanan-e Iran [The Grand 
Congress of Iranian Women] (Tehran: Women’s Organization of Iran, 2536 [1978]), 3–5. 
 
16 Alam, Assadollah. Yad’dashtha-ye ‘Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam 
Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. II: 1973-1974 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 1995), p. 148. 
 
17 Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap deWilde. Security: A New Framework for Analysis, (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 1998). p. 36. 
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state identity. The primary referent object in this field has been the nation and to some 
degree the ruling ideology, culture, and norms. Geo-economic threats are economic threats 
caused or intensified by geography. Iran’s vast oil reservoirs in its southwestern province 
of Khuzestan, as well as an abundance of oil in the southern shore of the Persian Gulf, were 
targets of these threats. Though significant for its foreign policy, Iran’s non-state foreign 
policy under the Shah’s reign was not shaped by geo-economic threats.18 Indeed, there 
were geopolitical-geocultural threats that shaped Iran’s non-state foreign policy, including 
the Red Threat, the Arab Threat, the Kurd Threat, the Black Threat, and the Palestinian 
Threat. 
1. The Red Threat 
Since Peter the Great’s invasion of the Northern Iran in 1722-3, the Russian danger 
had permanently featured in Iranian kings’ threat assessments. The treaties of Golestan, 24 
October 1813, and Torkamanchay, 10 February 1828, forced Qajar Iran to cede to Russia 
control of its historical territories in the South Caucasus.19 These treaties limited Iran’s full 
independence and then transformed the country to a major battlefront for the Russian-
British competition in Asia. With this historical background in mind, Iranians considered 
the geopolitical manifestation of the Red Threat, the Russian Expansionism, as a dangerous 
threat to Iran’s national integrity and independence. The historical Russian threat was 
intensified with the establishment of the communist empire of the Soviet, posing 
                                                
18 The Middle East Oil was a strong motive for both superpowers’ policies. Iran was a golden gate for the 
unlimited Middle East oil sources that could play a decisive role in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. 
For the U.S. policy makers, losing Baghdad and Riyadh oil reservoirs would bring up an oil war with the 
Soviet Union and vice versa. Besides, regional disputes over the price of oil, a general fear of the hegemonic 
ambitions of Saddam Hussein, prompted the Shah to contain the Iraqi threat by the support for Barzani’s 
Peshmerga.   
 
19 These territories in the north of Aras River comprise modern-day Republic of Azerbaijan, Dagestan, 
Armenia, and Georgia. 
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Communism as a strong geocultural threat to Iran. In the wake of the Cold War, the Red 
Threat symbiotically interplayed in both geopolitical and geocultural domains and 
endangered Iran’s state and regime survival.  
After defeating the Nazi military machinery in World War II, Russian 
expansionism was fueled with the Cold War contest with the U.S. and thus was promoted 
from a regional threat to Iran to an international one. Born in the late years of World War 
I and intensified by the Soviet victory in the World War II, Communism became a 
dominant discourse of anti-government forces in the third world. From the Shah’s 
perspective, communism was Moscow’s ideological tool to achieve its longstanding goal 
of reaching the warm water of the Persian Gulf. Consequently, Iran had been directly 
connected to the international level due to its geographical proximity to the USSR by the 
end of the World War II. 
In the Shah’s view, the Red Threat was not solely acting on the international level; 
rather, it had amplified regional threats to Iran. First, he considered Pan-Arab regimes as 
Moscow’s potential allies in the region. Egypt in the mid-50s and then Iraq in the late-50s 
shifted from pro-West monarchies to a leftist government with an arms-supply relation 
with Moscow. With the formation of the second Baath regime in the late 60s, Iraq became 
the Soviet major ally in the region. In mid-June 1969, Assadollah Alam warned the U.S. 
ambassador to Tehran that “Iraq has become the Soviet colony.”20 The Iraqi-Russian Treaty 
of Friendship of April 1972 fueled the Shah’s suspicion of a Moscow-Baghdad 
                                                
20 Alam, Assadollah. Yad’dashtha-ye ‘Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam 
Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. I: 1968-1970 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 1995). p. 71. 
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alignment.21 Indeed, he remained deeply concerned with Moscow’s political-military links 
with both the Arab regimes and militant non-state entities, like the Palestinian and Dhofar 
rebels in Oman.22 He considered the Soviet potential and intention in transforming the 
regional power arrangement at the expense of Iran through “a continuing use of state 
proxies against Tehran” and raising the military capability of Iran’s regional foes.23 
Massive influxes of Russian armament and financial aid to the Pan-Arab regimes and 
Moscow’s occasional threat of bringing their forces into play against Iran made the Red 
Threat an imminent danger to Iran. “Brezhnev begrudgingly warned me that conflicts in 
the Persian Gulf might lead to [the outbreak of] another world war,” the Shah explained 
his concern to Alam over Moscow’s siding with Baghdad against Iran.24 Second, in the 
Shah’s view, the Arab countries of the region were prone to the communist coups or 
revolutions. For the Shah, communism had contagious effects in the region. “Once you 
have a legal Communist government they penetrate everywhere,” the Shah told President 
Ford.25 In the Shah’s view, the Arab states were fake and weak; therefore, they would be 
toppled, sooner or later, and replaced with communist regimes. The formation of a 
communist regime in South Yemen in June 1969 reaffirmed his concerns.26 
                                                
21 Alam, Assadollah. Yad’dashtha-ye ‘Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam 
Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. II: 1970-1971 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 1995). p. 270. 
 
22 A secret U.S. State Department document, April 1974, Documents of the United States Embassy in Tehran, 
Volume 8, 1979, 65.   
23 A secret U.S. State Department document, April 1974, Documents of the United States Embassy in Tehran, 
Volume 8, 1979, 65. 
 
24 The Shah visited Moscow in June 1965. Alam, Assadollah. Yad’dashtha-ye ‘Alam: Virayesh va 
Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. IV: 1974-1975 
(Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 1995). p. 253. 
 
25 Memorandum of Conversation, May 15, 1975. (FRUS 1969-1974, XXVII, 377). 
 
26 Southern Yemen gained its independent initially under the name of the People’s Republic of Southern 
Yemen on 30 November 1967 under the control of the National Liberation Front (NLF). Two years later, 
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The Red Threat also endangered both state and regime survival in Iran. Iran’s 
historical multi-ethnic, multi-lingual society was a target for Russian communism. Since 
the dawn of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, Moscow had built its ties with non-Persian 
communities, particularly the Azaris and the Kurds. Both Azari and Kurdish elites had 
joined the communist, pro-Soviet parties of the Tudeh Party, Kurdistan Democratic Party, 
and Azarbaijan Democratic Party. Although the Soviet-fabricated republics of Azarbaijan 
and Mahabad did not last more than a year (December 1945-December 1946), the Shah 
never forgot the potential of communism in nurturing ethnic separatist groups against the 
Iranian state. Additionally, a deeply uneven distribution of wealth, extensive corruption, 
and the authoritarian political system of Pahlavi Iran produced a fertile ground for 
communist movements to target the Pahlavi regime. Founded in 1941, the Tudeh (People 
in Persian) Party was the most popular party in Iran’s modern history. Considering its broad 
support base and close affinity to Moscow, the Shah saw the Tudeh Party as the Russian 
fifth column with a questionable loyalty to Iran’s constitution. The Party had notoriously 
supported the Soviet demand for Iran’s oil in the Caspian Sea and sided with the separatist 
republics. Finally, after the coup pf 1953 the government cracked down the Party.  By the 
late 50s, Communism revived under the banner of militant groups, the Marxist Sazman-e 
Cherik’ha-ye Fada’i-ye Khalq (Organization of the Iranian People’s Sacrificing Guerrillas) 
and Islamist-Marxist Sazman-e Mojahedin-e Khalq-e Iran (Organization of the Iranian 
People’s Islamic Warriors). These groups took violent strategies in challenging the Shah’s 
regime. Until the end of the Shah’s reign, Communism remained as a robust domestic 
threat. 
                                                
however, a radical Marxist wing of the NLF transformed the country into a communist one and reorganized 
it as the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. 
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2. The Arab Threat 
Since the Arab Muslim conquest of Iran during 633-654 BC, Iran had been subject 
to the Arab Threat. Despite the Islamization of Iran, the country was never Arabized. By 
sticking to their strong civilization and the revival of the Persian language, Iranians 
remained Iranians. After two centuries of unstoppable riots and insurrection, Iran 
reemerged. With the establishment of the Safavid Empire in the early 16th century, Sunni-
Shia division was added to Iranian-Arab rivalry. Despite this historical background, Iran 
initially built friendly relations with newly-founded Arab states of the region. Nevertheless, 
the Arab Threat came to the scene with its geopolitical manifestation, Arab Unity, and its 
geocultural aspect, Pan-Arabism, in the early 50s.  
In the middle of the Cold War, Pan-Arabism was a major de-territorializing force, 
promising the unity of the Arab-speaking territories, stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to 
the Persian Gulf. Pan-Arabism was first coined by Jurji Zaydan and his Nahda movement 
in the late 19th century. Though popular since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire,27 it was 
under Gamal Abdel Nasser that Pan-Arabism swept the region. With the coup of 23 July 
1952, Nasser took power in Cairo and soon challenged the Western powers and their 
regional allies, particularly Iran.28 The Suez Crisis of 1956 immeasurably cemented his 
position in the Arab World. On 22 February 1958, the United Arab Republic (UAR) was 
founded out of Egypt and Syria. Nasser’s UAR was a catalyst for a series of destabilizing 
                                                
27 Pan-Arabism was first followed by Sharif Hussein ibn Ali, the Sharif of Mecca. Promised a support for the 
establishment of a unified Arab state, constituted of the Arab lands of the Ottoman Empire, he sided with the 
British military against Turks in the First World War. The idea of the unified Arab territories was then 
followed by his son, Abdullah I of Jordan who dreamed of Greater Syria of Syria, Jordan, and Palestine.  
 
28 The coup plotters initially appointed General Muhammad Naguib as the Egypt’s first president. However, 
it was soon revealed that the real leader of the revolution was Nasser. Conflict with Naguib over strategies 
soon resulted in his removal in October, 1954.  
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events in the region, like the first Lebanese Civil War of 1958 and the Iraqi coup of 14 July 
1958. Despite a growing tension between Baghdad and Nasser on the Arab leadership, the 
Arab Threat challenged Iran in the 60s and 70s.  
In the Shah’s view, Pan-Arabism was a naturally anti-Iranian ideology. First, the 
Shah considered the Pan-Arab regimes as the Soviet’s natural allies. In his view, Nasser 
and Pan-Arab leaders with their socialist background were Moscow’s surrogate to 
penetrate the Persian Gulf. After the Iraqi coup of 1958, the Shah faced the rise of 
Communism in Iraq.29 Second, Pan-Arabism was based on framing external threats to 
solidify the heterogeneity of Arab identities.30 For Pan Arab leaders, the enemy was 
Zionism and Western Imperialism. Arab historical suspicion of the West’s role in the 
creation of Israel and breaking-up of the Arab Unity had nurtured the anti-Western tone of 
Pan-Arabism.31 Within this context, Israel and pro-Western regimes, notably Iran, became 
targets for the Pan-Arab propaganda, denouncing Iran’s secret cooperation with Tel-Aviv 
as “a treacherous plot to divide the Arab World between themselves.”32 Third, Pan-
Arabism soon fell on an ethnic fault line of the Arab-Iranian and Shia-Sunni divisions. 
                                                
29 The headquarters of the Iranian Tudeh Party was in Sulaymaniya and Basra. Mosul hosted Turkish and 
Syrian communist parties, and the Jordanian Communist Party set it bases in Najaf and Karbala. SAVAK 
Documents, No. f-b2b2/15607, 6 February, 1960; SAVAK Documents, No. 7b4/8200, 13 December, 1958; 
SAVAK Documents, No Number. 
 
30 For more detailed discussions see Laclau, Ernesto. New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990; Laclau, Ernesto. The Making of Political Identities, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993; Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy: towards a Radical Democratic politics, Verso, 1985; Melucci, Alberto, Challenging 
Codes: Collective action in the information age, Cambridge University Press, 1996; Torfing, Jacob. 
Poststructuralist Discourse Theory: Foucault, Laclau, Mouffe, and Zizek, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005. 
 
31 Barnett, Michael N. Dialogues in Arab Politics. (Columbia University Press, October 15, 1998). pp.108–
29. 
 
32 Neda al-Watan, 22 March 1969. 
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Therefore, Iran’s border dispute with Iraq risked becoming a fiery conflict with all Arab 
states. According to the Iraqi leaders, war with Iran was a war with the enemy of the Arab. 
“Iraq is not fighting with Iran over one of the Iraqi issues; rather, its goal is to prevent 
Iran’s ambitions and to preserve the Arabness of the [Persian] Gulf and Arabs’ right in the 
Shatt al-Arab (Arvand Rud) waterway. Iraq is not fighting with Iran over an oil barrel; 
rather, it is doing to defend the Arab nations’ wealth of the [Persian Gulf].”33 Highlighting 
“the old alliance pact between Cyrus the Great and the Jews,”34 the Pan-Arab leaders of 
Baghdad had tried to legitimize Iraqi position within the Arab World by framing 
themselves as “the Guardian of the Eastern Gate of the Arab World.”35  
The Arab Threat also posed domestic dangers to Iran. Indeed, the Pan-Arab leaders 
were concerned about Arab-speaking people in non-Arab states of the region. Amidst the 
growing Iranian-Arab rivalry, Nasser, Iraqis, and other Pan-Arab leaders claimed the oil-
rich Iranian province of Khuzestan. With considerable Arab-speaking inhabitants, less than 
half of its population, Khuzestan soon became the primary target for Iraqi expansionist 
ambitions. Qasim called Khuzestan ‘Arabistan’ and Nasser named the Persian Gulf ‘the 
Arabian Gulf’. Iraqi leaders had also claimed that “Iraq is not fighting with Iran to liberate 
just an Iraqi territory from Iran’s occupation; rather, it is doing to preserve the [Persian] 
Gulf area from Iran’s occupation.”36 They stressed Iran’s “occupation of oil reserved, 
Arab-speaking province of Khuzestan and Mohammarah [Khoramshahr] and stealing our 
                                                
33 Kuwait 3511 to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 February 1975. 
 
34 Beirut 3506 to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 December 1971. 
 
35 Kuwait 9939-12352 to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 February 1975. 
 
36 Kuwait 3511 to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 February 1975. 
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[the Arab] oil.”37 Saddam Hussein clearly stated that “Iraq has not had a serious dispute 
with Iran over Shatt al-Arab (Arvand Rud) since this is part of Iraq’s soil. Iraq’s dispute 
with Iran is over Khuzestan that is part of Iraq’s soil and was annexed to Iran during foreign 
rule!”38 The alleged ‘Iranian Occupation’ aimed at painting Israel and Iran with the same 
brush--a claim that was frequently used by Pan-Arab leaders in the 60s and 70s.  
Iraq also supported several separatist and anti-Shah organizations. There were 
several, yet weak, Arab separatist groups, including Arabistan Liberation Front (ALF), the 
National Front for the Liberation of Arabistan, the Arab Gulf, and the Al-Ahwaz Liberation 
Front, all fabricated by Iraq.39 The Pan-Arab leaders of the region also conspired to raise 
trouble within other non-Persian communities in Iranian Kurdistan, Azarbaijan, and 
Baluchistan.40 Led by Panhah-Ali Khan Javanshir, the Sunni Baluchi tribes living in the 
south-east of Iran were among Iraqi targets. In the aftermath of the debacle of the Soviet-
fabricated Republic of Azarbaijan, a few of its leaders fled into exile to Iraq, particularly 
Mahmoud Panhaian.41 In the late 60s, Baghdad helped him to establish Jebhe-e Melli 
Khalq-ha (the National Front of People), a multi-ethnic party aiming to urge non-Persian 
elites to separate from Iran. Mohammad-Taghi Zehtabi and pro-Ayatollah Khomeini 
                                                
37 Neda al-Watan, 22 March 1969. 
 
38 Rajaiee, Farhang, The Iran-Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression. (University Press of Florida, April 20, 
1993), p. 12. 
 
39 Iraqi had also penetrated in the Arab-speaking community of Khuzestan. In the mid-60s, Iranian Arab-
speaking teachers, including Zariya Al-Mohiaddin, in Iraqi schools in Khorramshahr were in full connection 
with Iraqi Istikhbarat, aiming to urge anti-Iran sentiments among the Arab-speaking people. With Mossad 
direct intervention, SAVAK thwarted their plot. Interview with Major General Mansour Qadar, Oral History, 
Foundations for Iranian History. 
 
40 Abdulghani, Jasim, Iraq and Iran: The Years of Crisis. (The Johns Hopkins University Press, October 1, 
1984). p. 52.  
 
41 Panahian was Minister of War in the Soviet-fabricated republic of Azarbaijan. 
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Mahmoud Doaie also cooperated with Panahian in Radio Baghdad.42 Both Nasser and Iraqi 
leaders unsuccessfully tried to urge the Iranian Kurds, particularly the Jawanrodi, against 
Tehran.43 In addition to supporting separatist groups, Iraqi regimes had backed Iranian 
dissidents, like anti-Shah Teymour Bakhtiar, former Director of SAVAK. Nasser also 
backed Sazeman-e Makhsus-e Eettehad va Amal (Special Organization for Unity and 
Action or SAMA), founded by religious elements of the Iran’s National Front. Although 
the Arab Threat was damaged after the Six Day War of 1967, it was revived with the 
formation of the Baath regimes in Baghdad and remained a significant threat to Iran’s 
security and interest until the debacle of the Pahlavi dynasty. 
3. The Kurdish Threat 
Since the formation of the Soviet-backed Mahabad Republic (1945-6), the Shah 
had been considerably worried about the Kurdish Threat. Despite the execution of its 
separatist leader--Qazi Mohammad--44 the Republic of Mahabad had provided a master 
frame for the Kurdish separatist groups in Iran and in turn, intensified the Shah’s suspicion 
of the Kurdish movements in the region. The outbreak of the Kurdish War in the north of 
Iraq in 1961 was a double-edged sword for Iran. Indeed, Iran sided with the Iraqi Kurds in 
order to contain Pan-Arab Iraq. On the other hand, the Shah was worried about the spillover 
of the Iraqi Kurdish insurgency into Iranian Kurdistan.45 Indeed, the Shah never supported 
                                                
42 Zehtabi was the main ideologue of Pan-Turkism in Iran. Doaie has been a reformist clergy and editor-in-
chief of Ettelaat Newspaper since 1994. 
 
43 SAVAK Documents, No. A/316/23010, 1 September 1964, and SAVAK Documents, No. 2399, 10 
September 1966. 
 
44 There were some strong documents stating that the Shah did not agree with Qazi’s execution. It was general 
Haj-Ali Razmara, then-prime minister, who oredered the execution of Qazi. 
 
45 SAVAK Documents, 311/185-2-d, 6 May, 1962; SAVAK Documents, 331/21715, 28 August, 1963. 
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the idea of an independent Kurdistan in the region. The Iranian Kurds soon expressed their 
support for Barzani and his Peshmerga.46 Several Iranian Kurds in Mahabad and Sanandaj, 
as well as the Javanroudis tribe, joined a pro-Barzani party, Kurd Population (Jamiat-e 
Kurd), in Iranian Kurdistan.47 Seyed Abdullah Es’haghi (known as Ahmad Tawfiq), the 
leader of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI), had pressed Barzani to support 
the Iranian Kurds while at the same time urged Iranian Kurds in Mahabad to launch a riot 
against Tehran. Besides, the outbreak of the war in the north of Iraq endangered Iran’s 
national security with a massive influx of the Kurdish refugees crossing the border with 
Iran. According to SAVAK, Barzani had asked the Kurdish refugees to stay in Iran since 
they could function for his propaganda against Iran.48 Despite such a broad base of support 
among the Iranian Kurds, the Iraqi Kurd leaders were divided on the support for other 
Kurdish communities. With increasing dependency on Iran’s support in their conflict with 
Baghdad, Barzani gradually abandoned supporting the Iranian Kurds. In the late-60s, he 
killed members of the anti-Iran Revolutionary Committee, aka the KAK, and handed their 
bodies to SAVAK.49 
The Shah was also worried about Kurdish-Russian connections. It was Stalin and 
his agent Mir Ja’far Baghirov, the communist leader of Azerbaijan SSR (1932-1953), who 
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really fabricated the republics of Azarbaijan and Mahabad.50 With this historical 
background in mind, the Shah considered the Kurdish Threat naturally interwoven with the 
Red Threat. In addition to Ja’far Pishevari and Qazi Muhammad, leaders of ethnic republics 
in Iran, Barzani had an extensive tie with Moscow. Barzani believed that an independent, 
united Kurdistan compared of Kurdish parts of Turkey, Iraq and Iran could be established 
only by the Russians’ support.51 During his exile in Moscow for more than thirteen years 
under the surname Mamedov, Barzani had been connected with the Russian Red Army and 
the KGB and gained a certificate from the Higher Party School.52 Even after the rise of the 
Kurdish insurgency, Tehran had been suspicious of Moscow’s support for Barzani.53 
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Although Barzani never became a communist,54 and Moscow never fully backed the 
Kurds,55 the Shah was permanently worried about the creation of a Soviet-backed 
Kurdistan.   
Tehran was also already disturbed by the secret ties between Iraqi Kurds and Cairo. 
Indeed, a possible independent Kurdistan could provide an opportunity for Egypt to 
infiltrate Iran’s western borders. Months before the outbreak of the Kurdish War of 1961, 
the UAR officials had tried to side with the Iraqi Kurds. General Hakim Amer, the chief of 
Syrian Army, met both the Russians and Barzani to express his support for the creation of 
an independent Kurdistan in Iraq.56 This was a manifestation of a tripartite alliance of the 
Red/the Arab/the Kurd threats to Iran’s national security. In the middle of fighting with 
Qasim, Barzani had dispatched Hahzhar Mukriani to the Egyptian embassy in Baghdad in 
spring 1962. “I went to Baghdad to talk to Egypt ambassador to Baghdad. I initially offered 
them to make a coup in Iran or at least to begin a war with Iran in Iranian Kurdistan. I also 
added that Egypt should give us some tanks and planes along with weapons to launch an 
effective military operation in Iran and weaken the pivot of the CENTO Pact.”57 Despite 
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Iran’s heavy support for the Iraqi Kurds, Barzani maintained “friendly but unhelpful”58 
contacts with Cairo in the mid-60s. Indeed, SAVAK had been well aware of Nasser’s 
promise of support for “an autonomous, even independent, Kurdistan.”59 Egypt’s on-and-
off support for Barzani finally ended with Nasser’s fiasco in the Six-Day War of 1967.60  
The Shah was also perturbed by Barzani’s unreliable personality. Considering his 
increasing “popularity” among other Kurds after the outbreak of the movement,61 the fate 
of the Kurdish uprising lay in his hands. Despite the Kurdish-Iranian alliance against 
Baghdad, Barzani never showed his total loyalty to the Shah. His drastic shift towards 
Baghdad on several occasions, like the ceasefire of 1964, reaffirmed that he was not a 
reliable ally for Iran. Indeed, Barzani was a pragmatist leader seeking a balance between 
Iran and other powers, like the Soviet and Egypt, to gain more concessions.62 As SAVAK 
rightly argued, “Mullah is an ambitious man” who was “neither Communist nor Pro-West; 
rather, he is a Barzani Kurd.”63 In the Shah’s view, Barzani was an opportunist leader who 
prioritized his personal interest over the Kurds and Iran. Thus, Tehran supported anti-
Barzani’s figures, like Ahmad and Talabani, to counter-balance Barzani’s position in Iraqi 
Kurdistan.64 Despite Iran’s support for the Iraqi Kurds, the spillover of an independent 
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Kurdistan in the north of Iraq into Iranian Kurdistan, Mullah Mustafa Barzani’s connection 
with Moscow and Cairo, and his unreliability intensified the Kurdish Threat to Iran’s 
national security.     
4. The Black Threat 
Islamism, the Black Threat, challenged the Pahlavi regime after the mid-60s. Along 
with Egypt and Turkey, Iran had been a pivotal center for the Islamic Movement in the late 
19th century. Sharing common issues with Islamic Revivalism, Islamism gradually gained 
ascendence after World War II. As Pan-Arabism declined after the fiasco of 1967, the 
Islamic revivalism gradually emerged as an alternative mobilizing ideology in the region 
with a potential to unite the Islamic World around the nodal point of ‘Islam’.65 In the 
aftermath of the Shah’s proclaimed White Revolution in January 1963, Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini lashed out at the regime for its westernization program. In June 1963, Ayatollah 
Khomeini was finally arrested after a fiery anti-Shah speech, leading to bloody riots. The 
Islamic uprising was violently cracked down, though. The Shah then tightened the political 
atmosphere, banned moderate opposition groups, and limited Shia Ayatollahs’ political 
activities. Nevertheless, the Iranian dissidents became more radicalized. Despite the 
growing emergence of Left-oriented militant groups in the world, Islamist groups gradually 
and successfully spreaded their ideology in Iran. As a pro-Mossadegh party, the Freedom 
Movement of Iran (FMI) became a major national-religious force in Iran. Influenced by 
Ali Shariati, the main ideologue of the Islamic Revolution, the lslamist Sazman-e 
Mojahedin-e Khalq-e Iran (the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran or MEK) was 
established as one of the most influential militant groups throughout the 70s. It was within 
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this context that the Shah coined an ‘Unholy Alliance of Erteja’a-e Sorkh va Siah’ (the Red 
and the Black Backwardness). The Red and the Black, according to the Shah, referred to 
the guerrilla oppositions’ eclectic ideology of Revolutionary Islam with Marxism. Despite 
the rising popularity of the FMI and the Mojahedin, it was Ayatollah Khomeini and his 
followers who successfully announced a politicized interpretation of Shia Islam. By the 
mid-70s, Islamism had been the strongest anti-Shah ideology in Iran. 
The main bridgeheads of the FMI, the Mojahedin, and pro-Ayatollah Khomeini 
elements were in the Arab countries of the region, including Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and 
particularly Lebanon. In the Shah’s threat assessment, Baghdad’s hosting of Iranian 
Islamist elements was an ominous alliance of Pan-Arabism and Islamism. These groups 
also found Lebanon a heaven for waging their anti-Tehran struggle that in turn, damaged 
Iran’s ties with the Lebanese Shia. Besides, Sadr’s strong streak of ecumenist messages 
was based on the revival of Islam and the unity among the Islamic World. With his on-and-
off connections with the Iranian Islamist opposition, Pahlavi Tehran ultimately 
transformed its policy towards the Lebanese Shia. Sadr’s support for the Palestinians was 
also framed as an example of rising Islamism backed by radical left groups. It was another 
manifestation of an unholy alliance of the Red and the Black. The Black Threat ultimately 
overthrew the Pahlavi regime in the Islamic Revolution of 1979. 
5. The Palestine Threat 
Contrary to popular perception, the Shah was not against the idea of Palestine. The 
Shah had rightly predicted that the creation of a Jewish state in the Middle East “would 
lead to decades, if not centuries, of violence.”66 Since the dawn of the crisis, he had put 
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emphasis on the formation of a ‘single federal state’ including both the Arab and the Jews. 
Tehran, in fact, voted in UN against the partition of Palestine,67 and refused to formally 
recognize Israel. Nevertheless, the unstable power equation of the region fed the Shah’s 
controversial view towards the conflict.  
Though remote, the durability of Israeli-Palestinian conflict provided a geocultural 
threat to Iran. The Palestine Cause fueled the three threats of the Arab, the Black, and the 
Red to Iran. First, Tehran’s informal alignment with Israel had damaged Iran’s image 
among the Arabs.68 In July 1960, the Shah stated that “Iran has recognized Israel long ago,” 
pointing to Tehran’s de facto recognition of Israel in 1951.69 His reckless interview gave 
Nasser a pretext to cut off diplomatic relations with Tehran. Framing the Shah as a pro-
Israeli puppet of the Western Imperialism, Nasser pushed the Arab regimes to change their 
relations with Iran. The Iraqi leaders had also taken the same language against Iran and 
criticized Iran’s economic relations with Israel.70 Second, the Shah was concerned about 
the Palestinians connections with the Soviets. In December 1974, the Shah expressed his 
sympathy with the Palestinian in an interview with the Lebanese newspaper, al-Hawadis, 
while warning “What I fear is that the Palestinians may allow international circumstances 
to make their cause a tool of Soviet or some other international strategy.”71 For the Shah, 
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the Palestinian cause had been a source of regional instability that provided Moscow with 
an opportunity to infiltrate the Middle East. Third, the Islamist leaders had considered the 
Palestine cause a symbol of the oppression of the Muslim. Sadr’s Islamic message for the 
support of the Palestinians had tremendous ramifications for Iran’s non-state foreign policy 
in Lebanon. More substantially, the Palestine had urged the Iranian Islamist groups, like 
pro-Ayatollah Khomeini’s elements, the FMI, and the Mujahedin, to challenge Tehran. 
Furthermore, the Palestinian militancy struggle had inspired anti-Shah dissidents, 
both Marxist and Islamist, in choosing violent strategies against the Pahlavi regime. The 
Shah had warned of dangerous connections between the Palestinian groups and Leftist-
Islamist Iranians, stating that “… some of the groups of the resistance trained Iranian 
saboteurs to infiltrate our territory, kill our people, and blow up various installations...”72 
Within this context, controlling and monitoring relations between Iranian dissidents with 
the Palestinian was among Tehran’s goals in the region.  
 
Consequently, Iran’s non-state foreign policy under the Shah’s reign was heavily 
shaped by both geopolitical and geocultural threats, interplaying on three levels 
international, regional, and domestic. Iran’s non-state foreign policy was, in fact, forged to 
limit threats to Iran. Interplaying in geopolitical and geocultural domains, international 
threat of the Red had the spillover effects on both regional and domestic levels. The 
regional threats by the Arabs, the Kurds, and Palestinian issue had spillover effects on the 
domestic level. This complex of geopolitical-geocultural threats shaped the trajectory of 
Iran’s non-state foreign policy under the Shah’s reign (Table 1). 
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Table 1: Threats in a tripartite domain and level 
Levels\\\ 
Domains 
Geopolitics  Geoculture  Geoeconomics  
International  Russian 
expansionism  
Communism  …… 
Regional  Arab Unity 
Greater Kurdistan 
The Palestine  
Pan-Arabism 
Kurdish 
Nationalism 
…….. 
…… 
Domestic  …….. Islamism ….. 
 
B. Opportunities 
“The White House should push the regional powers that had the ability to uphold stability to take on a greater 
role in security matters. It is better for [the] U.S. to have Iran able to defend [it]self than to have... another 
Vietnam,” the Shah advised Richard Nixon.73  
 
I like him [the Shah], I like him, and I like the country[Iran]. And some of those other bastards out there I 
don’t like,” President Nixon told his advisers.74 
 
In addition to threats, there were international and regional opportunities that 
facilitated Iran’s non-state foreign policy. These opportunities included major strategies 
and policies taken by Iran’s allies during the Cold War, i.e., the U.S., Israel, and the UK. 
They created fertile ground for Iran to build and expand its networks with the Lebanese 
Shia and particularly the Iraqi Kurds.  
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1. The U.S., Zero-Sum Nature of the Cold War, and the Nixon Doctrine  
The trajectory of Iran’s non-state foreign policy under the Shah’s reign was affected 
by U.S. Cold War strategies. Although the U.S. initially had no interest in the Middle 
Eastern conflicts, it was gradually dragged into the regional crises by the all-encompassing 
zero-sum nature of the Cold War. The U.S. central goals were designed to counter the 
Soviet incursion and domination of the oil sources through the support for anti-leftist 
autocrats in the region. Therefore, the U.S. was not strictly scrupulous about the ideology 
of its allies as long as they stayed non-communist. 
Interestingly, the Iran Crisis of 1946 and the formation of the Soviet-backed 
republics of Azarbaijan and Mahabad in the north-western of Iran was the dawn of the Cold 
War. Israel’s defeat of the Arab armies in 1948 and then Iran’s Nationalization Oil 
Movement in 1951-53 accelerated the U.S. intervention in the region. Fueled by the Suez 
Canal crisis of 1956, the Eisenhower Doctrine institutionalized Secretary Dulles’s term for 
the ‘Northern Tier’ states through the establishment of the Baghdad Pact to contain the 
Soviets. Nevertheless, the Pact collapsed with the Iraqi coup of 1958. The new Iraqi regime 
adopted a pro-Soviet policy. Indeed, Iraq’s geostrategic position at the heart of the region 
made it a target of Moscow hoping to leapfrog over the West’s containment shield in the 
Levant and the Persian Gulf. Within the zero-sum nature of the Cold War, Iraq’s warming 
relation with Moscow was considered as Iraqi drift into the orbit of Russian influence.75 It 
was within this context that the Shah crafted ties with the Iraqi Kurds. Although the U.S. 
did not welcome the Kurdish War in the early 60s, the Cold War context provided Iran 
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with an ample opportunity to justify its support for the Iraqi Kurds to block the Soviet 
infiltration. 
In the mid-60s, the U.S. refused to join Iran in its support of the Iraqi Kurds against 
Baghdad. Under the anticommunist Baath-Arif regime in Baghdad, the Kurdish War was 
framed as “strictly an internal manner” by U.S. officials.76 Nevertheless, this policy was 
gradually abandoned in the late-60s. On 25 July 1969, President Nixon announced that the 
U.S. “must avoid the kind of policy that will make countries in Asia so dependent upon us 
that we are dragged into conflicts such as the one we have in Vietnam… except for the 
threat of a major power involving nuclear weapons … the United States is going to 
encourage and has a right to expect that this problem will be handled by, and responsibility 
for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves.”77 According to the Nixon Doctrine, the U.S. 
regional allies, including Iran, would be provided with military and financial aid to contain 
the Soviet and its satellites in the Third World without U.S. direct intervention. As Nixon 
clearly outlined, “what happens in those parts of the world is not, in the final analysis, 
going to have any significant effect on the success of our foreign policy in the foreseeable 
future.”78 Interestingly, it seems that Nixon’s visits to Tehran, December 1953 and April 
1967, planted the seeds of the Nixon Doctrine.79 
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The Nixon Doctrine was, in fact, intertwined with both Nixon-Kissinger plans for 
the superpower détente and a rapprochement with China. The Moscow Summit of 1972 
transformed superpower relations from containment to détente and recognized a peaceful, 
yet competitive, superpower coexistence. The Shah initially considered détente as a fertile 
ground for growing the Soviet threat. “The Shah takes a close interest in our détente with 
the USSR and the possibility that it might free Soviet resources for the Middle East. …The 
Shah remains concerned by the potential for instability—and Soviet Exploitation of it—in 
neighboring countries.”80 As time wore on, he perceived an opportunity with détente. 
During Tehran Summit of 1972, Nixon told the Shah, “Don’t look at détente as something 
that weakens you but as a way for the United States to gain influence.”81 Astutely 
employing the Nixon Doctrine language, the Shah replied that the U.S. should “have the 
right allies . . . If they are self-reliant they will welcome it. If they have the principle of 
fighting until the last American they will not welcome it … Iran, like Israel, must be able 
to stand alone.”82 Détente ultimately recognized Iran’s ambitions and facilitated the Shah 
to adopt a more independent path in Iran’s regional policy.  
Besides, President Nixon had built a special relation with the Shah. Nixon had 
found his personal characteristics in the Shah: brutally pragmatist and harshly anti-
communist. Both men were fond of realpolitik and saw themselves as geopolitical 
mastermind leaders. “I like him [the Shah], I like him, and I like the country[Iran]. And 
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some of those other bastards out there I don’t like,” Nixon told his advisers.83 No foreign 
leader praised his relation with an Iranian leader in the way President Nixon did. Indeed, 
Nixon saw Iraq and the Persian Gulf through the Shah’s eyes. “As you know, your thoughts 
and mine coincide at many points on this subject, and a number of the positions I expressed 
during my Asian trip last summer--as you have noted--would apply to the problems in your 
region as well.”84 The Shah had also pointed that Kissinger’s “geopolitical ideas coincided 
perfectly with mine.”85 Such deep thoughts-and-minds-coincidence ultimately led to the 
approval of the National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 92 on 7 November 
1970 that recognized “the preponderance of Iranian power” in the Persian Gulf.86 Given 
the fact that Iran was “the most powerful and most stable state in the area,”87 NSDM 92 
approved Iran as “the preponderant power in the [Persian] Gulf.”88 Although Nixon 
rhetorically stressed Saudi-Iranian cooperation, “the Saudi pillar” was “a nominal pillar 
there for obvious necessary regional political reasons.”89 The core assumption of the Nixon 
Doctrine in the area lay “in marrying what is already, in fact, extensive support for Iran as 
the unquestioned power in the area with the logic of cooperation between a strong Iran and 
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a weak Saudi Arabia.”90 The Nixon Doctrine abandoned the Twin Pillars policy and 
acknowledged Iran as the sole pillar in the Persian Gulf. 
The Nixon Doctrine also gave Iran a fertile ground to act as the U.S. major Cold 
War partner in the region. Nixon had told the Shah that “I see the world and the part Iran 
plays pretty much as you do.”91 His recognition of Iran’s regional preponderance brought 
up the necessity of providing Iran with massive military aid. Subtly taking the language of 
the Nixon Doctrine, the Shah believed that Iran “must have an ‘over-kill’ capability so that 
should anyone be tempted to attack Iran they would think twice or even three times.”92 
Nixon finally gave Iran a blank card on the purchase of almost all non-nuclear U.S. arms 
during Tehran Summit of May 1972.93  
More substantially, the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine entailed backing 
Iran’s non-state foreign policy. At the Tehran Summit, Nixon finally authorized a covert 
CIA cooperation with SAVAK to support the Iraqi Kurds in order to paralyze Baghdad and 
decelerate Moscow’s rising influence in Iraq. SAVAK-CIA-Mossad cooperation 
successfully tied down 80% of the Iraqi army and disabled Iraqi power projection in the 
Persian Gulf.94 Indeed, the cooperation soon became the major manifestation of the Nixon 
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http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/ NSAEBB21/03-01.htm. 
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41 
 
Doctrine in recognition of Iran’s non-state foreign policy. In contrast to Johnson’s “policy 
of detached friendliness” towards Baghdad, 95 President Nixon drew the U.S. into the 
Kurdish War “primarily as a favor” to the Shah.96 Indeed, CIA cooperation with SAVAK 
in Iraqi Kurdistan was, according to the Pike Committee, explained by the fact that the U.S. 
“national interest had thus become effectively meshed with his [the Shah’s].”97 
In the aftermath of the Tehran Summit of 1972, the U.S. considered the Kurdish 
War as a new front in the Cold War struggle with the Kremlin, rather than a regional 
competition between Tehran and Baghdad or local fighting between Baghdad and the 
Kurds. Framed within the context of the Cold War logic of the zero-sum game, Kissinger 
intended to make the Kurdish War a “bottomless pit” and an “open wound” for the Soviets. 
He wanted pro-Soviet Arab regimes to understand that “they cannot get a free ride by 
linking up with the Soviet Union.”98 “If we could get the Soviets to suffer a misadventure 
in Iraq it would curb the Soviet appetite in the Middle East”, Kissinger argued.99 It was a 
pure logical extension of the broader Cold War politics over crises in the Middle East that 
in return, facilitated Iran’s non-state foreign policy.  
2. Israel and the Doctrine of Periphery 
The origin of the Doctrine of Periphery or Peripheral Strategy dated back to the late 
30s. As a lonely Jewish state in a sea of hostile arab countries, Israel needed to develop 
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96 Memconn, July 23, 1973, (FRUS 1969-1976, XXVII, 24.) 
 
97 United States Congress, House Select Committee on Intelligence, CIA: The Pike Report. (Nottingham, 
England: Spokesman Books, 1977). p. 198. 
 
98 Memcon, July 23, 1973, (FRUS 1969-1976, XXVII, 24). 
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strategic partnership with the non-Arab states of encircling the Arab world, i.e., Iran, 
Turkey, and Ethiopia, as well as non-Arab minorities within the Arab World, including the 
Lebanese Maronites, the Kurds, and even the Coptic community in Egypt. Before the rise 
of Seyyed Musa Sadr, the Lebanese Shia minority had been among Israeli targets. Iran 
needed Israel, though Israel was not equally important to Iran. In the mid-50s, the Shah 
was seeking Israeli technology as well as the Jewish lobby in the U.S. to contain the Soviet.  
As time wore on, Pan-Arab regimes of the region came to play a greater role in 
Iran-Israel relations. The Iraqi coup of 1958 led Israel to formalize the Doctrine of 
Periphery through the establishment of formal trilateral intelligence sharing—the Trident-
-with Ankara and Tehran in 1958. Trident involved semi-annual meetings of the three 
countries’ intelligence Directors of SAVAK, Mossad, and MIT to constantly monitor 
Soviet-Egyptian-Iraqi military cooperation.100 Indeed, the foundation of Iran-Israel entente 
was predicated less on the non-Arab makeup of the two countries against the Arab regimes 
rather than their common threat assessment and the logic of the balance of power. On the 
one hand, a non-Arab, anti-Moscow state in the region could divert Baghdad and Cairo 
away from Iran’s west and the Persian Gulf. On the other hand, a strong Iran would prevent 
freeing up Baghdad to join Arab armies against Israel. Although Iran never recognized 
Israel, the Shah considered relation with Israel as a strategic one. “We do not like their 
[Israeli] policy in occupying Arab territories and we have announced this issue officially 
several times; however, we are happy of [Israelis] in putting Arab regimes in their places. 
                                                
100 Military Attaché Report 196-45 from captain Archibald B. Roosevelt, Jr. (Baghdad), “Tribal Revolt in 
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[Therefore] It would be nonsense to support [officially] Israel’s policies.”101 In addition to 
Trident,102 the Pan-Arab Iraq of the 60s and the 70s brought up the Iranian-Israeli-Kurdish 
alliance. The Kurds were the most populous non-Arab, stateless minority and had been 
fighting with Baghdad since World War I. Furthermore, the geostrategic location of land-
locked Kurdish territories in Iraq and Syria provided a strategic base for Israel.103 In 
addition to SAVAK, the Israelis played a partial key role in convincing the Shah to side 
with the Iraqi Kurds. In the course of the Kurdish War, Iran provided a land corridor to the 
Israelis “for special subversive and terrorist operations in Iraq.”104 SAVAK worked with 
Mossad in the establishment of a Kurdish intelligence organization--the Parastin--in order 
to collect military intelligence on the Iraqi Army. An Iran-Israel-Iraqi Kurds alliance 
remained until 1975 when Tehran signed the Algiers Accord. Nevertheless, the Shah’s 
swift pullout from northern Iraq did not weaken the continuity of the Iran-Israeli alliance 
since Iran was the cornerstone of the Israeli Doctrine of Periphery.  
3. The British Withdrawal from East of Suez 
                                                
101 Alam, Assadollah. Yad’dashtha-ye ‘Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam 
Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. I: 1968-1970 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 1995). p. 196. 
102 The Tehran-Tel-Aviv alliance was also coupled with strategic cooperation in other domains, including the 
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In January 1968, the UK surprisingly announced the withdrawal of its army from 
‘East of Suez’ by the end of 1971. The decision stemmed from Britain’s declining power 
in the post-World War II era. The shocking fall of Singapore to the militant Japanese in the 
heat of World War II and then Indian (India and Pakistan) Independence in 1947 had 
weakened awe of the Britain Empire. The Suez Crisis of 1956 hammered the last nail in 
the coffin of British economic and military power and brought about a financial crisis. In 
January 1968, Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Defense Secretary Denis Healey 
announced the withdrawal of the British army from major UK military bases. Despite U.S. 
heavy lobbying to dissuade London from its announcement, the British withdrawal was an 
“irreversible decision.”105  
Contrary to popular perceptions, Britain’s withdrawal weakened the U.S. Twin 
Pillars policy in the Persian Gulf.106 The policy had been rooted in London’s strategy in 
the post-World War II. Earlier, in the late 19th century, the Persian Gulf had become a 
British Lake. In the wake of the Withdrawal Announcement, London convinced the Arab 
sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf to establish a single federation in order to contain the 
ensuing Soviet influence in the area.107 More importantly, the UK fabricated a policy based 
on a power equilibrium between Tehran and Riyadh to prevent both countries’ supremacy 
                                                
105 In the meeting with British Foreign Secretary George Brown, Secretary Rusk underlined the significance 
of the UK presence in the Middle East and warned the possible threat of Russian infiltration in the region to 
fill the power vacuum created by the British departure. Rusk even begged the British officials to “for God’s 
sake, act like Britain!” See Memorandum, Battle to Rusk, “British Plans to Accelerate Withdrawal of Military 
Presence from the Persian Gulf: Your Meeting with Foreign Secretary Brown, January 11,” January 9, 1968 
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in the area. The Johnson Administration inherited the British Twin Pillars policy. Despite 
the Shah’s constant pressure, the U.S. stuck to the Twin Pillars policy and encouraged both 
states to cooperate in the region.108  
Nevertheless, the Nixon Doctrine provided Iran with an opportunity to fill the 
power vacuum in the Persian Gulf. Lobbying from 1969 to 1972, the Shah pressed the U.S. 
to leave the unnatural power equilibrium in the Persian Gulf. The Shah argued that the best 
strategy for the U.S. was to provide Iran a context to “stand by itself if necessary.”109 He 
also warned the U.S. Ambassador MacArthur, “Who else in the area can supply a credible 
military deterrent in the Persian Gulf? Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the small weak the [Persian] 
Gulf States? Of course not.”110 At the same time, however, he was worried about both 
British secret plans against Iran. “The Shah ordered me to tell the UK ambassador [to 
Tehran] to wake up their mind. I responded that the British might be worried about us and 
want to obstruct. He confirmed it. They do not want to see the Persian Gulf in Iran’s full 
control.”111 He also warned that “We will not permit the replacement of the UK navy with 
the U.S. navy in maintaining [security of] Bahrain…If the Americans do not give us 
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weapons, we will buy them from the Russians.”112 At the end, he successfully convinced 
Nixon to accept the Persian Gulf as a “Persian Lake.”113 
The British withdrawal shifted Iran’s non-state foreign policy, particularly towards 
the Iraqi Kurds, in two directions. First, the British withdrawal meant that the Persian Gulf 
states had to fend for security on their own. It provided Iran with an opportunity to expand 
its role in the Persian Gulf. For the Shah, the Persian Gulf was Iran’s backyard and, 
therefore, critical to its national security. With the UK withdrawal from East of Suez, the 
Shah tried to frame Iran as an independent state that could guard the Persian Gulf shores. 
In March 1969 in an interview with the New York Times, he self-confidently argued that 
“the Americans should be thankful that we do not permit external power’s entrance to the 
Persian Gulf. The U.S. should be thankful that there is a country who does not rely on 
anybody else and will not surrender.” The White House ultimately welcomed his decision. 
According to Kissinger, “the vacuum left by British withdrawal, now menaced by the 
Soviet intrusion and radical momentum, would be filled by a local power friendly to us 
[that meant Iran].”114 The power vacuum in the Persian Gulf provided a common threat 
assessment and deepened cooperation in the region, including in Iraqi Kurdistan. Second, 
Iran’s power projection in the Persian Gulf alerted Baghdad. On 30 November 1971, 
Iranian troops were deployed on geo-strategically located islands of Abu Musa and the 
Tunbs in the Persian Gulf. While these islands were historically parts of Iran, the 
sheikhdoms of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah claimed their sovereignty over them. Iraq’s 
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harsh reactions to Iran’s move convinced the Shah to intensify his support for the Iraqi 
Kurds. It was within this context that the Shah framed the Baghdad-Moscow warming 
relation as an existential threat to the U.S. Cold War policy. The British withdrawal 
accelerated the U.S. dependence on Iran, rather than the other way around and convinced 
the White House to side with Iran’s non-state foreign policy in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
 
The U.S. Cold War policy to contain the Soviet and its allies in the region, the 
Nixon Doctrine, the Israeli Doctrine of Periphery, and the UK withdrawal from the East of 
Suez all provided opportunities for the formation and expansion of Iran’s non-state foreign 
policy, particularly in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
 
C. Institutions 
“The Shah is a tough, unemotional, and able guy. He has a geopolitical view.”115  
 
-Colonel Isa Pejman: “Your Majesty, please forget it. The zeitgeist and regional context have been completely 
transformed.”116 
 
“I asked the Shah to build a hospital for the Shia. Then, we can build a university for them, too. The Shah 
agreed. But Qadar attempted to dissuade the Shah,” Seyyed Musa Sadr told Ehsan Naraghi.117 
 
The continuity and change in the evolution of the Iran’s non-state foreign policy 
towards the Iraqi Kurds and the Lebanese Shia were shaped by the specific interactions 
among political institutions in Iran. In contrast to the mainstream literature on Pahlavi 
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Iran’s foreign policy that overemphasized the Shah’s role as Iran’s foreign policy 
custodian, there were major political institutions, including SAVAK, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Iranian Army, and Religious networks, that played key roles in shaping 
the trajectory of Iran’s non-state foreign policy. 
1. The Shah  
Pre-revolutionary Iran’s foreign policy has been heavily framed as the Shah’s 
personal foreign policy. Indeed, the Shah’s major preoccupation during his reign was the 
army and foreign policy. He had criticized his father, Reza Shah, for lack of flexibility in 
foreign policy and “working with the foreigners.”118 Iran’s non-state foreign policy was, in 
fact, a major manifestation of the Shah’s flexible foreign policy.  
During the 40s and early 50s, the Shah stayed out of foreign policy decision-making 
processes. As time wore on, particularly after the coup of 1953, the Shah became 
increasingly involved in micromanaging both domestic and foreign affairs. “The Shah rules 
as well as he reigns. He makes all the important and many unimportant decisions for the 
government of Iran.”119 With Iran’s rising power and wealth in the early-70s, the Shah 
became increasingly arrogant. He saw himself as a geopolitical mastermind who forced the 
Middle Eastern states to recognize Iran as a paramount power in the region in less than 
three decades. For such a man who single-handedly, as he thought, transformed a backward 
developing state in the chaotic region into a modern industrial regional power, an appetite 
for more power rose.  
                                                
118 Alam, Assadollah. Yad’dashtha-ye ‘Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam 
Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. III: 1974-75 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 1995), p. 62. 
 
119 Department of State, Scope Paper, August 15, 1967. Available at the National Security Archive.  
49 
 
In reality, some of the Shah’s advisers were aware of dangerous consequences of 
his decisions. However, nobody dared to challenge his decisions. The Shah was, in fact, 
suspicious of his experts, calling them as illegible intellectuals. In a meeting with 
Kissinger, he said that “the intellectuals will destroy the world without knowing how to 
replace it. They do not have a plan. They would be street cleaners in a Communist 
regime.”120 Stressing on a natural interconnection between intellectuals and communists, 
the Shah claimed that the “intellectuals will win over the world without creating a better 
one, because when they destroy it the Communists will take it over.”121 Within a highly 
circumscribed publicly political environment, there was neither public debate over foreign 
policy issues nor any apparent and credible mechanism to correct errors, beyond the Shah’s 
own perceptions. The failure to consult with Iranian officials fit his autocratic rule. It 
surprisingly stood in sharp contrast to the Shah’s lack of self-confidence in the middle of 
domestic crises, particularly the Oil Nationalization era and the Islamic Revolution.  
By the mid-70s, the Shah had near-absolute free rein in Iran’s domestic and foreign 
policy and had become a one-man government. In January 1973, the U.S. embassy in 
Tehran assessed that the Shah was “standing astride the Iranian political scene like a 
colossus, with all the reins of power in his hands and his admitting of no rival.... total 
success has enhanced his prestige and underlined his multifaceted position as stern ruler, 
national guide and mentor, remote but omniscient father-figure arid, to some, reactionary 
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oppressor and destroyer of individual liberties.”122 It was within this context that the Shah 
cut Iran’s support for the Iraqi Kurds and the Lebanese Shia.  
2. SAVAK 
 Under the Shah’s reign, one of the most important institutions that conducted Iran’s 
non-state foreign policy was Sazeman-e Ettela’at Va Amniyat-e Keshvar (the National 
Intelligence and Security Organization or SAVAK). Officially established in 1957 with the 
help of the CIA and Mossad, SAVAK successfully suppressed the Shah’s opponents, 
especially the Marxist Tudeh Party and the pro-Mosaddegh National Front. According to 
General Hossein Fardoust,123 “After the coup of 1953, the Americans decided to keep Iran 
as their major base in the region. Thus, they established Iran Army Counterintelligence and 
then SAVAK.”124 Headed first by general Teymour Bakhtiar, military governor of Tehran 
in December 1953, SAVAK expanded its initial nucleus of a new intelligence organization 
and conducted training for its members in basic intelligence techniques. The Shah 
personally controlled SAVAK, though SAVAK directors were nominally under the prime 
minister’s authority. According to Fardoust, “SAVAK had two functions of both 
‘Intelligence’ (related to external issues) and ‘Security’ (related to internal issues).”125 
Constituted of ten different offices, SAVAK was a combination of the American FBI and 
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123 Fardoust was the Shah’s childhood friend. He served as deputy of SAVAK (he was, in fact, a real head of 
SAVAK) for ten years and headed the Special Intelligence Bureau of Iran—described as ‘SAVAK within 
SAVAK’—and the Imperial Inspectorate. He was the Shah’s ear. 
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the CIA. The Third Office or the Internal Security Office was the most important, yet the 
most notorious, SAVAK office. Headed by Parviz Sabeti, the Third Office was constituted 
of six directorates with each focusing on internal threats.126 Directed by Manouchehr 
Hashemi, the Eighth Office or the Counterintelligence Office was established to control 
the Soviet intelligence networks within Iran. These two offices monitored domestic 
issues.127 The external issues were monitored by the External Intelligence Organization 
that constituted the Second Office and the Seventh Office. Headed by major general 
Mansour Qadar--then brigadier general Ali Farazian--the Second Office focused on 
gathering external intelligence. Headed by brigadier general Kaveh, the Seventh Office 
focused on analyzing external intelligence. The External Intelligence Organization was 
also managed by Major General Ali Motazed. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
supposed to submit its gathered information to this organization.128  
Although the Shah’s role in crafting Iran’s foreign policy was untouchable, there 
were a few SAVAK officials who played significant roles in shaping the trajectory of Iran’s 
non-state foreign policy. Chief among them were major general Mansour Qadar and 
Colonel Isa Pejman. Qadar had served as the chief of the Middle East directorate in the 
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Second Office between 1958 and 1961. He was then appointed as the head of SAVAK 
Station in Lebanon, 1964-67, and later appointed as the Second Secretary in Iran’s embassy 
in Syria and Jordan in 1967-72. In 1972, he was promoted as Iran’s ambassador to Jordan. 
With his diplomatic and security background, Qadar was finally assigned as Iran’s 
Ambassador and the head of SAVAK Station to Beirut where he was until December 1979. 
By the mid-70s, Qadar had been the strongest Iranian ambassador in the Middle East. As 
“a sly and sneaky, but very smart, man,”129 he soon became the Shah’s favorite ambassador 
in the region. When Foreign Minister Khalaatbari explained to the Shah Lebanon’s 
strategic location as the Middle East crossroad and therefore, the necessity of Qadar’s 
appointment as Iran’s ambassador to Beirut, the Shah wondered if “Lebanon is that much 
important that you want to send Qadar there!”130 Qadar’s source of power stemmed from 
his close friendship with Fardoust. Overconfident of these networks, he got promoted fast. 
According to Qadar himself, “After the Black September, King Hussain of Jordan informed 
the Shah of my role in helping the Jordanian government. Although I had not been part of 
the army at the time, the Shah promoted me to a brigadier general. In 1975, I was then 
promoted as major general.”131 More substantially, Qadar had a key role in transforming 
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Iran’s non-state foreign policy in Lebanon. As a power-hungry, ambitious general, with a 
Machiavellian mentality, Qadar considered Sadr as his main foe in Lebanon since Sadr 
rejected entering a master-agent relation with Qadar. Qadar, himself, refused to accept his 
destructive role. “We tried several times to convince the Shah to revive relations with Sadr 
but the Shah was against the idea. However, Sadr thought I destroyed the Shia-Iran 
relation.”132 In reality, Qadar played a destructive role in portraying Sadr as the Shah’s 
enemy.  
Colonel Isa Pejman was one of the major SAVAK officers in building Iran’s ties 
with the Iraqi Kurds. As an Iranian Kurd, Pejman was among the first officers who joined 
SAVAK and then was introduced to Major Pashaie, head of SAVAK Middle East 
directorate, by Colonel Hasan Alavikia, head of the Third Office and then-deputy of 
SAVAK. Under Pashaie’s strict education, Pejman became the main member of the new-
founded Kurdistan Desk in SAVAK Middle Eastern Directorate. He was later promoted to 
the head of SAVAK in Iranian Kurdistan. From 1957 to 1969, Pejman was appointed to 
different posts, including the head of SAVAK station in Iraq and the head of the section of 
Kurdistan in the Second Office. Indeed, it was Pejman who persuaded SAVAK Director 
Bakhtiar and then the Shah to approve the publication of the first Kurdish-language 
newspaper and Kurdish radio in Iran. Although the Shah initially rejected siding with 
Barzani, it was Pejman who convinced him to change his attitude towards the Iraqi Kurds. 
“I was the one who suggested the Shah support a military insurgency in Iraq … The Shah 
asked me of the necessity of Iran’s support for the Iraqi Kurds and added, ‘Barzani killed 
my Army soldiers (during the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad).’ I responded him back, 
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‘Your Majesty, please forget it. The zeitgeist and regional context have been completely 
transformed’ … The Shah ultimately accepted the plan [for Iran to support the Iraqi Kurds] 
and instructed me to write a letter to general Pakravan, deputy of SAVAK at the time. I 
asked the Shah to dedicate 1000 Berno133 and 1 million bullets, along with 2-3 millions 
Rial (Iran’s national currency) to the Iraqi Kurds. When the Shah wrote on the back of the 
letter “Accepted” to general Pakravan, I felt I was the true leader of the Kurdish movement. 
Immediately, I came back to Baghdad and met Talabani in my home. I told him, 
‘Congratulation!’ Jalal was shocked and replied me, ‘I have not got married yet!’ I told 
him, ‘Who cares about marriage. The Shah has accepted the plan.’ Jalal hugged me and 
said, ‘Kak Isa, this is our only way to free Kurdistan.’”134  
Concisely put, and contrary to popular perceptions of SAVAK as a mere 
suppression machinery, Iran’s non-state foreign policy in Iraqi Kurdistan and Lebanon was 
mainly monitored by the SAVAK External Intelligence Organization. As Sadr’s relation 
with Tehran worsened, the Lebanese Shia issue was handled in cooperation with the 
SAVAK Third Office. Indeed, SAVAK’s role in non-state foreign policy was much more 
prominent than other political institutions in Iran. 
3. The Army  
Iran’s ties with the Iraqi Kurds in the 60s and early 70s effectively paralyzed 
Baghdad’s power projection in the Persian Gulf area. Despite this fact, Iran’s army generals 
were always suspicious of Barzani and Kurdish Peshmerga. It partly stemmed from 
Barzani’s participation in the Soviet-fabricated Republic of Mahabad. When the army 
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bloodlessly recaptured Azarbaijan and Mahabad, Barzani had been the only rebel who 
continued fighting with and killing Iranian troops on his way towards the Soviet Union. 
The army never forgot this. Furthermore, as the major ‘guardian’ of Iran’s territory, the 
army considered the Kurdish uprising in Iraq as Soviet master plot targeting Iran’s national 
integrity. In short, Iranian army never trusted the Kurds and it was SAVAK that provided 
the support for the Iraqi Kurds. 
4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Interestingly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not effectively intervene in 
shaping the trajectory of Iran’s non-state foreign policy. Indeed, the Ministry did not have 
the final word in the foreign policy decision-making processes; conversely, the Shah 
gradually became uncomfortable with the Ministry’s intervention. The Shah never 
respected his foreign ministers. When Kissinger had visited the Shah, His Imperial Majesty 
ordered to see him in private. Foreign Minister Abbas-Ali Khalatbari joined them during 
the lunch.135 In the aftermath of his successful OPEC policy in 1974, the Shah increased 
his control over the Ministry. “I told Foreign Minister that nobody should interfere in 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ issues except me,” he told Alam.136  
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was generally kept in the dark about Iran’s relations 
with the Lebanese Shia and particularly the Iraqi Kurds. While the Ministry officials were 
partially aware of Iran’s ties with the Iraqi Kurds and the Lebanese Shia, the extent of 
Iran’s involvement was hidden from them. “Often,” a former Iranian diplomat explained, 
                                                
135 Alam, Assadollah. Yad’dashtha-ye ‘Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam 
Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. III: 1974-75 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 1995). p. 274. 
 
136 Ibid. p. 367. 
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“we didn’t even know what was going on.”137 The Ministry was, in fact, consulted neither 
in the initiation nor in the termination of the support for both non-state entities. Regarding 
the Lebanese Shia, it was Ambassador Qadar and SAVAK who controlled Tehran’s policy 
towards Sadr. Major decisions were shaped by Qadar’s reports to SAVAK, rather than to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and then the Shah ratified them. As Qadar argued, “Iran’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was never strong. They have no comprehensive, detailed 
knowledge on the regional issues, like when Foreign Minister Khalaatbari convinced the 
Shah to recognize the PLO but I convinced the Shah later to change his mind.”138 Similarly, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had also been detached from the Kurdish issue. In contrast 
to SAVAK that urged the Shah to side with the Iraqi Kurds, the Ministry was unaware of 
the depth of Iran’s support for the Kurdish Peshmerga. Succinctly put, the Shah and 
SAVAK systematically left the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the dark on Iran’s non-state 
foreign policy.  
5. Religious institutions 
Although the Shah increasingly tightened the Shia clerics’ activities, particularly 
after the riot of 1964, the development of Iran’s ties with non-state entities, especially the 
Lebanese Shia, was to some degree bound up with Shia Marja’iyya (religious authority) 
networks. It was mainly because of Seyyed Musa Sadr’s undeniable role within the Shia 
community. Though effectively controlled by SAVAK, connections between religious 
Marja’iyya and Sadr remained. These networks functioned as double-edged swords for 
Iran’s non-state foreign policy. In the late 50s and 60s, they provided a fertile ground for 
                                                
137 Parsi, Trita. Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S. (Yale University 
Press, 2007). p. 62.  
 
138 Interview with Major General Mansour Qadar, Oral History, Foundations for Iranian History. 
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Tehran to increase its support for the Lebanese Shia. Supported by both Grand Ayatollah 
Boroujedi in Qom and then Ayatollah Hakim in Najaf, Sadr left Iran to Southern Lebanon 
wherein he single-handedly constructed a strong sense of a Shia collective identity that 
acted as a bulwark against the rising tide of Pan-Arabism.  
With the emergence of Islamism in the riot of 1964, however, networks between 
Sadr and Qom were securitized by SAVAK. Sadr’s connections with Iranian dissidents, 
mainly the Islamist ones, framed him as a major problem making actor for Iran’s national 
security. SAVAK became worried about the increasing Iranian Ayatollahs’ financial 
support for the Lebanese Shia. Indeed, Marja’iyya’s networks had provided a benchmark 
for the resource dedication and movement mobilization in the course of the Islamic 
Revolution. Throughout the 60s and 70s, Sadr’s relations with Tehran were partially 
affected by his ties with Ayatollahs, particularly Ayatollah Khomeini, and their disciples. 
The significance of these Marja’iyyah networks reaffirms a different nature of cultural-
religious domain wherein “the state, no matter how resistant and how insistent on its unitary 
nature and sovereignty,” deals with and interacted with “its composite form.”139  
 
The dynamics of Iran’s non-state foreign policy show that other institutions, along 
with the Shah, played key roles in shaping Iran’s ties with the Iraqi Kurds and the Lebanese 
Shia.  
 
 
 
                                                
139 Mesbahi, Mohiaddin, Free and Confined: Iran and the International System. (Spring 2011). Iranian 
Review of Foreign Affairs, 5 (2): 9-34. 
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D. Theoritecal Conclusion: 
Iran’s pre-revolutionary regime established complex networks with the Iraqi Kurds 
and the Lebanese Shia to contain geopolitical and geocultural threats. Iran also jumped on 
the geopolitical opportunities. In addition to the Shah’s decisive role in shaping Iran’s non-
state foreign policy, there were other institutions, particularly SAVAK, that were 
responsible for the establishment of these connections. (Figure 1) This figure also shows 
that Iran’s non-state foreign policy was a crosscutting policy, interplaying in three levels 
of international, regional, and domestic. Despite his preoccupation with these tripartite 
levels, the Shah was heavily engaged with an ‘in-between’ policy: Iran’s non-state foreign 
policy. 
 
Figure 1: Theoretical Framework for Iran’s Non-State Foreign Policy  
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III. Chapter 2 
Inception: Iran’s Non-State Foreign Policy in Pre-1958 
 
 
Iran’s non-state foreign policy under the Shah’s reign was mainly crafted out of 
Iran’s historical relations with the Iraqi Kurds and the Shia Lebanese. The extent and nature 
of Pahlavi Iran’s ties with these two non-state actors were to some degree related to their 
past connections with Iranian dynasties and society. As an ethnically and culturally Iranian 
people, the Kurds, particularly the Iraqi Kurds, used to be part of Iranian empires and 
regimes. As the major Shia country in the region, Iran kept its ties with the Shia 
communities since the early 16th century. Before the late 50s, these connections had been 
mostly cultural and religious. It was only after the Iraqi coup of 1958 that the Iranian regime 
began crafting its non-state foreign policy towards the Iraqi Kurds and the Lebanese Shia. 
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Inception—The Iraqi Kurds 
“The Kurdish fighters, with their Iranian blood, resisted against the well-armed Ottomans to keep their 
ancient ethnic-cultural Aryan identities just like how Rostam and Esfandiar did,” Ihsan Nuri Pasha wrote in 
his biography.140 
 
“As history shows, our grand-grandfather, Kak Ahmad, and family have proved our Iranianness since the 
Afsharid Dynasty,” Sheikh Mahmoud Barzanji wrote a letter to Reza Shah Pahlavi.141  
 
The Iranian Medes  
As descendants of the ancient Medes, the true founders of the Iranian Empire (678-
549 BC), the Kurds have inhabited the mountains of the ancient powers of the 
Mesopotamian plain and the Iranian and Anatolian plateaus. Identified by classical 
historians, like Xenophon, as ‘Karduchoi’ or ‘Gurti’, the Kurds are a distinctive Indo-
European ethnic group. Traditional ‘Kurdistan’ has never had a separate political status 
and was instead part of the Iranian Empire for millennia. In the pre-Arab Muslim conquest 
of the Middle East, it was an Iranian satrap of the Achaemenian, Parthian, and Sassanid 
Empires. After the debacle of the Abbasid caliphates, Kurdistan became part of Iranian and 
then Iranian-Turkic small emirates, until Shah Ismail I (reign 1501-1524), the founder of 
the Safavid dynasty, conquered it in the early 16th century under his military-political 
campaign for the revival of Iran. Following the victory of the Ottomans over the Safavid 
Empire in the Battle of Chaldiran (23 August 1514), Iran lost the western part of Kurdistan, 
nowadays known as Turkey’s Kurdistan, and the Iraqi Kurds became pawns in the 
destructive Iranians-Turks wars. Iraqi Kurdistan was then ruled back and forth by Persians 
and Turks until Treaty of Zuhab in 1659 gave its control to Ottomans. Despite the brief 
                                                
140 Bayat, Kaveh, Vaghayeh-e Ararat: Khaterat-e Ehsan Nuri Pasha (Ararat Events: Ihsan Nuri Pasha’s 
Memories). (Tehran, 1999). 
 
141 Tehran, The Center of Court and Prime Ministry Documents, No. 17353. 
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seizure of Iraqi Kurdistan by Shah Abbas in the late 17th century and Nader Shah the Great 
in the early 18th century, Iranians were never able to reconquer the region. Ruled by three 
principalities of Baban, Badinan and Soran, the Ottoman rule lasted until World War I. 
During the War, the Kurdish tribes joined the Ottoman Army.142  
With the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, the map of the Middle East was 
redrawn. Although the foundations of the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire were formed 
through the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 1916, it was the Treaty of Sevres of 
August 1920 that temporarily opened an opportunity for an independent Kurdish state. 
Despite American President Wilson’s support of the Kurds, the Turkish War of 
Independence (1919-1923) and then the Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923 destroyed the 
Kurds’ dream and their territory became part of modern Iraq, Turkey, and Syria. As the 
leader of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, later known as Atatürk, claimed, 
“The state which we have just created is a Turkish state.”143 Turkish leaders called the 
Kurds ‘Mountain Turks’ and banned the Kurdish language. Frustrated by the lack of 
support from foreign powers and persecuted by the Turks’ brutal policies,144 the Kurds 
challenged Ankara’s authority in the Sheikh Said Rebellion (1925) and the Ararat 
Rebellion (1927-30), though the Turkey Army crushed them.145 In the wake of the 
emergence of the modern state system in the region, the Kurds were left without a state of 
                                                
142 There have been major reports that the Kurdish tribes participated under the Turk commanders in the 
Armenian genocide in the east of Turkey and the north of Syria. 
 
143 Chaliand, Gerard, A People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan. (Interlink Pub Group Inc, 
1993). p. 48. 
 
144 700,000 Kurds were removed from their homes by Turkish Army and 400,000 are believed to have died. 
 
145 The main figure of the Ararat Rebellion was Ihsan Nuri, Commander-In-Chief of the Kurdish National 
Army, who died in exile in Tehran in 1976.  
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their own. Nevertheless, their dream of an independent Kurdistan provided a geo-cultural 
base for their separatist movements.  
The Kurdish question has been historically less crucial in Iran than in Iraq and 
Turkey where the existence of Kurds was denied for decades. Culturally and linguistically 
related to the Iranian people, the Kurds never faced the brutality and ethnic cleansing from 
Tehran as they did from Ankara, Baghdad, and even Damascus. On top of that, a third of 
Iranian Kurds are Shia Muslim, the predominant sect of Islam in Iran. Conversely, the Iraqi 
state, like Ankara, has been more prone to Kurdish irredentism. Constituted of the Ottoman 
principalities of Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul and carved out of three ethnic-religious groups 
of Shia, Sunni, and Kurd, Iraqi national identity had been vague since its creation.  
Still, despite a decisive absence of national identity in Iraq and a historical Persian-
Kurdish affinity, later Qajar kings and then Reza Shah Pahlavi were far from backing 
Kurdish rebels in Iraqi Kurdistan. Chief among them was the rebelion of Sheikh Mahmud 
Barzanji between 1919 and 1922. At the height of the revolt, Sheikh Mahmud pleaded 
Tehran for the support, expressing his loyalty to Iran and Reza Shah. “I am ready to keep 
our fathers’ land, Iran, safe,” he wrote a letter to Reza Shah.146 Nevertheless, the lack of a 
strong state in Iran, the Sunni religion of the Kurdish tribes in Iraqi Kurdistan, and Tehran’s 
fear of rising Kurdish separatism within Iran’s territory dissuaded Tehran to side with the 
Kurdish uprisings in Iraq. Conversely, Iranian leaders joined Turks and Iraqis signing the 
Treaty of Saadabad of July 1937 in order to provide a joint military action against Kurdish 
uprisings.  
                                                
146 Documents of Political Studies and Researches Organization [Asnad-e Motaleat va Pajouheshhay-e Siasi], 
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Kurdish secessionism was an imminent threat to Iran. In late August 1941, Iran was 
temporarily conquered by the Allies. The Soviet Red Army did not leave its wartime 
occupation of northwestern Iran’s provinces of Azarbaijan and Kurdestan; rather, it 
attempted to annex them to the Soviet Union through the establishment of republics of 
Azarbaijan and Mahabad in mid-December 1945. Qazi Muhammad, the chairman of 
Komeley Jiyanewey Kurdistan [the Society for the Revival of Kurdistan] and then the 
leader of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, was appointed as the head of the 
Republic. Organized by Russian officers, the Kurds rallied their support for the new-
founded republic.147 The Republic quickly collapsed on 17 December 1946 after the Soviet 
troop withdrawal from Iran and Qazi was hanged on 31 March 1947.148  
Red Mullah and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)          
Iran’s conections with the Iraqi Kurds was heavily influenced by Mullah Mustafa 
Barzani. Long before the Iraqi Kurdish Revolt (1961-75), Mullah Mustafa had become a 
prominent leader of Iraqi Kurds when he fought against the British in 1919 and the 1930s, 
and then the Iraqi monarchy in the 40s. In the meantime, he founded the Rizgari Kurd Party 
(the Kurdish Freedom Party) in early 1946.149 Right after the establishment of the short-
lived Republic of Mahabad, Barzani crossed the Iran-Iraq border with his followers on 7 
October 1945, and was then appointed as the Minister of Defense and Commander of the 
Republic army under Soviet pressure. However, relations between Barzani and Qazi 
                                                
147 The Republic of Mahabad was constituted of a small territory, including Mahabad and its close cities of 
Piranshahr and Ushnaviya (Naqadeh). 
 
148 Qazi was executed by elements of the Iranian Army, especially Major General Haj-Ali Razmara. It seemed 
the Shah was against the execution of Qazi Muhammad. The Shah later financially supported his family and 
sent his sons, Mohammad Qazi and Seyf Qazi, to Europe.  
 
149 The Rizgari was a major foe of the Hiwa [Hope] Kurdish Party, founded by Namik Salim Jaf in 1940. 
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Muhammad were not easy since Qazi was against Mullah’s special dispensation for the 
Barzanis in Iran in return, for prioritizing the idea of ‘One Party’.150 In the aftermath of the 
collapse of the Republic of Mahabad in December 1946, Barzani led his 500 followers in 
a fifty-day-long running battle with the Iranian Army until they finally fled into the 
Armenian SSR and then Azerbaijan SSR. Backed by Mir Jafar Baghirov, the Secretary of 
the Azerbaijan Communist Party, Barzani held a conference on 19 January 1948 in Baku 
in order to unite the Kurds in Iraq and Iran. The Kurdish Threat was still alive.  
Mullah Mustafa was a brave leader whose militiamen worshiped him. According 
to Abolhasan Tafreshian,151 “Mullah was a wise man, though he had not been educated. 
He knew Persian and Arabic languages well and spoke in Turkish… He told me: “I am 
neither Pishevari [Leader of the Soviet-made Democratic Republic of Azarbaijan (1945-
6)] nor Panahian [Minister of War in the Soviet-fabricated republic of Azarbaijan 1945-6] 
who was the head of the army in times of peace but escaped to Baku with the outbreak of 
the war [When the Soviet withdrew from Northwestern Iran]. I have but my gun, and I am 
not a servant of any other powers’, neither American’s, Russian’s, nor British’s. I am just 
the Barzani tribe’s servant.”152  
Although Barzani’s exile weakened the Kurdish movement in Iraq and Iran, the 
new-founded Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) filled partially the void. The KDP was 
founded at a Baghdad meeting on 16 August 1946 under Mullah Mustafa’s plan to establish 
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151 Tafreshian was a pro-Tudeh Party officer who joined the revolt of ‘Khorasan Officers’ (July 1945) in 
Turkemen-Sahra, north-east of Iran. He was also the head of the artillery in the Soviet-made republic of 
Azarbaijan 1945-6. 
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a party independent of Qazi Muhammad and Republic of Mahabad. The Party was 
constituted of former members of the Rizgari and the Hiwa. During the first meeting, 
Hamza Abdullah was appointed as secretary-general, Mullah Mustafa as president (in 
exile), and Shaikh Latif and Ziyad Agha as vice-presidents. The main figure of the KDP 
was Ibrahim Ahmad. Ahmad was a ‘communist and influential’153 intellectual who was 
also the main editor of the KDP newspapers of Rizgari and Xebat. In the second congress 
in summer 1951, Ahmad was elected as secretary-general. He changed the party’s name 
from Kurdish Democratic Party to Kurdistan Democratic Party at the third congress in 
January 1955. On the eve of the bloody regime change in Baghdad, the Kurds had a strong 
organization to seek their longstanding ambition of independence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
153 SAVAK Documents, No. 313/29188, 5 May 1963. 
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Inception—The Lebanese Shia 
“You are the real king and I am just one of your agents,” Shah Tahmasb Safavid told Sheikh Mohaqeq Karaki, 
senior Shia clergy.154 
 
The Shia Jabal Amel 
As one of the oldest Shia communities in the Middle East,155 the Lebanese Shia 
were a marginal people mostly settled in the Beqaa Valley and Jabal Amel, mountainous 
regions in the south of Lebanon with cities like Nabtiya, Marjayioun, and Bent-Jabil. 
Harshly persecuted by the Ottomans, and for a while by Egyptians, for more than four 
centuries, the Shia had been forced to leave the Mediterranean coast and to live in faraway 
places in the mountain. The Sunni Sultans, Khedives, and ulama had been framing the Shia 
as ‘deviating’ from the path of Sunni Islam and put them savagely to the sword. In addition 
to their different narrative of Islam, the Sunnis, particularly the Turks, suspected the Shia 
of being “a stalking horse for Persia.”156 The Shia oppression in Lebanon was, in fact, a 
marriage of politics and religion.  
From its very inception, the political rise of the Shia had been influenced by Iran. 
Despite the Iranian Shia dynasties, like the Buyid dynasty of Dailamite origin (934-1055 
AC) as well as Zaydi Shia of Alavids (864-928 AC),157 Shiism did not come to predominate 
in Iran before Shah Ismail I. As a champion of Shia aspiration to regional hegemony, the 
Safavid kings began converting Iran to Shiism by coercion and persuasion. Safavid-led 
                                                
154 Qaffari Qazvini, Qazi Ahmad, Tarikh-e Jahan-Ara. (Hafez press, 1343). p, 285.  
 
155 The oldest Shia community in the Islamic World was the Shia community in Hejaz. 
  
156 Norton, Augustus R. Hezbollah: A Short History. (Princeton University Press, 2007). p. 13. 
 
157 At their peak, Buyids consisted a large portion of modern Iraq and Iran (except North of Iraq as well as 
East and North of Iran), Alawids consisted of North of Iran. 
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Shiism, in return, provided Iran its distinct identity and distinguished Iranians from other 
Muslims, especially the Arabs and the Turks, and established bases for the nation-state of 
Iran. Interestingly, the Lebanese Shia had a profound role in this process. To compensate 
for the lack of established Shia Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) in Iranian territory, Shah 
Ismail asked Shia clergies from Jabal Amel in Lebanon and Bahrain and al-Ahsa, Eastern 
Saudi Arabia, to immigrate to Iran.158 Chief among them was Sheikh Mohaqeq Karaki, 
known as Mohaqeq Sani,159 who achieved limitless power during the reign of Shah 
Tahmasb, Shah Ismail’s successor, such that Shah Tahmasb told him that “You are the real 
king and I am just one of your agents.”160 In a decree of 1532, Shah Tahmasb honored him 
by conferring on Karaki the titles of Na’eb al-Imam (Hidden Imam’s Deputy) and Khatam 
al-Mojtahedin (The Last Jurist).161 After Kertir, the powerful Zoroastrian chief-priest 
during the Sassanid, it was only the second time in Iran’s history that a jurist became the 
strongman of the country. Karaki and his successors, like Allameh Majlesi and Sheikh 
Bahai, were the main jurists for the Safavid Shahs to challenge the Sunni Fiqh backed by 
the Ottoman Sultans who laid claim to the caliphate in the aftermath of conquering Egypt 
in 1517. Competing for regional hegemony, the Safavid Iranians and the Ottoman Turks 
fought several wars. These wars soon took on sectarian overtone between the Shia and the 
                                                
158 A traditional oasis in the East of the Saudi Arabia and South coast of the Persian Gulf. 
 
159 His real name was Nur-al-Din Abul-Hasan Ali bin Hussain bin Abdol-Ali. Other than Karaki, Hasan bin 
Zeinoddin, known as Saheb-e Maalem, and Mohammad bin Ali, known as Saheb-e Madarek, were two of 
the most famous Lebanese Shia clergies who immigrated to Iran. They are all known as Amelis.    
 
160 Qaffari Qazvini, Qazi Ahmad, Tarikh-e Jahan-Ara. (Hafez press, 1343). p, 285.  
 
161 Amir Arjomand, Saeed, tr. And ed., “Two Decrees of Shah Tahmasb Concerning Statecraft and the 
Authority of Shaykh Ali al-Karki,” in Authority and Political Culture in Shi’ism, ed. S.A. Arjomand. 
(Albany, 1988). pp.255-6; and Amir Arjomand, Saeed, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam: Religion, 
Political Order, and Societal Change in Shi’ite Iran from the Beginning to 1890. (Chicago, 1984). pp. 133-
34. 
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Sunni. This was the classic combination of geopolitical and geo-cultural forces that shaped 
the trajectory of the regional politics for more than four centuries.  
Despite the Shia clergy’ historical role in the expansion of Shiism in Iran, the 
Iranian kings were never able to ameliorate their relations with the Lebanese Shia as the 
Safavids had done. The Weak Zand and Qajar dynasties of Iran were not able to keep Iran’s 
borders safe, let alone expand their power to the Levant. The only exception was Nader 
Shah, the last great Iranian kings, ‘the Napoleon of Persia,’162 who took a distinct religious 
policy. Nader Shah disagreed with the Safavid policy in the support for the Shia, since he 
believed that Iran’s Shiism had intensified conflicts with the Sunni Ottoman Empire. With 
Iranian kings’ weakness and reluctance in supporting the Shia communities of the region, 
the faraway Jabal Amel Shia became increasingly distant from Iran’s zone of influence.  
The Sunni Turks ruled the Lebanese Shia for more than four centuries; however, 
with the gradual decline of the Ottoman Empire, each ethnic-religious group began seeking 
external patrons. After all, the fragmented Lebanese society was prone to external-internal 
ties. During the 19th century, the Maronitess were supported by French, the Druze by the 
British, the Greek Orthodox by the Russian, and the Sunni by the Ottoman Sultans. In spite 
of nominal support by the weak Qajar dynasty, the Shia lacked any external state-patron. 
Indeed, they were the least powerful community in Lebanon. In the meantime, with the 
Ottomans’ agrarian reform in 1858, a new class of Zuama (notables), wealthy feudal 
patrons who were also politically influential, was formed and gradually dominated ordinary 
Shia people through extensive patronage networks.163  
                                                
162 Axworthy, Michael, The Sword of Persia: Nader Shah, from Tribal Warrior to Conquering Tyrant. (I.B. 
Tauris, 2006). p. xvii 
 
163 Major Zuama family included al-Asad, Hamada, Beizoon, Khalil, Osairan and al-Zayn. 
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After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Lebanon was mandated by the French 
until 1943 when the country finally won its independence. The first government was 
established based on the Mithaq al-Watani’ (National Pact) that divided political 
dominance between the Maronites and the Sunni. The Mithaq paved the way for the 
formation of a unique system of sectarian communities within which religious-ethnic 
communities pursued their interests as parties.164 However, the Mithaq did not change the 
status of the Shia. The young Shias were attracted to new political forces, mainly left-
secular parties that promised to remove exploitation of minority groups by the ruling 
elites.165 In addition to the leftist groups, the young Shia joined the Palestinian guerrillas 
and fought for the Palestinian cause to prove their fidelity to the Sunni Arabs. With the 
Shia Marja Ayatollah Hakim’s permission, the Shia began supporting the Palestinian 
guerrillas.166 As the social change occurred in the late 50s, the growing process of 
urbanization—the Shia immigration to Beirut and other large cities—and the politicization 
of the young Shia, the grip of Shia notables and patrons became loosened. Nevertheless, 
the Shia still did not gain political power. However, an Iranian-born, charismatic Shia 
leader single-handedly changed their status. 
 
                                                
164 According to the Mithaq, Lebanese society recognized political privileges in bureaucracy and parliament 
for each of the 17 constituent sects. It became 18 communities after the 1975 civil war. 
 
165 These parties included the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP), two factions of the Arab Socialist Baath 
Party (a pro-Iraq one led by Sunni Abdul-Majeed Al-Rafei and Greek Christian Nicola Y. Ferzli and a pro-
Syrian one headed by Shia Assem Qanso), the Arab Nationalist Movement, the leftist Lebanese National 
Movement of the Druze led by Kamal Jumbalat, the Progressive Socialists, and the Parti Populaire Syrien 
(PPS), especially the Organization for Communist Labor Action and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party 
(SSNP), which supported the idea of ‘Greater Syria’ and heavily backed by the Syrian government, attracted 
the young urbane Shias. 
 
166 Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future. (W. W. Norton & 
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A Charismatic Seyyed        
Born in Qum in 1928 into a family with a long-standing tradition of religious 
education and family networks across Iran, Lebanon, and Iraq, Seyyed Musa Sadr was the 
main figure in the story of Iran’s ties with the Lebanese Shia. Sadr had an ancestry line 
back to Shia clerics in Jabal Amel. His father, Ayatollah Seyyed Sadr a-Ddin Sadr, and 
grandfather, Ayatollah Seyyed Ismail Sadr, were both famous Marja in late 19th and early 
20th. His great-great-grandfather Seyyed Salih bin Muhammad Sharafeddin, a senior cleric 
in Tyre, had been forced to leave Lebanon and stayed in Najaf. His teachers in Qom were 
Grand Ayatollah Boroujerdi, Ayatollah Mohaqeq Damad, Allameh Mohammad-Hussein 
Tabatabaie, Ayatollah Khansari, and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Along with his 
religious study in Fiqh, Sadr earned a degree in political science from the Law School of 
the new-founded University of Tehran in 1953.167 After his father’s death in 1953, he went 
to Najaf with SAVAK’s indirect permission to continue his Fiqh study under Ayatollah 
Mohsen al-Hakim.168  
Sadr soon became the most educated student of Ayatollah Hakim and Ayatollah 
Khoie. He stayed in Najaf four years. In 1955, Sadr took a short trip to Lebanon, his 
ancestral home, and met the leader of the Lebanese Shia, Ayatollah Seyyed Abd al-Husayn 
Sharaf al-Din al-Musawi. Impressed with Sadr’s personality, Sharaf al-Din asked him to 
stay in Lebanon and take responsibility for the Shia. But Sadr had other priorities at the 
                                                
167 Mansour Qadar, Iran’s ambassador to Beirut and Sadr’s major foe in Lebanon, claimed that Sadr was 
interested in socialism. For the first time, the SAVAK monitored him during the Left students meeting at the 
University of Tehran. “He was not turbaned when he came to the university, but in the meetings and official 
gathering he was turbaned.” He also claimed that “Seyyed Musa did not want to go to Najaf. … Then, his 
family pressed him to leave Tehran for Najaf and study theology there.” See Interview with Major General 
Mansour Qadar, Oral History, Foundations for Iranian History. 
 
168 SAVAK Documents, No. 15/s/9880, 24 August 1959. 
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time. In early 1957, he went back to Qom, Iran’s major religious city, and founded a 
religious journal, Dars ha-i az Maktab-e Eslam [Lessons from the School of Islam], also 
known as Maktab-e Eslam, with Ayatollah Shariatmadari’s support and Grand-Ayatollah 
Boroujerdi’s endorsement. Sadr’s journal alarmed SAVAK Director, General Teymour 
Bakhtiar, who complained to Sadr about his journal and called it “a communist grumble” 
from Qom. He was, however, convinced by Sadr and permitted Seyyed Musa to continue 
publishing the journal.169 Among the authors of Sadr’s journal were then-Shia ayatollahs 
and Marja, like Seyed Mohammad-Hossein Beheshti, Naser Makarem Shirazi, Ja’far 
Sobhani, Majd ad-Din Mahalati, Seyed Abdol-Karim Mousavi Ardabili, Seyyed Morteza 
Jazayeri, Hosein Nouri Hamedani, Mohammad Vaez-zadeh Khorasani, and Ali Davani. 
Sadr, Beheshti, and Makarem Shirazi planned in devising a new scheme to reform 
educational system of the Hawza in Qom. Sadr’s activities and talent heralded a new school 
of Shia thought. However, an unpredictable chain of events did not let him continue his 
religious studies. 
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IV. Chapter 3 
Creation: Iran’s Non-State Foreign Policy in 1958-1963 
In summer 1958, the Hashemite dynasty of Iraq was overthrown in a bloody coup 
led by the Pan-Arab ‘Free Officers’. It was a watershed for Iran’s non-state foreign policy. 
Led by Qasim, the new Iraqi regime gradually approached the Soviets. At the same time, 
Barzani returned to Iraq and initially sided with Qasim. Iraq then became a center of 
destabilizing threats for Iran, namely, Communism, Pan-Arabism, and Kurdish separatism. 
It was within this context that Tehran unsuccessfully tried to rally pro-Hashemites and the 
Iraqi Shia against Baghdad. As a gap between Barzani and Qasim increasingly widened, 
Iran gradually created its non-state foreign policy towards the Iraqi Kurds to contain Iraq. 
With the outbreak of the Kurdish War in 1961, Iran effectively backed the Kurdish 
Peshmerga and tied down the Iraqi Army in Iraqi Kurdistan. Despite the U.S. hands-off 
policy towards the Kurdish War, Iran kept up its support for the Iraqi Kurds until the 
debacle of the Qasim’s regime in the coup of 1963. In the meantime, and with the formation 
of the United Arab Republic (UAR) under Nasser’s leadership and then of the Iraqi 
republic, the rising Pan-Arabism convinced Iran to build connections with the Lebanese 
Shia. In the Shah’s view, the Shia community on the east coast of the Mediterranean could 
function as Iran’s natural ally in containing Pan-Arabism. In the meantime, Seyyed Musa 
Sadr left Iran for the south of Lebanon and led the marginalized Shia community. He began 
reviving the Shia collective identity by establishing socio-political and religious 
institutions. Although he did not enter into a Master-Agent relation with Tehran, his 
messages were in favor of Lebanese unity and independence, counterweighting Nasser’s 
brand of Pan-Arabism.   
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Creation—The Iraqi Kurds 
“Alam said Barzani had approached the Shah on a number of occasions to seek assistance against Iraq. He 
made grand promises of incorporating Iraqi Kurdistan into Iran in return.”170  
 
The Iraqi Coup of 1958 
On 14 July 1958, the Iraqi Free Officers toppled the Hashemite monarchy in a 
bloody coup. King Faisal II, the Prince Regent and Crown Prince Abdullah, and Prime 
Minister Nuri al-Said were brutally assassinated. The leaders of the coup, Brigadier Abd 
al-Karim Qasim and Abdul-Salam Arif, shared power.171 It was the beginning of a new era 
in Iraq.172 The Iraqi coup took Tehran by surprise. The word of the coup reached Istanbul 
where the Shah, as well as Turkish and Pakistani leaders, expected to see his Iraqi allies 
for the Baghdad Pact talks. Shocked by the brutality of revolutionaries in killing the royal 
family, the Shah immediately left Istanbul and put the Iranian Army on red alert along the 
border with Iraq for several months. The Shah’s suspicion of the new Iraqi regime 
increased when Baghdad approached the Soviets. In the Shah’s view, Iran’s western 
neighbor with its considerable oil wealth had turned into a center of the challenging 
ideologies of Communism and Pan-Arabism. With its deep-rooted local organizations, the 
Iraq Communist Party (ICP) became the strongest ally of Qasim.173 Headed by Abdol Qadir 
Bostani, the ICP did not strictly adhere to the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism; however, 
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the Shah considered it as a major element in the Soviet master plot. He feared Moscow’s 
plot to jump over the Northern Tier containment shield in order to control the Persian Gulf 
with its vast oil reserves.  
Following the Iraqi coup, Tehran expected the U.S. to follow the zero-sum logic of 
the Cold War and contain the ‘Red Threat’. Surprisingly, President Eisenhower took a wait-
and-see strategy. The White House thought Cairo, not Moscow, had been behind the coup 
in Baghdad. CIA Director Allen Dulles stated: “The coup … was executed by pro-Nasser 
elements of the Iraqi army, and a Republican government has been set up that includes pro-
Nasser people.”174 Even, Qasim’s further radical moves, including closing British military 
bases, did not change the U.S. strategy. Amidst the rising threats of Pan-Arabism and 
Communism from Baghdad, Mullah Mustafa Barzani’s return to Iraq increased the threat 
of Kurdish separatism to Iran. 
Qasim and the Kurds 
In the aftermath of the coup, Qasim took an inclusive policy towards marginal 
groups. Article III of the Provisional Constitution stated that “Arabs and Kurds are partners 
in the Homeland, and their national rights are recognized within the Iraqi entity.”175 Qasim 
founded a triumvirate ‘Sovereignty Council’ of a Shia, a Sunni, and a Kurd. It was a 
temporary move, though. Mohammad-Mehdi Kebbeh, a Shia member of the Supreme 
Council of the Republic, was soon excluded for his objection to Qasim’s lefty policy.176 
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The Kurds, however, hailed the revolutionary constitution and sovereignty council. It was 
a promising era that heralded resolving the Arab-Kurdish tension. Both Barzani and 
Ibrahim Ahmad pledged the KDP support for Qasim. “We had been surrounded by three 
countries of Iran, Turkey, and Iraq all were members of Baghdad Pact. We supported 
Qasim since Baghdad [Hashemite Monarchy] was against the Kurds. We thought no one 
could be worse than Nouri Saeed. Therefore, we helped Qasim to gain the power”, Ahmad 
recalled explaining his support for Qasim.177 On the other side, Qasim needed strong allies, 
like the KDP, to centralize state power by implementing his Agrarian Reform Law of 
September 1958 and weakening the Aghas.178 The alliance could also appease Kurdish 
nationalism by binding a major portion of Iraqi Kurds to Baghdad. On top of that, Qasim 
intended to terminate external interference in Iraq. With a rising tension between Qasim 
and pro-Nasser Arif, the Kurds became Qasim’s assets in defying Nasser in the Arab 
World. It was in this context that Qasim permitted Barzani and his companies to return 
from exile in Russia. When Barzani returned via Cairo to a tumultuous welcome in October 
1958, Qasim apologized to Barzani on behalf of Iraqi people, named him Chairman of the 
KDP, and provided him an automobile as well as a handsome monthly stipend of 300 Iraqi 
Dinars.179 He also promised Barzani a degree of Kurdish autonomy. In return, he asked 
Mullah Mustafa to oust Ibrahim Ahmad due to Ahmad’s building relations with Arif and 
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Nasser.180 Ahmad was then replaced with Hamza Abdullah in January 1959. Pro-socialist 
Hamza Abdullah eased the Kurdish-Communist front to support Qasim. In October 1958, 
both parties reached a compromise “the KDP abandoned its claim to an independent 
Kurdistan in return for the ICP endorsement of administrative autonomy.”181  
In the Shah’s view, Barzani’s return and the Kurdish-Communist alliance made 
Iraq “the center of communists.”182 According to SAVAK, the Iraqi Kurds and the 
Communists planned to “dispatch several men into Iran’s territory for the (anti-regime) 
propaganda.”183 The Shah was also worried about Barzani’s efforts to establish an 
independent Kurdistan along Iran’s western borders. According to SAVAK, Barzani had 
begun to support several former followers of Qazi Mohammad as well as Iranian military 
officers who had already fled to the Soviet Union. According to SAVAK, Barzani’s 
Peshmerga had been receiving training from Russian officers in Haj-Omran, Sidkan and 
Baradoust, close to the border with Iran, while at the same time making secret connections 
with the Iranian Kurds in Mahabad and Sardasht.184 In late 1959, Russian officers were 
instigating the Javanroudis tribe to subvert Iran’s national security.185 In SAVAK’s view, 
Barzani had been assured of Qasim’s support for the establishment of a ‘Free Kurdistan’.186 
The Americans were suspicious of Barzani’s ties to Moscow. According to the Americans, 
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Barzani received a monthly stipend of a thousand Iraqi dinars ($2,800 in 1962) from the 
Soviets in the mid-60s.187 It was Moscow’s support for Barzani and the short-lived project 
of the Republic of Kurdistan in the north-west of Iran that convinced the U.S. of the 
possible Soviet intention to use the Kurds to bypass America’s Middle Eastern containment 
strategy. Within this situation, Tehran began seeking a more reliable strategy of 
containment.   
SAVAK and the ‘Rescue Iraq’ 
In initial months after the coup, Qasim did not cease alarming Tehran. “Whenever 
I saw him [Qasim], he implied having a better relation with the Shah and pointed that while 
he and his followers were anti-royalist forces in Iraq, they were not anti-Shah,” Ja’far Raed, 
Iraq’s ambassador to Iran, wrote in his biography.188 However, Qasim’s fear of Iran’s will 
and potential to mobilize the Iraqi Kurd, the Arab Shia, and anti-Communists groups 
dissuaded him from having a constructive negotiation with Tehran. Ruptures in Iranian-
Iraqi relations widened when Qasim denounced the Shah as a Western puppet in several 
official conferences and interviews. Qasim then claimed the eastern bank of Arvand Rud 
(Shatt al-Arab) and the Iranian city of Khorramshahr as indivisible parts of Iraq in March 
1959. He also claimed sovereignty over the oil-rich province of Khuzestan in the southwest 
of Iran and its Arab-speaking inhabitants, stating that his “Arab brother lived under 
Iranians’ yoke for several years.”189 On 18 December 1959, Qasim stated that “We do not 
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wish to refer to the history of Arab tribes residing in al-Ahwaz and Mohammareh (Arabic 
names for Khuzestan and Khorramshahr, respectively). The Ottomans handed over 
Mohammareh, which used to be a part of Iraqi territory, to Iran… And the 1937 Treaty was 
unfairly imposed on Baghdad and Iraq has given 5 km for free to his neighbor. This 
generosity was, however, under pressure and Iraq now does not accept it. Iran has no right 
tn this 5 km/sq2 and Iraq will take it back again finally.”190 Qasim also supported Arab 
separatists of the Arabistan Liberation Front (ALF) and unsuccessfully raised the issue of 
his territorial claims in the Arab League. The tension between two countries escalated to 
the brink of war when the Shah harshly rejected Qasim’s territorial claim and called him 
“Crazy.”191 Etela’at, the most important daily newspaper in Tehran, stated, “The new 
regime of Iraq is not aware that if Iran implements his claims, all oil-rich parts of Iraq, 
especially Kurdistan, should be retaken by Iran.” Arsalan Khalatbari, an influential 
Parliament representative, stated, “150 years ago, both Baghdad and Basra were parts of 
Iran. Now, Qasim wants 5 km/sq2 of Iran.”192 In the wake of rising instability in Bagdad, 
this rhetoric was an effective tool for Qasim to rally Iraqis behind himself. According to 
SAVAK, “The anti-Iran propaganda has been strengthening the unity between the [Iraqi] 
Army and Qasim.”193 Qasim also tried to connect with Iranian Kurdish groups. Right after 
the Iraqi coup of 1958, Ahmad Tawfiq had tried to convince Iraqi leaders to support Iranian 
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Kurds.194 SAVAK believed that the plot was made by the ICP since the Iraqi communists 
did not want “to act directly in Iraqi politics to prevent deterioration of Qasim-Nasser 
relations.”195 
Beyond threats of Kurdish and Arab separatism, the Iraqi coup convinced anti-
Shah, Marxist opposition groups to opt for violent strategies in challenging the Pahlavi 
regime of Tehran by providing them military bases. With Nasser’s harsh policy towards 
the communists in Egypt and Syria, a central headquarters of the Middle Eastern 
communist parties in Sofia, Bulgaria, were replaced by Baghdad. Within this context, the 
majority of the Iranian Tudeh Party’s leaders fled Iraq to revive their activities.196 Along 
with their anti-Shah activities, the Tudeh Party had two missions: training the ICP and 
making secret connections with pro-Tudeh military officers within the Iranian Army. The 
Tudeh Party leaders successfully reorganized the ICP.197 Pro-Tudeh Party military majors, 
like Pouladdezh and Pezeshkian, joined the Iraqi Army. Pouladdezh became the head of 
the Iran desk in the Second Office of the Iraqi Army.198 Later, pro-Tudeh radio, ‘National 
Voice of Iran’, was founded by the Russians in Chamchal, Iraqi Kurdistan.199 The Tudeh 
Party in Iraq also trained Iranian refugees in revolutionary tactics against Tehran.200  
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Baghdad’s support of Iranian dissidents accelerated the ominous alliance of a 
Soviet-Baghdad plot against Iran’s national security.201 According to the SAVAK, 
“thousands of the Soviet Kurds entered Iraq along with 1500 Tudeh members to cooperate 
with the ICP.”202 SAVAK was, in fact, worried about a pro-Soviet coup in Iran; “it is said 
that several thousands of Iraqi and Iranian communists will enter Iran to sabotage Iran.”203 
The zenith of the communism and Pan-Arab threats came at the Baghdad Conference of 
the Middle Eastern Communist Parties, held on 26 February 1959. The conference 
supported Qasim’s policy in Iraq as well as the rights of the Kurds in Iraq’s neighbors. 
Lastly, it put emphasis on the support for the Iranian Tudeh Party as the main tool to “save 
Iran from a dictatorship” and “the establishment of a democratic republic.” According to 
SAVAK’s report, the conference incited sabotage and demonstration in Iranian provinces 
of Azarbaijan and Kurdistan with Baghdad and Moscow’s support.204 By spring 1959, Iraq 
was the center of destabilizing forces in the Middle East. 
In this context, the Shah instructed SAVAK to prepare a plan to contain threats 
coming from Baghdad. The plan was supposed to overthrow the revolutionary regime and 
restore the Iraqi monarchy. In doing so, SAVAK built connections with Iraqi feudal, pro-
Hashemite, and military generals to form a coup against Qasim. “I was called to SAVAK’s 
headquarter. SAVAK Director, Brigadier General Teymour Bakhtiar, raised an interesting 
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issue [on planning a coup in Iraq]. Had this plan come successfully through, it would have 
been SAVAK’s masterpiece in the world.”205 The plan--later known as ‘Rescue Iraq’--was 
based on connections with Iraqi pro-Hashemite elites in Beirut and Baghdad.206 Under 
Colonel Hassan Pakravan, Deputy Director of SAVAK, the plan was conducted from 
SAVAK station in Baghdad and Colonel Isa Pejman was selected to lead the plan in Iraq.207 
In the next step, Major Mujtaba Pashaie, Director General Bakhtiar, and Colonel Hassan 
Alavi-Kia visited Beirut to recruit pro-Hashemite Iraqi elites, particularly Abdel-Hadi 
Chalabi.208 SAVAK invited Chalabi and Colonel Mahdavi, head of Iraqi al-Amn al-‘Amm 
[Directorate of General Security (DGS)], to Iran.209 The plan was initially supported by 
King Husain of Jordan whose reign was under the threat of domestic turmoil after Baghdad 
labeled him as the puppet of imperialism and urged the Jordanians to overthrow the 
Hashemite reign. Thus, Bakhtiar, Pashai, and Pejman met King Hussain in Amman to 
implement the plan.210 “During lunch time, Bakhtiar reported a summary of the plan to 
King Husain. The King promised full support for the plan. Then, he ordered Amir Hasan, 
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Minister of Royal Court, to facilitate the cooperation.”211 Later, Colonel Ali Motazed was 
appointed in Amman as Iran’s military attaché, and in return, Colonel Umar Madani was 
assigned to Iran.212 Despite all of these preparations, the plan was terminated. In the middle 
of the talks, Bakhtiar found out that King Hussain intended to revive the Hashemite throne 
in Baghdad and to unite Iraq and Jordan. Therefore, Bakhtiar ordered a stop to cooperation 
with Jordan.213 On top of that, SAVAK realized that pro-Hashemite elites had 
overpromised since they lacked real power on the ground to initiate the plan. The plan of 
‘Rescue Iraq’ came to an end.  
In the aftermath of ‘Rescue Iraq’, SAVAK invested in the Iraqi Shia tribes, like 
Beni-Laam, which were worried about rising communism in Iraq.214 To this end, Isa 
Pejman met Rashid Kiliddar, an influential Shia figures in Kazemain. Nonetheless, the plan 
faced the same fate as ‘Rescue Iraq’. While the majority of the Iraqi population was Shia, 
it had been marginalized from the political and economic domains and thus lacked a 
politically strong organization.  
Unstable Iraq 
Shortly after the establishment of the new regime in Baghdad, more acute struggle 
emerged in Baghdad. Qasim and Arif disagreed on three distinct issues: The Kurdish 
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question, the role of the ICP in the politics, and unification with the UAR. In contrast to 
Qasim, Arif endorsed unity with the UAR. Although Qasim had no plan to give the Kurds 
and the ICP more concessions, he gradually sided with them to deter Arif. In the final 
course of the struggle, Arif was stripped of his power.215 Qasim then pushed the Syrians to 
quit the alliance with Egypt.216 By late 1958, Qasim had consolidated his position as ‘Zaiim 
al-Awwal’ [Sole Leader] in Iraq. Nevertheless, Iraq plunged into chaos.217 Most of the 
Arab military officers were against the Kurds, the ICP, and Qasim’s policy towards 
them.218 Nasserists in Iraq considered the ICP as a major factor in deepening a gap between 
the UAR and Baghdad.219 The instability of Iraq escalated as a Syrian-backed group of 
Pan-Arab and Baathist officers, led by general Abdolvahab Al-Shawaf, seized control of 
Mosul on 6 March 1959. The riot was suppressed by the Iraqi Army, the communist Peace 
Partisans, and Barzani’s Peshmerga. The Mosul riot gave Qasim a pretext to purge 
Nasserists and Baathists from the Iraqi Army and government. The riot also gave the ICP 
an unprecedented influence in Iraq and pushed Qasim towards the Soviet bloc. It was 
within this context that Qasim withdrew from the Baghdad Pact on 24 March 1959. For 
Tehran, the Iron Curtain was descending over Iraq.220  
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As time wore on, the power of the ICP was limited in Iraq. With quelling Mosul’s 
riot and its potential to rally people, the ICP gradually became a threat to Qasim. On 10 
July 1959, serious disorder in Kirkuk occurred as the communist-organized rally ‘Popular 
Resistance Force’ [PRF] and Turkmen fought each other. The Kirkuk riot was a watershed 
for the ICP.221 Harshly condemning the violence in Kirkuk, Qasim held the ICP, rather than 
the Kurds, responsible for the Kirkuk disturbance.222 Like the Mosul riot, Qasim used the 
Kirkuk uprising as a pretext to limit communism in Iraq. By January 1960, Qasim had 
neutralized the ICP and in March 1960, he allowed the formation of a new communist party 
to weaken the ICP.223 SAVAK reports drew an interesting resemblance between the Iraqi 
situation with Iran during Mosaddegh’s era: “Two years after the July Revolution [of 
1958], the Iraqi situation was similar to Iran’s situation under Dr. Mosaddegh. This 
similarity is more vivid in the domestic context than in foreign affairs … Initially, Qasim 
supported the ICP and called them the ‘most patriot Iraqis’ … due to Moscow’s close 
policy towards Qasim, the ICP newspapers were apparently supporting him. However, they 
harshly criticized Qasim’s conservativeness in their private meetings… Qasim was forced 
to limit the ICP. Nonetheless, the ICP supported Qasim and warned radical right groups 
that ‘any anti-Qasim action would be harshly reacted upon and Iraq would face a bloody 
civil war.’ It was just like the Tudeh Party activities in the Mosaddegh era.”224  
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While the Kirkuk riot limited Communism in Iraq, the relationship between Qasim 
and the KDP was apparently unscathed. By late August 1959, the Iraqi communists had 
been purged from Iraqi Kurdistan.225 Well-aware of Qasim’s sense of insecurity, Barzani 
dismissed some pro-communist KDP members. At the KDP Fourth Congress in October 
1959, Barzani replaced pro-communist Hamzah Abdullah with Ibrahim Ahmad as 
secretary-general and allowed the politburo to re-instate Talabani as a member. Despite his 
loyalty to Qasim, Barzani’s rising power was gradually framed as a threat to Baghdad. Well 
aware of a deep, long-standing tension between Barzani-KDP forces and Kurdish Aghas, 
the Iraqi leader tried to incite the Aghas against Barzani.226 By fall 1959, Iraqi Kurdistan 
slowly headed towards a revolt. According to SAVAK, “the people of Sulaymaniyah were 
ready for the Kurdish uprising.”227 In early 1960, Qasim publicly disparaged the Kurds and 
sided with anti-Barzani tribes of the Surchis, the Zibari, and the Harkis. By February 1961, 
Barzani suppressed his foes. His undisputed grip on Kurdistan convinced Qasim to ignore 
his promise to the Kurds to “separate the Kurdish culture from the rest of Iraq and train 
Kurds with the Kurdish language.”228 By December 1960, the Kurds felt frustrated with 
Qasim,229 mainly because of Qasim’s increasing emphasis on Arab nationalism.230 The 
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KDP also accused Baghdad of secret talks with Tehran against the Kurds.231 In the 
meantime, pro-Qasim newspapers called Barzani Mullah al-Ahmar (Red Mullah), calling 
him as a communist puppet. In June 1961, Qasim ultimately ignored the Kurds’ set of 
demands,232 and cut the government stipend and privileges to Barzani. It was within this 
context that Tehran began building ties with the Kurds.  
Planting the Seeds of the Revolt 
As Qasim purged the ICP from his government, a slight détente between Iran and 
Iraq came to the fore. Baghdad stopped anti-Iran propaganda and attempted to revive 
diplomatic relations with Tehran in April 1960. Qasim also rejected Iranian political 
refugees and dissidents to show Tehran his good will.233 As a next step, Qasim appointed 
Abdul-Motalleb Amin as Iraq’s ambassador to Tehran, and in return, Azodi was dispatched 
to Baghdad in May 1960. In the meeting with Azodi, both Qasim and Jawad Hashim, Iraqi 
Foreign Minister, repeated their request for better relations with Iran. On the Iranian side, 
however, there was no consensus. While Foreign Minister Gholam-Abbas Aram tried to 
revive relations between two countries, SAVAK was still suspicious of Qasim’s 
unexpected approach to Tehran. Amidst the tension between Qasim and the ICP, pro-
Qasim forces had accused the Soviets of intervening in Iraqi domestic affairs.234 However, 
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SAVAK considered this tension as a “deceptive one.”235 Indeed, SAVAK attributed 
Qasim’s new policy to both economic motives, as well as his anti-UAR position.236 On the 
other side, Barzani began seeking support from external powers to counterbalance the Iraqi 
threat. Iran was his major target since he had considered the Shah as “the key to [side with] 
the West.”237 Other KDP figures, like Ahmad, were against siding with Tehran. “Barzani 
pleads the U.S. for support. So, he will be with CENTO Pact members [including Iran] and 
imperialism,” Ahmad stated.238 However, nobody could challenge Mullah Mustafa.  
Although Barzani’s policy could be a strategic asset for Iran to contain the Iraqi 
threat, the Shah was still cautious. The Shah’s primary concern was a possible spillover of 
a Kurdish insurgency in Iraq to the Iranian Kurds. In addition to their close connections 
with the Iraqi Kurds, the economic underdevelopment of Iran’s Kurdistan had fed the 
separatist groups. The Shah tried to assuage anti-regime sentiments in Iranian Kurdistan. 
SAVAK officers, particularly Tabrizi, chief of SAVAK Second Office, convinced the Shah 
to introduce some hasty economic reforms in Iranian Kurdistan to contain the rising 
Kurdish separatism in Iran.239  
More significantly, the Shah was rightly worried about Barzani’s connections with 
Moscow. The KDP had sharply criticized the Baghdad Pact as yet another imperialist 
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alliance against the Socialist Bloc, in general, and anti-Kurdish in particular. In an article 
published in Xebat, the official newspaper of the KDP, the Red Army’s role in “the 
liberation of parts of Kurdistan from ‘Iranian Oppression’… and the formation of the 
Democratic Republic of Mahabad” was highly praised.240 The Kurdish-Russian threat 
accelerated with Barzani’s trip to Moscow in January 1961. SAVAK reported that his trip 
was for “the creation of independent Greater Kurdistan, extending from Taurus Mountains 
of Turkey to the Persian Gulf.” The report added that “Barzani stood in front of a fake map 
of the Greater Kurdistan.” Indeed, Tehran considered Barzani’s move as a “Moscow’s plan 
to create a corridor to the north coast of the Persian Gulf by promising him the oil-rich 
Khuzestan.”241 According to SAVAK,  “the [Kurdish-Russian] negotiations lasted more 
than 10 days, but it seems the communist Barzani plans to establish an independent 
Kurdistan out of Kurdish parts of Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Southern Armenia. It is 
said that Khrushchev has promised Barzani to donate part of Southern Armenia to Free 
Kurdistan.”242 
Although the Shah would be eternally suspicious of Barzani, a rising tension 
between the Kurds and Qasim gradually convinced him to contain Iraq by siding with 
Kurdish rebels. Earlier, some of the Kurd leaders, like Sheikh Abdul Qadir, had offered 
SAVAK to launch an insurgency against Baghdad. While the Sheikh assured SAVAK 
officers that the Kurd tribes would join his movement,243 Tehran did not take it seriously 
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mainly due to Sheikh Abdul Qadir’s lack of popularity among the Iraqi Kurds. Conversely, 
Barzani’s popularity had made him the only Kurd leader with a capacity to unite several 
tribes into a formidable paramilitary force. In the aftermath of SAVAK’s unsuccessful 
‘Rescue Iraq’, the only option for Iran to destabilize Iraq was to side with Barzani.  
Shortly before the Iraqi coup, Director Bakhtiar sent Pejman to Iran’s Kurdistan 
region where he secretly crossed the border with Iraq with the support of Colonel Kamali, 
the head of the SAVAK office in Saqez. In the midst of apparently calm Baghdad days, he 
warned SAVAK of an imminent coup in Iraq. The report was, however, mocked by 
SAVAK personnel, Bakhtiar, and even the Shah.244 Pejman visited Turkey Kurdistan and 
Syrian Kurdistan to gather information on the Kurds’ socio-political background. In his 
second report, Pejman reemphasized the possible role of the Kurds in upcoming drastic 
changes in Iraq and recommended that Tehran invest in the Kurdish question in order to 
undermine Iran’s western neighbors. Right after Qasim’s coup, SAVAK followed his 
advice to contact Barzani. As head of the SAVAK station in Baghdad, Pejman met Isa 
Zabihi, head of the KDP in Baghdad, and clarified to him Iran’s new strategic turn towards 
the Iraqi Kurds and asked him to hold a meeting with Barzani.245 Before that, though, he 
went to Sulaymaniyah to meet Jalal Talabani during the Nowruz celebration where he 
successfully convinced him to join the plan.  
In the meantime, Pejman established the first Kurdish-language newspaper in Iran. 
In doing so, he left Tehran for Paris to meet with Kamran Bedir-Khan.246 Pejman explained 
                                                
244 Qaneifard, Erfan, Tondbad-e Havades: Goftogooi ba Isa Pejman [Hurricane of Events: A Dialogue with 
Isa Pejman] (Elm Publication, Tehran, 2011) p. 231. 
 
245 Ibid. p. 97. 
 
246 He was a Sorbonne professor and the head of Kurdish Association in Europe He was also Bedir Khan’s 
grandson, the last ruler of the principality of Cizre-Botan.  
90 
 
to him Iran’s new strategy towards the Kurds. “If the Shah is honest on Iran’s new turn, so 
where is a Kurdish newspaper in Iran then?” Bedir-Khan asked Pejman.247 On his return to 
Tehran, Pejman convinced SAVAK of the advantages of publishing a Kurdish-language 
newspaper for Iran. With a direct SAVAK budget and supported by Sheikh Othman 
Naqshbandi and Adab, a newspaper for Kurdistan was published by Abdolhamid 
Badiozzaman. The Moftizadeh Brothers and Shokrollah Baban managed the newspaper. 
The Kurdish newspaper alarmed both Iran’s Army and Ankara statesmen. Turkey’s 
ambassador to Tehran objected to Iran’s use of Kurdish nationalism in the meeting with 
the Shah. Iranian Army General Jahanbani and General Shahbakhti warned the Shah of 
uncontrollable consequences of this decision in instigating separatist movements in Iran. 
The Shah initially gave an order to stop publishing the newspaper; however, Pejman 
convinced him to republish the newspaper. The Shah then gave an order to restart 
publishing the newspaper, yet in a more limited way.248 Right after publishing the 
newspaper, Bedir-Khan was invited to Tehran and scheduled a dinner with the Shah. The 
Pahlavi monarch promised Bedir-Khan to sponsor international conferences of the Kurdish 
immigrant communities in Europe.  
In addition to publishing a Kurdish newspaper, SAVAK implemented new 
strategies towards the Iraqi Kurds. Colonel Bahrami, director of SAVAK in Kermanshah, 
the most populated Kurd-inhabited city in Iran, offered Tehran to use a provincial radio to 
mobilize Iraqi Kurd tribes along the border by highlighting the corruption within the 
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communist organization in Iraq.249 SAVAK then set a Kurdish radio broadcast channel in 
motion from Radio va Telvizion-e Melli-e Iran [the National Radio and Television 
Organization of Iran] in Kermanshah and Mashhad.250 SAVAK-orchestrated Kurdish 
Radio was an effective propaganda campaign to counterweight both Iraqi revolutionary 
messages and Moscow’s new-founded Kurdish-language broadcasts. Managed by 
Shokrollah Baban, the Kurdish channel cooperated with several Kurdish cultural and 
intellectual figures, like Abdorahman Sharafkandi (He Zhar).251 Indeed, the Newspaper of 
Kurdistan and the Kurdish Radio both resuscitated Iran’s leverage among the Iraqi Kurds. 
SAVAK also built a personal tie with Barzani. Despite strict Iraqi-Russian security 
in Baghdad, Pejman met Barzani for the first time and notified him of the Shah’s full 
readiness in support for the Iraqi Kurds. Barzani immediately welcomed the plan and 
promised him to be Iran’s ‘eternal friend and the Shah’s servant’. In return, he asked Tehran 
not to support other Kurd Aghas, like Sheikh Latif Hafidzadeh and Mohammad-Rashid 
Banehie who were both secretly supported by Iranian border guards.252 SAVAK then 
provided Barzani with a modest amount of ammunition and allowed him to build a radio 
station to operate from Iranian territory.253 SAVAK also thwarted Qasim’s plan to 
assassinate Barzani. “I was informed by Brigadier Fuad Arif, one of few Kurdish generals 
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of the Iraqi Army, of Qasim’s plan to assassinate Barzani. I informed Barzani through 
Talabani to leave Baghdad as soon as possible.”254 At the same time, Colonel Iraj 
Mansourpour was assigned as SAVAK’s military attaché in Iraqi Kurdistan to monitor a 
strategic supply route running to the Iranian border. With SAVAK’s financial support, two 
strategic military bases were built for Barzani’s Peshmerga along the border with Iran. The 
scene was set for the Kurdish revolt. 
Kurdish-Israeli Connections 
In the wake of the formation of the Tehran-Kurdish alliance, Barzani was looking 
for another external power to undermine Baghdad. Strategically speaking, relying on the 
Shah would not be a rational decision for the Kurds. Besides, Barzani considered 
establishing relations with Israel as a key to drag the U.S. into the conflict. On top of that, 
the geopolitical logic of the region led to the formation of the Israeli-Kurdish alliance. As 
a major component of the Israeli Doctrine of Periphery, Israel’s covert support for the 
Kurds was a decisive step in containing Baghdad. Indeed, Baghdad had participated in the 
1948 Arab fighting with the Jewish state without signing any ceasefire agreements with 
Israel. Shortly after the establishment of the peripheral ‘Trident’ pact of 1958, Kamran 
Bedir-Khan was dispatched by Barzani to Zurich, Switzerland, in 1959, where he was 
warmly welcomed by Golda Meir, Israeli Foreign Minister. Bedir-Khan was promised 
unconditional support in fighting against their common foe in Iraq and the creation of a 
non-Arab state. “We told the Kurds … [that] whatever they do, we are supporting them - 
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in war and peace,” Eliezer Tsafrir,.the head of the Mossad’s operations in Iraqi Kurdistan, 
stated.255  
In the middle of 1959, the Shah was still hesitant about siding with the Kurds. 
According to Tsafrir, the Iranians “did not like Mullah Mustafa Barzani because they 
thought he was a Red Mullah . . . because he spent twelve years in Russia as a political 
refugee.”256 Additionally, Tehran was initially quite opposed Israel’s presence in Iraqi 
Kurdistan. Indeed, any support for the Iraqi Kurds without Tehran’s permission might have 
brought up a long-running threat to Iran’s national security. No less important, the Shah 
refrained from exacerbating relations with the Arab states by siding with Israel in support 
of the Iraqi Kurds. Nevertheless, the formation of a Soviet-backed regime claiming part of 
Iran’s territory, the Iranian-Israeli conflict of interest over support for the Iraqi Kurds was 
overcome when Iran permitted advanced Israeli weaponry to go to Barzani through Iran.257  
The Illul Movement of 1961 
On 10 September 1961, an Iraqi Army column was ambushed and massacred by a 
group of Kurdish forces, led by Barzani-allied Abbas Mamand, near Bazyan. Baghdad 
faced two alternatives of either “granting the Kurds autonomy” or “dealing with them by 
force.”258 Qasim went quickly with the Iron Fist strategy. While Barzani had initially stayed 
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out of the conflict, the Iraq Air Force (IAF) bombed Barzan and led him and other Aghas 
to join the fight.259  
The war in Iraqi Kurdistan was not only welcomed by Iran and Israel but also by 
Nasser. Barzani had already turned to Nasser and at the same time stopped supporting 
Khaled Beyk, the head of the Syrian KDP, to satisfy Cairo. Nasser had also promised to 
support the Kurdish demands, though verbally, to weaken Qasim’s brand of Arab 
nationalism 260 Radio Sawt al-Arab [Voice of the Arabs] had been challenging Qasim’s 
regime of Baghdad.261 Nevertheless, Qasim denounced the Kurds as “American 
stooges.”262 The interesting point is that neither Iran nor Israel was aware of Barzani’s 
decision to join the war. Rather, it was the KGB that pressed Barzani to launch the war.263 
It seemed the logic of geopolitical contest with the U.S., as well as Qasim’s anti-ICP 
campaign, changed its policy.264 In a historically unique juncture, the Soviet international 
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competition with the U.S. opened a strategic opportunity for both regional powers, Iran 
and Israel, to side with a local leader like Barzani.  
By December 1961, the Iraqi Army had defeated Mamand’s disorganized forces, 
but Barzani’s skill in irregular warfare in the Zagros Mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan escalated 
the war at the expense of Qasim. Despite Iraqi Air Force superiority, Baghdad troops on 
the ground lacked experience in fighting in the mountains. As fighting continued with 
heavy Iraqi losses, part of Iraqi Kurdistan territory fell under the control of the 
Peshmerga.265 Qasim’s distracting management of the war and his profound distrust of 
military commanders led to the successive defeats of Iraqi Army and damaged his image 
in the military’s eyes. To add insult to injury, his peace offers in November 1961 and March 
1962 were rejected by Barzani. In the meantime, Qasim rejected Moscow’s offer to cease 
the invasion and to accept Barzani’s autonomous government in the north of Iraq.266 The 
war soon became a “full-fledged storm-cloud for Qasim.”267   
The war was a strategic asset for Iran. Almost all of the aid the Kurds received came 
from or passed through Iran. Aware of the Soviet Union’s intensified support for the Iraqi 
Kurds,268 Tehran closed its eyes to the weapon smuggling from the Soviet Union. 
According to SAVAK reports, the Russians provided Barzani with weapons through Iran 
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and Kurdish tribesmen, like Senatmamedi and Aghas of Shakkak Tribe.269 Barzani had 
also conveyed a message to Tehran via Ahmad Towfiq to convince Tehran to side with the 
Kurdish insurgency in Iraq.270 In the following months, elements in SAVAK played a key 
role in changing Iran’s policy towards the Iraqi Kurds. Prime Minister Alam told Julius 
Holmes, the U.S. Ambassador to Tehran, that “up to the present Iran had adopted a hands-
off policy only taking necessary steps to protect the Iran-Iraq border by the deployment of 
forces last summer when there was some possibility that Barzani wars might spill over into 
Iran. Alam said Barzani had approached the Shah on a number of occasions to seek 
assistance against Iraq. He made grand promises of incorporating Iraqi Kurdistan into Iran 
in return.  
While the Shah had rejected his offers, elements of Iran’s military believed helping 
the Kurds might be a viable means of undermining Qasim. On 24 May 1962, the State 
Department indicated that “important elements in the Government of Iran … may be 
considering a change in basic Iranian policy from the past and present line of half-hearted 
opposition to the Kurdish rebellion to one of covert cooperation with the rebels.”271 
Convinced by SAVAK, the Shah considered “more positive position with regard to Iraqi 
Kurds.”272 Iran’s military aid included ordinary guns, like Brno KAR98K, and bullets. The 
military aid flew freely across the border due to Barzani’s “close and friendly” relations 
with Tehran.273 On the other side, Barzani was careful to avoid making trouble for Iran. He 
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warned Iranian Kurds several times not to take any step against the central regime in 
Tehran.274 In response to Iran’s support, Qasim had tried to mobilize Kurdish tribes in 
Western Iran, mainly the Javanroudis, and provided them armament support.275 However, 
the Javanroudi revolt was easily suppressed by Iran’s Army. 
The Iranians, the Americans, and the Kurds 
Interestingly, the Kurdish war became a problematic issue in Iranian-American 
relations. While Tehran considered the Iraqi Kurds as a strategic tool to press Iraq, the U.S. 
did not consider Iraq in the Soviet orbit, particularly after Qasim’s purge of the ICP. The 
U.S. was instead suspicious of Barzani’s ties with Moscow. The U.S. believed the 
establishment of an independent Kurdistan would destabilize both Iran and Turkey and 
provided the Soviets a strategic base at the heart of the Middle East. In late September 
1961, the Kurds even promised the U.S. to join CENTO to function as a “bulwark against 
the Soviet Union.” Nonetheless, James Atkins, the U.S. embassy officer in Baghdad, 
rejected their request and called the Kurdish insurgency an Iraqi internal affair.276 In the 
middle of the war, Barzani publicly pleaded for U.S. support, stating that “We could be 
useful to the United States. As the Communist party serves the interests of the Soviet 
Union, we could serve the United States … Look at our strategic location on the flank of 
any possible Soviet advance into the Middle East through the Caucasus and remember that, 
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whether as guerrillas or as regulars, we are the best soldiers in the Middle East.”277 
Although he promised that an independent Kurdistan would be “another state of the union 
where American firms would enjoy privileged access to Kirkuk oil fields,”278 the U.S. 
rejected his appeals. For the U.S., supporting Barzani would raise domestic threats to Iran 
and Turkey. In the U.S. view, “[Iran’s] interference … portends more of danger than of 
advantage to the essential interests of Iran or the U.S.” However, the U.S. request of Tehran 
to take “a policy of strict neutrality and watchful waiting”, rather than “a commitment, 
overt or covert, to interference,”279 fell on deaf ears.  
The Ramadhan Revolution of 1963 
By winter 1962, the Peshmerga had targeted vital Iraqi infrastructure of oil and gas 
pipelines,280 and conquered Duhok.281 In retaliation, Baghdad escalated air force raids. 
Nonetheless, siding with Iran helped Barzani to resist the Iraqi troops. By late 1962, the 
Kurdish forces inflicted a series of major defeats on the Iraqi Army and damaged its 
morale.282 After the humiliating failure of a twenty-month military campaign against the 
Kurds, Qasim became more politically isolated in Baghdad and that in turn, opened room 
for anti-Qasim Baath Party.283 After secret talks with the Kurds in January 1963, the Baath 
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leader Showkat Aqrawi asked Ahmad not to launch a new invasion in the middle of the 
Army cooperation with coup plotters. In return, they promised the KDP to concede large 
degree of autonomy to Kurdistan.284 On 8 February 1963, a coalition of pro-Nasser forces, 
the Baath officers, and powerful military generals, headed by Abdul-Salam Arif, launched 
a coup, later known as the Ramadan Revolution. Qasim was brought to the court under a 
Arif presidency and was then brutally executed.285 The coup plotters accused Qasim of the 
formation of a “Terror Era” and of weakening the “Arab-Kurdish fraternity.”286 Right after 
the coup, the Baath militia, the National Guard, initiated a brutal campaign against the Iraqi 
communist and made a “blood bath.”287 The coup of 1963 also frightened the Tudeh 
leaders.288 It seemed that Iran’s non-state foreign policy had ultimately borne fruit.  
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285 The new regime consisted of a three-men of Nasserist Arif as President, the Baathist General Ahmad 
Hasan al-Bakr as Prime Minister, and Ali Salih al-Saadi as Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior, 
and Secretary of the Regional (Iraq) Baath Party, all established the National Council of the Revolutionary 
Command (NCRC) that exercised supreme power. 
 
286 The Declaration of Iraq Ramadhan Revolution, Baghdad to Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 
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Creation—The Lebanese Shia 
“We should combat and contain the threat [of Nasserism] in the East coast of the Mediterranean to prevent 
shedding blood on the Iranian soil,” Colonel Pashaie explained in a SAVAK meeting.289 
 
Pan-Arabism and Tehran-Beirut Connection 
The rise of Pan-Arabism prompted Tehran to contain Cairo in the Middle East. In 
addition to the formation of the Baghdad Pact, Tehran turned its attention to the eastern 
Mediterranean to challenge Nasser in Lebanon, as one of the cultural-intellectual centers 
of the Arab World. To contain the Egyptians, Tehran began cultivating connections with 
Lebanese communities. Despite historically religious-cultural ties with the Lebanese Shia, 
Iran initially focused on building ties with powerful Maronite elites. Already consolidating 
their position in Lebanon by assuming the presidency since Lebanon’s independence, the 
Christian Maronite elites considered Pan-Arabism as a new driving force for the Arab 
Sunni to challenge the political order. In the aftermath of the Suez Crisis of 1956, President 
Camile Chamoun approached the U.S. and the UK, and stood aside from the Baghdad Pact 
members, especially Iran. While the UAR-backed Pan-Arab elements in Lebanon, like 
Saheb Salam, Walid Jumblatt, and Ibrahim Kulaylat, supported Egypt, President Chamoun 
and parts of the Maronites elite tacitly sided with the invasion of Suez and refused to break 
diplomatic relations with the West.  
In December 1957, the Shah met Chamoun. In the meeting, both leaders stressed 
opposing any foreign intervention, i.e., the Egyptian intervention, in the domestic affairs 
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of their countries.290 Shortly after that, the formation of the UAR brought political turmoil 
within the Arab societies, including Lebanon. While the Maronites intended to keep 
Lebanon aligned with the West, the Sunni led by Prime Minister Rashid Karami pushed 
Beirut to join the UAR. In May 1958, Chamoun asked Iran, Turkey, and the Arab League 
to support Beirut against the UAR-backed Sunni-Druze parties in Lebanon.291  
It was only Iran that sided with Beirut by instructing SAVAK to deliver military 
aid to the Maronitess. The operation was managed by Air Force Colonel Hamid Nasseri, 
Iran’s military attaché in Beirut, and particularly by Mansour Qadar, director of Iran’s 
consulate in Damascus at the time.292 Iranian support for Beirut convinced Israel to provide 
the Maronitess with the Soviet-made weapons already captured in the 1956 Suez War. The 
Israeli armaments were loaded at Mehrabad airport, Tehran, and then delivered to pro-
Chamoun forces in Beirut through SAVAK.293 SAVAK-Mossad-Beirut operation was 
monitored by Ahmad Azima, a naval officer in SAVAK’s Foreign Intelligence section, and 
Emir Farid Chehab, Director of General Security.294 Rahmat Atabaki, Iran’s ambassador 
to Beirut, was also involved in the operation. Nonetheless, Tehran-Beirut alliance did not 
lead to building an effective bulwark against Pan-Arabism. According to Qadar, “Pro-
Chamoun forces received armaments through Iran. However, they sold most of the 
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291 The UAR supporter parties included the Independent Nasserite Movement (INM or Harakat al-Nasiriyin 
al-Mustaqillin or simply Al-Murabitoun) led by Ibrahim Kulaylat, the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP or al-
Hizb al-Taqadummi al-Ishtiraki) led by Kamal Jumbalatt, and the Lebanese Communist Party or LCP.  
 
292 According to Qadar, it seemed Nasseri was not reliable at the time. He was also one of Major General 
Batmanghelich’s relatives. See Interview with General Mansour Qadar, Oral History, Foundation for Iranian 
Studies. 
 
293 Interview with General Mansour Qadar, Oral History, Foundation for Iranian Studies. 
 
294 Chehab was also the head of the Anti-Communism Section of Lebanon.  
102 
 
weapons to pro-Nasser forces! Nasserist elements also sold weapons to Pro-Chamoun 
forces. There was a huge corruption. It was a totally fruitless operation.”295 Iran needed a 
strong ally in Lebanon. 
The Iraqi Coup of 1958 and SAVAK’s ‘Green Plan’ 
On 14 July 1958, the Iraqi Hashemite dynasty was overthrown in a coup. This 
event, along with the rise of the UAR-backed militias in Lebanon instigated Chamoun to 
plead with President Eisenhower for military support. At Saudi King Saud’s request,296 as 
well as the Shah’s pressure in his meeting with Eisenhower in July 1958,297 the U.S. 
deployed the Sixth Fleet marines in Beirut in operation Blue Bat on July 15.298 
Simultaneously, British troops landed in Jordan. However, Lebanon’s internal crisis 
persisted until Chamoun was replaced by Army commander Fuad Chehab on 31 July 1958. 
Chehab immediately implemented political reforms and social developments to slow down 
the tide of Nasserism.299 Though partially successful, Chehab’s political reform did not 
prevent the rise of Pan-Arabism in Lebanon. Fueled by the 1958 Iraq coup, Pan-Arabism 
had attracted many eyes and hearts among young, urban Sunni and Druze.  
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The U.S. limited action convinced the Shah that he could not rely on his allies in 
containing Cairo. Thus, he instructed Director Bakhtiar to prepare a plan to contain a 
growing threat of Pan-Arabism. Led by Colonel Hassan Pakravan, the Iranian security 
service planned to restore Hashemite monarchy of Iraq.300 While the ‘Rescue Iraq’ plan 
was a failure for Tehran, SAVAK continuous visits to Beirut set a benchmark in a 
geographical zone beyond the Iraqi Kurdistan. As a democratic, yet fragile, society, rife 
with multifarious religious-ethnic identities, Lebanon was a perfect target for Tehran to 
build its non-state foreign policy. SAVAK soon implemented a new plan, known as the 
‘Green Plan’. As Major Pashaie’s argued, “We should combat and contain the threat [of 
Nasserism] in the East coast of the Mediterranean to prevent shedding blood on the Iranian 
soil.”301 Iran’s aim of shaping the Green Plan was to contain Pan-Arabism in Lebanon, 
instead of its western border with Iraq, by making connections with the Lebanese Shia, 
rather than the Maronites. Led by Air Force officer Hamid Nasseri, Head of SAVAK 
Station in Beirut,302 SAVAK’s Green Plan increased Iran’s financial support for the Shia 
community to $33,000 annually. Earlier, Iran’s slight support of the Middle Eastern Shia, 
including the Lebanese Shia, was provided through the Pahlavi Foundation (Bonyad-i 
Pahlavi--later called as the Alavi Foundation after the 1979 Revolution). The Foundation 
channeled financial aid to the Shia communities of the region through religious networks, 
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especially Grand Ayatollah Muhammad-Hussein Borujerdi. Under the Green Plan, 
SAVAK, instead of the Marja’iyya networks, directly distributed 80 percent of financial 
aid to Shia schools and clergies in Lebanon.303  
Though the Shia community was SAVAK’s major target, the Green Plan provided 
networks with other Lebanese communities and parties. In the eve of the parliamentary 
election of 1960, Tehran launched an anti-Nasser campaign to weaken Pan-Arabism. 
SAVAK dedicated $330,000 to cover financial expenses of the Maronite Phalanges--also 
known as the Kataeb Party (al-Kataib al-Lubnaniya or Phalangist Party)--and its leader 
Pierre Gemayel,304 former president Chamoun, and National Block (Al-Kutlah Al-
Wataniyyah) led by Raymond Edde.305 The Dashnak Party, a right-wing Armenian party, 
was also supported when Iran approved Yerevan-Beirut flight passing its territory. SAVAK 
indirectly supported anti-Nasser newspapers and magazines, particularly Al-Hayat and its 
well-known columnist, Kamel Morwa, and the Daily Star.306 The Syrian Social Nationalist 
Party (Al-Ḥizb Al-Suri al-Qawami al-Ijtimai or SSNP) was among SAVAK’s initial targets 
since they used to receive financial support from Hashemite Iraq.307 However, the Shah 
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himself ordered the removal of the SAVAK list due to the SSNP emphasis on the concept 
of the Greater Syria after the formation of the UAR.  
Sadr and Tehran 
By the late 50s, Musa Sadr’s reputation in Qom as a young Mujtahid had 
flourished.308 However, a constitutive event changed the trajectory of his life. In December 
1957, Seyyed Abd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din died, and Sadr was immediately invited by 
Sharaf al-Din’s followers to Tyre. Indeed, Sharaf al-Din had left a will naming Seyyed 
Musa as his successor before his death.309 Seyyed Ja’far, Sharaf al-Din’s son, asked Seyyed 
Reza Sadr to convince his younger brother to lead the Shia in Tyre.310 According to 
Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad-Ali Abtahi, Sharaf al-din’s children asked Seyyed Musa to 
lead the Shia in the south of Lebanon in their father’s funeral ceremony in Najaf. They also 
went to Qom and asked Grand-Ayatollah Boroujerdi to convince Seyyed Musa to accept 
to go to Lebanon. Indeed, most of Lebanese Shia clergy were old and corrupt at the time.311 
Boroujerdi agreed and dispatched Seyyed Musa to Lebanon.312  
In addition to Sharaf al-Din’s Testament, it seems Sadr’s departure to Southern 
Lebanon had been part of Grand-Ayatollah Boroujerdi’s religious plan. As the most 
legitimate cleric and the last Shia Marja whose religious authority was consensually 
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accepted by the Shia World, Boroujerdi took an innovative strategy by dispatching his 
students to other countries to keep and expand Shia fiqh. In doing so, Mehdi Haeri-Yazdi 
was sent to the U.S. and Mohammad Mohagheghi Lahiji was sent to Hamburg in the late 
50s. Boroujerdi had initially intended to send Seyyed Musa Sadr as his representative in 
Italy with full authority. However, Seyyed Musa declined Grand-Ayatollah’s request; 
instead, he asked Boroujerdi to dispatch him to Lebanon. Other senior Marjas, including 
Ayatollah Abul-Qasim Khu’i and Ayatollah Mohsen al-Hakim, as well as Sheikh Morteza 
Al-Yasin, had already expressed their request to Sadr to accept leading the Shia in 
Lebanon. Despite Sadr’s family’s objection,313 Grand-Ayatollah agreed and Sadr traveled 
to Tyre in late 1959.  
In the aftermath of the 1953 CIA-orchestrated coup against nationalist Prime 
Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, the Shia Marja and ulama, particularly Ayatollah Abol-
Ghasem Kashani, Mosaddegh’s former ally, in Iran had been forcefully marginalized from 
the political realm. With a tightened political atmosphere in Iran, the majority of Shia 
ulama followed Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi’s apolitical line. Their activities were limited 
to religious ones, including rallying people against the Bahais. For a young, ambitious 
clergyman who was fond of political activity, leaving Iran and leading a community, even 
a remote and powerless one, was a windfall opportunity.  
According to another narrative, SAVAK seemed to play a key role at this juncture. 
With the Green Plan, SAVAK had become more involved in detailed politics in Lebanon, 
particularly in the South. In the aftermath of Sharaf al-Din’s death, Director Bakhtiar asked 
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Seyyed Nasser al-Din, Sharaf al-Din’s elder son who had been studying in Hawza in Qom 
to lead the Lebanese Shia. Pressed by Seyyed Ahmad Tabatabaie Qomi, a close Sadr’s 
relative,314 Bakhtiar changed his mind and considered Seyyed Musa as a possible leader of 
the Shia in Lebanon. In his meeting with young Sadr, Bakhtiar was impressed by his 
personality. Bakhtiar agreed with his leadership under one condition, that Sadr should 
cooperate with Tehran, or according to Qadar, to be “Iran’s ally in Lebanon.”315 As Qadar 
claimed, with Bakhtiar’s agreement, Boroujerdi--who never objected to the government--
appointed Sadr as the Imam of Tyre.316 Bakhtiar immediately gave instruction to prepare 
Seyyed Musa’s travel to Lebanon.317 In the wake of Iran’s search to build its ties with the 
Lebanese Shia, Sadr’s ambitions to lead the Shia community, his Lebanese-Iranian 
background, his approval by Sharaf al-Din, Boroujerdi’s religious plan, and SAVAK’s 
Green Plan all resulted in Sadr’s leaving Iran for the south of Lebanon.  
The Young Leader 
Sadr arrived in the south of Lebanon in late 1959. Upon his arrival, he faced some 
protests from several Lebanese Shia who backed Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Hussein 
Fadlallah as the head of the Shia. Though religious, Sadr’s opposition had an Arab-
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superiority point of view, criticizing Iranian-born Seyyed. However, Sadr’s charisma soon 
attracted the Shia hearts. “Sadr was a handsome man … He was a smart, educated, talkative 
and charismatic man.”318 A tall (66"), good-looking with piercing green eyes, intelligent, 
and modern ‘Man of God’ who spoke stylish Arabic and French was supposed to change 
the Shia position in Lebanon.  
The Shia had been suffering poverty and underdevelopment with a lack of political 
identity of their own. Marginalized by a unique sectarian system of political representation, 
the Lebanese Shia lacked considerable political authority and privileges. Despite their 
growing numerical weight, the Shia’s requests for a larger proportion of positions in the 
decision-making process and reshaping Lebanese national identity had been ignored. It was 
in this context that Sadr began fighting for promoting the downtrodden and disenfranchised 
of his community and reviving their collective identity. He began taking a road of 
institutionalization. In contrast to most of the traditional clergymen, Sadr was a clear-
sighted man who “embraced modern technology and understood both the power of public 
opinion and the tools of popular mobilization in the modern world.”319 He taught Persian 
language and several classes on Iran at the Amaliyah School, Fiqh at a Sunni school of Al-
Maghasid, and Islamic philosophy at St. Joseph University in Beirut. He also reestablished 
religious institutions and charitable foundations, like Jami’at al-Birr wa al-Ihsan 
(Community of Goodness and Welfare) wherein Shia orphans were trained,320 as well as 
al-Mu’assasa al-Ijtima’iyya (The Social Institute), a Shia orphanage in Tyre. In 1963, Sadr 
                                                
318 Interview with Major General Mansour Qadar, Oral History, Foundations for Iranian History. 
 
319 Bonnin, Richard, Arrows of the Night: Ahmed Chalabi and the Selling of the Iraq War (Anchor; Reprint 
edition November 13, 2012) p. 57. 
 
320 Jami’at al-Birr wa al-Ihsan was first established by Seyyed Abd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din. 
 
109 
 
founded Bayt al-Fatat (The Girls’ Home), a nursery and sewing school, and then 
established Ma’had al-Dirasat al-Islamiyya (The Institute of Islamic Studies) as well as 
‘Maahad a-Darasat al-Eslamiyya’ (the center of Islamic Research). He also established a 
carpet weavering factory.321 Sadr’s innovative activity and modern ideas were gradually 
supported by wealthy merchants and urban youth.  
SAVAK initially welcomed Sadr’s social activities. His programs could contain 
both Pan-Arabism and Marxism in Lebanon by improving the Shia position and dissuading 
them from joining Pan-Arab parties. While initially considered as an inclusive ideology, 
Pan-Arabism did not attract the Shia minority since the idea of a Greater Arab Nation 
would be another manifestation of a predominant Sunni authority. A Shia community with 
a strong collective identity would function as Iran’s natural ally by counterweighting Sunni 
Pan-Arab powers. In contrast to Iraqi Kurdistan, Tehran avoided providing military support 
for its ally in the east coast of the Mediterranean; rather, it was Sadr’s message that could 
accomplish Iran’s Green Plan. Sadr maintained a close connection with the Iranian 
embassy and SAVAK’s station in Beirut. Initially, he was in touch with Nasseri. Qadar 
claimed that “Nasseri was an angry and hot-tempered, while Sadr was a Machiavellian 
talkative man. So, they could not work with each other.”322 On the one side, ambitious 
Bakhtiar who had a plan to gather political and religious elites around himself considered 
Sadr as a possible strong ally. As Qadar claimed, he instructed Sadr to connect himself 
through Pashaie and bypassed Iran’s embassy. Sadr had a weekly meeting with Major 
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Pashaie, head of SAVAK Station in Beirut, from 20 November 1960 to 20 December 
1963.323 In addition to his charisma, it was Pashaie who initially facilitated Sadr’s 
connection with Lebanese elites in Beirut. These connections developed a long-term 
friendship between Sadr and Pashaie. According to SAVAK documents, Sadr put emphasis 
on his Iranian background and expressed his great respect for Iran in his speeches in several 
meetings.324 Nonetheless, Sadr never became a lackey agent for the Shah’s regime. He was 
aware of keeping his distance from the regime and never accepted Tehran’s direct financial 
support. Sadr still believed that the Shah’s direct support of the Shia might prompt other 
regional countries to obstruct the Shia interests in Lebanon. Within a fragmented society 
like Lebanon, Iran’s direct support for the Shia could fuel a devastating regional 
competition and power interventions in Lebanon. Furthermore, a remote, non-Arab state 
like Iran, with its covert relation with Israel, could pose a threat to a marginal community 
like the Shia. Despite these concerns, Sadr still kept his ties with Iranian officers. 
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V. Chapter 4 
Ascension: Iran’s Non-State Foreign Policy in 1963-1968 
 
       Iran’s non-state foreign policy became more proactive in this period. The coup of 1963 
was a major victory for Iran’s non-state foreign policy. However, the Iraqi threat to Iran 
was still alive. Despite its anti-communist nature, the Baath-Arif regime overemphasized 
its Pan-Arab tone, declared a territorial claim on the Eastern bank of Arvand Rud and the 
Iranian province of Khuzestan, and revived negotiations with Nasser over the Arab Unity. 
Therefore, when Baghdad reinvaded Kurdistan in Summer 1963, Tehran intensified its 
support for the Iraqi Kurds. Despite the U.S. clear objection, under both the Kennedy and 
the Johnson presidencies, Iran sided with the Kurds in order to contain Pan-Arab Iraq. 
Iran’s connections with the Iraqi Kurds turned away the Iraqi Army from posing a threat 
to Khuzestan and the Persian Gulf. 
     Simultaneously, Iran kept its ties with the Lebanese Shia in order to set a bulwark 
against Nasser’s leverage in Lebanon. This connection was strong enough that even Sadr’s 
indirect support for the riot of 1964 and Ayatollah Khomeini, as well as former SAVAK 
Director Bakhtiar’s meeting with Sadr, did not lead to a transformation of Iran’s non-state 
foreign policy in Lebanon. Conversely, Iran’s ambassadors to Beirut were in complete 
coordination with Sadr whose reputation as a national figure reached its zenith in the late 
60s. 
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Ascension—The Iraqi Kurds 
“Wherever the Kurds live, it is Iran.” Mullah Mustafa Barzani 
 
“The Kurds are Iranian wherever they live.” Ibrahim Ahmad 
 
The First Baath Regime 
In the aftermath of the coup of 1963, the Shah thought that formation of an anti-
communist regime in Baghdad would decrease the Soviet leverage in the region. Despite 
initial cooperation with Iraq in extraditing communist refugees, Tehran was suspicious of 
intimate Baghdad-Cairo relations. The coup of 1963 revived the issue of Arab unity among 
Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. With the negotiation between Iraq and Egypt on 22 February 1963, 
the Shah concluded that the coup would lead to Egyptian power expansion in the region. 
Iran needed the Iraqi Kurds most. 
Though initially hailing the coup, both the Kurd and the Arab-speaking Shia 
population of Iraq opposed becoming part of a “larger Arab entity dominated by the Sunni 
Arab.”325 Upon the arrival of an Iraqi delegation to Cairo for the second round of talk, 
Barzani dispatched Talabani there to meet Nasser.326 Nasser was among the few Arab 
leaders who believed in a peaceful solution of the Kurdish question.327 With the coup of 
1963, he urged Baghdad to establish an Iraqi federal system, like Yugoslavia and the 
USSR, and authorize autonomy for the Kurdish minority. In a meeting with Nasser, 
Talabani expressed a long-standing Kurdish-Arab friendship while arguing that Iraq unity 
with Egypt and Syria would water down the Kurdish population and marginalize them 
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more in an Arab-dominated society. Thus, he asked for Cairo’s guarantee to support an 
autonomous Kurdistan. Although Nasser “gave his full backing to Kurdish demands for 
autonomy within Iraq and hoped that [a] rapid agreement could be reached,”328 he warned 
the Kurds of the Shah’s instrumentalist view towards the Kurdish war. “Be aware that 
Mohammad Reza Shah is the Kurds’ enemy. He possesses a great portion of the Kurdish 
population. If he supports you, it is because he wants to use you against the Arabs to 
achieve his goals,”329 Nasser told Talabani. He also asked the Kurdish delegation to 
postpone their demand for the regional government.330 As another negotiation with 
Baghdad began on 5 March 1963, the KDP announced their demands and asked the Arab 
leaders to recognize Kurdistan as “the fourth pillar, though depending on Iraq pillar, in a 
tripartite Arab Federation of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq.”331 The Kurdish leaders threatened to 
leave the negotiations if Baghdad refused their demands.332 Nevertheless, fear of the Iraqi 
                                                
328 Baghdad 501 to the U.S. Department of State, March 1, 1963 (KPL/NSF/Countries/Box117a/Iraq.3/63-
5/63/doc.2), pp.1-2.  
 
329 Qaneifard, Erfan, Pas az Shast Sal: Zendegi va Khaterat-e Jalal Talabani [After Sixty Years: The Life and 
Memories of Jalal Talabani] (Elm Publication, Tehran) p.783. 
 
330 Baghdad 501 to the U.S. Department of State, March 1, 1963 (KPL/ NSF/Countries/Boxes117a/Iraq.3/63-
5/63/doc.2), pp.1-2; Heikal, Nasser’s ghostwriter and editor-in-chief of the Al-Ahram, also put emphasis on 
the peaceful settling the Kurdish question in the north of Iraq. See Baghdad 774 to Iran’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 28 April 1963. 
 
331 London 1305 to Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 August 1963. Their major demands included: 1. The 
recognition of Iraq with two mutual nations of the Kurd and the Arab with equal rights, 2. The formation of 
a Kurdish autonomous region constituted of Sulaymaniyah, Kirkuk, Erbil, and the Kurdish-inhabitant of 
Mosul, 3. The establishment of an executive council as well as legislative council for the administration of 
the Kurdish region and membership of the Kurdish leaders to the Revolutionary Council, 4. The proper 
division of money coming from Oil and border Customs between the Kurds and the Arabs and 5. The 
membership of the Kurds in the government with regards to their population. See London to Iran’s Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 8 May 1963. 
 
332 On 8 April 1963 Jalal Talabani stated that “If Iraq wants to join the UAR, the Kurds must have their 
autonomous government. If Iraq decides to be annexed in the greater alliance with other Arab countries, then 
the Kurds should have their provincial identity. The Kurds have no intention to get independence.” See 
Qaneifard, Erfan, Pas az Shast Sal: Zendegi va Khaterat-e Jalal Talabani (After Sixty Years: The Life and 
Memories of Jalal Talabani), Elm Publication, Tehran, p.710. Barzani also threatened Baghdad of the 
114 
 
Shia’ possible demand of autonomy convinced Baghdad to adopt a hardline policy towards 
the Kurds.333 On 10 March 1963, Ali Salih al-Saadi stated that Iraq was only ready for a 
cultural, instead of political, autonomy of the Kurds.334 Baghdad claimed that most of the 
Kurdish tribes would not follow Barzani’s fruitless adventure.335 In mid-April 1963, Iraq, 
Egypt, and Syria signed a formal agreement to form the Arab Confederal Republic while 
the Kurds’ rights were mentioned.336  
J.F.K versus the Shah  
Since the outbreak of the Kurdish War in 1961, Iran’s non-state foreign policy had 
stood in contrast with the U.S. policy in Iraq. The U.S. had welcomed the formation of the 
anti-communist Baath regime. “As a result of the Iraqi coup,” the U.S. Department of State 
argued, “the Soviets suffered a setback in Iraq and their general Middle Eastern 
policies.”337 In the U.S. view, the formation of an anti-communist federation of Iraq, Egypt, 
and Syria would function as a major bulwark against the Soviet infiltration in the region.338 
The U.S. ambassador to Beirut declared that “the U.S. supports the Baath regimes of Iraq 
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and Syria since they follow anti-communist policies. The U.S. also avoids turning away 
from Nasser because he may approach the communists.”339 They were still worried about 
destructive results of the Kurdish War in weakening the Iraqi anti-Communist regime and 
spurring the Kurdish separatist groups in Turkey and Iran that could be used by Moscow.340 
The Kurds had already asked the U.S. officials to press Baghdad for a peaceful settlement 
of the crisis.341 Nonetheless, their appeal was turned down. The American officials argued 
that the Kurdish question was “strictly an internal Iraqi matter in which there is no role for 
the United States either directly or indirectly.”342 Indeed, the U.S. support for Baghdad 
stood in sharp contrast with Iran’s non-state foreign policy. The Kennedy administration 
pressed Iran not to interfere in the crisis, warning Tehran to “keep [its] hands off” Iraq. The 
U.S. officials argued that the Shah’s policy towards the Iraqi Kurds was so “short-sighted” 
that it could be “inimical to Iran’s overall security interests.”343 They also warned the Shah 
to “stay out of what could become a political and military morass for a foreign state.”344 
However, when the U.S. secretly provided arms for the Iraqi army,345 the Shah intensified 
Iran’s support for the Kurds to undermine the U.S. policy.  
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By early June 1963, the last round of Iraqi-Kurdish negotiation, especially over 
Kirkuk’s rich oilfields, deadlocked. Although Arif was partly inclined to settle the crisis 
peacefully, the Baath Prime Minister Hassan al-Bakr could not digest a peace agreement 
with Barzani who had brutally suppressed the 1959 Baath riot in Mosul. As Moscow 
gradually sided with the Kurds and initiated an anti-Baath radio broadcasted in Iraqi 
Kurdistan, the U.S. thought that a “failure to find a political solution to the Kurdish problem 
would benefit only the Soviets and the Iraqi communists.”346 Barzani apparently agreed 
with the negotiation and asked Baghdad to establish a national unity regime of both left 
and right groups--a request that, according to Talabani, was against the peace process.347 
Amidst the fragile negotiations, Iraqi forces had mobilized and built up military posts in 
the Kurdish area. Air strength had been augmented proportionately.348 On 5 June 1963, the 
Baath troops surrounded Sulaymaniyah and proclaimed martial law. The Kurds, in return, 
threatened to explode oil pipelines.349 War was inevitable. 
The First Baath-Kurdish War 
On 9 June 1963, Baghdad launched an invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan with 45,000 Iraqi 
troops, nearly two-thirds of the Iraqi army.350 As a heavy bombardment of Kurdish villages 
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began,351 Radio Baghdad called the Kurdish Peshmerga communist and separatist.352 The 
Baath forces arrested the Kurdish delegate in Baghdad,353 and gave an ultimatum to the 
Kurds to surrender their weapons and announced a 280 thousand dollar award for killing 
Barzani.354 President Arif claimed, “The Kurdish insurrection will finish soon. There is no 
more room to tolerate them.”355 In the meantime, Iraqi newspaper al-Jamahir highlighted 
the Kurdish-Communist connections and denounced the Soviet infiltration in Iraq. The al-
Shaab newspaper also accused Barzani of his efforts to build an “Oil Empire” in the north 
of Iraq.356 Meanwhile, Iraqis mobilized anti-Barzani tribes.357 Baghdad expected an easy 
victory.358 According to the al-Minar newspaper, however, “It is said that history repeats 
itself; however, it seems it does so in Iraq continuously.”359  
The Kurdish War of 1963 widened a gap between the pro-Nasser forces, like the 
Harikat Party, on the one side, and the Baath Party, on the other side, in Baghdad. Although 
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the Baath Party had been initially backed by Nasser,360 they never fully supported political 
unity with Cairo and Nasser’s leadership.361 Thus, the Baath parties of Syria and Iraq 
limited most Nasserist newspapers and purged their elements from the government and the 
army.362 In retaliation, Cairo launched harsh propaganda against Baghdad.363 While the 
Baath regime framed the formation of Kurdistan as a “new Israel,” planned by 
“Imperialism, Communism, and Zionism” and headed by Barzani as “one of their agents” 
to “contain the Arab Unity,” Cairo denounced the Baath Party as a “war criminal” against 
the Kurds.364 Although Nasser’s support for the Kurds was “not decisive,”365 the idea of 
Iraqi unity with Egypt cracked with the Kurdish War. In a unique historical juncture, 
Tehran sided with its principal regional enemy over the support for the Kurds. 
In the meantime, Baghdad approach the Baath regime of Syria to revive the Arab 
Unity. Syrian Prime Minister Salah ad-Din al-Bitar promised Iraq military cooperation to 
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crush the Kurdish rebels.366 A possible spill-over into its Kurdish minority and a discovery 
of oilfields in its predominantly Kurdish populous province of Jazira convinced Damascus 
to participate in the Kurdish War.367 Damascus provided aircraft and armored vehicles and 
dispatched 6,000 soldiers to join the military campaign against the Kurds. This cooperation 
would usher in the Iraqi-Syrian unity, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued.368 Backed 
by Damascus, the Iraqi Army savagely destroyed the Kurdish villages and massacred the 
civilian Kurds.369 By September 1963, the Iraqi Army had captured major parts of the Iraqi 
Kurdistan, including Barzan and Sulaymaniyah.370 Nevertheless, Baghdad’s initial plan to 
suppress the Peshmerga in a few weeks proved to be unrealistic. Rather, its “costly, 
prolonged campaign” to Kurdistan widened a breach between the Kurds and Arabs.371 By 
Summer 1963, the Kurdish War had become a major regional issue.  
Meanwhile, Moscow threatened Baghdad to support the Kurds.372 After the Syrian-
Iraqi invasion of Kurdistan, the Russians intensified their anti-Baath propaganda and 
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suspended their military aid to Baghdad.373 The ICP leaders also sided with the Kurds.374 
Barzani, in return, permitted the communists to enter Iraqi Kurdistan.375 On 6 May 1963, 
the Soviet Union officially announced its support for the Kurds,376 pressing the UN to 
investigate the Kurdish War and to level charges of genocide against Baghdad.377 The 
Russian move prompted the U.S. to intensify its support for Baghdad. When the Kurds 
delivered a letter to the U.S. consulate in Tabriz, Iran, and asked the U.S. to press Baghdad 
for a truce or ceasefire,378 the U.S. rebuffed it. By Fall 1963, the Kurdish War had become 
a Cold War battlefront.   
In contrast to the U.S., Iran viewed the Kurdish War through the regional lens, 
rather than the international Cold War one. The resumption of the war was Iran’s major 
tool to resist Pan-Arabism. In early September 1963, Barzani traveled to Tehran to meet 
the Shah for the first time and asked him for more substantial support. The Shah agreed 
and instructed SAVAK to mobilize in support of the Kurds. On September 16, Director 
Pakravan met Julius C. Holmes, the U.S. ambassador to Iran, and asked him to consider 
the Shah’s view on the Kurds. According to the Shah, Pakravan stated, Barzani’s main goal 
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was a “limited autonomy,” rather than an “independent Kurdistan,” and the Kurdish leader 
preferred negotiating with Baghdad; therefore, the U.S. should deliver a strong guarantee 
for the Kurds to convince them to stop the war.379 Well-aware of the reason behind the U.S. 
support for Baghdad, i.e., the anti-communist nature of the Baath regime of Baghdad,380 
the Shah was confident that his determining role in building the U.S.-Kurdish alliance 
would transform Barzani’s image to that of an opportunist, rather than a Russian puppet.381 
It was the first time that Tehran officially conducted diplomacy on behalf of the Kurds.  
Nonetheless, the Shah’s request was turned down by the Kennedy administration. 
The Department of State recommended that an “essential part of any policy must be to beat 
up the Shah on this score.”382 The U.S. ambassador to Baghdad also warned Iran’s 
ambassador of Tehran’s support of the Kurds.383 But Tehran did not consider it and kept 
providing “limited support to the Kurds.”384 SAVAK transported weaponry that was 
mainly prepared from Europe to Iraqi Kurdistan.385 In addition to facilitating Israeli 
assistance in providing food for the Kurds,386 Iran purchased a radio transmitter from 
Germany for the Kurds,387 later smuggled it into Iraqi Kurdistan, and set it up in a large 
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cave with modern tools.388 Monitored by Pejman and Isa Zabihi,389 the Free Radio of 
Kurdistan Democratic Party, also known as Radio SAVAK among Kurdish people, 
launched anti-Baghdad propaganda.390 Most of the KDP declarations were published under 
SAVAK’s monitoring in Iran’s embassy in Baghdad.391 At the same time, Iran ignored 
Iranian Kurds across the border with Iraq.392 Indeed, Barzani’s resistance against the Iraqi 
army encouraged the Iranian Kurds, particularly from Mahabad, to join the Peshmerga in 
their fight with Baghdad.393 By Summer 1963, the Kurdish revolt had been a significant 
element in Iran’s non-state foreign policy.  
The Iraqi Kurdish Ceasefire of 1964 
As the war was spiraling out of control, the power struggle in Baghdad escalated 
over the issue of Arab unity. While al-Saadi supported unity with Syria, Prime Minister al-
Bakr tried to resume unity with Nasser. The clash finally convinced Arif to purge the Baath 
Party in a coup of 18 November 1963.394 The collapse of the Baath government 
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disentangled Arif from the hardliner pressure on the Kurdish question. Convinced by 
Nasser and Algerian President Ahmad Ben Bella, Arif inaugurated rounds of negotiations 
with the Kurds. He also asked the Syrian army to leave the northern Iraq. Vying to gain 
dominance over Kurdistan, rather than keep fighting a bloody war with Baghdad, Barzani 
welcomed Arif’s goodwill.395 “We should stop fighting … Arif is a [Muslim] believer, and 
the believer should be believed,” Barzani stated.396 In contrast to SAVAK’s prediction, 
Barzani signed a peace agreement with Arif on 10 February 1964. Although the ceasefire 
did not include Kurdish autonomy and used a Pan-Arab euphemism ‘the Northern Region’, 
instead of ‘Kurdistan’, Barzani accepted it and then launched a brutal campaign against the 
ICP.397 Barzani contended that “Iraqi state is like a father who thinks about the future and 
progress of its family and children.” He also praised Nasser and claimed that the Kurds 
would be “ready in [joining the Arab regimes of the region in] fighting with Israel.”398  
With the ceasefire of 1964, the U.S. diplomats in Baghdad appreciated Barzani for 
having “wisely resisted Persian blandishments” and urged him to “remain calm and try [to] 
work out [a] solution with GOI [Government of Iraq].”399 Conversely, the ceasefire 
shocked the Shah. The Iraqi Kurds who had been the main elements in Iran’s non-state 
foreign policy left Tehran and sided with pro-Nasser Arif. The direct result of the ceasefire 
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would be the creation of a larger Arab entity at Iran’s western borders, as well as Barzani’s 
possible intrusion into Iranian Kurdistan. According to SAVAK, the formation of an 
autonomous government in Iraqi Kurdistan would instigate the Iranian Kurds to achieve 
the same concessions in Iran.400 The ceasefire had been also welcomed by Iranian Kurds 
who saw it as a historic victory for all the Kurds.401 By late 1964, Iran had been encountered 
by rising threats of Pan-Arabism and Kurdish Secessionism. 
The Kurdish Civil War 
The peace agreement of 1964 was a major setback for Iran. To add insult to injury, 
a bloody civil war erupted among the Iraqi Kurds. Ahmad and Talabani denounced the 
ceasefire since the agreement excluded local autonomy for the Kurds, and criticized 
Barzani for signing the agreement without consulting with the KDP members.402 It ended 
in splitting the KDP into two competing factions of pro-Barzani and Ahmad-Talabani.403 
The Iranian army also viewed tension between Barzani with Talibani and Ahmad as a fake 
one as both planned to ease the armed Peshmerga entrance in Iran.404 Conversely, SAVAK 
considered historical enmity among the Kurdish tribes and the harsh arguments over the 
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ceasefire as major roots lurking beneath the Kurdish cleavage.405 Besides, Barzani’s 
“selfishness, arbitrariness, unfairness, tribal backwardness and even his dishonesty” was a  
major obstacle for a democratic decision-making process in the KDP.406 According to Isa 
Pejman, “Barzani himself had neither talent nor interest to manage the party and its 
bureaucracy. On the contrary, it was Ahmad’s intellectual image and personality that 
attracted the young, educated Kurds in the post-revolutionary era.”407 The unbridgeable rift 
between the two camps was ultimately intensified with the ceasefire of 1964.  
Right after the ceasefire agreement, Pejman was sent to Haj Omran, Barzani’s main 
stronghold, to see his reasons for the termination of the war without consulting with Iran. 
In response to Pejman’s objection, Barzani reacted: “I am the Party”408--a claim that 
reminded Louis XIV’s famous quote, “L’État, c’est moi” (I am the State). Despite Pejman’s 
promise of Iran’s heavy military aid, Barzani did not show any flexibility and replied, “We 
have not taken any step against Iran and its national interests. We only intended to negotiate 
with Arif our demands. Our demands are not against the Shah and Iran. On top of that, our 
Peshmerga have been tired of bloody fights with the modernized Iraqi Army.”409 In return, 
SAVAK pressed the Ahmad-Talabani faction to oppose Barzani. The faction publicly 
denounced the agreement, reemphasized demand for a Kurdish autonomy, and declared 
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that Barzani was not the leader of the Kurdish movement anymore. Omar Dababeh claimed 
that Barzani had received “a black bag full of Iraqi Dinars” from Arif.410 In the meantime, 
Talabani went to Tehran to consult with SAVAK and the Shah. Nevertheless, they were 
not able to challenge Barzani’s position as the sole Kurdish leader. Barzani soon arrested 
their representatives upon their arrival at the KDP sixth Congress in Qala Dizeh in July 
1964 and dispatched his oldest son, Idris, to their stronghold in Mawet when Talabani and 
Ahmad rejected Barzani’s order for a full disarmament.411 Talabani and Ahmad withdrew 
their forces to Sardasht in the Northwest of Iran.412 They surrendered their weapons to 
Iran’s Army and were then sent to Hamedan wherein they stayed until summer 1965.413 
The Kurdish civil war in the mid-60s divided the Iraqi Kurds for several decades and 
planted the seeds of a bloody Kurdish civil war in the 90s.414  
The Kurdish civil war shook Iran’s non-state foreign policy in Iraq. Nonetheless, 
Iran did not cut off all financial and logistical aid to Barzani. Despite the Shah’s initial 
decision to terminate Iran’s support, SAVAK played a key role in keeping connections 
with Barzani open. “Your Majesty, I think Arif and Prime Minister Abd al-Rahman al-
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Bazzaz will not eventually implement the agreement. Furthermore, the majority of the KDP 
leaders have been opposed to the agreement. Lastly, we have so far built up deep ties with 
both Kurdish factions. Thus, it would not be a good idea to leave them alone.”415 The Shah 
was finally convinced not to halt the flows of arms from Iran to Barzani, though 
simultaneously he worked to lessen tension between two factions.  
Iraq-Egypt Unity and the Collapse of the 1964 Ceasefire 
The ceasefire Agreement of 1964 released Arif from a domestic war with the Kurds 
and in return, revived the formation of “one army, one economy, one nation” out of Iraq 
and Egypt.416 Backed by the Iraqi Army, Arif declared the unity plan with Egypt on 22 
March 1964 and two months later, on May 26, a Joint Presidency Council under Nasser’s 
leadership was established.417 With the suppression of a Baath plot by pro-Nasser forces in 
Baghdad, Cairo dispatched 6,000 men force to Iraq to secure the Iraqi regime. SAVAK, 
however, considered Nasser’s move as Nasser’s plan to sabotage Tehran.418 Later, Egypt 
began building up naval forces in Faw, Iraq’s only port in the Persian Gulf, and joined 
Iraq’s newly-founded council of The Arabian Gulf.419 With a military maneuver of Iraq 
and Egypt, the threat of Arab Unity reached its peak on Iran’s western borders.420 It was in 
this context that Arif repeated Iraq’s claim on Khuzestan. As the Shah argued, “the main 
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threat to Iran is not the Soviet Union but the United Arab Republic.”421 In this atmosphere, 
the Shah instructed SAVAK to revive the connection with Barzani. 
As time wore on, the ceasefire of 1964 did not lead to a permanent peace. It was, 
in fact, a tactical move for both sides, giving them a break to regroup and consolidate their 
positions.422 The announcement of the Iraqi Provisional Constitution in May 1964 without 
including their demands disappointed the Iraqi Kurds. At the same time, Barzani was under 
Iranian and Israeli pressure to resume the war with Baghdad. On 11 October 1964, Mullah 
Mustafa publicly raised a demand for an autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan. He also threatened 
Baghdad with a declaration of Independence in case of Iraqi unity with Egypt.423 
Convinced by his army generals, Arif rebuffed Barzani’s request.424 As the most powerful 
Iraqi institution since the late 50s, the Iraqi army had been opposed to concessions to the 
Kurds. According to SAVAK, “the most important factor to rule Iraq and keep stability in 
such a fragile country is to have the Iraqi Army on your side.”425 Nonetheless, it seemed 
Iraqi generals had forgotten the failures of Baghdad’s Kurdish campaigns.426 Despite 
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Nasser’s stress on a political and peaceful solution for the Kurdish question,427 Baghdad 
launched another invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan. The resumption of the Kurdish War favored 
Iran. To weaken Baghdad and Cairo, SAVAK and Mossad bypassed the U.S. and provided 
the Iraqi Kurds with logistics and ammunitions. Beyond providing arms for Barzani’s 
Peshmerga, Iran tried to bridge a gap between two Kurdish factions. SAVAK was aware 
that since the resumption of the war, Arif had been supporting the Talabani-Ahmad faction 
to weaken Barzani’s position. Backed by Baghdad, Talabani had opened KDP branches in 
Erbil and Rawandez.428 SAVAK considered this progress as Nasser’s leverage over Arif in 
support of Talabani to stir up a revolution in Iran and weaken the Barzani-Iran alliance.429 
According to SAVAK, the Iraqi plot was designed to instigate the Iranian Kurds.430 Within 
this context, Iran tried to put the two Kurdish factions together. With SAVAK’s pressure, 
Ibrahim Ahmad wrote a letter to Mullah Mustafa on 16 March 1965 and asked him to forget 
inter-Kurdish enmity. With a growing desire to crack down on the Peshmerga, Baghdad 
launched vitriolic propaganda against Tehran. In April 1965, Naji Talib, Iraqi Foreign 
Minister, denounced Iran for its support of the Kurds and called Iran’s interference a major 
factor for Iraqi failure in the Kurdish war. “Several loads of unidentified equipment were 
transported onto Iraqi soil in jeeps without license plates” from Iran, Talib claimed.431 
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President Arif also pointed out that “a backward foreign regime [i.e., Iran] is supporting 
ethnic and tribal tensions in Iraq.”432 Heikal also accused the Shah as “the West agent” 
against the Arab people by supporting the Iraqi Kurds and royalist guerrillas of the 
Mutawakkilite Kingdom against the pro-Nasser Yemen Arab Republic. In the same line, 
Brigadier general Abdul-Qadir Yasin put that the Kurds were directly supported by Iran 
and the Iranians provided 40,000 guns for them.433  
The Shah vs. Johnson 
The U.S. policy toward the Kurds and Baghdad was still at odds with its allies.434 
In the wake of the resumption of the war in Iraqi Kurdistan, SAVAK and Mossad provided 
arms and financial aid to Barzani’s Peshmerga. Both states were backed by London whose 
policy in the Persian Gulf was to contain Egypt. The UK ambassador to Baghdad, Stephen 
Egerton, had urged Barzani to renew a war with Arif and promised him support for their 
resurgence through Iran.435 According to the U.S. ambassador Strong, “Britain shares with 
Israel and the Shah a deep antipathy for Nasser ... given the depth of [British] hostility to 
Nasser and the importance of the [Persian] Gulf to the UK, the British may well engage in 
covert cooperation with Iran and Israel against a Nasserist dominated Iraqi regime as well 
as against Nasser elsewhere.”436 In August 1964, SAVAK Director Pakravan met with MI6 
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officials in London and successfully planned Iranian-English support for the Kurds.437 Pan-
Arabism had become a major denominator of Iran’s, Israel’s, and Britain’s common 
interests. The Iraqi Kurds had become a tool to destabilize Iraq, to turn Baghdad away from 
a possible Arab-Israeli war, and to divert Egypt’s interest in the Persian Gulf.  
As the war raged in the north of Iraq, Arif asked the U.S. to press Iran to cut off its 
support for Barzani. The Johnson administration considered that the outbreak of the war 
would catalyze Moscow’s subversive activity against Baghdad. Therefore, it turned down 
Barzani’s request for the support.438 The White House tried to convince the Shah to 
abandon the support for the Kurds when Secretary Rusk met him in Tehran during his stay 
at the CENTO meeting on 7 April 1965. In the middle of the conversation, the Shah 
contended that he would not stop backing the Kurds unless a national regime was 
established in Baghdad. He also clarified his support for the Iraqi Kurds to tie down the 
Iraqi Army as long as Baghdad sided with Cairo.439 Iran was determined to support the 
Kurds, especially after the national anthems and flag unification of Iraq and Egypt of 31 
May 1965.440 On August 13, the Department of the State informed the Iranian Ministry of 
                                                
23a), p.2; London’s goals were “to make obstacle in the unification of Iraq-Egypt,” “keep internally Iraq 
divided and weak,” and “keep its national interests in the Persian Gulf out of Baghdad’s hands as well as 
protecting oil flowing from the Middle East.” Baghdad A-424 to U.S. Department of State, enclosure: “Kurds 
- Iraq,” no date (NARA/RG59/CFPF/1964-66/Box2339/POL 13-3–Ethnic Minorities), p.1. 
 
437 U.S. Embassy Baghdad, Memorandum, “Indicators of British Activity Against Iraq and Cooperation with 
Iran in such Activity,” October 15, 1964 (JPL/NSF/Box.28/RWK/Iraq [December 1963-March 
1966]/doc.23a), p.2. 
 
438 Tehran A-625 to U.S. Department of State, “Iran-Iraq: Letter to President Johnson from Mullah Mustafa 
Barzani,” March 12, 1965 (NARA/RG59/CFPF/1964-66/Box2339/POL 13-3–Ethnic Minorities), pp.1-2. 
 
439 Tabriz A-25 to State, “Iranian Government Policy in Kurdestan and its Effect on Kurdish Attitudes,” 
March 24, 1966 (NARA/RG59/CFPF/1964-66/Box2339/POL 13-3–Ethnic Minorities), pp.5-9. 
 
440 SAVAK Documents, No. 314/16084, 1 June 1965.  
 
132 
 
Foreign Affairs of the U.S. “concern over pressures by Iraqis arising out of Iranian 
assistance to Kurds.”441 In response, Abbas Aram, the Iranian Foreign Minister, denied 
Iran’s support for the Kurds and claimed, “it is Iraq that follows a policy to annoy Iran.”442  
U.S. relations with Baghdad improved when Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz, a Western-
oriented lawyer, was appointed as the first civilian prime minister in the post-1958 
revolutionary Iraq. Right after an aborted coup, led by pro-Nasser Prime Minister Arif Abd 
ar-Razzak, President Arif ousted Nasserist elements from the cabinet and weakened 
Baghdad-Cairo relations.443 Prime Minister Bazzaz’s first move was to urge the U.S. to 
press Tehran for its secret war against Baghdad in Iraqi Kurdistan. “Iranians were creating 
future trouble for themselves by continuing clandestine assistance to the Iraqi-Kurdish 
insurgents,” Bazzaz told Rusk in October 1965.444 The U.S. shared his view since a “high 
degree of autonomy or independence for the Iraqi Kurds would be disruptive to area 
stability and inimical” to the U.S. “interests in the long run” by stirring up the Kurdish 
question in Turkey and Iran and could be hijacked by Moscow .445 Thus, the best possible 
option for the U.S. was to convince the Kurds to participate in “the united Iraq.”446 
Ambassador Strong advised the Kurds to avoid siding with external players, i.e., Iran,447 
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because Baghdad-Barzani’s negotiations could “guarantee the framework of the country of 
Iraq” and “decrease the foreign interference.”448 Indeed, the main U.S. concern in Iraq was 
to prevent communism and to keep the country out of Moscow’s orbit.449 Iran’s central 
objective, however, was to keep Iraq “weak, divided, and separate from Nasser” to advance 
its supremacy in the Persian Gulf.450 It was in this context that the U.S. embassy in Baghdad 
warned that “continued Iranian/Israeli intervention is a threat to the United States position 
in Iraq but, unfortunately, neither country is likely to be heedful of United States interests 
in this matter.”451 Iran had effectively challenged U.S. interests.  
A Non-Arab Triangle: Iran, Israel, and the Kurds 
By fall 1965, the war had become a catastrophe for Iraq. In November 1965, with 
the Iranian Army’s heavy support, the Kurds launched a successful attack against Iraqi 
strongholds.452 In retaliation, a few Iranian soldiers were shot by the Iraqi irregulars on 7 
December 1965. The tension between two countries escalated when Iraqi MIG jets bombed 
a border post in Iran on 21 December 1965. Iran, in response, mobilized its troops along 
the frontier and intensified backing the Kurds and the Peshmerga pushed the Iraqi forces 
back with the substantial support of the Iranian artillery. As spring 1966 approached, the 
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Prime Minister Bazzaz took a risk and proposed to Barzani a decentralization law that 
could have economically, culturally, and socially rehabilitated Iraqi Kurdistan with a full 
recognition of the Kurdish identity.453 In the meantime, Bazzaz invited Iranian Prime 
Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda to Baghdad. However, Iraqi military generals called for the 
termination of Iran’s support for the Kurds before any negotiation between two countries 
and thus, wrecked the proposal.454 Both Arif and general Abd al-Aziz al-Uqaili, Iraq’s 
Defense Minister and the Chief Commander of Iraq Army, were against the plan.455 They 
thought any concession to the Iraqi Kurds would weaken Baghdad.456 The secret talks with 
Barzani then broke down when Uqayli stated “military operations [would] continue until 
the [Kurds were] defeated.”457 While Bazzaz argued that a peaceful settlement of the 
Kurdish question would be a major pre-condition for Iraqi progress, Uqayli determined to 
bring Barzani to his knees since he firmly believed “The West and the East, both, are 
creating a ‘new Israel’ in the north of Iraq.”458 For Baghdad, an Iranian-Israeli-Kurdish 
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triangular alliance was an existential threat. Israel had sided with Kurds to turn away the 
Iraqi army from an upcoming Arab-Israeli war on the Jordanian or Syrian fronts. In 1964, 
Kamran Bedir Khan, Barzani’s envoy, was invited to Israel and met with Israeli leaders. 
Ben-Gurion then authorized Mossad to supply money, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, 
and dispatched a Mossad envoy David Kimche to Iraqi Kurdistan. Kimche went to Iraqi 
Kurdistan and met Mullah Mustafa in May 1965. Geography, however, limited the Israeli 
agency in siding with the Iraqi Kurds. While Turkey had a close tie with Israeli leaders, 
Ankara’s harsh anti-Kurd attitude led Israel to see Iran as the only possible conduit to assist 
Barzani. The Shah had already permitted limited Israeli support for the Kurds in 1961,459 
but he refrained from entering full cooperation with Israel in Iraqi Kurdistan. For Israel, 
the Shah’s hesitation would be a big challenge its Doctrine of Periphery. As time wore on, 
Arif’s territorial claim of Khuzestan and Arvand Rud weakened Iran’s hesitation to fully 
cooperated with Israel in Iraqi Kurdistan. To alleviate the Shah’s hesitation, Mossad 
Director Meir Amit met with SAVAK Director Pakravan in Paris. In the meeting, Pakravan 
warned Amit of Tehran’s concern over the Kurdish threat and insisted that any operation 
should be coordinated with SAVAK.460 Pakravan also offered his Mossad counterpart to 
keep the cooperation in secret. Tel-Aviv immediately accepted Tehran’s condition and 
agreed to exchange detailed information with SAVAK. They also decided to keep it in 
strict secrecy from other allies, particularly the U.S., and to deny support for the Kurds if 
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the covert cooperation was exposed.461 It was one of the rare instances wherein the U.S. 
allies, Iran and Israel, tried to bypass their superpower ally.462 However, the U.S. was aware 
of Israeli-Iranian secret meetings over the Kurdish issue, though the full extent of their 
cooperation was not clear to the White House. “Israel plays an important role in Iran and 
is known to be supporting the Iraqi Kurds,” a memo prepared by Ambassador Strong raised 
Israel’s cooperation with Iran in Iraqi Kurdistan for the first time.463 After several months 
of Israel’s lobbying, the first agreement of the non-Arab triangle of Iran, Israel, and the 
Kurds was eventually sealed in May 1965.464 Dressed in traditional Kurdish costumes and 
escorted on Pejman, General Tzur and two senior Israeli military intelligence officers 
crossed the Iraqi border on foot to join Pakravan at Barzani’s headquarter in Haj Omran.465 
After two days of talks, Israel offered a huge supply of arms, ammunition, and funds to 
Mullah Mustafa. Iran also provided the Kurds with funding and material assistance. More 
significantly, Iran became a major conduit for the Israeli military and medical aid. The 
Israeli shipment of weapons and ammunition, mostly the Russian-made weapons captured 
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by the Israelis in fighting with Arabs, reached Iraqi Kurdistan by the winter of 1965.466 The 
most remarkable impact of Israeli involvement in the north of Iraq was improvement in the 
Peshmerga’s tactics. Before, the Peshmerga’ victories were mainly because of the Iraqi 
army’s “gross incompetence,” rather than the Kurds’ effective “guerrilla warfare” since 
they had “little aptitude for” this tactic.467 Conversely, after Mossad-SAVAK cooperation, 
the Kurds “refused to defend flat areas, let the government move into the mountains albeit 
at the cost of some casualties, attacked army supply lines and [were] now apparently 
attacking bivouac areas.”468 Ironically, factions of SAVAK and the Iranian Army were 
against Iran-Israeli cooperation. They thought Iran’s warm relation with Israel would 
considerably harm the country’s regional position by exposing it to the Pan-Arab 
propaganda. They also argued that any possible credit for the Kurdish success in Iraq would 
eventually go to Israel, rather than Iran, since the Israelis’ involvement in training 
Peshmerga had been more effective than Iranians’. It would, thus, provide the Jewish state 
a strategic space beyond its ‘bloody borders’ that might, in return, pose danger to Iran’s 
national security some day in the future by planting the seeds of the Kurdish separatism.469 
“I was called by major general Ali Motazed, Chief of SAVAK External Intelligence 
Organization, from Baghdad to Tehran. He told me that Chief Staff of the Israeli Army and 
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his deputy, accompanied by chiefs of the Second and the Third SAVAK directorates, met 
Barzani. I asked him of the necessity of Mossad’s connections with the Kurds. He promptly 
replied back, ‘Only the Shah knows,’”470 Pejman recalled. He was worried that with an 
Israeli strategic presence on Iran’s western borders, there would be no more space for Iran. 
Nonetheless, neither SAVAK nor the Iranian Army dared to object to the Shah’s decision. 
On the Kurdish side, there was no consensus over siding with Israel. While Barzani 
welcomed building ties with Israel, socialist Talabani and Ahmad were against it. They 
were also unaware of Kamran-Bedir Khan secret meetings in Europe and Israel. They knew 
that major Arab states, notably Egypt, and the Soviets were against the Israeli-Kurd 
connections. “The Russians promised us full-support for the Kurdish Movement. They 
even told me that the Kurds could keep their connection with the Shah against Baghdad. 
However, they strongly warned us not to make relations with Israel,” Talabani explained.471 
Shaky Baghdad 
In April 1966, Baghdad planned a final assault. However, President Abdul Salam 
Arif was killed in a helicopter crash on April 13.472 Arif’s death prompted a power struggle 
in Baghdad between the civilian and military elements. After four days of internal debate 
and Bazzaz’s interim presidency, General Abdul Rahman Arif, Arif’s brother, became the 
new president. The Kurds welcomed Arif’s unexpected death.473 In the meantime, the war 
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ground to a halt when Barzani announced a month-long ceasefire expecting Baghdad’s new 
response to the Kurds’ demands. In return, Arif ousted warmonger Uqayli and relied more 
on Bazzaz. Nevertheless, the Kurds’ optimism soon evaporated. Finally, Iraqi generals won 
the debate over the war and launched another military campaign on 2 May 1966.474 The 
Iraqi army machine of 40,000 troops attacked the North. Their main goal was to cut 
mountain supply lines from Iran to Barzani’s headquarters in Rawanduz. A hundred 
combat aircraft extensively bombarded the Kurds with poison gas, damaging Iranian 
villages close to the border with Iraq.475 The Iraqi army captured a strategic supply route 
road running to the Iranian border and strategic mountains, like Mount Zozik.476 
Nevertheless, Iraqi generals were unaware of the depth of Mossad-SAVAK support for the 
Kurds. Logistically supported by the Iranian Army and SAVAK and commanded by Zuri 
Sagy, an Israeli officer, the Peshmerga surrounded the Iraqi Army at Mount Handren. After 
two days of a blood-bathing fight, 1,400 to 2,000 Iraqi soldiers were butchered, hundreds 
more captured, and large quantities of arms and ammunition abandoned.477 The Battle of 
Mount Handrin shattered Iraqi Army morale and brought its massive military offensive to 
a destructive humiliation. It was the peak of the Iran-Israel secret war in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
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The Battle of Mount Handerin reaffirmed the futility of the use of brute force to settle the 
Kurdish question and thus forced Baghdad to offer Barzani a peace settlement. After a few 
weeks of talks, Prime Minister Bazzaz announced a ‘Twelve Point Plan’, known as the 
‘Bazzaz Declaration’, on June 29, 1966. Covering major Kurdish demands,478 the Bazzaz 
Declaration was immediately accepted by Barzani, though the KDP Sixth Congress 
indicated that the Kurds would still push for autonomy in November 1966. The Bazzaz 
Declaration was also welcomed by the U.S. However, Arif’s weak personality rendered 
him unable to end the power struggle in Baghdad. Although the Bazzaz Declaration deal 
was a breakthrough, it was harshly criticized by the Iraqi Army which was suspicious of 
Bazzaz’s intention to limit the Army budget and privileges. With an aborted pro-Nasser 
coup of 30 June 1966, led by former prime minister General Aref Abdul-Razzaq,479 the 
Army intensified its pressure on Arif and Bazzaz was replaced with General Naji Talib on 
6 August 1966 and ended the only civilian government in pre-2003 Iraq. The Battle of 
Mount Handerin slightly revived Baghdad-Tehran relations. Prime Minister Bazzaz 
pleaded with Saudi King Faisal to mediate between Iran and his country. After rounds of 
talks, along with the effective role of Iran’s ambassador to Baghdad, Mehdi Pirasteh, the 
two countries came to lessen the tension by the removal of their heavy propaganda against 
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each other, the establishment of a common committee on their border disputes, and the 
withdrawal of Iran’s Army from controversial spots on the borders. In December 1966, 
Foreign Minister Abbas Aram went to Baghdad, and in return, President Arif left Iraq to 
Tehran and met with the Shah in the Niavaran Palace on 13 March 1967. Both leaders came 
to an agreement on Arvand Rud and the Kurdish issue. Arif tried to cultivate a friendly 
personal relationship with the Shah. According to Ja’far Raed, a major Iranian diplomat, 
in the middle of the meeting, Arif suggested the Shah continue their discussion in a private 
meeting without any diplomats, ministries, and ambassadors. “Arif spoke just in Arabic. I 
was then called for the translation. In the meeting, Arif promised the Shah to put an end to 
the Arvand Rud crisis and realize the Shah’s demands. He asked the Shah to cut off his 
support for the Kurds. The Shah immediately agreed.”480 It was a strategic victory for the 
Shah. After all, the Shah’s main goals were to win border disputes in Arvand Rud and 
prevent the formation of a pro-Nasser regime in Baghdad. Time was on the Shah’s side. 
Transformative Years 1967-9 
On 5 June 1967, Israel launched a preemptive war against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. 
The attack so surprised Iraq that it could not participate in the war, though Iraq’s Third 
Armored Division had been already stationed in Jordan, close to West Bank. Beyond a 
swift and decisive victory of Tel-Aviv over the weak Jordanian army, the Kurdish threat 
had pinned down the Iraqi Army in Kurdistan. Morally beaten down by the Battle of Mount 
Handren, Baghdad did not want to take a risk and divert its army away from Kurdistan.481 
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Shortly before the outbreak of the Six Days War, “an Israeli agent … visited Mullah 
Mustafa to arrange, if possible, some Kurdish action to tie down the Iraqi army.”482 
Although the Kurds did not launch an invasion in June 1967, the Kurdish-Israeli military 
coordination reaffirmed SAVAK’s and the Iranian Army officers’ suspicion of the Israel’s 
growing leverage in Iraqi Kurdistan. It showed that Barzani could bypass SAVAK and 
team up against any regional states. On top of that, the devastating Israeli victory over its 
Arab neighbors spurred radicalism and anti-American zeal in the Arab World. More 
significantly, Baghdad’s ineffective reaction in the war weakened the moderate Arif regime 
in favor of “extremists in [the] name of national unity.”483 With damaged prestige after the 
Battle of Mount Handrin and the Six Day War, Arif’s regime was subject to increasing 
plots led by the Baath and Arab nationalist groups.484 The Iraqi threat to Iran had been 
almost eliminated. The post-war tectonic shifts in the geopolitical trends of the Middle East 
were later followed in 1968 by London’s announcement of a withdrawal of its military 
forces from ‘East of Suez’ by the end of 1971. Amidst the ensuing anti-American zeal 
following the Six Day War, the British withdrawal announcement intensified Moscow’s 
move to shore up its leverage inside Iraq. On 2 April 1968, Moscow signed an oil deal with 
Baghdad, and on 11 May, Russian naval forces entered the Persian Gulf for the first time 
since 1903 and visited the Iraqi port of Faw. It was a significant advance in the Russian-
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Iraqi relations that alarmed the Americans. For the first time, “the [Kurdish] problem [was 
not] so ticklish.” Harold Saunders suggested the White House launch a support for the 
Kurds “until there seem good reason to change it.”485  
Iran’s non-Kurdish Proxies 
Bazzaz’s removal, Arif’s weak personality, and an imminent coup in Baghdad 
deepened the Shah’s hesitation over the negotiation with Arif to put an end to border 
disputes. Despite Arif’s acceptance of Iran’s full territorial demands in the Tehran 
statement, the Shah did not want to bet on a weakened regime plunged in harsh power 
struggle. At the same time, Iran refrained putting all its eggs in the Kurdish basket in Iraq.  
The Iraqi Shia and the anti-Nasser Baath Party had been Iran’s secret targets. Although the 
Iraqi Shia-SAVAK was not effective after the Iraqi coup of 1958, Iran had kept its 
connections with the Shia. In the mid-60s, the threat of Iraqi-Egyptian alliance had 
prompted the Iraqi Shia. Both the Kurds and the Shia were against the unification with 
Egypt.486 In Karbala, the Shia senior clergymen lashed out at the Pan-Arab alliance,487 and 
criticized Egyptian control over Baghdad.488 Along with the Shia ulama, the Fatemi Party 
was against Egypt-Iraq unification. As a Shia party that still supported Qasim’s ideas,489 
the Fatemi Party had promised Barzani Shia support for Kurdish autonomy.490 With 
                                                
485 Saunders, a major aide on the Middle East National Security Council, pointed this suggestion out after a 
secret talk with Shawfiq Qazzaz, Barzani’s emissary. White House, “Memo for Mr. Goldstein,” March 13, 
1968 (JPL/NSF/HSF/Box16/Iraq 4/1/66-1/20/69/doc.6), p.1. 
 
486 SAVAK Documents, No. 326/609, 8 June 1964.  
 
487 SAVAK Documents, No. 768, 15 July 1964. 
 
488 SAVAK Documents, No. 1097, 14 August 1964. 
 
489 SAVAK Documents, No. 7 March 1965. 
 
490 SAVAK Documents, No. A-872, 4 December 1964.  
 
144 
 
Tehran’s advice, the Fatemi Party had also tried to make the Iraqi Kurds and the Baath 
Party come close together against Arif.491 Despite Iraqi propaganda against the Shah and 
framing him as an Israeli ally, Iran had formed a second front in southern Iraq against 
Baghdad. As Iran’s leverage among the Iraqi Shia increased, Arif threatened to oust the 
Shia clergies, particularly Ayatollah Hakim, to Iran. Such a bold move was harshly 
criticized by the Shia communities in the region.492 Although Arif did not act on his threat, 
anti-Baghdad sentiments grew among the Shia political organizations. Founded in 1943 by 
Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, the Baath Party’s political slogan of ‘unity, 
freedom, and socialism’ expressed a new brand of Pan-Arabism and socialism. In spite of 
praising the revolutionary activism to achieve Arab unity, the Baath Party was the most 
significant force that challenged Nasser in the Arab World in the 60s. Additionally, the 
Baath’s anti-communist ideology fit Iran’s national security. SAVAK had cooperated with 
the Baath Party in a bloody suppression of the ICP.493 The Baath military offensive against 
the Kurds in summer 1963 apparently terminated its relations with SAVAK; however, 
when Arif ousted the party from power in spring 1964, SAVAK revived the connection 
with its leaders, particularly former prime minister Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr. Nevertheless, 
the Baath-SAVAK covert cooperation did not result in consequential outcomes, mainly 
due to Iran’s priority for the formation of a pro-Hashemite regime in Baghdad.494 
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Ascension—The Lebanese Shia 
“Sadr works [in favor of Iran’s interest] as [effective] as three Iran’s Ambassador to Lebanon,” the Shah told 
SAVAK officers.495 
 
“Sadr has become the ‘Heart of Beirut’,” a SAVAK report stated in the 60s.496 
 
The First Tension 
By the mid-60s, Iran’s non-state foreign policy in Lebanon was at its zenith. 
SAVAK’s network with several Lebanese newspapers and elites, as well as with the Shia 
Lebanese, had successfully launched an anti-Nasser campaign in Beirut. In contrast to the 
Iraqi Kurds, the Lebanese Shia were never provided with Iran’s military aid. Rather, it was 
Sadr’s message that functioned as a bulwark against the ensuing threat of Pan-Arabism. 
Almost all Pan-Arab elements in Lebanon were Sunni, pressing Beirut for unity with the 
UAR or another larger Arab entity. Within this context, Sadr’s efforts for the revival of the 
Shia identity through the removal of long-standing discriminations against the Shia 
communities weakened pro-Nasser elements. Seyyed Musa Sadr had become, in fact, the 
‘armature’ of Iran’s non-state foreign policy in Lebanon. 
Beyond his personal charisma and Iran’s limited support, specific power 
arrangements within Lebanon had provided Sadr an opportunity to revive the collective 
Shia identity. Challenged by the pro-Nasser, Sunni Lebanese, the Maronites considered 
Sadr as a possible ally against Nasser. Since the early 60s, Sadr had been constructing 
friendly relations with the Christians and their religious leaders. “Your Majesty! I have 
heard a lot of you! I do believe that the history of Lebanon is divided in ‘Pre-Sadr and post-
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Sadr’ era,” Cardinal Franse Quoning, the Assyrian bishop told Sadr.497 In the early 60s, the 
Maronites, particularly President Fuad Chehab, had financially supported Sadr.498 The 
Maronite-Shia alliance was reflected in the parliamentarian elections.499 According to the 
U.S. embassy in Beirut, Sadr’s personality “challenges Nasser’s popularity in Lebanon.”500 
Sadr’s efforts to lay down the roots of the Shia revival was viewed by the Maronites and 
other Christian sects as a reliable bulwark against Nasser’s infiltration in Lebanon. With 
the rise of the formation of a Shia-Maronite alliance against Nasser, it seemed Iran’s non-
state foreign policy in Lebanon bore fruit. Nevertheless, Sadr’s image in Tehran was 
tarnished for the first time in June 1963. In the aftermath of the Shah’s reforms, known the 
‘White Revolution,’ several Iranian Shia clerics, particularly Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini, challenged the Shah’s growing power. Along with other religious figures, Musa 
Sadr signed a letter against the Shah.501 In the meantime, waves of the demonstration, later 
known as the Movement of 15 Khordad, soon erupted throughout Iran and transformed 
into a violent riot. Immediately, the Shah and SAVAK denounced external powers, 
especially Egypt, for backing the riot. Right after the demonstrations, Sadr attempted to 
release Ayatollah Khomeini who had been condemned to death. In doing so, he asked his 
teacher, Ayatollah Seyyed Abul-Qassim Khu’i, to convince the Shah to stop Ayatollah 
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Khomeini’s execution.502 Sadr also met Pope Paul VI and asked him to press the Shah. 
Indeed, Sadr’s efforts, along with the Pope’s request, General Hasan Pakravan’s and 
Ayatollah Shariatmadari’s effective intervention503 and, more significantly, Ayatollah 
Hossein-Ali Montazeri efforts, were key factors in convincing the Shah to renounce the 
death sentence. Meanwhile, Iran’s embassy in Beirut heavily criticized Sadr for signing an 
anti-Shah letter. Sadr tried to assuage the tension, stating that he signed the letter just to 
keep his connections with Iranian clerics safe.504 He told the Papal Foreign Minister that 
‘the Grand Ayatollahs had no general objection to the White Revolution, though they want 
to modify some details; unfortunately, some adventurers were behind the recent riot in Iran 
and grand clergies’ concerns were soon alleviated.”505 Despite SAVAK’s suspicion, 
Tehran did not want to cut off its strategic ties with him. Sadr also refrained from escalating 
tension with Iran. After all, Sadr’s leverage in the Lebanese society was unstoppable.    
Imam’s Popularity 
Sadr soon achieved socio-political successes in Lebanon and gained an 
unprecedented prestige for the Shia community. His achievements were mostly predicated 
on his ability to rally Shia power. His personal charm and enormous energy attracted a 
broad range of the Shia adherents. The cornerstone of Sadr’s idea was based on the 
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rejection of traditional Shiism based on the fatalistic acceptances of the Shia deprivation. 
His point of view stood in sharp contrast with a role of Shia religious figures in the society 
and the politics. For several centuries, the Shia in Lebanon preferred a ‘quietist 
interpretation’ that prescribed bearing the burden of living as an oppressed minority until 
the ‘End of the World’, when Mahdi, the Twelfth Imam, would return to establish a just 
government and society for humanity. Accordingly, Shia clerics should avoid engaging 
with politics since any government was a Ja’er (illegitimate) one; rather, they must dedicate 
their life to religion and religious activities. This point of view nurtured a deterministic 
worldview within which a faithful Shia must accept destiny just as Hussein ibn Ali [the 
Third Shia Imam] did at Karbala. Obviously, there was no room for socio-political reforms 
led by a clerical figure. Conversely, Sadr showed the Lebanese Shia another path. Much 
like the Latin American Catholic priests and their Liberation Theology, Sadr worked 
tirelessly to improve the status of the Shia community and give them a voice, identity, and 
power. Sadr once spelled out that “whenever the poor involved themselves in a social 
revolution it is a confirmation that injustice is not predestined.”506 Sadr believed that a Shia 
cleric had both political and social obligation, beyond his religious role. Combining social 
activism with the Shia identity, he produced a distinct approach to political issues in 
Lebanon. This combination led to the construction of a new Shia collective identity distinct 
from the Sunni-led Arabs in Lebanon. Such a new point of view attracted modern strata 
within the Shia, like lawyers, and bridged the gap of untrustworthiness between modern 
and traditional as well as religious and secular parts of the community. Sadr soon gained a 
deep leverage within Lebanese society. His power reached its zenith to the point that during 
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Fitr Eid, President Helou sat between Sadr and Hasan Khaled, grand Mufti and leader of 
Lebanese Sunni.507 As a voice of reason, Sadr’s leverage in Lebanon was so deep that it 
soon became popular in Lebanon to mimic his Persian accent. Nevertheless, his rising 
popularity was challenged by the Shia Zuama, especially Kamel Asaad and then Kazem 
al-Khalil (Kazem Bey). As a former minister of the government, Kazem Bey was one of 
the most influential Shia Zuama who saw in Sadr a threat to the Zuama’s hegemony in the 
south of Lebanon. He had unsuccessfully launched a campaign against Sadr, accusing him 
of sexual improprieties.508 He also denounced Sadr of working as Beirut’s agent working 
of the Lebanese intelligence, effectively rearranged by President Chehab, in order to 
weaken Zuama.509 In addition to the Shia Zuama, the Sunni community saw Sadr as a threat 
to their status and power in Lebanon. City-dwellers, the Sunnis shared a historical enmity 
with the Shias in the country. The Nasserist elements in Lebanon, particularly Al-
Murabitoun (the Independent Nasserite Movement or INM) led by Ibrahim Kulaylat, 
harshly criticized Sadr for his objection to Pan-Arabism and accused him of supporting the 
Shah and the CENTO Pact. The Sunnis, no matter whether West-oriented, Pan-Arab or 
leftist, considered the Shia empowerment led by a Persian ‘Seyyed’ as a betrayal of the 
Sunni goals and a challenge to the gauzy-fiction Arab Unity. This could pose a threat to 
the cement-hard reality of the Sunni hegemony in Lebanon, and by extension elsewhere in 
the Middle East. However, Sadr was smart enough to deter and limit the threat of the Sunni 
and his Shia opponents. He supported Chehab’s political reforms and social developments. 
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He was, in fact, Chehab’s main ally in strengthening the national army and the 
government’s interference in economic affairs. These programs, Sadr thought, could keep 
the Shia safe from a possible Israeli invasion of the South and remove a long-standing 
discrimination against the Shia. On top of that, Chehab-Sadr’s alliance was in perfect 
alignment with Iran’s sub-state foreign policy to contain a regional advance of Pan-
Arabism in Lebanon. This alliance was later solidified as Seyyed Musa Sadr and his wife, 
Parvin Khalili, were granted their Lebanese citizenship on 24 March 1964. SAVAK 
initially reacted to the fact by suspending Sadr’s Iranian citizenship.510 It was a temporary 
halt, though. Convinced by Pashaie, Sadr took a trip to Iran on 29 July 1965 and the Shah 
gave order to prevent the suspension of Sadr’s citizenship.511 In the meantime, Sadr had 
been keeping open his ties with SAVAK and Iran’s embassy in Beirut. On 5 November 
1965, Sadr met General Khosravani and expressed his patriotism and loyalty to the Shah. 
After Sadr’s trip to the West Africa, Manouchehr Davoudi, a political officer of Iran’s 
embassy in Lebanon, met Sadr in Tyre on 14 July 1967 and asked if Iran’s ambassador to 
Beirut could meet him. Sadr welcomed the idea and contended that his support of Iran was 
based on his “patriotism” and beyond politics.512 The Shah was right when he once argued 
that “Sadr works [in favor of Iran’s interest] as [effective] as three Iran’s Ambassador to 
Lebanon.”513 Nevertheless, SAVAK had no homogenous view on Sadr. For instance, 
elements in SAVAK, like the Seventh Office, argued that Sadr and the Shia progress in 
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Lebanon “would give Iran a privilege.”514 At the same time, SAVAK accused Sadr of 
making an anti-Tehran move in his speech on 21 July 1966 when Sadr called the CENTO 
Pact a “American-British plot”.515 These elements believed that Sadr’s criticism of the 
CENTO Pact reaffirmed his Nasserist view.516 They also faulted Seyyed Musa’s 
connections with Egypt and framed him as Cairo’s agent in Lebanon.517 Although 
Bakhtiar’s replacement in SAVAK was later called a major factor in changing the nature 
and essence of Sadr’s ties with Tehran,518 what, in fact, lurked beneath the surface of such 
paradoxical analyses was Sadr’s rising power in Lebanese politics. The more he became 
popular, the less he felt dependent on Iran and in turn, encouraged him to distance himself 
from Tehran, the SAVAK argued. Though open to Iran’s support for the Shia, Seyyed 
Musa did not want to be framed as Tehran’s agent in an Arabic country. In his interview 
on 15 August 1966, Sadr pointed out that he was “a religious leader” and he was “doing 
what he believed in” and while it might “be aligned with another ruler [he meant the Shah 
of Iran], but this should not be interpreted as his obedience to the external power [i.e., 
Iran].”519 Although these explanations did not convince pessimistic elements in 
SAVAK,520 the Shah still considered Sadr and the Lebanese Shia as Iran’s potential ally to 
contain Pan-Arabism. 
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VI. Chapter 5 
Limbo: Iran’s Non-State Foreign Policy in 1968-1973 
 
In this period, Iran’s non-state foreign policy reached its zenith. With the formation 
of the second Baath regime in Baghdad and the Iraqi invasion of 1969, Iran intensified its 
support for the Iraqi Kurds. Iran also pressed Iraq in Arvand Rud and then unsuccessfully 
planned an anti-Baath coup. In the meantime, the Shah put his weight behind the Kurdish 
appeals for the U.S. to side with Iran in challenging Baghdad. Extensively utilizing Cold 
War language – featuring the Soviet infiltration in the region by backing the Iraqi Baath – 
the Shah finally convinced President Nixon and Kissinger at the Tehran Summit of 1972. 
It was the beginning of SAVAK-CIA-Mossad support for the Iraqi Kurds. In the meantime, 
the Shah gradually linked the Kurdish War with border disputes with Iraq in Arvand Rud. 
Therefore, this period was also the beginning of Iran’s shift in its non-state foreign policy 
in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
At the same time, Iran had kept its ties with Sadr open. However, a geopolitical 
shift in the regional power arrangement after the Six Day War of 1967 weakened Nasser’s 
power and therefore, diminished the significance of Lebanon for Iran. In the meantime, 
Sadr’s support for the Palestinian guerrillas, his connections with Arab states of the region, 
and his increasing support for the Iranian revolutionaries weakened his connections with 
Tehran. More significantly, it was Iranian Ambassador Qadar who weakened Sadr’s 
relations with Iran when Sadr refused to work for him as an agent. This period was, in fact, 
the beginning of Iran’s shift in its non-state foreign policy in Lebanon. 
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Limbo -- The Iraqi Kurds 
“The Soviet Union wants a red crescent [constituted] of Syria and Iraq,” the Shah argued in his meeting with 
President Ford and Kissinger.521 
 
Our people look at Your Imperial Majesty as a father and protector and is certain that any other door open to 
us had Your efforts behind it…. You have on many occasions stated …. that relations between Iran and Iraqi 
Kurds should be deeper than what exists between Turkey and Cyprus Turks.”522 
 
  The Baath Coup of 1968 
On 17 July 1968, the Iraqi Army-backed Baath Party successfully launched a coup 
and overthrew the Arif regime.523 New Prime Minister Ahmad Hassan Al-Bakr 
underpinned his position in the government, the Baath Party, and the army mostly with the 
help of Saddam Hussein’s newly founded Baath security apparatus.524 In the next step, both 
Nasserist and Communist forces were purged from politics by Saddam.525 The anti-
communist and anti-Nasserist nature of the Baath Party was initially welcomed by the Shah 
as Iran was the first country to recognize the Baath regime. In the Shah’s view, the Baath 
coup in Baghdad was the third successive defeat for Nasser after the Six Days War and the 
Yemeni Civil War. Despite a growing anti-American sentiment in the Arab World in the 
post-1967 War, Iran was not a target for Iraqi propaganda.  
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However, the honeymoon between two countries ended soon. In the aftermath of 
the coup of 1968, Baghdad improved relations with the Soviets.526 Besides, Baghdad did 
not show flexibility in border disputes with Iran. In a meeting with the Shah, general 
Hordan Takriti, the chief of the Iraqi Airforce and the Prime Minister Deputy, did not 
accept the Thalweg Line, half the width in Arvand Rud, and repeated Iraq’s claim of the 
eastern shore of Arvand Rud. Besides, Baghdad’s chauvinist view towards the Kurds and 
the Shia deteriorated relations with Iran. Despite its claim to equality for ethnic-religious 
minorities, the Baath Party considered both communities as Iran’s fifth column. Although 
al-Bakr blamed an Israeli-American subversion and stated “while Iraq was facing the 
enemy on the Arab-Israel front, the fifth column of agents of Israel and the U.S. was 
striking from behind,”527 the Kurds and the Shia had a ‘natural’ proclivity towards Iran, 
Baghdad argued. It was within this context that Iraqi-Kurdish negotiations halted, and 
Baghdad chose to settle the Kurdish question with the use of brute force for the second 
time.  
To weaken Barzani’s position in Iraqi Kurdistan, Baghdad initially took a divide-
and-rule strategy by siding with Talabani and Ahmad. In contrast to Barzani’s hesitation, 
they had welcomed the Baath regime in Baghdad. In October 1968, Barzani’s loyal 
Peshmerga made Talabani-Ahmad forces suffer major setbacks. In return, the Iraqi Army 
launched a massive offensive on 3 January 1969.528 Tehran immediately increased its 
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assistance to Barzani by supplying sophisticated artillery. After only three weeks, the Baath 
military campaign was brought into a stalemate by the freezing winter of 1969.529 Despite 
the sudden impasse in the war, the Shah ordered Barzani to paralyze Iraqi oil installations 
in Kirkuk and Mosul. On 1 March 1969, the Peshmerga shelled the Iraq Petroleum 
Company (IPC) installations and cut short Iraq’s oil pumping capacity. It was a devastating 
blow to Baath prestige.530 “The Shah felt great. I had been secretly informed that the Kurds 
bombed Iraqi oil pipelines in Mosul and Kirkuk. Therefore, the oil companies are going to 
make an excuse of not cooperating with Iraqis due to the lack of security in Iraq and in 
return, switch their production targets to Iran at the expense of Iraq.”531 The Iraqi Army 
broke the impasse in Kurdistan; however, its offensive again ended in April as border 
tension with Tehran escalated. Unlike past Iraqi invasions of Kurdistan, Iran pressed the 
Baath regime with the threat of direct fighting in Arvand Rud. 
Arvand Rud Crisis of 1969 
Iran’s support for the Iraqi Kurds had been gradually intertwined with a long-
standing border dispute with Iraq in Arvand Rud. As a wide waterway formed by the 
confluence of the Euphrates, the Tigris, and the Karun rivers, Arvand Rud or Shatt al-Arab 
has served as a constant source of conflict between Iran and Iraq--and the Ottoman Empire 
as the predecessor of the Iraqi state. The roots of such a centuries-long contention dated 
back to the Ottoman-Safavid wars over control of Mesopotamia. Even the 1639 Treaty of 
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Zuhab did not settle the contention over the control of the waterway.532 The Second Treaty 
of Erzurum and then the Istanbul Treaty of 1913 confirmed the Ottoman-Iranian frontier 
running along the Thalweg Line.533 The 1937 Treaty, however, recognized the Iran-Iraq 
frontier along the low-water mark on the Iranian shore of the waterway and gave newly-
independent Iraq almost the entire Arvand Rud, except at Abadan and Khorramshahr where 
the treaty set the frontier along the Thalweg Line.534 The Treaty, in fact, guaranteed Iraq’s 
full sovereignty over Arvand Rud as its only functional access to the Persian Gulf and, in 
return, stripped Iran of one of its major naval outlets. The Shah believed the terms of the 
treaty gave British-backed Baghdad full control of navigation on Arvand Rud with a 
potential to endanger Iran’s Abadan refinery and the strategic port of Khorramshahr.535 
Despite its lack of power to enforce his claim, Baghdad had considered the entire Arvand 
Rud up to the Iranian shore as its internal territory. Conversely, the Shah had argued several 
times that almost all river borders ran along the Thalweg Line, dividing the border river 
into two equal sections between the neighboring states. The Shah intended to rid the 
Pahlavi dynasty of the Treaty of 1937.  
In addition to containing the Pan-Arab regimes of Baghdad and thwarting a possible 
threat of Soviet encroachment in the Persian Gulf, the Shah had gradually become the Iraqi 
Kurds’ major patron in order to make Baghdad concede in Arvand Rud. Since the mid-60s, 
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the Shah’s long strategy in Iraqi Kurdistan had been to “exploit tension with Iraq to force 
[a] solution to [the] Shatt issue.”536 The Shah self-confidently told the U.S. ambassador 
Armin Meyer that he would “wait a few more years” to settle down the border dispute in 
Arvand Rud since Iraq would finally “come to Iran in the hope of sharing the burden, and 
dividing [the] Shatt between them.”537 It seemed he was ready to abandon Iran’s ‘trump 
card’, the Iraqi Kurds, but only under Baghdad’s readiness to concede in Arvand Rud. 
However, no Pan-Arab Iraqi government had so far dared to accept a territorial concession 
to its historical enemy: The Iranians. 
In the middle of an on-and-off truce in Kurdistan, Baghdad took a venturous risk 
towards its eastern neighbor. On 15 April 1969, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Iraq 
claimed that Iraq considered Arvand Rud as part of its territory and, thus, demanded that 
Iranian vessels lower the Iranian flag upon entry into the waterway and withdraw any navy 
personnel on board ships in the river. Baghdad warned that if its demands were not met, it 
would “not permit in future any Iranian ship entering the Shatt-al-Arab.”538 In response, 
the Shah abrogated the Treaty of 1937 in April 1969 and declared it “valueless and null 
and void” since Iraq had violated its Treaty obligations.539 The Baath leaders threatened 
war over Iran’s bold move and claimed the right to take legal and legitimate counteraction. 
A harsh propaganda erupted. President al-Bakr gave a tirade speech and threatened Iran 
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that “I would be neither Arab nor Muslim if I forget this [Iran’s] position. They [Arab and 
Muslim] are in my hands. I will shoot them [to Iran] whenever I want.”540 General Salih 
Mahdi Ammash, Minister of Interior Affairs, called the Shah as a “sheep.”541 On the other 
side, Alam was worried about an outbreak of a war with Iraq, “I know Iranian mentality. 
A slight defeat would make Iran unstable, especially a defeat from a country that is not a 
[real] country.”542 The war was apparently inevitable. 
Tehran escalated the tension to an almost full-scale war by putting the Iranian army 
on red alert. Aware of Iraq’s weaker position—60,000 Iraqi troops had been already 
deployed in Iraqi Kurdistan and three Iraqi brigades had been stationed in Jordan--543 the 
Shah ordered an Iranian tanker, the 1176–ton Iranian merchant ship Ebn-i-Sina (Avicenna), 
escorted by heavy Iranian jet fighters and heavily armed naval vessels, to sail down the 
waterway into the Persian Gulf without lowering Iranian flag on 22 April 1969.544 Iranian 
freighters, like Arya Far, continued passing Arvand Rud with Iranian flags flying. Despite 
putting its army on full alert at Basra, Iraq failed to endanger the Iranian vessel. Iran’s 
heavy tanks, aircraft, and artillery dissuaded the Baath leaders from blocking the waterway. 
It was a major blow for Baghdad.   
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The only retaliatory measure Baghdad took was to maltreat and evict thousands of 
Iranians resident in Iraq, as well as banning Iranian goods.545 Iraq also banned importing 
Iranian commodities in order “to support the goals of the Arab Nation.”546 On 8 September 
1969, an Iranian civilian was hanged after being convicted of spying for the U.S. and Israel. 
On September 18, Baghdad Radio announced that 30 Iranian soldiers had been shot and 14 
others arrested by Iraqi forces near an area controlled by the Kurds. Iran’s Foreign Minister 
Ardeshir Zahedi denied the report on the following day, stating that “certain elements of 
the population of the frontier regions, whose families are the object of almost daily 
bombing and napalm attacks by the Iraqi forces engaged against Mullah Barzani’s troops, 
may have been driven to participate in the fighting without the Persian Government’s 
knowledge.”547 Although Baghdad brought the case to the attention of the UN Security 
Council, the Arvand Rud Crisis was Iran’s considerable victory.  
The Aborted Coup Plot  
In the aftermath of the humiliating Arvand Rud Crisis, the Kurdish Peshmerga 
smashed the Iraqi army and occupied Penjwin and Qala-Diza by late June 1969.548 The 
Iraqi Army reopened an offensive in August 1969 to seal the border with Iran and cut off 
Kurdish arms supply routes. The Iraqi Air Force began dropping napalm and nitric acid 
bombs on the Kurdish villages.549 However, the offensive halted again because of a harsh 
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winter. In addition to the Iraqi Army’s incompetent tactics, Iran’s heavy support for the 
Kurds convinced a faction of the Baath Party, led by Saddam Hussein, to seek a peaceful 
and amenable solution of the Kurdish crisis in order to avoid giving the Shah territorial 
concessions over Arvand Rud. For the Baath Party, any territorial concession to the Persian 
Shah would shatter the fragile legitimacy of the Baath regime at home and erode its claim 
to being champions of Pan-Arabism. In June 1969, the Baath regime entered into secret 
negotiations with Barzani at Michel Aflaq’s residence in Beirut.550 The Kurdish delegation 
refused to consider any principle for a settlement other than the Bazzaz Declaration of 1966 
while at the same time, the Iraqi Army continued its on-and-off military operations against 
the Peshmerga. In early October 1969, Baghdad offered an agreement to the Kurds but they 
refused it.551 Mullah Mustafa never trusted the Baathists. In an interview with a 
correspondent of Le Monde, he stated that “we cannot sit at the same table with wolves.”552 
The Iraqi Ambassador to Paris replied to these claims by stating that the total population 
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of the northern provinces was only 1,500,000 of whom 500,000 were non-Kurds, and 
claiming that the Kurds had “succeeded only in disturbing a narrow strip of the frontier, 
thanks to Teheran’s complicity.”553 Nevertheless, Baghdad leaders were determined to rob 
Iran of its Kurdish trump card.  
Aware of the Iraqi-Kurdish negotiations, the Shah instructed SAVAK to run an 
anti-Baath coup. Since the Iraqi coup of 1958, SAVAK had built up covert and complicated 
networks of Iraqi dissidents. Despite an increasingly controlled atmosphere of Baghdad, 
these networks remained partially intact during the Qasim and Arif brothers presidencies. 
These underground networks had been constituted of opponent Iraqi military generals, Shia 
civilians, and the Kurds living in Baghdad. Chief among the military elements were general 
Abdul Ghani al-Rawi, general Saeed Salibi, and Colonel Salih Mahdi al-Samarrai.554 They 
were opposed to the Baath new decision for a peaceful settlement of the Kurdish issue and 
its proclivity towards Moscow. Among the Shia civilians were Seyyed Mahdi al-Hakim, 
Ayatollah Mohsen al-Hakim’s son,555 and Ahmed Chalabi, Abdel-Hadi Chalabi’s son, who 
had joined up with a small group of Kurdish and SAVAK in Iran. After meeting with 
Barzani in Iraqi Kurdistan, Chalabi “acted as both a courier and a mediator, traveling to 
London, Spain, Jordan, and elsewhere to deliver messages and negotiate on behalf of the 
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conspirators… including leading figures from Iraq’s Shia community.”556 In Lebanon, 
Chalabi facilitated connections between the Kurdish delegation and Carolan, the U.S. 
Ambassador to Beirut, pushed the U.S. officials to “step up their support of Barzani,” and 
“to cut out the untrustworthy Shah as the middleman.”557 He was also in direct contact with 
SAVAK Director Nematollah Nassiri. On 15 April 1969, Davoud Taher, the Third 
Secretary of Iran Embassy to Baghdad, contacted the Iraqi military elements, and on 
September 28, Iraqi coup plotters met Iranian representatives at Iran Embassy in Kuwait.558 
General al-Rawi, the leader of the coup, was fully cooperating with the Iran embassy in 
Baghdad and about 300 officers were “privy to the plot.”559 Although Tehran tried to keep 
the Americans in the dark, they noticed the Iranian-orchestrated to overthrow the Baath 
regime.560 The Shah was gravely concerned about the plan with details.561 
Nevertheless, Istikhbarat, the Iraqi security services, succeeded in infiltrating 
SAVAK’s networks.562 On 20 January 1970, on the night of the projected coup, the plotters 
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gathered at the Rashid military camp just outside Baghdad, fell in Istikhbarat’s trap. The 
next day, the Baath regime announced the SAVAK-backed coup. According to Iraqi 
officials, SAVAK had supplied the coup plotters with 3,000 sub-machine-guns, 650,000 
rounds of ammunition and two mobile radio transmitters in coordination with Iranian 
embassies in Baghdad and Kuwait.563 They also claimed to have acquired all meeting 
conversations between the coup plotter and Iranian representatives. Several Iraqi military 
elements were executed.564 Three SAVAK members, including Ismail Nahid, the head of 
SAVAK station in Baghdad and the plot coordinator, as well as several Kurds and Iranian-
Iraqis, were arrested with a bunch of secret documents. Baghdad also expelled Ezzatollah 
Ameli, Iran’s ambassador to Baghdad, Davoud Taher, and Ismail Nahid on 22 January 
1970.565 In retaliation, the Iraqi ambassador to Tehran and the military attaché were forced 
to leave Iraq.566 Iran also increased its troops along the border. In return, Baghdad to notify 
the UN and to object Iranian armed provocations as a threat to peace and security in the 
Middle East and the world. Zahedi threatened Baghdad that in case of the Iraqi invasion, 
                                                
563 Keesing’s Record of World Events (formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives), Volume XVII, 
February, 1970 Iraq, Page 23827.  
 
564 Despite al-Rawi’s escape to Iran, 87 generals, soldiers, and civilians, including general Mosleh and 
Brigadier Sirri, all accused of participation in the plot, were executed, together with seven other persons 
previously condemned on charges of espionage in the next four days. Conspirators condemned in a special 
court consisting of Captain Jazrawi (a member of the Revolutionary Command Council), Mr. Nazem al-Zar 
(head of the Security Police) and Mr. Ali Reda (director of the Council's public relations office). See 
Keesing’s Record of World Events (formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives), Volume XVII, February, 
1970 Iraq, Page 23827. 
 
565 Iran’s military attaché, the assistant military attaché, and the press attaché in Baghdad, together with the 
staffs of the Iranian consulates in Karbala and Basra, were also deported from Iraq. 
 
566 On returning to Baghdad on January 28 the Iraqi Ambassador alleged that Iranian authorities had 
“brutally” treated himself and his staff, in violation of diplomatic practice. Tehran strongly objected to ‘ill-
treatment’ of Majid Mehran, Iranian Charge d’ Affairs in Baghdad who had been stopped by frontier guards 
to search him and his car. Iran also protested the way Iraq treated AbdulKhaleq Bushehri-Zadeh, the Second 
Secretary at Iran’s Embassy, who had been kidnapped and tortured. See Keesing’s Record of World Events 
(formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives), Volume XVII, February, 1970 Iraq, Page 23827. 
164 
 
Iran would not hesitate to retaliate “fire by fire” and to “reduce to ashes the area from which 
the attack would originate.”567 With both UN and Turkey’s interventions,568 the tension did 
not lead to the outbreak of war.  
Baghdad also reacted to Iran’s aggressive posture by backing Teymour Bakhtiar, 
the first SAVAK director and the Shah’s major opposition leader. Bakhtiar had been ousted 
by the Shah on March 1961 after his suspicious trip to the U.S. and talks with J.F.K on 
leading a coup against the Pahlavi regime. After going into exile in Europe a year later, he 
traveled from Switzerland to Lebanon where he was temporarily arrested with Iran’s 
request in Beirut. While the Shah issued a warrant for his arrest, Bakhtiar entered Iraq and 
set up his headquarters wherein several Iranian volunteers were recruited to form an armed 
underground movement against the Shah. On 19 June 1970, Iraq granted political asylum 
to Bakhtiar. Baghdad also set up three to five radio stations to transmit anti-Shah 
propaganda and allocated 50 million US Dollars to anti-Shah activities.569 Saddam himself 
confessed that “we gave them a radio program for seven long years; we gave them money 
and arms and whatever they needed to fight the Shah.”570 Nevertheless, Bakhtiar was 
finally assassinated by SAVAK agents in Saadieh, near Khaneqin, on 12 August 1970.  
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Although Tehran did not encounter any Iraqi military retaliation on the ground, the 
aborted coup of 1970 destroyed SAVAK networks in Baghdad. SAVAK unsuccessfully 
tried to revive Iranians’ networks in Iraq in Summer 1972.571 The Shah never forgave 
Nasiri for his incompetence in leading the plot.572 The worst had yet to come. Iran’s 
brinkmanship with Iraq in Arvand Rud and the aborted plot convinced Baghdad of an Iraqi-
Kurdish agreement. 
The March Accord of 1970 
Three days after the suppression of the aborted plot, Baghdad issued a decree in 
support of a peaceful settlement of the Kurdish question by reaffirming the Bazzaz 
Declaration.573 Although al-Bakr refused the Kurds’ demands in late January 1970,574 both 
Iran and Israel were worried about their losses in the north of Iraq. On 4 March 1970, Idris, 
Barzani’s older son, met with Nasiri and Israeli intelligence officers in Tehran. Both 
Iranians and Israelis pressed the Kurds to reopen the war with Baghdad. The Mossad 
promised them weaponry while SAVAK promised to increase Iran’s financial support to 
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$3 million a month. In February 1970, Iranian and Israeli funding had been around 3.3 
million US Dollars.575 Director Nassiri told Idris that “Iran was fully behind the Israeli plan 
to renew the fighting in Northern Iraq … and Barzani needs to carefully note what the 
Israelis were suggesting.”576  
Nonetheless, Barzani had already made his decision. As Idris was in Tehran, 
President al-Bakr sent Saddam Hussain to Kurdistan to reach a peace agreement.577 After 
a month talking about details, they reached an agreement, known as the March Accord of 
1970. By recognizing the bi-national identity of Iraq, the Accord concluded that “History 
will bear witness that you [the Kurds] did not have and never will have as sincere a brother 
and dependable an ally as the Arab people.”578 Barzani himself received a monthly income 
while his Peshmerga were paid as border guards. By April 1970, major parts of the Accord 
had been implemented.579 Some Baath elements were optimistic about the settlement of the 
Kurdish question. Tariq Aziz stated, “We were sincere when we announced the March 
Accord. It was not [a mere] propaganda.”580 Even pessimistic Barzani saw a remarkable 
development towards the formation of a Kurdish state. Barzani stated in December 1970 
                                                
575 CIA, Information Cable, March 9, 1970. (FRUS 1969-1976, E-4, 267).   
 
576 CIA, “Israeli Aid to Kurdish Rebels,” March 7, 1970 (FRUS/1964-68/XXI/doc.267), pp.1-3. 
 
577 At the time, Saddam was a Vice President and Chairman Deputy of the RCC of Iraq and Assistant 
Secretary General of the Baath Party, 
 
578 Harris, G. S. Ethnic Conflict and the Kurds (1977) Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, 433 (1): 118–120. 
 
579 The Baath regime appointed five Kurdish men to the cabinet, though in junior-level ministries and 
provincial posts, began reconstructing impoverished regions of Iraqi Kurdistan, taught the Kurdish language 
for the first time in schools, and established a Legislative Assembly in Erbil with theoretical authority over 
the Kurdish provinces of Dahuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah. 
 
580 McDowall, David, A Modern History of the Kurds (London, Tauris. 2005) p.528. 
167 
 
that “for the moment we are optimistic. After ten years of fighting, the Iraqi Government 
offered us autonomy last March and so far they seem to be implementing the agreement.”581  
The March 1970 Accord was a failure for Iran. “If it [the Accord] results in 
significant outcomes, at least 20,000 Iraqi army troops will turn from borders with 
Kurdistan to our western borders and Iraq will be unchained [of the Kurdish insurgency] 
… It would also spark the formation of independent Kurdistan in Iran and Turkey,” Alam 
was worried about the Accord.582 In July 1970, Saddam defied Tehran, claiming that “we 
are ready to confront agents of Iran, America, and Britain, and all the reactionaries.”583 
Although Barzani kept strategic positions safe along the border with Iran and the supply 
routes, the Accord would apparently undercut the Shah’s plan in linking the Kurdish-
Arvand Rud issues.  
As time wore on, however, it became clear that Baghdad was buying time. Though 
labelled a “total and final” solution by Saddam, the Accord contained controversial issues 
that made its real implementation uncertain.584 Baghdad refused to appoint a Kurdish vice 
president and to give oil-rich Kirkuk to the autonomous Kurdistan. Rather, it continued the 
Arabization policy in order to decrease Kurdish standings in the contested cities of Kirkuk 
and Khaneqin. Viewing autonomy as a trap for the Kurds and an opportunity for Baghdad 
to revitalize its military machine, Barzani was not prepared to settle for “the mere trappings 
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of autonomy” where the Bath would “retain all the essentials of real political power in their 
own hands.”585 By summer 1970, the Kurds had begun “strengthening their forces and 
lining up potential allies.”586 Amidst Barzani’s hesitation to join a national unity 
government, Baghdad devised a Russian-backed covert plot to assassinate him on 29 
September 1971.587 Despite the regime’s denial, Barzani was convinced Saddam was 
behind the plot.588 Lacking trust in Baghdad, Barzani was still suspicious of Iran’s full 
support for the Kurds. Interestingly, SAVAK was well aware of his suspicion.589 Barzani 
thought that the Shah’s brute pragmatism would sell the Kurds for a territorial concession 
over Arvand Rud. He was also tired of Iran’s “heavy-handed control over Kurdish 
activities.”590 To avoid putting all his eggs in the Iranian basket, Barzani had been pleading 
with other regional states, particularly Jordan and Saudi Arabia, for support. King Faisal 
of Saudi Arabia had already “endorsed the idea of an Iraqi revolt in principle,” but he 
needed more reliable sources before making any move.591 Given Iraq’s ineffective support 
                                                
585 Beirut A-38 to the U.S. Department of State, February 2, 1972, FRUS 1969-1976, E-4, 297. 
 
586 CIA Information Cable, August 10, 1970, FRUS 1969-1976, E-4, 273.    
 
587 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, “The Kurds of Iraq: Renewed 
Insurgency?” 31 May 1972 (NPL/HAK/Box138/Kurdish Problem-Vol. I/June 1972-Oct 1973), p.3; U.S. 
Interests Section to U.S. Embassy Brussels, “Attempt on the Life of AL-BARZANI,” October 4, 1971 
(NARA/RG59/Records Relating to Iraq/1966-1972/Box12/POL 23-7), p.2, and Lawrence, Quil. Invisible 
Nation: how the Kurds' quest for Statehood is shaping Iraq and the Middle East, New York: Walker & Co. 
2008. p. 22. 
 
588 Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade to the U.S. Department of State, “REPIR: Reports on 
Assassination Attempt Made on Al-Barzani,” November 2, 1971 (NARA/RG59/Records Relating to 
Iraq/1966-1972/Box12/POL 23-7), p.2, Primakov, Yevgeny. Russia and the Arabs: Behind the scenes in the 
Middle East from the Cold War to the present. New York: Basic Books. 2009. p. 334) 
 
589 National Security Council, Memorandum, Saunders to Kissinger, “Supporting the Kurdish Rebellion,” 
March 27, 1972 (FRUS/1964-68/XXI/doc.301), p.3.  
 
590 Beirut 222 to U.S. Department of State, July 16, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976, E-4, 292. 
 
591 Baghdad 291 to U.S. Department of State, March 14, 1970 (NPL/NSC/NSF/Box601/Country Files/Middle 
East/Iran/Vol. I/1/20/69-5/31/70), p.1. 
169 
 
for the PLO in the Black September,592 King Hussein had been interested in the Kurdish 
War. He promised Barzani to convince the U.S. to reconsider its strategy towards the Iraqi 
Kurds.593 But none of these states had the potential to back the Kurds against Baghdad.  
Baghdad-Moscow Connection and the Shah’s Cold War Language 
The March Accord released Baghdad from a decade-aged war in Kurdistan and, 
instead, gave it an opportunity to turn its attention to the regional issues. In late 1969, the 
Baath regime attempted coming to terms with both the Kurds and the Communists to 
broaden its political base of support and to draw Moscow to its side.594 Although the 
Russian knew that their alliance with Baghdad might damage its image among ethnic 
minorities in the world, including the Kurds, they finally put their eggs in the Iraqi basket 
since they did not want to miss a power vacuum in the Persian Gulf. Therefore, Barzani 
was pressed by the Russians, through a combination of pressure and bribery, to settle the 
issue which finally led to the March Accord. Baghdad-Moscow relations underwent a 
major thaw as Iraq signed covert arms deals with the Soviets in September 1971.595 In 
February 1972, Saddam Hussein visited Moscow and signed several military and economic 
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agreements.596 On 9 April 1972, the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation that involved a 
fifteen-year Moscow military and economic aid and commitment to Baghdad was signed. 
Following the Kosygin visit to Baghdad in April 1972, Communists were appointed to the 
cabinet and the Baath Party allowed the ICP to formally participate in a National Patriotic 
Front, though the real power was still in its hands. As Baghdad’s dependence on Moscow 
decreased, mainly because of skyrocketing oil revenues following the Oil Crisis 1973-4, 
the ICP was gradually suppressed. 
The warm Baghdad-Moscow relations concerned the Shah. In the broader context 
of détente at the international level and the U.S. disinclination for direct intervention in the 
region, the Russian inroads in Baghdad were considered by the Shah as a growing threat 
to Iran. The Shah was worried about its unpredictable results, stating that the Treaty was 
“a prestigious declaration for both sides; however, it was thinkable.”597 The Shah knew 
that the full implementation of the March Accord would blow down Iran’s non-state 
foreign policy in Iraqi Kurdistan and, that in turn, could unshackle Iraq to interfere in the 
Persian Gulf area. It was unacceptable for a man who saw his country as the natural heir to 
the British in the Persian Gulf. In the Shah’s view, the Accord was not only a prelude to 
Moscow’s quest for supremacy in the region but also a harbinger of the establishment of 
the greater Kurdish entity. For the first time since the coup of 1958, Iran’s major geo-
cultural threats of Pan-Arabism, Communism, and Kurdish Separatism were all combined. 
Under this circumstance, his only way to convince Barzani to reopen fighting with 
Baghdad was to drag the U.S. into the Kurdish War.  
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The Shah began lobbying the Nixon administration to abandon its hands-off policy 
toward the Iraqi Kurds. His major tool to convince the U.S. was his strategic use of the 
Cold War language that framed the Kurdish War and Baath-Kremlin relations as a Soviet 
wider plan to infiltrate the region. Just a few days after signing the Accord, Prime Minister 
Amir-Abbas Hoveyda clarified the Shah’s view of the Accord to Douglas MacArthur, the 
U.S. ambassador to Tehran, as a “very grave development greatly increasing [the] threat to 
[the] Persian Gulf area and [the] Arabian Peninsula.” Hoveyda--in reality, the Shah--
asserted that Baghdad was “very much under the influence of the Soviets because of its 
dependence on Soviet military and other aid for survival.” He also added that the March 
Accord would unchain Baath Iraq from Kurdistan and allowing it to deploy about 20,000 
Iraqi troops and resources in the Persian Gulf “for subversion and another mischief against 
the small Persian Gulf states or Israel.” For the Shah, Hoveyda added, the Accord was also 
a harbinger for the Russians to “begin to play on [a] strong national sentiment of Kurdish 
people to stir up Turkish and Iranian Kurds in subversive activities holding out bait of an 
enlarged independent Kurdish state.” 598 He concluded that the accord of 1970 would 
“prepare for next step in [the] Soviet plan which is eventual transformation of autonomous 
Iraqi Kurdish province into autonomous Kurdish state with [a] view to enlarging Kurdish 
state until it eventually has contiguous borders with [the] Soviet Union which will thus 
enable [the] Soviets to overcome [the] present Turkey-Iran barrier to their direct 
penetration of [the] Middle East.”599 It was a major manifestation of the Shah’s strategic 
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use of Cold War language. “Preponderantly communist” means, the establishment of an 
Iraqi national unity government would unleash the Iraqi army in the Persian Gulf and 
increase the possibility of the rise of communists in Baghdad, the Shah thought.600 It was 
“a status similar to that of the East European satellites.”601 In the same line, an Iraqi national 
unity government “would include communists, Nasserists and Kurds subservient to the 
Baath … and would represent a situation antithetical to both Iranian and U.S. interests.”602 
For the U.S., however, the Kurdish War was less an element in the Cold War contest with 
Moscow than a far-away local-regional conflict.  
The American Hesitation 
For more than a decade, the U.S. had refrained from intervening in the Kurdish 
War. Although the U.S. State Department agreed with increasing support for modernizing 
Iran’s military forces to deter the Russian threat, it had rejected the Shah’s framing of the 
March Accord of 1970 as a major part of a “Moscow’s master plan” for the formation of a 
“Kurdish corridor” into the Persian Gulf since it seemed “unlikely that the Soviets would 
want to risk damaging their carefully nurtured relations with Iran and Turkey.”603 The State 
Department thought both Iran and Israel had overstated the Soviet threat.604 Even Iraqi bold 
reaction to Iran’s retaking of its three strategically Persian Gulf islands was not framed as 
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a threat to Persian Gulf security.605 The Department also rejected Iraq’s growing leverage 
in the Arab World after signing the Accord;606 rather, it argued that with warming relations 
with Moscow, the Iraqis had been “isolated even from the mainstream of Arab world.”607 
As Marshal Andrei Grechko, the Soviet Defense Minister, visited Baghdad to seal the arms 
deal,608 the Department did not consider it as a “part of aggressive policy in the Persian 
Gulf aimed at Iran;” rather, it was framed as a step “designed to placate Baghdad, not to 
pose [a] threat to the Shah.”609 The Treaty of Friendship was also called “nothing surprising 
or sudden but rather a culmination of existing relationships.”610 Calling it another version 
of the former Soviet agreements with India and Egypt,611 the Department thought that a 
major driving force behind signing the Treaty was less based on the geopolitical realities 
rather than the initiative of Saddam Hussein who was seeking Russian support for 
consolidation his power.612 Within this context, Joseph Farland, the U.S. Ambassador to 
Iran, stated that any support for the Iraqi Kurds would generate “far too much risk 
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compared to the limited benefit gained.”613 Harold Saunders also argued that the U.S. 
involvement in the obscure, faraway Kurdish War might be “regarded by the Soviets as a 
move directed against them.”614 For Saunders, both Iran and Israel were trying to draw the 
U.S. into the crisis by overemphasizing the Iraqi-Russian ties while at the same time they 
were capable of assisting the Kurds without U.S. support. They “absolutely needed nothing 
from us except that they want to involve us” in Iraqi Kurdistan, Saunders argued.615 Time 
was not on Iran’s side. 
In the meantime, Barzani became more determined to reorganize his Peshmerga for 
an upcoming Baath military campaign. Despite his suspicion of Tehran, he did not listen 
to Russian Rumanytsev’s warning not to “trust to the Shah.”616 Barzani joined SAVAK in 
planning a coup plot against Baghdad led by Colonel Abd al-Razzaq al-Nayif in March 
1972.617 Although SAVAK provided military and financial needs for the plot, Barzani 
suspected that SAVAK would not “implement the promises.” Neither Barzani nor Iraqi 
opposition would welcome “direct control or intervention by Iran in Iraqi internal 
affairs.”618 Therefore, Barzani pleaded with the U.S., as well as the UK and King Hussein 
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of Jordan, to support the plot.619 At the same time, SAVAK urged the CIA to support the 
coup plotters by “providing financial and military support” and “drawing together Iraqi 
exiles who would comprise the nucleus of a separatist government initially harbored by 
Barzani.”620 Nevertheless, the State Department downgraded the possibility of the debacle 
of the Baath regime, arguing that a new Iraqi regime would be weak and dependent on the 
Soviets due to Barzani’s “umbilical cord with Moscow.” According to the State 
Department, any cooperation in a coup would be framed as a major example of a U.S. 
alliance with non-Arab countries against the Arab states and damage strategic relations 
with the Arab allies of the U.S. Furthermore, it would possibly result in the formation of a 
Kurdish state in Iraq that would, in return, boost Kurdish nationalism in Iran and Turkey 
and culminate in the “further fragmentation in an already fragmented area.”621 In the same 
line of thought, CIA asserted that any American involvement in the plot could be “regarded 
by the Soviets as a move directed against them.”622 The U.S. still did not want to side with 
Iran in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
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Tehran Summit of 1972  
By early 1972, the U.S. still resisted siding with its regional allies, Iran and Israel, 
against Baghdad, even when King Hussein of Jordan joined the Shah’s campaign to press 
the White House.623 However, the Shah did not abandon his hope to convince the U.S. to 
reconsider its hands-off policy. In February 1972, President Nixon’s visit to Beijing 
initiated the new U.S. policy later consolidated by the historical Moscow Summit in May 
1972. In the Shah’s view, the Nixon-Brezhnev Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT-
I) demonstrated the U.S. disinclination to fully support its allies and its recognition of 
Moscow’s zones of influence, including Iraq and possibly the Persian Gulf, at the zenith 
of the Cold War.  
Nixon and Kissinger arrived in Tehran and met the Shah in Saadabad Palace just a 
day after the Moscow Summit. During his lunchtime with the Shah, Nixon reemphasized 
his special relation with Iran and said, “The Kremlin was a palace, but staying there for 
eight days was very stifling. I am breathing here in the Shah’s personal house since we 
share the same house and I feel myself at home.”624 Aware of the Shah’s concern of the 
potential consequences of the Moscow Summit for Iran, Nixon pledged full support and 
provided Iran with modern weaponry, particularly F-14s and F-15s, to deter the Soviet 
ultra-modern Mig-23 jets recently given to Baghdad.625 “Nixon gave me anything I had 
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asked,” the Shah victoriously told Alam.626 Nixon’s decision was based on the U.S. “need 
to ensure friendly relations with the Iranian monarch as the key figure in maintaining Iran’s 
stability.”627 More significantly, his decision laid the foundations for the Nixon Doctrine 
by making Iran the sole pillar in the Middle East “with the Saudi pillar being a nominal 
pillar there for obvious necessary regional political reasons.”628 It was a victory for the 
Shah. 
The Shah also pressed Nixon to support the Iraqi Kurds.629 Subtly applying the 
Cold War language, the Shah framed the national unity government in Baghdad as the 
Soviet plan to “establish a coalition of the Kurds, the Baathists, and the Communists.” He 
argued that “the Kurdish problem instead of being a thorn in the side [of the Baath regime 
of Baghdad] could become an asset to the Communists” against Iran and Turkey. When 
Kissinger asked “What could be done?” the Shah quickly replied back “Iran can help with 
the Kurds.”630 He repeated his request the next day by asserting that the immediate danger 
to Iran came “mostly from Baghdad, or at least Baghdad would take credit for it.”631 Next 
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time, the Shah subtly played with the U.S. sensitive issues of the spread of communism 
and separatism in the region.  
At the same time, an analysis outlined by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
warned against U.S. engagement in Iraqi Kurdistan since it would be a lose-lose game and 
advocated rejecting the Shah’s plan to draw the U.S. into the Kurdish War.632 The analysis 
argued that the 69-year-old Barzani, “the only Kurdish leader who can unite his people to 
the point of armed insurgency” and “whose personal appeal has been stronger than any 
Kurdish figure of this generation,” saw “the goals that his people fought for and almost 
attained slipping away unless he can force some substantial political gains in what may be 
his last campaign. He probably also foresees that if he declines this challenge, his personal 
leadership is doomed.” The analysis added that Barzani had two destructive options. While 
joining the national unity government would terminate his efforts for an autonomy in Iraqi 
Kurdistan, fighting a “long-drawn-out insurgency” would not be conclusive. The analysis 
also predicted that Barzani’s defeat would create “a complaisant pro-Baath or even pro-
Soviet clique in control of Iraqi Kurdistan [that] could of course bring pressure on Iran and 
even create a nuisance in eastern Turkey.”633 Nonetheless, the analysis fell on deaf ears. 
Nixon had agreed that “American participation in some form was needed to maintain the 
morale of such key allies as Iran and Jordan, disparate as their motives were, and as a 
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contribution to the regional balance of power.”634 Enticed by the Shah’s Cold War 
language, both Nixon and Kissinger agreed to support the Iraqi Kurds.635  
The Shah was confident that he could transform the U.S. policy on Iraqi Kurdistan. 
“When I talked with Nixon on Kurdistan, Iraq and the Soviet’s influence in [Iraq], he turned 
very sad and told me he would implement any thwarting plan I offered,” he told Alam.636 
The Shah’s agency in changing the Americans’ policy was heavily based on his ‘special 
relationship’ with Nixon. Indeed, Nixon saw Iran as America’s “one friend there” and “by 
God if we can go with them, and we can have them strong, and they are in the center of it, 
and a friend of the United States, I could not agree more--it is something.”637 Additionally, 
both Nixon and Kissinger knew little about the origin and dynamics of the Kurdish 
question. “We did not know much about Kurds … we thought they were some kind of hill 
tribe.”638  
The Tehran Summit of 1972 was a watershed in the Kurdish War. Although their 
effort to meet Nixon and Kissinger was rejected,639 the Kurds could not be happier because 
of the U.S. policy shift. A day after Nixon’s departure from Tehran, Baghdad nationalized 
the Iraqi Petroleum Company. It was a critical move that right fell into the Shah’s Cold 
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War language and justified Iran’s non-state foreign policy in containing the “first Soviet 
penetration of a major oil producer in the Middle East.”640 Only a week later, the Shah 
asked Kissinger to receive Idris Barzani and Mahmoud Othman to get the cooperation 
going.641 Despite a strong objection in the State Department,642 Kissinger met with the 
Kurdish delegates. A few days later, John Connelly, former Treasury Secretary, went to 
Tehran and informed the Shah of the U.S. paradigm-shifting decision to assist the Kurds.643 
It was a new era in the Kurdish war. 
To initiate the operation, the CIA assessed that the U.S. would need to dedicate $24 
million annually for the Kurds only to pay the salaries of Barzani’s 50,000-man army.644 
Despite Saunders’ warnings,645 CIA Director Richard Helms and Colonel Richard 
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Kennedy, a senior member of the NSC staff, met Kurdish delegates on 30 June 1972. Helms 
expressed “the sympathy of the U.S. for the Kurdish movement” and “readiness to consider 
their requests for assistance” while stressing the covertness of the operation. He warned 
them that “the relationship could indeed be soured by a failure to honor our need for such 
secrecy.” More significantly, Helms clearly told them that only “because the Shah wanted 
the American government to help” Barzani Peshmerga, they were being supported and, 
therefore, they should not think of bypassing Tehran to deal directly with the White 
House.646 At the end of the meeting, he called Iran a conduit to channel the U.S. military 
aid.647 Despite initial warnings, the CIA argued right after the meeting with the Kurds that 
the U.S. support for the Kurdish operation was justified by the Soviet and Iraqi threat to 
Western interests.648 “There can be no doubt that it is in the interests of ourselves, our allies, 
and other friendly governments in the area to see the Baath regime in Iraq kept off balance 
and if possible overthrown, if this can be done without increasing Soviet influence in Iraq 
or escalating hostilities to a dangerous international level,” the report advocated support 
for the Iraqi Kurds.649 The Shah’s ‘Cold War language’ was finally heard by the 
Americans.  
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In the meantime, 15,000 Russian military personnel withdrew from Egypt. It was a 
tectonic shift in the regional power arrangement.650 By summer 1972, Baghdad had become 
a valuable element in Moscow’s Middle Eastern strategy.651 It was a game-shifting moment 
for the Shah that “made that [supporting the Kurds] is more important than ever.”652 As 
Kissinger recalled, the U.S. was “very receptive to helping the Kurds,”653 Thus, he chose a 
strategy to “weaken any country tied up with the Soviet Union.” On 1 August 1972, the 
Kurdish operation was set in motion.  
A Triangular Cooperation in Iraqi Kurdistan 
Shortly after Nixon’s victory in the presidential election of 1972, Barzani received 
the CIA’s first financial support and shipment of arms through SAVAK.654 In a meeting 
with the Shah, King Hussain agreed to support the Kurds with weapons “captured [from 
Palestinian] Fedayeen” during the Black September of 1970. Through SAVAK, CIA, and 
Mossad, 14 planes were loaded full at Mehrabad Airport and then delivered to the 
Peshmerga.655 The Kurdish operation was run by the Iranian Colonel Pejman and General 
Manuchehr Hashemi, the head of SAVAK’s Eighth Office, Arthur Callahan, CIA station 
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chief in Tehran, Langley, and Israeli David Kimche.656 In contrast to CIA, both SAVAK 
and Mossad had permanent military and intelligence liaison officers in Haji Omran. 
Training Peshmerga, Israel’s few platoons rarely engaged in heavy fighting.657 Iran’s larger 
military presence was comprised of one artillery battalion, one anti-aircraft battalion, and 
a few SAVAK operatives.658 Iran then provided the Kurds with long-range artillery 
support. On the American side, former CIA Director Richard Helms, the U.S. new 
ambassador to Tehran, was a key figure.659 Functioning as the “American Number One”660 
and the U.S. “super ambassador” in the region,661 Helms’s views on the Kurdish operation 
and Iran’s affairs were unchallenged by CIA and the State Department doubled the extent 
and secrecy of the U.S. involvement in Iraqi Kurdistan. CIA aid continued to be loaded on 
planes at Mehrabad airport, Tehran, and finally delivered to the Kurds through SAVAK.662 
As Iran increased its annual financial support to $30 million, the U.S. raised its annual 
support from $3 million to $5 million. Israel also provided Barzani with $50,000 monthly 
stipend. These aid was donated to make Barzani stick to the “defensive posture” to keep 
the secrecy of the operation. Kissinger stated that “We may wish to … avoid the impression 
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of a long-term escalating commitment by telling Barzani that we will provide these 
additional funds for this year on a monthly basis but, in any event, would emphasize that 
we share the Shah’s view regarding maintenance of the defensive posture of the Kurds.”663 
By early 1973, all roads had led to Tehran. 
Interestingly, the State Department was bypassed by the Shah and CIA. The State 
Department had opened the U.S. Interests Section in Baghdad on December 1972. 
Nonetheless, its head, Arthur Lowrie, was unaware of SAVAK-CIA-Mossad covert 
cooperation.664 Baghdad leaders were aware of Iranian, Israeli, and, recently, Jordanian 
support for the Kurds;665 however, they did not know about CIA involvement in Kurdistan. 
The real winner of the operation was the Shah. He had successfully kept Barzani out of the 
Iraqi national unity government and prevented Baghdad from deploying its army along 
Arvand Rud. With the U.S. massive arms sales to Iran, the Shah argued that Iraq would 
turn more to the Soviets that, in turn would lead to a Cold War arms race in the region, a 
situation that would facilitate framing Baghdad as a Soviet satellite and, therefore, justify 
his non-state foreign policy in Iraqi Kurdistan.  
The Shah’s Hesitation  
Amid the Kurdish operation, the Watergate Scandal planted in the Shah’s mind the 
seeds of doubt over the support for the Iraqi Kurds. He thought the Watergate Scandal 
might dissuade the White House from continuing to back Iran’s non-state foreign policy in 
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Iraqi Kurdistan. In a wider, international perspective, he was concerned about the U.S. 
ability to contain Moscow amid its withdrawal from Vietnam. The Watergate Scandal was 
“unfortunate for everyone.”666 Within this atmosphere, the Shah began testing a diplomatic 
solution with Iraq. Iran’s paralyzing support for Barzani had already convinced Baghdad 
of the importance of the détente.667 Due to Iran’s upper hand in the power equation, the 
Baath leaders had “a healthy respect for the Shah’s military edge and have backed down 
from military confrontation whenever large-scale action seemed likely. This caution is 
likely to persist even in the face of provocations by the Shah.”668 Iranian Foreign Minister 
Abbas-Ali Khalatbari met with his Iraqi counterpart in Geneva in April 1973; however, 
talks were quickly stopped as Baghdad strongly rejected accepting the Thalweg Line in 
Arvand Rud.669 The Shah knew that Baghdad would not accept the Thalweg Line unless 
Iran cut off its support for the Kurds. Besides, he knew that Barzani would not last forever. 
Although the Shah’s “tough play for the moment” in Geneva did not result in a decisive 
outcome,670 the meeting brought his major goal to the fore for the first time: ‘Leave the 
Kurds, Take Arvand Rud’. 
On the other side, the Geneva talks perturbed the Kurds. Informed of the secret 
talks by two Soviet diplomats,671 Barzani went to Tehran to seek the Shah’s view. Barzani 
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raised the possibility of the Kurds’ joining the national unity government. The Shah’s 
response was short, yet decisive: “Do so if you want to commit suicide!”672 The Shah, 
instead, suggested Barzani ask Baghdad to hold free elections as his precondition to join 
the Baath and the ICP since it would both diminish Moscow’s pressure on the Kurds and 
perturb Iraqi leaders due to their inability to hold a free election.673 Concerned about the 
American commitment, Barzani asked the Shah to “speak on our behalf in the U.S. or any 
other place you find it necessary and we are ready to accept the commitments needed from 
us and the way Your Majesty thinks those commitments should be made.”674 He also asked 
the Shah about “the moral support of the U.S” and to guarantee “full American 
understanding and backing” for the Peshmerga. The Shah confidently responded, “We 
could provide that.”675 Aware of the Shah’s possible treachery in selling him out in an 
exchange for Iraqis’ territorial concession in Arvand Rud, Barzani tried to receive more 
money and arms by threatening his allies to join Baghdad. In the meeting with Helms, 
Othman and Masoud Barzani had pleaded with the U.S. and Iran for heavier weaponry 
support since Baghdad would soon attack them with “poison gas.”676 On 23 July 1973, 
Helms advised Kissinger to modestly increase the Kurds’ monthly payments in return for 
not equipping them with offensive weapons. Kissinger agreed and wrote, “they [the Kurds] 
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ought to have enough money so that they can remain a thorn in the side of the [Iraqi] 
government.”677 It was a lucrative deal for Barzani. 
Iran’s non-state foreign policy in Iraqi Kurdistan had widened a gap within the U.S. 
top foreign policy decision-making processes. The CIA, Helms, Kissinger, and Nixon had 
accepted the Shah’s portrayal of the Kurdish War as a Cold War battleground and, 
therefore, the significance of backing the Kurds to contain Iraq as a “satellite country of 
the Soviet Union.”678 Conversely, the State Department called it a “self-fulfilling 
prophecy.”679 In his late July analysis, Lowrie advocated that the White House 
“disassociate” itself from the Kurdish crisis. He argued that “Kurdish resistance to 
compromise with [the] Baath would end if Iran stopped its assistance,” arguing that any 
settlement between the Kurds and Baghdad would also serve the U.S. interests by 
terminating Kurdish war and diminishing Iraq’s dependence on Moscow.680 Lowrie’s view 
on the Bath leaders’ efforts of “demonstrating their independence” from the Soviet was 
empowered by the Iraqi new policy.681 In March 1973, Baghdad had reached an unexpected 
deal with the Western oil companies.682 After the aborted coup of 30 June 1973, led by 
Istikhbarat Director Nazim Kazzar, Saddam stated that “Iraq would welcome moves by the 
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U.S. and Britain that could lead to [a] normalization of relations”.683 However, the White 
House was still following the Shah’s view.  
The SAVAK-CIA-Mossad covert cooperation in Iraqi Kurdistan reached its zenith 
with the Shah’s visit to the United States. On 24 July 1973, the Shah met Nixon in the Oval 
Office and informed him of Iran’s intention to prevent “a coalition of the Baath Party, the 
Kurds, and the Communists.” Convinced by his analysis, Nixon agreed to “a policy of total 
cooperation.”684 A day after, in the meeting with Kissinger and Helms, he requested more 
support for the Kurds. While re-expressing his disagreement with an independent 
Kurdistan, the Shah underscored the Kurds’ significance as “the only lever over the Iraq’s 
Government” for the U.S. and Iran. He framed the Kurds as “a trump card that we [Iran 
and the U.S.] do not want to let go,” assuring Kissinger that the Kurds had already 
“promised not to do anything without our okay.”685 In the next meeting, the Shah informed 
Kissinger that he had told Barzani “absolutely not to participate in a coalition government. 
I told them to stop receiving [the] Soviet representatives or the Baath representatives from 
Baghdad. But if we are going to ask that of them, we will have to give them some more 
money.”686 Besides, the Shah knew that Kissinger and the CIA had been aware of Iran’s 
secret talks with Iraq in Geneva. In order to deemphasize the possibility of a deal with 
Baghdad, he acutely framed the Geneva meeting as the Iraqis’ move intending “to gain 
time” since they felt “weak.”687 Shortly after the Shah’s departure to Tehran, Kissinger 
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instructed the CIA to begin “stockpiling arms for contingency supply” for an upcoming 
Iraqi-Kurdish war and to increase the Kurds’ monthly financial support by 50 percent.688 
At the same time, the Shah enhanced annual financial support for Barzani to “a little more” 
than 50 percent to $30 million.689 “Impressed and gratified,” the Shah considered it as the 
U.S. “symbolic” support of Iran’s non-state foreign policy.690 
The October War and the Rising Iraqi Threat  
On 6 October 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a surprisingly joint attack in the 
Israeli-occupied positions in the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. In the middle of 
their initial defeats in the battlefront, the Israelis pressed Barzani to launch an offensive in 
the north of Iraq to keep Baghdad out of the war. Nine days after the outbreak of the war, 
Barzani informed Kissinger that “the [Israelis] suggest we try to gain territories in 
Kurdistan while it is busy with the war. They promised that they will study helping us with 
arms with Iran. No troops have been withdrawn from our area and we have no such 
offensive weapons. We like to know your opinion on this.”691 However, Kissinger was 
uncertain of the feasibility of the Israeli plan.692 Thus, he asked Helms to inform the Shah. 
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The Shah strongly opposed the proposal and called it “suicidal.”693 Aware of the Kurds’ 
lack of heavy offensive weapons, the Shah argued that any Peshmerga offensive would end 
in a fiasco. He also disagreed with the destruction of the Kurds for Israel’s security, stating 
that “I do not want the Kurds to be proxies of Israel and America.”694 Ambassador Helms 
shared the Shah’s view and warned Kissinger of that “If they [the Iraqi Kurds] were to get 
chewed up militarily, it would deprive the Shah of his ‘Kurdish card’ and he does not want 
to see that.”695 With the Shah’s advice, Kissinger “considered it unwise to tie the Kurds too 
explicitly to Israel’s tactical preferences and thereby bring down on the already 
beleaguered Kurds the wrath of other Arab states,”696 and ordered Barzani to reject Israeli’s 
proposal.697 Once again, the Shah showed his central role in the political dynamics of the 
Middle East. 
Despite his claim that Iran could “crush Iraq in a few hours,”698 the Shah had been 
concerned about Saddam Hussein’s rising power in Baghdad. After convincing the ICP to 
join to the national unity government, he had received Russian heavy armaments.699 The 
October War of 1973 also empowered the Iraqis. Unaware of a coordinated surprise attack 
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launched by its allies in Cairo, Damascus, and Moscow,700 Baghdad refused to participate 
in the Arab oil embargo because the sale of oil provided Baghdad with petrodollars. It was 
within this context that Kissinger painted Baghdad as “the principal Soviet client in the 
Middle East” during his visit to Tehran in November 1973. He contended “that the Ba’ath 
government under Saddam Hussein continued to finance terrorist organizations … and that 
it was the driving force in the rejectionist front seeking to block Arab-Israeli peace 
initiatives … whose instability we should continue to promote.”701 By late 1973, 
commitment to the Pahlavi monarch had overshadowed anything else for the United States. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
700 Baghdad 596 to U.S. Department of State, “Post War Assessment of Iraq and Policy Recommendations,” 
November 4, 1973 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1973), pp.1-3. 
 
701 Kissinger, Henry. Years of Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999). p.385. 
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Limbo -- The Shia Lebanese 
“I asked the Shah to build a hospital for the Shia. Then, we can build a university for them, too. The Shah 
agreed. But Qadar attempted to dissuade the Shah.” Sadr told Ehsan Naraghi.702 
 
The Six-Day War and the Decline of the Nasserism 
On 5 June 1967, Israel defeated the Arab armies in the Six-Day War and destroyed 
the credibility of Nasserism. The scale of Israel’s devastating victory with a rapid seizure 
of large areas of Arab territories marked a major transformation in the Shah’s calculation 
of the power arrangement in the Middle East. Israel’s crushing defeat of Arab regimes did 
not prompt the Shah to see the Jewish state as a threat to Iran. The fiasco of 1967 convinced 
Nasser to reevaluate his strategy of seeking regional primacy by siding with the Soviets 
and challenging the U.S. and Iran.703 A gradual thaw between Iran and Egypt emerged. A 
month after a normalized relation with Tehran, Nasser died and the Shah was no longer 
threatened by his major foe in the region.704 It was the last nail in the coffin of Nasserism.  
As Pan-Arab sentiment was hammered down, the threat of Egypt lessened. It was 
a paradigm-shifting moment for Iran’s non-state foreign policy on the east coast of the 
Mediterranean. With Cairo’s lack of power to pose a threat to Iran’s national security, the 
                                                
702 Naraghi’s interview with Khabar-Online, 2 May 2011. 
 
703 With Kuwaiti mediation, Nasser tried to lessen his tension with the Shah. Aware of Nasser’s miserable 
situation, the Shah asked Cairo to issue an official apology to Iran for its previous provocations toward Tehran 
as a pre-condition for the revival of diplomatic relations with Egypt. Nasser had no option but to accept the 
Shah’s demand. A year before his death, The Egypt Ambassador to Belgrade, Serbia, talked to Iran’s 
ambassador and expressed Cairo’s inclination to revive diplomatic relations with Tehran. Then. Egypt took 
the first step toward the resumption of ties with Iran when he agreed to a joint communiqué announcing the 
resumption of full diplomatic relations in August 1970. Tehran-Cairo relations’ major thaw when Prime 
Minister Hoveyda participated in Nasser’s funeral. Interview with Major General Mansour Qadar, Oral 
History, Foundations for Iranian History; Parsi, Trita, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, 
Iran, and the United States (Yale University Press, 2007) p. 32. 
 
704 Alam, Assadollah. Yad’dashtha-ye ‘Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam 
Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. I: 1968-1970 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 1995), p. 125. 
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necessity of containing Egypt and therefore, Iran’s need for the Lebanese Shia disappeared. 
Indeed, the Six-Days War had huge ramifications for Iran’s ties with the Lebanese Shia. 
Besides, four factors forced Tehran to shift its non-state foreign policy in Lebanon: Sadr’s 
connections with Palestinian guerrillas, his connections with the Iranian opposition, his 
connections with Arab powers of the region, and, finally, his tension with Iran’s embassy 
in Beirut. By the late 60s, however, Sadr’s popularity had been still unscathed.         
The Supreme Islamic Shia Council  
In April 1966, Sadr prepared a plan to establish a major Shia institution, the 
Supreme Islamic Shia Council (al-Majlis al-Eslamiya a-Shii al-A’la or SICS) to “unify all 
the Shia” against social injustice and political and economic marginalization and to fight 
“for their rights.”705 On 15 August 1966, Sadr had asked Beirut to approve the plan. The 
plan was ultimately signed by Chehabist President Charles Helou in 1967. On 29 May 
1969, the SICS was officially established and Sadr was appointed as its first Chairman, 
defeating his unremitting opponent Kamel al-Asaad (Kamel Bey).706 The establishment of 
the SISC was Sadr’s most impressive achievement, providing the Shia a powerful 
representative body independent of the Sunni majority. It declared the Shia community as 
a Lebanese legal community. It was, in fact, a watershed in the crystallization of the Shia 
identity.  
The SICS soon made a demand on Beirut for socio-economic, political supports, 
including defending the South, developing the Shia territory, and increasing the 
                                                
705 SAVAK Documents, No. 212s/1445, 19 September 1966. 
 
706 Kamel Asaad was a former Speaker of Parliament, former Minister of Education and Fine Arts, and an 
influential Shia zaim (notable) from al-Tayyiba. 
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governmental positions for the Shia. Later entitled ‘Imam’ by his followers,707 On 10 
August 1969, Sadr began defying both traditional Shia clerics and leftists as he called for 
all Lebanese communities tto work equally hard to implement political reform and to fight 
deprivation in all regions of Lebanon. The declaration reaffirmed Sadr’s image as a leading 
political figure in Lebanon. According to SAVAK, “Seyed Mousa Sadr is a Shia clergy 
with a ‘strange’ position in Lebanon as such that he has become the ‘Heart of Beirut’. No 
Lebanese [politician] dares to disobey his commands. Whenever he leaves or enters 
Lebanon for his short trips, all Beirut elites should welcome him. He is far more powerful 
than Lebanese President. One can easily find his images in all Lebanese newspapers and 
magazines as well as Beirut bazaars … Sadr has established various foundations in Beirut. 
He is the head of Shia Council and was entitled Imam by his followers. [There was a rumor 
that] the Lebanon President feared his power. All military generals are Sadr’s Fedayeen. It 
would be unbelievable if any political actor disobeys his orders … There is no power 
beyond Sadr’s power in Beirut and whenever he intends, he travels to any part of the world 
with a special ceremony … In short, Sadr means Lebanon and Lebanon means Sadr.”708 
Time seemed to be on Sadr’s side. 
The establishment of the SICS was welcomed by the Maronites since the Shia rise 
would weaken the Pan-Arab Sunni front. Conversely, the Sunni lashed out at Sadr’s SICS. 
Earlier before, the Sunni elites had unsuccessfully tried to dissuade Sadr from the 
establishment of the SICS by offering him the post of deputy of the Sunni-dominated 
                                                
707 While the Sunnis use the term for leaders of any organized group activities, like prayers, the Shia had 
never ascribed it to a religious figure, since Imam was a ‘Baraka’ (divine gift) and only a Ma’sum (moral 
infallible) would enjoy this. But Sadr was the first Shia clergy who was entitled as Imam right before 
Ayatollah Seyyed Rohullah Khomeini was later entitled it in the 1979 Islamic Revolution. 
 
708 SAVAK Documents, No. (39-40). 
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Islamic Coalition. With his refusal, the Sunni leaders, including Sheikh Hassan Khaled, the 
Sunni Mufti and the Head of the Islamic Coalition, called the SICS Sadr’s betrayal of the 
Muslim front against the Christians. Nasserist elements in Lebanon, whose major members 
were the Sunni, argued that “appointing a Mufti for the Sunni and an Imam for the Shia 
would be nonsense since all the Muslim should be united.”709 Both Leftists and Palestinians 
also opposed the formation of the SICS. Some elements in the Shia community, including 
influential Lebanese politicians, landowners, and traditional clerics, criticized Sadr and the 
Council. Sheikh Hussein Khatib,710 Riadh Taha,711 Ja’far Sharaf al-Din,712 and Kamel al-
Asaad were Sadr’s major foes in the South. These Shia elites rallied both Sunni and Shia 
mercenaries chanting, ‘We do not want an Iran’s Servant’, against Sadr.713 Sadr, in 
response, assured them that “the new-founded SICS was not [established] in order to add 
troubles as a new sect; rather, it intends to lessen these sectarian cleavages [in Lebanon].”714 
Nonetheless, the Sunni leaders denounced him as the Shah’s agent in Lebanon. Sunni 
newspapers launched an anti-Sadr campaign and framed Sadr as “one of the Iranians, who 
are [all] the Shah’s spies, who just came here [Lebanon] yesterday and now intends to 
control the Lebanese people destiny in his hands.”715 Sadr was also accused of working for 
                                                
709 SAVAK Documents, No. 212/306, 3 May 1965.  
 
710 Khatib was an influential Shia clergy. 
 
711 Taha was a pro-Iraqi Baath politician. See SAVAK Documents, No. 212/971, 1 July 1970. 
 
712 Ja’afar was Seyyed Abdol-Hussein Sharafoddin’s son who did not have a good relationship with Sadr 
since he saw Sadr as a usurper of his father’s title. 
 
713 SAVAK Documents, No. 212/1494, 11 August 1970. 
 
714 Sadr’s declaration, 29 May 1969. 
 
715 SAVAK Documents, No number, No date. 
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SAVAK and of being someone whose political moves were based on “SAVAK’s future 
master plan.”716 In the wake of Iran’s policy shift from Lebanon, Sadr was still considered 
by his Lebanese foes as the Shah’s agent. 
Palestinian Cause  
Geography and history have both cursed Lebanon with the Palestinian Cause. Since 
the Balfour Declaration of 1948, Lebanon’s security had become vulnerable in the face of 
both threats of a foreign state, i.e., Israel, and non-state actors, i.e., Palestinian guerrillas. 
Right after the creation of Israel, one hundred thousand Palestinians fled into Lebanon and 
stayed in their camps on the southern border. Lebanese insecurity escalated when the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was established in the Arab Summit of Amman, 
June 1964. Although the Lebanese Army trained dozens of Palestinian guerrillas after the 
Six-Day War of 1967,717 Beirut criticized the formation of the PLO camps on its soil. 
However, the Palestinian guerrillas established a virtual state-within-a-state in West Beirut 
and part of southern Lebanon. Some of the PLO leaders, like Ahmad Shukeiri, the first 
PLO chief, stayed in Lebanon until 1968. After all, the Palestinian guerrillas had been 
supported by the Sunni Lebanese. Sunni Arab countries, like Libya, supported the 
Palestinian immigration to southern Lebanon. On top of that, PLO presence in Lebanon 
forced Israel to target the south of Lebanon. In January 1965 Fatah, the strongest faction 
of the PLO, launched its operations from the South, causing the Israeli Army to invade 
Lebanon. In return, Beirut blamed the PLO for the Israeli invasion.718 The Black September 
                                                
716 Ghassan Tueni, head of An-Nahar, was also accused of Tehran’s agent. See SAVAK Documents, No. 
(p.50). 
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of 1970 accelerated the presence of armed Palestinian guerrillas in Lebanon that, in return, 
revived skirmishes between Beirut and the PLO.  
Sadr had initially supported the Palestinians. Putting emphasis on Islamic unity, 
Sadr considered the Palestine cause as a common denominator of the Muslim interests. 
Sadr had, in fact, convinced the Palestinian groups to establish the PLO. “Your struggles 
would be fruitless as long as you yourself do not claim your land and, instead, give others 
authority to act on behalf of you,” Sadr had told Arafat.719 A significant portion of the Fatah 
members were young Lebanese Shia with a deep sympathy for the Palestinian plight. Many 
young Shia had been training in the PLO camps in Yamunah and Ayn al-Boniyyeh around 
Baalbek. Sadr’s famous slogan, “We want Bayt al-Maqdis (Jerusalem) before Sour [the 
najor Shia city in the south of Lebanon],” represented his view towards the Palestinian 
Cause.720 Despite major disagreements, the Sunni Lebanese and the PLO welcomed Sadr’s 
growing support for the Palestinian armed militias. Nevertheless, the Maronites and other 
Christian communities began distancing themselves from Sadr.  
SAVAK gradually framed Sadr’s close relations with the PLO as an example of 
rising Islamism backed by radical leftist groups. The situation deteriorated when Sadr 
criticized Tehran for abandoning Palestinians and instead supporting Israelis. “The Iranian 
                                                
718 The Israeli Air Force targeted high-ranking PLO officials, the headquarters of the Democratic Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and refugee camps, like Nahr al-Band and Badawi, the most significant 
guerrilla training headquarters for Palestinians, and other revolutionary international groups like Chinese, 
Japanese, Turks, Cypriots, and Iranians. The central government of Lebanon declared the state of emergency 
in April 1969 and launched a major offensive against the Syrian-backed Palestinian group of As-Sa’iqa in 
the southern Lebanon. After on-and-off fighting between Palestinian guerrillas and the Lebanese Army, the 
PLO and Beirut signed an agreement in late 1969 and accepted the ceasefire. 
 
719See 
http://tarikhirani.ir/Modules/News/Phtml/News.PrintVersion.Html.php?Lang=fa&TypeId=4&NewsId=924. 
 
720 Seyyed Hadi Khosrowshahi, Jonbesh-e Amal va Emam Musa Sadr [Amal Movement and Imam Musa 
Sadr], See http://iscq.ir/?part=menu&inc=menu&id=41. 
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people supported the Arab because they were Muslim. Unfortunately, the Iranian 
government did not support the Palestinians and, instead, had good relations with Israel … 
Iran could have supported the Palestinians by providing them with weapons as [Iran did 
in] Pakistan.”721 In the aftermath of the decline of the Nasserism, the Shia-PLO alignment 
exacerbated Tehran-Sadr relations. 
As time wore on, however, the relations between Sadr and the PLO worsened. The 
PLO guerrilla wars from southern Lebanese soil led to devastating and unstoppable 
campaigns by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Although the Shia had shown their fidelity 
to the Palestine cause, the undisciplined Palestinian guerrillas took over the Shia farms and 
villages, cutting off their roads and forcibly recruiting the young Shia into their militias.722 
By the early 70s, the Shia had been forcibly engaged in the bloody Palestinian cause, 
fighting with the Israelis and the PLO’s foes in Lebanon. Indeed, the Palestine cause 
brought the Shia only suffering, and the south of Lebanon turned into a bloody battle zone. 
Therefore, Sadr pleaded with both Beirut and other Arab states to consider the Shia plight. 
He began denouncing the PLO for prompting Israeli raids on the South. In May 1970, Sadr 
publicly objected the Palestinian guerrillas’ behavior with the Shia girls and women.723 
“The South is the most explosive region in Lebanon … While the Shia initially supported 
the Palestinian militias, some of the Palestinians began making trouble for the Shia, like 
imposing a levy on the Shia … I tried persuading the Shia that these radical subversions 
                                                
721 The Shah backed Islam-Abad in wars with India in 1965 and particularly 1971. SAVAK Documents, No. 
316/2818, 8 September 1970. 
 
722 Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival: How conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future (W.W. Norton & 
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723 SAVAK Documents, No. 212/320, 9 May 1970. 
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have nothing to do with real Palestinian guerrillas,” Sadr contended.724 Additionally, a 
growing flux of Sunni Palestinian refugees could demographically jeopardize the Shia 
position in the South that would, in turn, force the Shia to immigrate to Beirut and live in 
ghettos in deep poverty and prompt Israel to attack the South. With Beirut’s inability to 
defend the South from Israel and the anarchy-causing PLO, Sadr stressed the national unity 
of Lebanon. However, his support for a more functioning state in Lebanon prompted the 
Palestinians to denounce him as a Lebanese Intelligence agent.725 Indeed, nobody 
recognized the Shia appreciation and faithful support for the Palestinians. Once again, the 
Shia pain was ignored by the Sunni leaders.  
The rising tension between Sadr and the PLO did not decrease Tehran’s suspicion. 
Instead, Iran’s embassy in Beirut accused Seyyed Musa of having close ties with radical 
Palestinian militias and their leaders, like George Habash and Nayef Hawatmeh.726 While 
Seyyed Musa Sadr clearly did not support the Palestinian militias in the South as it would 
harm the Shia, he had been labeled by SAVAK as a ‘natural’ ally of radical Palestinian.  
Sadr and Arab Regimes  
Lebanon’s fragile state, its fragmented political arena and weak national identity all 
provided room for the Arab states to build connections with other Lebanese communities. 
These ties allowed Lebanese elites and groups to maneuver and play off outside powers 
against each other. In the aftermath of Iran’s gradual shift from the south of Lebanon, Sadr 
began seeking an external supporter for his community. Syria and its politically ruling 
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Alawite elites were the first targets. Excoriated by the Sunni as disbelievers (kuffar) and 
idolaters (mushrikun), the Alawite community had been marginalized from the larger 
Islamic community.727 There had been also a small Alawite community in Tripoli and the 
Akkar district, in the north of Lebanon, persecuted by the Sunni Ottomans for centuries. 
Even after Lebanon’s independence, they were not entitled as a legal community. In the 
aftermath of the establishment of the SCIC, the Alawite efforts to seek an ally in Lebanon 
were welcomed by Sadr. Although the Lebanese Shia had no historical ties to the Alawites, 
Sadr built a friendly relation with al-Alwashi, the leader of the Lebanese Alawites in 
Tripoli, and brought the Alawite community of Lebanon under the Twelver Shia 
jurisdiction.728 Despite the “uncomplimentary references to the Alawis in the Twelver 
sources,” Sadr’s preaching for the revival of the Shia collective identity and Muslim unity 
as well as his ambition “to extend his reach into the north of Lebanon,”729 convinced him 
to take an inclusionary policy towards the Alawite community. In late 1969, in a 
contentious meeting of the SISC, Sadr declared the Alawite community as a branch of the 
greater Shia community and brought them under his wing. Despite an initial Alawite 
religious shaykhs’ disinclination, it was Alawite Hafiz Assad’s rising power after the coup 
of 18 May 1971 and the Sunni violence of 1973 that convinced the Alawites as a non-
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Muslim community to strengthen the Shia-Alawite ties in the Levant. On the one hand, the 
new regime of Assad needed religious legitimacy. On the other hand, the Lebanese Shia 
needed a powerful patron. This situation convinced Sadr to cultivate friendly, strategic 
connections with Damascus.730 In July 1973, Sadr issued his historical fatwa on the 
recognition of the Alawite as Shia co-religionists and “appointed a local Alawi to the 
position of Twelver mufti of Tripoli and northern Lebanon.”731 It was a decisive political-
religious move that opened a way for the inclusion of the Alawite community into the 
jurisdiction of an appointee of the SISC.732 Sadr’s fatwa also legitimized Assad’s regime 
and “prevented its fall” in a country with a Sunni majority.733 Damascus, in response, gave 
full support to the Shia with political, financial, and military aid. Back then, the Syrian 
national interests and the interests of Lebanese Shia became intertwined.  
The growing Lebanese Shia-Damascus alliance threatened both the Maronites and 
Palestinian supporters. In spite of sharing the same view with the Shia over blaming the 
PLO radicalism, the Maronites could not accept Syria as a powerful patron of a Lebanese 
community. “Surrounded by Syria from north and east,” the Lebanese government had 
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731 Martin Kramer, “Syria’s Alawis and Shi’ism,” in Shi’ism, Resistance, and Revolution, ed. Martin Kramer 
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considered relations with Syria “vital and substantial” since its independence.734 After all, 
Syria was still seeking to realize the idea of the Greater Syria that encompassed the Levant 
and western Mesopotamia.735 The idea was obviously against the Maronites who saw 
Syrian nationalism as an existential threat to Lebanon. In the view of the Maronites, Sadr’s 
growing closeness with Damascus was the first alignment between a Shia community and 
a Pan-Arab regime.  
Despite a major conflict of interests with Damascus, Iran was not prompted by 
Sadr-Assad’s Syrian relations. Since the emergence of Baghdad-Damascus competition, 
the Shah had considered a more remote Syria as a possible lever over Baghdad. SAVAK 
had recommended that the Shah employ Damascus against Baghdad. “In the mid-70s, I 
suggested that the Shah have a friendly relation with Damascus due to the Syrian enmity 
with Baghdad. I reminded the Shah that I had a close relation with Assad. We [Qadar and 
Assad] used to live in a neighborhood in Damascus. In the aftermath of the Black 
September of 1970, he invited me to visit Damascus. In the meeting, he pointed to the desk 
in the middle of the room and said, “Imagine the desk is Iraq. Why cannot we shake hands 
above the desk? We can bypass Iraq. Well, of course, His Imperial Majesty should not 
expect me to officially announce Syria’s support for Iran’s retaking of three islands in the 
Persian Gulf [i.e., Abu Musa, Great Tunb, Small Tunb]. But, I believe those islands were 
yours [Iranians]. Do not pay attention to newspapers and the media,” Qadar claimed his 
role in convincing the Shah to have a closer relation with Assad. A growing Assad-Sadr 
                                                
734 Madrid 1982 to Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 October 1970. 
 
735 When Lebanon won its independence from France in 1943, the Syrian regime futilely objected to the 
French government for carving out generous chunks of its territory to shape Lebanon and weaken Arab-
Nationalism. 
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relation did not prevent the revival of Tehran-Damascus diplomatic relations forged in 
order to contain Iraq. 
However, Tehran immediately criticized a thaw in Sadr-Nasser relations. In the 60s, 
Sadr’s efforts to revive the Shia collective identity were initially criticized by Nasser and 
the Lebanese Nasserist groups.736 There were some rumors that several Nasserist elements 
in Lebanon had planned to assassinate Sadr.737 However, a geopolitical reshuffle following 
the Six-Day War pushed Cairo to reconsider its regional policy. After his short trip to 
Kuwait in March 1970, Sadr was invited to Cairo.738 In an interview with Mohamed 
Hassanein Heikal in Cairo on 12 March 1970, Sadr talked about his extensive connections 
with the Iranian revolutionaries.739 A few hours later, he met with Nasser. In the meeting, 
Nasser stressed that Egypt had no enmity with the Shah of Iran and he was fully ready for 
the revival of the diplomatic relations with Tehran, though the Iran-Iraq crisis of Arvand 
Rud had been the main obstacle against the move.740 Nasser also permitted Sadr to give the 
Friday speech in al-Azhar, Sunni’s most prestigious, religious university.741 Iranian 
officials soon reacted to his meeting with Nasser. In the Shah’s threat assessment, the Shia-
Egyptian ties could revive the weakened Pan-Arabism in Lebanon or cement a new Arab 
Unity including both the Shia, Sunni, and even Christians. Besides, Sadr’s turn to Egypt 
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could trigger Islamic revivalism--later called Islamism--in Iran. Due to his popularity 
among the Iranian Shia clergies, Sadr’s connection with Nasser could also prompt the 
consolidation of the Arab-Black Threat. It was in this context that Iran’s embassy in Beirut 
and elements in SAVAK framed him as an Egyptian agent. Aware of the Shah’s suspicion 
of his meeting with Nasser, Sadr tried to assuage the tension. On 17 April 1970, Sadr 
reported to Manouchehr Davoudi details of his meeting with Nasser and added that 
Egyptian policy had become more moderate and rational in the post-1967 era. He also 
wished to see Tehran support the Lebanese Shia by providing them military aid.742 
However, his request was rejected. Tehran was still suspicious about Sadr’s contacts with 
Cairo.  
In the post-1967 period, the Baath leaders tried to portray Iraq as a new leader of 
the Arab World. Baghdad began supporting several Shia clergies to gain a strategic space 
in the south of Lebanon and to contain Syria, and to some degree, Iran there. With its 
majority Shia population, Iraq apparently had a potential to attract the Shia clergymen 
against Tehran as well as to placate its Shia opponents. The Iraqi Baath had considered 
Sadr as a threat to its regional interests. Baghdad, in fact, saw Sadr as Najaf’s anti-Baath 
representative in Lebanon.743 Sadr’s close relations with Hafiz Assad and dissident Shia 
clerics, particularly his cousin, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir Sadr, convinced Baghdad to 
mobilize anti-Sadr elites in Lebanon led by Kamel al-Asaad, Sheikh Hassan Khaled, and 
Riadh Taha.744 However, Sadr was cautious in dealing with Iraqi-backed elites in Lebanon 
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since Baghdad might get revenge by killing Ayatollah Sadr.745 Since the tightening of the 
Iraqi political situation for the Shia, Sadr had tried to convince Iran to support the Iraqi 
Shia Ayatollahs. In his talk with Davoudi, Sadr stated that “Ja’far Sharaf al-Din has built 
secret ties with the Iraqi Istikhbarat after a diplomatic halt in Iran-Lebanon relations.” He 
also stated that the Iraqis had dispatched 86 killers to assassinate him.746 While Sadr 
indirectly tried to convince Tehran to shift its policy in Lebanon, SAVAK preferred to stay 
out of intra-Shia tension. Besides, SAVAK argued that the main Iraqi allies in Lebanon 
were leftists and Palestinian guerrillas, instead of the Shia. While Sadr’s view towards 
Baghdad was in accord with Iran’s policy, Tehran ignored his potential to jeopardize Iraq’s 
interests in both Lebanon and Najaf.  
In addition to the unity of Lebanon and disapperance of the discrimination against 
the downtrodden Shia communities, Sadr’s message had ushered in the revival of Islam 
and the Islamic unity. Although he fought the dominant Sunni view over the recognition 
of Lebanese Shia, Sadr kept preaching the significance of unity in the Islamic World. To 
accomplish this mission, he tirelessly tried to unite the Arab leaders’ views over the 
regional conflicts. He approached the Saudis, particularly Prince Abdullah who financially 
supported Sadr in the establishment of the Ameliah School and other Shia institutions.747 
Prince Abdullah-Musa Sadr’s friendship grew so that Sadr had been permitted 
reconstructing of the sacred al-Baqi Cemetery.748 SAVAK criticized Sadr’s connection 
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746 SAVAK Documents, No.316, 7 May 1970. 
 
747 SAVAK Documents, No. 223/10, 24 March 1966. 
 
748 Masira al-Imam al-Seyyed Msa al-Sadr [Seyyed Musa Sadr’s Journey], Vol III, Second Edition, p. 357. 
See http://moodkerbes.info/1394/02/01/imam-sadr-and-Al-Baqi. Jannat al-Baqi cemetery is in Medina, 
206 
 
with regional states. Ambassador Qadar claimed, “Sadr went to Saudi Arabia and gave a 
speech, stating that ‘I am here because of our first Calipha, Abu Bakr, was from here.’ As 
a Shia, Sadr should not have said that. Then, King Khaled instructed the distribution of 
Sadr’s speech among the Shia in Saudi Arabia.”749 At the same time, Sadr was invited by 
Arab sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf. In March 1973, Sadr went to Bahrain, Qatar, and 
then the UAE. Although Sadr had no intention of making an anti-Iran move, SAVAK 
thought Sadr’s connections with the conservative Arab regimes of the Persian Gulf could 
provide him financial aid. With this aid, SAVAK concluded, Sadr could “build a university 
in the south of Lebanon for all the Shia in the world that might, in return, function as a 
strategic base for anti-Shah opposition in the region and beyond.” Therefore, SAVAK 
suggested that “it would be better for Tehran to open an Islamic Shia university in Iran to 
oppose Sadr’s anti-Shah plan that could pose a threat to Iran’s national security.”750 Sadr 
had been gradually framed as a foe. 
Bakhtiar and Sadr 
Tehran-Beirut relations went downhill over Brigadier General Teymur Bakhtiar’s 
issue. In the mid-50s, he had waged a ruthless campaign to crush anti-Shah forces.751 As 
the youngest three-star general, Bakhtiar was then appointed as the first SAVAK director 
in February 1956. Bakhtiar had created and managed an initial phase of Iran’s non-state 
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foreign policy between 1958-61. However, his fast rise soon stalled as Prime Minister Ali 
Amini warned the Shah of Bakhtiar’s secret connections with President Kennedy. Worried 
about an American-backed coup, the Shah dismissed Bakhtiar in 1961 and then forced him 
to live in exile in Geneva, Switzerland. Despite blaming Nasser for backing demonstrations 
organizers,752 the Shah was suspicious of Bakhtiar’s indirect intervention in the riot of 
1963. With a growing tension in the Shah-Bakhtiar relations, the former SAVAK director 
began reviving his secret networks within SAVAK and Iran’s allies in the region. 
Ambassador Qadar claimed of the existence of a strong pro-Bakhtiar group within 
SAVAK. “The head of this group was Colonel Pashaie. Other major members were 
Tajbakhsh, Azmoun, Pejman, Savadkouhi, and to some degree Alavi-kia,” Qaar 
claimed.753 Bakhtiar also tried to contact with Iranian dissidents in Europe, Lebanon, and 
Iraq, including Ayatollah Khomeini, Reza Radmanesh, and Mahmoud Panahian.754 Seyyed 
Musa Sadr was also among Bahktiar’s major targets. Ambassador Qadar accused Sadr of 
having permanent contacts with Bakhtiar even after Bakhtiar’s exile to Europe. He 
claimed, “when the Shah discharged Bakhtiar, Sadr cut his ties with Tehran and, in return, 
SAVAK terminated his financial support. Sadr, however, never cut his connection with 
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Bakhtiar. When I was charge d’ affairs in Iran’s embassy in Beirut, Teymur Bakhtiar 
entered Lebanon five times between 1965-67. Although Tehran pressed me to arrest 
Bakhtiar, I asked the officials to hold since Bakhtiar’s secretary in Beirut, Bahr al-Oloum, 
had been SAVAK’s agent … Speaking fluently in Farsi, Bahr al-Oloum was an Iraqi man 
who had extensive networks with several Iranian clergies. Seyyed Musa Sadr and Colonel 
Pashaie both participated in these meetings …We were fully aware of Bakhtiar and his 
allies’ detailed plans.”755 In the 60s, Bakhtiar and Ayatollah Khomeini were the Shah’s 
leading dissidents. 
In 1969, Bakhtiar entered Lebanon but, surprisingly this time he was arrested. 
Despite the Shah’s insistence, Bakhtiar was not extradited to Tehran and he finally left 
Beirut on 4 April 1969. Iran immediately broke its diplomatic relation with Lebanon. “The 
Shah got so angry that he ordered to sell all the furniture of the Iran’s embassy in Lebanon 
since, according to the Shah, there would be no return anymore.”756 While the Maronites 
regime of Beirut and President Helou were responsible for the Iranian-Lebanese diplomatic 
tension, SAVAK soon criticized Sadr since he “single-handedly pressed Beirut to release 
Bakhtiar,” according to Qadar.757 In reality, when Bakhtiar traveled to Beirut, Sadr had a 
secret meeting with him. Qadar claimed, “when I was appointed as Iran’s ambassador to 
Jordan, Bakhtiar came to Beirut two more times. Interestingly, Manouchehr Zelli, Iran’s 
ambassador to Beirut at the time, was not aware of his extensive connections in Beirut 
since SAVAK had not informed him. When Bakhtiar entered Lebanon, Zelli reacted and 
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unintentionally politicized the case. Despite Ambassador Zelli’s tireless efforts and 
Tehran’s financial investment and heavy payment to the Lebanese officials, including 
President and Parliament Speaker, Kamel Asaad, Sadr who had assigned a lawyer for 
Bakhtiar’s case convinced Beirut to release him. With Bakhtiar’s release, Sadr’s secret 
relations with him were disclosed.”758 Nevertheless, Sadr refused any cooperation with 
Bakhtiar against Tehran. Sadr argued he never agreed with Bakhtiar’s plot to overthrow 
the Pahlavi regime of Tehran and his meeting with the SAVAK former director was 
arranged just because of his religious position in Lebanon.759 Sadr explained to 
Manouchehr Davoudi that he was an Iranian who “loves the country but it seems that I 
have been punished because I am an Iranian. Wrongly reported by Ja’far Sharaf al-Din, the 
Iranian regime thinks that I have been one of those who prevented Bakhtiar’s extradition 
to Iran.”760 Nonetheless, Sadr’s efforts to purge himself of Bakhtiar’s anti-Shah activities 
fell on deaf ears. Although Tehran-Beirut relations were ultimately renewed in July 1971 
with former president Camille Chamoun meeting with the Shah in Tehran, SAVAK never 
stopped denouncing Seyyed Musa for having secret connections with Bakhtiar.  
The Iranian Revolutionaries 
In contrast to his ambiguous ties with Bakhtiar, Sadr’s direct and indirect support 
for the Iranian opposition had huge ramifications for Iran’s non-state foreign policy in 
Lebanon. Since the 50s, Beirut had been a major bridgehead for a wide variety of intellectuals 
and political dissidents. Lebanese open politics, at least compared to other regional states, soon 
                                                
758 Interview with Major General Mansour Qadar, Oral History, Foundations for Iranian History. 
 
759 SAVAK Documents, No. 27 December 1971.  
 
760 SAVAK Documents, No. 316, 6 May 1970. 
210 
 
became a magnet for several Middle Eastern opposition groups to establish their branches 
in Beirut. In the aftermath of the U.S.-orchestrated coup of 1953 and the reinstallation of 
the Shah on the Peacock Throne, anti-Shah dissidents, including the Pro-Mossadegh 
National-Front and the communist Tudeh Party, were effectively suppressed. Radical 
religious forces, especially Ayatollah Seyyed Rouhollah Khomeini and Nehzat-e Azadi-e 
Iran (the Freedom Movement of Iran), were both exiled and suppressed after the riot of 
June 1963. The rest of the conservative clergy had been cowed, co-opted, or, like Grand 
Ayatollah Boroujerdi, took an a-political line. By the mid-60s, however, the suppression 
of old popular opposition parties gradually radicalized the dissidents and left armed 
violence as the only means of inflicting damage on the Pahlavi regime. Inspired by Mao 
and the Third World revolutionary revolutions in Algeria, Cuba, Palestine, and Vietnam, a 
new wave of Iranian dissidents, mostly young students, emerged. Chief among them were 
the lslamist-leftists Sazman-e Mojahedin-e Khalq-e Iran (People’s Mojahedin of Iran or 
MEK) and the Marxist-Leninist Sazman-e Cherik-ha-ye Fadaiyan-e Khalq (Organization 
of the Iranian People’s Fadaiyan Guerrillas or Fadaiyan). The presence of Palestinian 
military bases in Lebanon provided a safe ground for Nehzat-e Azadi-e Iran--Shakhe 
Kharej (the Freedom Movement of Iran-External Branch), the Mojahedin, and the 
Fadaiyan. By the late-60s, their activities had been effectively monitored by the powerful 
SAVAK. SAVAK extensively used its connections with the Lebanese General Security 
Directorate to control Iranian militant groups. Nonetheless, when Suleiman Frangieh 
gained power in 1970, the Lebanese security service was soon purged of pro-Chehab 
forces,761 and in turn, Iran’s intelligence power in Lebanon was limited.  
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Rooted in the Islamic Student Associations, a student club aiming at preventing the 
expansion of communism in Iran in the post-World War II era by putting emphasis on the 
compatibility of Islam and modernity, the Freedom Movement of Iran (FMI) was founded 
by religious-liberal members of the pro-Mossadegh National Front, i.e., Mehdi Bazargan, 
then the first Prime Minister after the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Seyyed Mahmoud 
Taleghani, an influential reformist and senior clergy, and Yadollah Sahabi, a reformist 
politician, in 1961.762 The FMI was outlawed after backing the demonstrations of 1963. 
Shortly after that, its young member established the external wing of the FMI.763 After an 
unsuccessful meeting in Algeria, Mostafa Chamran, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, and Ebrahim 
Yazdi established Sazeman-e Makhsus-e Eettehad va Amal (Special Organization for 
Unity and Action or SAMA) in July 1964 in Egypt.764 After two years of military training 
at the al-Khas, a garrison 90 kilometers from Cairo, the SAMA left Egypt in 1966, due to 
Nasser’s increasingly anti-Iran attitude--referring to the Persian Gulf as the ‘Arabian Gulf’ 
and to Iran’s Khuzestan as ‘Arabistan’. The SAMA then moved its base to Beirut; however, 
with Tehran’s pressure, both Yazdi and Chamran returned to the United States. 
In the meantime, Sadr asked his friends, Mehdi Bazargan and Ibrahim Yazdi, to 
find a “committed” director for the Burj al-Shimali Technical Institute.765 Sadr was going 
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to establish a Technical Institute, a vocational institute in the southern town of Burj al-
Shimali and outside of Tyre where both ideological and technical training was provided. 
Mostafa Chamran then left the U.S. for Lebanon for the second time in 1971. Chamran 
soon became a major figure of the Iranian opposition in Lebanon. As a “former member of 
Iranian Student Confederation”766 and “National Front supporter,”767 Chamran was “a 
highly-educated student in the U.S. who had become pessimist of Iran’s regime.”768 After 
his graduation, he soon left the U.S. for Cuba to receive military training.769 He left his 
position as a senior research staff scientist at Bell Laboratories and NASA’s Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory to go to Egypt to found SAMA. In Egypt, he was chosen as SAMA’s military 
head. Upon his return to the U.S., he continued revolutionary activities.770 According to 
SAVAK, Chamran was “a very religious man. While his friends regret why Chamran is so 
religious, he sees the issue in a strange cold-blooded mood.”771 “Chamran was pure, 
praiseworthy, honest, decent, respected, and clever man. He led a humble life in Tyre with 
only two small rooms. We tried several times to entice him to cooperate with Iran and to 
dissuade him to struggle against the regime,” Qadar also confirmed Chamran’s special 
                                                
766 SAVAK Documents, No.213/265, 16 July 1975. 
 
767 Interview with Major General Mansour Qadar, Oral History, Foundations for Iranian History. 
 
768 Chamran received an M.S. degree from the Texas A&M University and a Ph.D. in electrical engineering 
and plasma Physics in 1963 from the prestigious University of California, Berkeley. See SAVAK 
Documents, No.222/2158, 16 March 1973. 
 
769 Zabih, Sepehr, Aspects of Terrorism in Iran, (September 1982). Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science. International Terrorism (Sage Publications) 463: 84-94. 
 
770 Chamran founded a group, Red Shiism, in San Jose with the aim of training militants. A year later, in 
1968, Ebrahim Yazdi and Chamran founded another group, the Muslim Students’ Association of America 
(MSA), with extensive branches in the U.S. and France. 
 
771 SAVAK documents, 27 August 1967. 
 
213 
 
personality.772 Despite his anti-Tehran position, he “was never a socialist-communist 
activist.”773 He was an anti-communist figure, though interested in Ernesto Che Guevara.774 
He, in fact, “believed in what he believed.”775 Chamran soon became Sadr’s right-hand 
man. The Chamran-Sadr relation was a “lover-beloved” one as such that Chamran called 
Seyyed Musa Sadr as “the one whom I love more than anything else,” “Imam Ali’s 
manifestation,” and “Imam Hussein’s heir.”776 Chamran also had a deep influence on 
Sadr.777 In the Technical Institute, Sadr and Chamran took an innovative way to train the 
Shia community. Qadar claimed that Chamran held relations with the U.S. embassy in 
Beirut! Therefore, he denounced Chamran of “abusing the Americans to achieve his 
revolutionary goals and Islam.”778 SAVAK also believed that it was Chamran who 
connected Sadr with “foreign officials.”779 In post-revolutionary Iran, Chamran became a 
major symbol of martyrdom among religious revolutionaries who left academic careers 
and prestigious positions in the U.S. to wage struggles against the Shah and Imperialism. 
Chamran was not the only pro-Sadr figure among Iranian revolutionaries. 
According to Qadar, while Chamran was Sadr’s connection with the U.S., it was Sadegh 
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Ghotbzade who connected Sadr with the European countries.780 Sadr’s alleged European 
connection through Sadegh Ghotbzadeh was also considered as a threat by SAVAK.781 
SAVAK had monitored Sadr’s contact with Ghotbzadeh from the very beginning.782 
Through Ghotbzadeh, Sadr bought a four-floor building on Kennedy Street in Paris, to 
establish an Islamic Association there and Ghotbzadeh lived on its Fourth floor.783 
Ghotbzadeh was not as pure as Chamran.784 “Despite his long-standing friendship with 
Ghotbzadeh, Chamran even had a negative view towards Ghotbzadeh’s revelry,” Qadar 
claimed.785 Tehran complained to Sadr of his support for Ghotbzadeh several times.786 But 
SAVAK’s request fell on deaf ears. While Sadr saw Ghotbzadeh as “moderate and 
rational,”787 SAVAK viewed him a “pro-communist”, “Islamist Marxist”, and “one of the 
leaders of the National Front” who was running sabotage activities against Tehran.788 Sadr 
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also facilitated the connections between the Iranian dissidents and Damascus.789 In 
SAVAK’s view, Sadr was attempting to unite the Iranian opposition against the Shah.790  
With Chamran’s move to Lebanon, a wave of anti-Shah, young Iranians found their 
way to Lebanon. Sadr was accused of having ties with pro-National Front students, as well 
as radical militant groups of the Islamist-leftist Mujahedin and even the Marxists-Leninist 
Fadaiyan. Founded by six former members of the FMI on 5 September 1965,791 the 
Mojahedin had been heavily influenced by Bazargan, Taleghani, and especially Ali 
Shariati, the main ideologue of the Islamic Revolution. The Fadaiyan was founded by the 
National Front former member Bijan Jazani and other young Marxist students in the early 
60s.792 Though staying by and large out of the Lebanese politics, both groups were 
suspicious of Seyyed Musa Sadr. their suspecions  was mainly due to their close ties with 
radical Palestinian guerrillas. The Fadaiyan were mostly trained at the Fatah military camps 
in Jordan and then in Lebanon by George Habash’s Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP)793 and Ahmad Jibril’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-
General Command. Besides, the Fadaiyan gradually took an anti-Damascus position, 
especially when Abu Abbas split from Jibril’s group. The Fadaiyan’s anti-Syrian position 
and ties with radical Palestinian groups were two major factors for their lack of trust and 
even enmity toward Sadr. Despite their ideological differences, the Mojahedin shared the 
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Fadaiyan attitude towards Sadr. In the aftermath of 1963, the Mojahedin started contacting 
with the PLO members in Dubai, UAE, for the first time.794 With these contacts, in July 
1970 several Mojahedin members left Iran for the Fatah bases in Lebanon and Jordan. 
Major among them was Massoud Rajavi who revived the non-Marxist–Leninist section of 
the group in 1978. As time wore on, Beirut became a bridgehead for Mojahedin’s external 
branches in Damascus, Aden, Baghdad, Paris, London, and Tripoli (Libya). As Sadr’s 
relations with the PLO deteriorated, the Mojahedin began criticizing him and Chamran. In 
fact, there was no alignment between Sadr with either Iranian militias.  
Despite the left-leaning ideologies of the Fadaiyan and the Mojahedin and their 
tension with Sadr, SAVAK still stressed their secret ties with Iranian armed groups. While 
the Mojahedin was mainly supported by Kamal Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party, 
SAVAK denounced Sadr for his financial support for them. “The first thing Sadr did was 
to make a connection between the Palestinian groups and Shariatmadari. Seyyed Musa 
asked financial support for the Shia and Volunteers for the liberation of Palestines. 
However, the money was for the Iranian Mojahedin who were being trained by the 
Palestinian. An enormous amount of money, 5 million dollars, was delivered to Sadr under 
the label of support for the Shia homeless in the south of Lebanon and volunteers for the 
Liberation of Palestine. I do not know if Shariaatmadari knew the money was for the 
Mojahedin. The money was then split among the Palestinian groups as well as the 
Mojahedin, instead of the Shia people. The major director was certainly Sadr,” Qadar 
claimed.795 SAVAK also believed that the Libyan regime had supported the Mujahedin 
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through Sadr.796 Despite Sadr’s denial, SAVAK did not stop accusing him of being a 
Godfather of the Iranian opposition groups.  
In addition to the FMI, the Mojahedin, and the Fadaiyan, Ayatollah Seyyed 
Ruhollah Khomeini’s disciples had been active in Lebanon since the late 60s. Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s harsh speech against the Shah, denouncing him as a “wretched, miserable 
man,” and the subservient bloody demonstrations of June 5th, 1963, heralded the rising 
power of the Shia clergymen. Sadr played a key role in saving Ayatollah from execution. 
A year later, on 26 October 1964, Ayatollah Khomeini criticized the Shah for granting 
diplomatic immunity to the U.S. military personnel in Iran. This time, he was exiled to 
Bursa, Turkey, and then to Najaf, Iraq, where he spent more than 14 years. Shortly after 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s arrival at Najaf, Sadr, who saw him as Imam al-Akbar (the Greater 
Imam), arranged his first interview with a foreign journal. Lucien George, a Le Monde 
reporter who had been converted to Islam by Seyyed Musa Sadr, entered Iraq with Sadegh 
Ghotbzadeh and interviewed Ayatollah Khomeini.797 Ayatollah Khomeini, in return, had a 
good relation with Sadr, apparently considering Musa Sadr as his substitute.798  
In the aftermath of his exile, Ayatollah Khomeini’s ties with Sadr were soon 
monitored by SAVAK. In SAVAK’s view, the Sadr-Khomeini connections could promote 
Shia Islamism, destabilize domestic politics and endanger Iran’s policy in Iraq and the 
Levant by instigating the Shia communities there against the Shah. Exaggerating Sadr’s 
role, Ambassador Qadar claimed that “even Khomeini was led by Sadr. It was Sadr who 
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was a real theorist behind Khomeini.”799 Indeed, several elements were suspicious of the 
Sadr-Khomeini connections. This suspicion increased when Sadr left Tyre for Najaf to visit 
Ayatollah Khomeini on 6 April 1968.800 SAVAK believed that Iranian students in Western 
Germany (i.e., Sadegh Tabatabaie, Sadr’s nephew) as well as pro-National Front political 
magazines and newspapers, like Bakhtar-e Emrouz (the West Today) and Khabar-nameh 
Jebhe-e Melli (National Front Newsletter), facilitated these connections.801 According to 
SAVAK, Ebrahim Yazdi, Mustafa Chamran, and Sadegh Ghotbzadeh were responsible of 
making connections between Ayatollah Khomeini with Seyyed.802  
With the Baath Party’s growing anti-Shia repression strategy to weaken Tehran’s 
alleged ties with the Iraqi Shia, the Shia senior clergies were pushed to leave Iraq to 
Lebanon. In the middle of Baghdad’s forced expulsion of a number of Iranians and Iraqis 
of Iranian origins from the country, Ayatollah Khomeini was invited by Sadr to move to 
Lebanon. Although the invitation was respectfully rejected, Sadr tried to meddle between 
Baghdad and the Shia Ayatollahs. Qadar claimed that “Seyyed Musa sent a message to 
Khomeini. SAVAK controlled the letter through Bakhtiar’s secretary. In the letter, Sadr 
asked Khomeini to warn Baghdad leaders that the Shia deportation from Iraq would 
confirm Iran’s position in support of the Iraqi Shia.”803 Though Ayatollah Khomeini did 
not leave Iraq and decided to stay in Najaf, some of his disciples left Iraq for the south of 
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Lebanon. As time wore on, however, these pro-Ayatollah Khomeini elements weakened 
ties between Ayatollah and Sadr. Indeed, the presence of Iranian opposition not only 
accelerated Iran’s turn away from aligning with the Lebanese Shia, but also intensifyed 
tensions between Musa Sadr and the Iranian revolutionaries. Sadr’s trip to Tehran 
hammered the final nail in the coffin of his relations with pro-Ayatollah Khomeini 
elements.  
A Controversial Trip  
By the early 70s, Sadr had been still optimistic about convincing Tehran to 
reconsider its non-state foreign policy. With Cairo’s waning power in the region, Iran’s 
regional rise could protect the Shia interests in the south of Lebanon, Sadr thought. 
According to SAVAK, Sadr was “an intellectual, smart, and cautious politician who had 
been successfully attracting the Christian leaders and become the head of Shia community. 
He has clergies’ characteristics, like ambitiousness and demagoguery… He is trying to 
approach Iran to improve its leverage in Lebanon, and that is why he has not done anything 
wrong against Your Majesty!”804 In his meeting with Seyyed Hossein Nasr, the head of the 
Literature School at Tehran University and a major Iranian philosopher, Sadr asked him to 
inform the Shah of an imminent Israeli invasion of the south of Lebanon. He pleaded with 
the Shah for Iran’s support since the Shah “could put pressure on the White House to stop 
Israeli raid on Lebanon.”805 Though his request fell on deaf ears, Tehran still did not want 
to fully abandon Sadr. Therefore, Sadr’s request of Roknoddin Ashtiani, Iran’s ambassador 
                                                
804 SAVAK Documents, No. 213/1940, 8 November 1972. 
 
805 SAVAK Documents, No. 4 March 1970. 
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to Lebanon,806 to revive friendly relations with Tehran was welcomed. Apparently, to gain 
leverage over the Shia leader, Ashtiani facilitated Sadr’s trip to Tehran and arranged a 
meeting with the Shah for him. Shortly before Sadr’s trip to Iran, SAVAK recommended 
that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ask the Shia senior clergies in Qom to invite him.807 It 
was a step taken by Tehran to increase Sadr’s prestige as a religious leader of the region 
and therefore, to make his meeting with the Shah more substantial. With Ayatollah 
Shariatmadari’s official invitation, Sadr left Beirut for Tehran on 26 November 1971. On 
18 December 1971, Sadr met Prime Minister Amir-Abbas Hoveyda and Khalil al-Khalil, 
Lebanon’s Ambassador to Tehran. He informed Hoveyda of the Lebanese Shia’s 
“improper political situation in Lebanon.” Sadr repeated his request for support and 
contended that “all the Shia, including the Lebanese Shia, respected the Shah and saw him 
as their leader.” Expressing his patriotism, Iranian background, and loyalty to the Shah, 
Sadr expressed regret for the recent tensions with Tehran due to “some lower officers’ 
activities” in Lebanon. Lastly, Sadr suggested to Hoveyda that Iran could gain more 
leverage within Lebanon and the Shia community with the establishment of a university or 
hospital for the Shia.808 In the meeting with the Pahlavi monarch, Sadr repeated his request. 
The Shah agreed and promised him to allocate 30 million dollars for the establishment of 
a university, a hospital, and a Dar al-Fatwa for the Shia community.809 Backed by Hoveyda 
                                                
806 Ashtiani was Sadr’s relative. He was from Khorasan clergies. Qadar claimed that Ashtiani jumped on the 
opportunity to plan a meeting between the Shah and one of his relatives. Ashtiani played a major role in 
convincing the Shah to meet with Sadr. See Interview with Major General Mansour Qadar, Oral History, 
Foundations for Iranian History.  
 
807 SAVAK Documents, No. 212/17101, 27 April 1971; SAVAK Documents, No. 312/1233, 17 May 1971. 
 
808 SAVAK Documents, No. h/15-264(s)-49, 18 December 1971. 
 
809 Interview with Major General Mansour Qadar, Oral History, Foundations for Iranian History. 
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and authorized at the Parliament, the money was approved to be delivered through Jami’at-
e Shir va Khourshid-e Sorkh-e Iran [the Red Lion and Sun Society (the Iranian Red 
Cross)].810 The meeting apparently initiated a thaw in Sadr-Tehran relations. 
There were other reasons behind Sadr’s meeting with the Shah. Shortly after Sadr’s 
arrival in Tehran, some leading figures of the opposition, including Mehdi Bazargan, 
Morteza Mottahari, Seyyed Mohammad-Husain Beheshti, and Yadollah Sahabi, asked 
Sadr to dissuade the Shah from the execution of the Mojahedin founding leaders.811 
According to Ali Hojjati-Kermani, “in a meeting held in Beheshti’s house, they asked Sadr 
to meet the Shah to prevent the Mojahedin’ execution. Beheshti insisted on his request… 
A few nights later, Abbas Masoudi asked Sadr if he would meet the Shah. Seyyed Musa 
responded that he had not made his decision yet. I was there… In fact, Sadr was pushed to 
meet with the Shah.”812 They thought that Sadr had leverage over the Shah and would 
convince him to reconsider his instruction. Some political prisoners’ families, like Ali-
Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani’s, also asked Seyyed Musa to convince the Shah to release the 
revolutionaries.813 Although Sadr argued that the authoritarian Pahlavi monarch would 
never accept his intervention, his comments fell on deaf ears. Alam himself called Seyyed 
Musa and his older brother, Seyyed Reza, to set a meeting with the Shah.814 On 29 February 
                                                
810 Alam advised the government to deliver money to the Lebanese Shia through the Red Lion and Sun 
Society’. Beigi, Ibid. p. 81. 
 
811 They were Mohammad Hanifnejad, Ali-Asghar Badizadegan, Saeed Mohsen, Ali Bakeri, and Naser 
Sadegh. See also http://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/459203/ 
 
812 KhosrowShahi, Seyyed Hadi, Yad-Nameh Emam Musa Sadr [Imam Musa Sadr’s Memoirs], 1387, pp. 
384-5. 
 
813 SAVAK Documents, No. (66) 
 
814 Sadr, Seyyed Mohammad, Enghelab va Diplomacy dar Khaterat-e Seyyed Mohammad Sadr [Revolution 
and Diplomacy in Seyyed Mohammad Sadr’s Memories], Soureh Mehr publication, pp. 36-8. See also 
http://khateemam.com/1392/12/25/4/4216.html/. 
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1972, Sadr met Alam, the Minister of Court, to see if the Shah would accept his request. 
Later, and in the meeting with the Shah, Sadr repeated his request. Although the Shah 
initially promised Seyyed Musa not to execute the prisoners, he never kept his promise.815 
The Mojahedin founders’ were executed on May 24, 1972.  
Ironically, Sadr’s opponents in the Qom Hawza, as well as radical revolutionaries 
in Iran and Lebanon, accused him of being the Shah’s agent.816 Seyyed Hamid Rohani 
(Ziarati), another pro-Khomeini revolutionary,817 criticized Sadr for his meeting with the 
Shah, stating that “Sadr’s relations with the Pahlavi regime were not limited to his meeting 
with the Shah; rather, he had relations with Iranian officials in Lebanon and the Court in 
Tehran. The Shah’s mother had apparently met Sadr. Sadr’s close relations with the 
dictators in the region had tarnished his image before [the Iranian] liberators.”818 Sadr’s 
meeting with the Shah damaged his image among the radical Iranian revolutionaries. “Mr. 
Davani, we have two problems here [Lebanon]. When we come to Iran, some of our 
opponents call us the Shah’s spy. When we are here [those] Iranians call us pro-Nasser and 
pro-Sunni. What should we do? None of them like us,” Sadr told Ali Davani, a major 
scholar in Islamic Studies.819 This was a major blow to him; however, Sadr never expressed 
his anger. According to Hojjati-Kermani, “When I asked him of those objections, he smiled 
and told me: ‘God knows why I met the Shah.’ He magnanimously ignored the issue.”820  
                                                
815 Tabatabaie, Mohammad Sadegh, Khaterat-e Siasi Ejtemai [Socio-Political Diary], Moassese Tanzim 
Nashr Asar Emam Khomeini, 1388, vol. 1, p. 211. 
 
816 SAVAK Documents, No. (67). 
 
817 Founder and former head of Islamic Revolution Document Center. 
 
818 See http://tarikhirani.ir/Modules/News/Phtml/News.PrintVersion.Html.php?TypeId=4&NewsId=1649. 
 
819 http://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/459203. 
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In addition to the Iranian radical revolutionaries, Sadr’s trip to Tehran was criticized 
by the Shah’s regional foes, especially Baghdad. Colonel Walid Mahmoud Sirat, Iraq’s 
attaché in Beirut, called Sadr the Shah’s agent who traveled to Tehran in the wake of Iran’s 
‘”illegal” conquest of three disputed islands in the Persian Gulf.821 On top of that, a rumor 
popped up in Beirut that Sadr’s trip was a plan to convince the Shah to interfere in the 
Lebanese election to support himself and Camille Chamoun.822 Despite these rumors, the 
Shah’s approval of the financial aid to the Shia community kept ties with Sadr open. 
However, a SAVAK officer single-handedly cut off Iran’s connections with the Shia 
community in Lebanon.  
Qadar Duel with Sadr  
Sadr’s tension with Qadar affected the trajectory of Tehran-Sadr ties. After the 
revival of Tehran-Beirut diplomatic relations, Roknoddin Ashtiani was appointed as Iran’s 
ambassador to Lebanon. Both Ashtiani and his deputy, Lavasani, had religious 
backgrounds that successfully rehabilitated the Lebanese Shia connections with Tehran. 
Besides, Sadr’s reputation in Lebanon was still at its peak. According to SAVAK, Sadr 
“has a dense religious-friendship-family network in Iran.”823 Shortly before Sadr’s trip to 
Europe, SAVAK recommended that the ministry of foreign affairs dispatch representatives 
when Sadr entered the European countries. With this, SAVAK officials argued, Sadr’s 
                                                
820 Khosrowshahi, Seyyed Hadi, Yad-Nameh Emam Musa Sadr [Imam Musa Sadr’s Memoirs] 1387, pp. 384-
5.  
 
821 SAVAK Documents, No. 212/4412, 18 December 1971. 
 
822 SAVAK Documents, No. 212/4965, 6 February 1972. 
 
823 SAVAK Documents, No. 213/1940, 8 November 1972. 
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prestige would prosper and, in return, his dependency on Iran would increase.824 
Nonetheless, when these elements were replaced by Qadar, a new era in the Iranian-
Lebanese Shia connection commenced. With his diplomatic and security background, 
Qadar was assigned as both Iran’s Ambassador to Beirut and chief of SAVAK Station in 
Lebanon in August 1973. Qadar himself claimed that Tehran needed his experience to run 
the embassy in Beirut since “the political situation in Jordan had been pacified but the 
Lebanese society was on the edge of a deepening tension. Thus, the Shah instructed me to 
go to Beirut due to the experience of the Jordanian situation.”825 With his conspiratorial 
mind,826 Qadar soon purged the embassy of his rivals.827 As a next step, he approached 
Sadr to monitor the Iranian dissidents. Qadar pressed Sadr to be his agent, rather than 
dealing with him as a respected Shia clergy or an influential Lebanese leader. Despite 
needing Tehran’s support, Sadr rejected the deal. In the wake of growing tension in 
                                                
824 SAVAK Documents, No. 3266, 11 August 1972. 
 
825 Interview with Major General Mansour Qadar, Oral History, Foundations for Iranian History. 
 
826 Qadar claimed, “When I was appointed as Iran’s ambassador to Beirut, the Lebanese government warned 
Tehran not to appoint me there. The Lebanese newspaper launched a campaign against me since I was 
apparently a member of military-security force. They told the Shah that Lebanese security forces might not 
be able to prevent Qadar’s assassination. The Shah, however, reacted harshly and said: “if you cannot provide 
security for our ambassador, so let us know not to dispatch any ambassador there. Otherwise, Qadar would 
be our only candidate in our embassy there”. Shortly before going there, Iran’s Foreign Minister told me: 
“Qadar. Are you sure you want to go there? You are going to Laneh-Zanbour”. I replied him back, “yes, Sir. 
I will do what His Imperial Majesty wants me.” See Interview with Major General Mansour Qadar, Oral 
History, Foundations for Iranian History. 
 
827 It seemed Qadar led a coup against Ambassador Ashtiani by accusing him of having a secret connection 
with Foreign Minister Hussein Fatemi, former Prime Minister Mossadegh’s closest adviser (Mossadegh had 
been born into the Ashtiani clan, and Mohammad Hussein Ashtiani allegedly had phoned a warning to 
Mossadegh three days before the coup of 1953 that Nassiri was on his way with the royal decree dismissing 
him; see Dr M. Mosaddegh (H. Katouzian, ed.) and Mosaddegh's Memoirs (London, 1988), p.69.) Qadar 
also pulled the rug under Colonel Abbas Shaghaghi’s feet, chief of SAVAK Station in Beirut, with General 
Nasiri’s support. Nasiri, the chief of SAVAK, had disliked Shaghaghi since they had served together in the 
Imperial Guard in 1953. Shaghaghi had allegedly played a part in blocking Teymur Bakhtiar’s extradition to 
Iran. Lastly, Qadar changed the personnel of Iranian embassy, like Kiafar. See Beigi, Abbas William, The 
Shah’s Lebanon Policy: The Role of SAVAK, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 33, No. 1 (January,1997), p. 81. 
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Lebanon and deepening enmity with the Palestinian guerrillas and the Shia Zuama, Sadr 
believed a direct connection with an external security service might have discredited his 
prestige and his socio-political capital. With Sadr’s refusal to cooperate with him against 
the Iranian opposition, Qadar framed Sadr as a major problem for Iran. “After meeting with 
President, Patriarch Maouchi, the religious head of the Maronites, and Hasan Khaled, 
Sunni Mufti, I met with Musa Sadr. I knew that Musa Sadr’s machination had been behind 
all uproar against Iran and me. Sadr knew that it was me who disclosed Bakhtiar’s 
connections in Beirut,” Qadar claimed.828  
The worst was yet to come. The Shah’s approval of the financial support for the 
Lebanese Shia could revive Sadr-Tehran relations. However, it could pose a threat to Qadar 
who had been tirelessly attempting to expand his influence in Lebanon. When the word 
reached Qadar, he tried to persuade Prime Minister Hoveyda to reverse the financial aid 
process by dedicating money through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in following, the 
Iranian embassy in Lebanon. The Shah, however, rejected his plan. Qadar’s hatred of Sadr 
increased. As time wore on, though, he ultimately changed Tehran’s policy towards Sadr. 
Although the Shah initially gave an orders to dedicate financial support to Sadr, a 
commission of SAVAK, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Education held a 
meeting on 15 March 1972 and rejected the idea of establishing a university in Lebanon. 
In return, Hoevyda offered to dedicate 30 education scholarships for Lebanese Shia 
students. Regarding the hospital, the commission voted to establish a small clinic in 
Tyre.829 As Sadr was informed of the decision, he called Iran’s embassy in Beirut “liar” 
                                                
828 Interview with Major General Mansour Qadar, Oral History, Foundations for Iranian History. 
 
829 SAVAK Documents, No. 16 March 1972. 
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and mentioned that “they [Iran’s embassy] would not give any Shia applicant a bourse 
unless to the specific one (one with a network with Tehran).”830  
Conversely, Qadar denied his decisive role at this juncture. “Sadr had secret 
connections with Gaddafi. Gaddafi had already asked Sadr to open a mosque in Munich. 
In 1972, Sadr flattered Gaddafi and instead, criticized the Shah in Munich. One of 
SAVAK’s agent recorded his speech and informed the Shah. The Shah who was informed 
of Ambassador Ashtiani’s family relations with Sadr immediately discharged Ashtiani and 
appointed me as Iran’s ambassador to Beirut… Shortly before leaving Tehran for Beirut, 
the Shah told me: ‘I already instructed to dedicate 20 million dollars to Sadr. Do not tell 
Sadr that we do not want to pay them money, rather play with him.’ But Sadr thought it 
was me who set obstacles in this process. That is why he planned to assassinate me,” Qadar 
claimed.831 Qadar’s narrative was wrong. According to Ehsan Naraghi, an Iranian writer 
and Queen Farah Pahlavi’s former adviser, it was Qadar who convinced Tehran to change 
its policy towards Sadr. “Sadr told me that Qadar had cut off relations between the 
Lebanese Shia and Tehran.” He noted that the Shah was supposed to support Sadr 
financially to build a hospital for the Lebanese Shia. “Imam Sadr himself told me he had 
talked with Shah,” Naraghi put. “Imam said that ‘I told the Shah that Arabs [regimes of the 
region] support the Sunni in Lebanon while the Europeans and the Americans both support 
the Maronites. The Shias, on the other hand, have not been able to find an [external] 
supporter. In response, the Shah assured me that he would do anything I wanted. I asked 
him to build a hospital for the Shia. It could have been later followed by the establishment 
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831 Interview with Major General Mansour Qadar, Oral History, Foundations for Iranian History. 
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of a medical university and then a major university for the Shia. The Shah agreed but Qadar 
single-handedly changed the plan.’ Qadar, in return, tried to build a few clinics instead of 
a hospital. He insisted on naming them after the Shah’s name. Sadr protested Qadar’s plan, 
arguing that no external support would be delivered in this way. Qadar used this issue 
against Sadr and discredited him in the Shah’s eyes.”832 Naraghi’s narrative was repetitted 
by Seyyed Hadi Khosroshahi. Interestingly, both Kamel Asaad and Ja’far Sharaf al-Din 
blamed Sadr for disrupting the Shah’s funding for the Shia.833 
Iran’s disinclination to support Sadr gave an opportunity to the Russians to support 
his plans. On 12 December 1972, Sadr was invited by Sheikh Ziaddin Babakhanov, Mufti 
of Tashkent in the Central Asia, to the USSR. After his trip that was “considerable” and 
“thinkable” for the Shia,834 the Soviet promised Sadr to dedicate 15 million Lebanon Lire 
to build a hospital. When he was asked whether if this support might anger other countries, 
especially Iran, Sadr responded that he had already asked Iran to build the hospital but the 
Iranian leaders agreed to build just some clinics.835 Sadr’s trip, however, gave Qadar a 
pretext to frame him as a powerful element of the Russian plot in the Levant. SAVAK 
believed that the Russian support of Sadr would give them strategic room in the south of 
Lebanon.836 Sadr refused to accept Moscow’s support. Sadr, in fact, did not want to escalate 
his tension with Tehran. 
                                                
832 See Fars News Agency, Interview with Ehsan Naraghi, 
http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8711240772. 
 
833See 
http://tarikhirani.ir/Modules/News/Phtml/News.PrintVersion.Html.php?Lang=fa&TypeId=4&NewsId=924. 
 
834 SAVAK Documents, No. 212/509, 24 November 1972. 
 
835 SAVAK Documents No. 213/2491, 26 December 1972. 
 
836 SAVAK Documents, No. 213/54013, 6 April 1974. 
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Though disappointed, Sadr made efforts to reconsider Iran’s attitude towards the 
Lebanese Shia. He pointed out that his relations with Tehran had been prospering during 
Ambassador Ashtiani’s time in Beirut; however, the situation deteriorated when Qadar was 
appointed to Beirut. He added that “the new ambassador [Qadar] wanted me to be an agent 
and to control all of my meetings and talks.” In his interview with Mohammad Anan, the 
editor of al-Hayat, Sadr threatened that he would make public Iran’s enmity with the 
Lebanese Shia and would declare that the new Iranian ambassador had been appointed just 
to gather information against the Shia.837 Sadr contended that Qadar was a dangerous man 
who was seeking to defeat the Lebanese Shia since he believed that all the Shia affairs 
should be controlled by him. Sadr argued that with the replacement of Ashtiani with Qadar, 
Iran’s diplomacy was transformed into an intelligence activity and security service that 
would endanger Iran’s interests in Lebanon.838 Despite his efforts, Sadr did not succeed in 
making Tehran reconsider its policy towards the Lebanese Shia. His image had been 
effectively tarnished by Ambassador Qadar.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
837 SAVAK Documents, No. 213/479, 15 January 1974. 
 
838 SAVAK Documents, No. 213/2395, 26 January 1974.  
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VII. Chapter 6 
Downfall: Iran’s Non-State Foreign Policy in 1973-1977 
 
In this period, Iran entirely transformed its non-state foreign policy. As the war 
changed at the expense of the Iraqi Kurds and the possibility of direct war with Baghdad 
increased, the Shah bypassed his American and Israeli allies and terminated his support for 
Mullah Mustafa Barzani. In the Algiers Agreement of 1975, Iraq accepted territorial 
concession to Iran in Arvand Rud while Iran cut off backing the Iraqi Kurds. The resistance 
of the Kurdish Peshmerga, who had increasingly depended on the Iranian Army, soon 
collapsed. 
In the meantime, Ambassador Qadar and SAVAK finally convinced Tehran to shift 
its policy towards the Lebanese Shia. The Lebanese Civil War of 1975 weakened Sadr’s 
position and deepened a gap between the Shia community and other Lebanese communities 
and parties, as well as the PLO and Arab regimes. Despite rising tension between Sadr and 
pro-Ayatollah Khomeini elements, the increasing presence of the Iranian Revolutionaries 
in the south of Lebanon tarnished Sadr’s image in Tehran. The Pahlavi regime ultimately 
broke its relations with Seyyed Musa Sadr and stripped him off his Iranian passport. 
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Downfall: The Iraqi Kurds 
“They [the Kurds] weren’t fighting; we were fighting [in Iraqi Kurdistan against the Iraqi Army]. The Kurds 
weren’t fighting,” the Shah told President Ford.839 
 
“No matter what the Shah does, he loves the Kurdish people very much,” President Anwar Sadat wrote a 
letter to Mullah Mustafa Barzani.840   
 
“The Shah sold out the Kurds,” Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin bitterly complained of the Shah to Kissinger.841 
 
Shuttle Diplomacy  
By late 1973, Iran had successfully tied down the Iraqi Army in Kurdistan and 
prevented Barzani’s joining the national unity government in Baghdad. Nevertheless, the 
Shah witnessed an accelerating rise of Baghdad. Even the revival of diplomatic relations 
after the October 1973 War with Iraq did not diminish the Iraqi threat.842 On 4 February 
1974, skirmishes along the Iranian-Iraqi borders unexpectedly broke out. Six days later, 
these clashes escalated into almost a war involving artillery exchanges.843 In addition to 
the Kurdish crisis and disputes over Arvand Rud, what lurked beneath this confrontation 
was Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy.844 With Anwar Sadat’s help, Kissinger had convinced 
                                                
839 Memorandum of Conversation, Ford, the Shah, Kissinger, and Scowcroft, May 15, 1975. Ford Library, 
National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 11. 
 
840 An Interview with Dr. Ahmad Chalabi: How is it possible that Saddam Hussein is still in power in 
Baghdad? See http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saddam/interviews/chalabi.html. 
 
841 Memcon, March 9, 1975, NSA, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China and Middle East Discussions, Box 3, 
GRFL. 
 
842 On October 7, 1973, Iraq opened its embassy in Tehran. In addition to signaling a turn in their regional 
policy, Iraqi leaders’ main intention in reviving the relations with Tehran, and later London, was to take 
retaliatory measures against Anwar Sadat, Hafiz Assad, and Russians since the Iraqis felt humiliated by not 
having been informed by their Arab friends of a coordinated attack in the Yom-Kippur War. 
 
843 United States Mission to the United Nations 472 to the U.S. Department of State, “Iraqi Request for SC 
Meeting,” February 12, 1974 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1974), pp.12; and Tehran 1159 to the U.S 
Department of State, “Iraqi-Iranian Border Clashes,” February 11, 1974 
(NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1974), pp.1-2. 
 
844 Amid his Arab-Israeli peace-building efforts in the post-October War of 1973, Kissinger was faced with 
a critical problem of managing the Israeli Army withdrawal from the Syrian Golan Heights. Though securing 
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the Pahlavi monarch to press Baath Iraq along the border in order to force Baghdad to 
withdraw its troops from the Golan Heights and to secure s’s withdrawal from there in May 
1974. “The Egyptians asked me to ask the Shah to put pressure on Iraq so Iraqi troops all 
leave Syria…. That is why there was trouble in February between Iraq and Iran,” Kissinger 
told Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir.845 Tied down in Kurdistan and unable to launch an 
offensive, Baghdad demanded that the UN Security Council convened an urgent meeting 
to condemn Iran’s aggression.846 Despite the Shah’s tough move,847 the weaker Iraq 
                                                
a disengagement agreement in January 1974 and Tel-Aviv’s withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, he saw an 
Iraqi armored brigade, about one-third of Iraq’s Army, in Syria as a threat to his peace initiative. Right after 
reopening diplomatic relations with Iran and neutralizing the eastern border, Iraq had dispatched an armored 
brigade to Syria to fight with teh Israelis. See Kissinger, Henry. Years of Renewal (New York: Simon & 
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leaders’ anger at Egyptian-Syrian covert cooperation. However, with Libyan and Algerian interferences, 
Baghdad resent the army in November 1973. See Baghdad 600 to U.S. Department of State, “Iraq Rejoins 
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deteriorating rapidly as the Iranian aggression continues and heavy massing of Iranian troops on the borders 
is still in progress ... Iranian forces at different levels are concentrated in the border area and continue their 
military actions, openly violating Iraqi territory in a planned manner while Iranian air force fighters violate 
Iraqi airspace threatening Iraq’s national security and sovereignty. See SCOR Supp. S/11216 (12 Feb. 1974). 
Iran, in turn, accused Iraq of cross-border attacks and demanded compensation for losses incurred. See SCOR 
Supp. S/11218 (12 Feb. 1974). Yemen, the UAE, and Libya joined the Council debate and contended that 
‘Iran’s aggression against Iraqi border posts could be regarded as an escalation of tension and an invitation 
to large-scale hostilities.’ See Sturchler, Nikolas, The Threat of Force in International Law, 2009, p. 231.  
 
847 To avoid using a veto to block the likely Security Council resolution against Tehran, Kissinger asked the 
Shah to accept a watered-down consensus statement, earlier passed on February 28 and let the Security 
General investigate the event. See U.S. Mission to the United Nations 634 to U.S. Department of State, 
“Developments in Iraqi SC Complaint,” February 26, 1974 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1974), pp.1-2; 
U.S. Mission to the United Nations 674 to U.S. Department of State, “Iraqi Complaint in SC,” February 27, 
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(NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1974), pp.1-2; and United Nations Security Council, “Note by the President 
of the Security Council,” February 28, 1974, S/11229, pp.1-2. But the Shah ignored it. See Tehran 1735 to 
U.S. Department of State, “Iran-Iraq Border Clash,” March 4, 1974 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1974), 
p.1; and Tehran 1779 to State, “Latest Iran-Iraq Border Clash,” March 5, 1974 
(NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1974), p.1. 
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intended to bring Tehran to the negotiation table. Thus, Saddam asked Iran’s ambassador 
to Baghdad to convey an invitation of the Shah to Baghdad to negotiate a “package deal” 
on 3 March 1974.848 Nothing happened, though. 
The Collapse of the March Accord 
The lack of clarity about issues in the March Accord, including the degree of 
autonomy of the Kurdish region, had cast doubt on its longevity and effectiveness.849 By 
the end of fall 1973, the Iraqi army had strengthened its position in the plains of Iraqi 
Kurdistan while the Peshmerga controlled mountainous areas. Despite periodic skirmishes 
throughout 1973, particularly in Kirkuk and Sinjar, neither Iraqis nor Kurds stopped the 
outbreak of the war. Backed by Iranians, Israelis, and Americans, Barzani had reorganized 
the Peshmerga. In October 1973, he announced the Kurds’ demands to control Kirkuk and 
its oilfields.850 Rejecing Barzani’s demands, Baghdad unilaterally promulgated a limited 
autonomy law for Iraqi Kurdistan on 11 March 1974.851 Baghdad’s proposal did not fulfill 
promises made in reasons to the Kurds’ demands in 1970.852 In addition to pressing Barzani 
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by giving him two weeks to accept, Baghdad intended to show Tehran its will to break the 
stalemate in Kurdistan. The scene was set for the collapse of the March Accord. 
Stuck with the choice of either resuming the war or surrendering to Baghdad, 
Barzani went to Tehran. On 18 March 1974, Barzani met the Shah and begged him to equip 
the Peshmerga with anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons in order to launch a wholesale raid 
on Iraq. He asked the Shah to allow the Kurds to declare an autonomous Kurdistan and to 
provide $180 million to $360 million annually in financial support to cover expenses, as 
well as Iran’s recognition and diplomatic support at the UN, otherwise he would “seek 
asylum in Iran, and tell the Kurdish people to make the best deal they can with the 
Baath.”853 The Shah promised him to increase military and financial aid but he stated he 
needed to consult his allies on his autonomy declaration.854 Barzani repeated requests to 
Arthur Callahan in Tehran. Nevertheless, the Americans refused to respond to him clearly 
and suggested that the Shah was in a better position to act on his requests.855 On 21 March 
1974, new CIA Director William Colby slightly objected to any increase in U.S. support 
for the Kurds.856 He believed the U.S. primary goal for its covert cooperation with SAVAK 
was less to support an autonomous Kurdistan than to maintain the stalemate in 
Kurdistan.857 The NSC and general Brent Scowcroft warned against Kurdish 
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independence.858 Though eager to help the Kurds, both Kissinger and the Shah were 
reluctant to accept an independent Kurdistan and to enhance their support beyond what the 
Kurds required to keep fighting. The Shah ultimately convinced Barzani to postpone the 
independence announcement by increasing Iran’s annual support from $30 million to $74 
million. With the Shah’s increasing support for the Kurds “to avoid creating a situation 
where they would have to capitulate to Baghdad,”859 Kissinger instructed a modest increase 
in support for the Kurds to $8.06 million annually in order to “keep the Iraqi Government 
tied down and to limit its capacity for adventures abroad.”860 Sharing the Shah’s limited 
support policy, he avoided taking a policy for a permanent disintegration of Iraq since “an 
independent Kurdish area would not be economically viable and [the] U.S. and Iran [had] 
no interest in closing [the] door to good relations with Iraq under moderate leadership.”861 
In his message to the Shah and then to Barzani, Kissinger argued that “supporting a Kurdish 
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government on a long-term basis on the scale which Barzani requests would be beyond our 
financial resources for this project and could not be carried out [secretly]. We do not feel 
an open confrontation with [the] government of Iraq would serve [the] U.S. and Iranian 
interests or the interest of long-term Kurdish survival.”862 The Americans considered the 
Shah’s “continued heavy support to the Kurds” as a “better indicator of his real attitude 
than the reestablishment of diplomatic relations and the cessation of direct military 
confrontation with Iraq and Iranian forces in the border areas.”863 The logic of Iran’s non-
state foreign policy in Iraq had been accepted by the White House. 
Mullah Mustafa Barzani accepted the Shah’s argument and the Pahlavi Monarch, 
in return, appreciated his position to “adhere to the line that they consider themselves a part 
of Iraq and are only defending themselves against an oppressive and illegal regime and are 
seeking democratic liberties for all the people of Iraq.”864 Therefore, Barzani let Baghdad’s 
deadline pass on March 26.865 It was the end of the four-year fragile truce. However, his 
position was shaken when his son Ubeydullah, as well as several high-ranking KDP 
Politburo members and Iraqi leftists sympathetic to the Kurdish demands, considered his 
decision as a betrayal of the KDP’s socialist origins and ultimately defected to Baghdad. As 
Ubeydullah stated, his father did not “want self-rule to be implemented even if he were 
given Kirkuk and all of its oil. His acceptance of the law will take everything from him, 
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and he wants to remain absolute ruler.”866 Barzani’s reaction was to assassinate his rivals 
via the Parastin, his SAVAK-Mossad-trained security forces. On the other side, Baghdad 
saw Barzani’s bold move as tantamount to a declaration of independence.867 Baghdad 
called up its reserves on 6 April 1974, tightened an economic blockade of Kurdistan, and 
the Iraqi air force began sporadically bombing the Peshmerga positions.868 The scene was 
set for the last war. 
The Last War 
In spring 1974, clashes erupted between the Iraqi Army and the Kurdish 
Peshmerga. With Turks’ sealing their border with Iraq,869 Iran’s border became the only 
route for the Kurds. It was a “desperate situation” for them.870 The escalated skirmishes 
soon changed to a full-scale war when Barzani rejected Saddam’s ultimatum.871 Baghdad 
finally launched its major ground offensive. At the same time, another round of Tehran-
Baghdad secret talks resumed. With the mediation of the UN secretary-general Kurt 
Waldheim, Saddam expressed his eagerness to end the tension with Tehran.872 The 
cornerstone of the Iraqi package deal was based on the intertwined Arvand-Kurdish 
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complex: Baghdad’s territorial concession in Arvand Rud in exchange for Tehran’s 
abandonment of support for the Kurds. Although the deal would be a brilliant achievement 
for the hawkish Shah who already claimed that Iran could “easily destroy … an artificial 
state [Iraq] … and a mere creation of [Winston] Churchill [Iraq],”873 it would be 
undoubtedly “at the expense of the Kurds of Iraq.”874 However, the Shah thought that the 
Iraqi leaders were still not ready for the ‘Grand Bargain’. Although the resumption of the 
war could break his delicate balance policy in Iraqi Kurdistan, the Shah took a risk and 
expressed his commitment to Barzani.875 In the meantime, the Shah tried to reconcile a 
long-standing tension within the Kurds. Thus, he instructed Colonel Pejman to convince 
Jalal Talabani and Ibrahim Ahmad to rejoin Barzani against the Baath offensive. Pejman 
accomplished the mission and Tehran allocated generous financial aid to the anti-Barzani 
group and assigned Captain Taha Nouri to establish ties with them and SAVAK in 
Tehran.876 
Despite Iran’s support, the Peshmerga were in trouble. The Shah was worried about 
coming waves of Kurdish refugees.877 With the Iraqi air force’s relentless bombing 
campaign, called a “genocidal war”878 by Helms, civilian Kurds crossed Iran’s border. By 
late June, several camps had been built for 25,000 refugees along the border.879 The U.S. 
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could not significantly increase its support since they had “reached the upper limits of 
concealable assistance.”880 Nevertheless, the Shah insisted he needed additional assistance. 
He pointed to Baghdad-Moscow connections and warned of “the grave consequences--for 
Iran and the entire Persian Gulf--should Kurdish resistance collapse.”881 The situation in 
the north of Iraq was contrary to Iran’s interests. 
By late August, the Iraqi Army had crushed the Peshmerga, conquered their key 
strongholds, and cut off strategic supply routes from Iran.882 To preventa a Baghdad 
victory, Iran took a more hawkish position. The Shah aligned three armored divisions, two 
infantry divisions, and two infantry brigades along the border with Iraq. Minor skirmishes 
soon erupted.883 On 23 August 1974, a five-hour battle between two armies occurred.884 
Nevertheless, the Iraqi Army was cautious not to incite the Iranians to attack.885 With the 
U.S. refusal of Barzani’s request for anti-aircraft missiles,886 the Shah instructed SAVAK 
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to equip the Peshmerga with anti-air craft weapons. These anti-Iraqi MIGs weapons were 
carried by mules via dangerous routes in the Zagros Mountains. Dressed in Kurdish clothes, 
the Iranian troops, gendarmes, and military advisors fought side by side with the Kurds 
against the Iraqi army. By late summer 1974, Iran had effectively deployed artillery and 
air defense units inside the rebel-held territory of Iraqi Kurdistan.887 A battalion of long-
range 175-mm artillery bombed strategic Iraqi Army positions from across the Iranian 
border.888 These units were all controlled by Iranian officers. Iran was still backing the 
Iraqi Kurds. 
Nevertheless, the Kurds’ situation appeared dire in the face of the Iraqi ground 
offensive. In addition to heavy casualties, Barzani’s headquarter in Haji Omran had been 
under direct fire from Iraqi long-range artillery.889 By October 1974, Baghdad had 
conquered the majority of Kurdish territory since the outbreak of the Kurdish uprising in 
September 1961. Following Barzani’s request for food, arms, and ammunition in his 
October 1974 meeting with the Shah,890 The Iranian Army crossed the border and 
empowered the Peshmerga positions with artillery units.891 To halt Iraqi heavy air 
bombardment, SAVAK also decided to provide the Peshmerga a strategic air route. 
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Marshal Khatam, the chief commander of Iranian air force, was instructed to accomplish 
the mission. Three Iranian Phantoms, with Iranian Kurd pilots, were supposed to bombard 
an Iraqi stronghold in order to open an air supply line for the Kurds. The Shah, however, 
suddenly changed his mind and gave an order to stop the plan.892 The Shah still kept 
sticking to the logic of a limited war.  
In the meantime, sdoubled its pressure on the White House to increase military aid 
to the Kurds.893 SAVAK had delivered Israel’s Russian-made anti-tank and anti-aircraft 
missiles captured during the Yom Kippur War of 1973 to the Peshmerga.894 In late October 
1974, Tel-Aviv increased arms delivery through Iran’s territory.895 Heavily backed up by 
Iranian-Israeli logistics and weapons, the Peshmerga finally “destroyed several Iraqi tanks” 
and prevented the Iraqi advance.896 At the same time, three Iraqi jets, including an Iraqi 
TU-16 Badger, were shot down by Iranian artillery units with British-made Rapiers on 
December 14 and 15.897 Nevertheless, the Shah still refrained launching a full-blown raid 
on Iraq.  
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Grand Bargain Preparation 
As the tides of the war escalated at the expense of the Kurds, the Pahlavi monarch’s 
willingness to reach a deal with Baghdad increased. Besides, Richard Nixon’s resignation 
in August 1974 and the Shah’s lack of confidence in the U.S. commitment to the Kurdish 
covert cooperation convinced Iranians to seal a deal with Baghdad. In addition to an Iraqi 
new diplomatic policy—lessening tension with Western Europe and a major thaw in 
relation with the U.S.—Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and King Hussein of Jordan asked 
the Shah to resume secret talks with Baghdad. Sadat told the Shah that Baghdad honestly 
intended to withdraw from Moscow’s orbit.898 Nevertheless, the Shah was still 
unconvinced that Baghdad was serious about a settlement.899 Calling the Baath Party a 
“bunch of thugs and murderers implacably hostile to him” in Baghdad,”900 he considered 
Iraqi diplomatic efforts as a “tactical move to divert attention from Iraq’s serious internal 
problems.”901  
On the other side, the Baath leaders were still doubtful about the Iranians’ interest 
in reopening diplomatic talks. They thought that the Shah never left the Kurds and strived 
to collapse Iraq. As Iraqi Foreign Minister Shathel Taqa told Lowrie, “if [the] Shah or 
anyone else has [any] idea of new Bangladesh in Iraq he is very mistaken.” According to 
Taqa, “Barzani is not representative of the Kurds, he is in his last days, and those who are 
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betting on him are betting on a losing horse.”902 Furthermore, Iran’s non-state foreign 
policy in Iraqi Kurdistan had been a major component of Iran’s strategy towards Iraq for a 
long time, the Iraqi leaders argued. Despite their claims, Iraqis were aware that the fate of 
the war was not in their hands. They were also under Moscow’s heavy pressure from 
Moscow. “It is better to negotiate with Iran and it would not be wise to involve yourself in 
two fronts [Iran and Kurdistan],” the Soviet leaders told Saddam.903 Even 
Sheikh Mohammad bin Mubarak al-Khalifa, Bahraini Foreign Minister, hinted to Saddam 
that the best way to cooperate with the Persian Gulf countries was to settle border disputes 
with Iran and Kuwait. The Iraqis felt lonely in the region.904  
Between 12 August and 1 September 1974, a low-level preliminary diplomatic 
negotiation led by Iranian Ambassador Abdul-Rahman Sadrieh and Iraqi Ambassador 
Talib Shabib was held in Istanbul.905 Although Tehran remained belligerent, both two 
parties “swallowed some of their pride.”906 The Istanbul negotiation ended with the parties 
issuing a joint communiqué, facilitating a foreign minister-level meeting on the sideline of 
the UN General Assembly. In mid-October 1974, Foreign Minister Abbas-Ali Khalatbari 
met his Iraqi counterpart Shathel Taqa in New York.907 However, negotiations were 
inconclusive. Talks were “tough, and certainly not smooth” since “neither side [could] 
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afford to make concessions”, Khalatbari claimed.908 The Iraqis did not show any flexibility 
over Arvand Rud that was “the basic ingredient of any Iranian-Iraqi settlement.”909 Despite 
his tough view, the Shah knew that the Kurds’ positions looked vulnerable. He expressed 
his frustration with the Kurds to Kissinger, stating that “even if the Iraqis succeeded in 
destroying the Kurds, they will still be nailed down on the Iranian border where they would 
in any event prefer to be as against facing the Israelis on the Syrian front.”910 He was well-
aware that Iran’s growing involvement in the Kurdish War would threaten the country with 
a full-scale war with Baghdad. 
The war was doubtlessly against the Iraqi Kurds. Only 40,000 Kurds with defensive 
weapons were fighting with 200,000 Iraqi troops. Besides, the mild winter of 1974-75 
allowed Iraqi air forces to keep bombing the Peshmerga’s strongholds “for several 
weeks.”911 It was only the Iranian artillery units along the border that supported the 
Peshmerga by hitting Iraqi positions with 300 rounds per day.912 The Iranian artillery 
support was “very effective” and that helped the Peshmerga who were “no longer 
withdrawing but were fighting tenaciously,” the Shah contended.913 Indeed, the Iranian 
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artillery fire forced Baghdad to withdraw the army from the valleys and secured the Kurds’ 
strongholds at Haji Omran. By December, Iranians had built a new supply route to Iraqi 
Kurdistan. However, the Kurds were unable to prevent losses. Recently reorganized by 
Russian advisors, the Iraqi Army had crushed the Peshmerga strongholds in the mountains. 
As the Shah told Callahan, a mere Iran’s support had not been able to change tides of the 
war mainly due to Iraqi new military tactics.914 “Unfortunately, the Iraqis had decisively 
defeated the Kurds. We sent them [the Kurds] several long-range cannons and anti-tank 
missiles. I think they will shatter the Iraqis. Nevertheless, it is the Russians, not the Iraqis, 
who defeated the Kurds,” confided the Shah and he shared his concern with Alam over the 
Soviets’ effective role in the war.915 Within this situation, the Peshmerga would not survive 
without Iran’s direct intervention-- a bitter reality for the Shah who saw a war with Iraq as 
inevitable. 
As the war was reaching a boiling point, the Pahlavi monarch began working on 
both offensive and defensive plans. He instructed the Iranian Army to prepare a plan to 
deploy forces inside Iraq and escalate tensions with Baghdad. Simultaneously, Alam, in 
full coordination with the Iranian Army and SAVAK, was instructed to prepare a plan to 
secure artillery pieces under any withdrawal from Iraqi Kurdistan.916 At the same time, the 
Shah was getting ready to make a grand deal with Baath leaders. On 4 December 1974, the 
Pahlavi monarch told Helms, “I wonder why the Iraqis do not simply settle with us” on 
Arvand Rud? “After all, the issues are minor as far as they are concerned,” he added. Later, 
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Helms found out through Alam that King Hussein was working as a secret intermediary 
between Tehran and Baghdad.917 He immediately informed Kissinger that “anything short 
of [an] Iraqi agreement to Iranian positions on the Shatt al-Arab and other border questions 
will get nowhere with Iran. The Shah holds firmly to his view that a different, ‘decent’ 
government is necessary for Baghdad. This is one of the reasons he militarily supports the 
Kurds. But an Iraqi agreement to settle with Iran might be tempting right now since the 
Kurdish War is becoming increasingly expensive and increasingly hazardous from the 
Iranian point of view.”918  
Within this context, the Shah faced a decision either to escalate the war or negotiate 
on the Kurdish-Arvand issue. He knew the Iraqi Army’s better position in the war and 
Baghdad’s determination to finish off the Kurdish rebels in spring. Thus, the only available 
option for the Shah would be to intensify Iran’s involvement in the war that could, in return, 
jeopardize his recently formed alignment with moderate Arab leaders, particularly Sadat.919 
On top of that, the Shah was worried about Iran’s weakened bargaining position. With the 
growing possibility of Kurdish failure, he did not want to lose the Iraqis’ potential 
concession in Arvand Rud.  
                                                
917 Tehran 10429 to U.S. Department of State, “King Hussein’s Intermediary Role,” December 10, 1974 
(NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1974), PP.1-2. 
 
918 Tehran 10429 to U.S. Department of State, “King Hussein’s Intermediary Role,” December 10, 1974 
(NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1974), pp.1-2. 
 
919 In an interview with al-Bayraq, President Sadat contended that “the Shah of Iran is a wise, prudent leader 
with a power in the analysis of the regional and international politics.” He also added that Cairo would try to 
meddle between Iran and Iraq. Beirut 3464 to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 January 1975. 
 
246 
 
With al-Bakr and Saddam’s visit to Jordan on January 15, Baghdad showed its 
flexibility with regard to the deal.920 Two days later, another round of diplomatic talk began 
in Istanbul. In the meeting, Foreign Minister Khalatbari put emphasis on Iran’s right in 
Arvand Rud while Iraqi Foreign Minister Saadun Hammadi asked Tehran to terminate its 
support for the Kurds. In fact, “Iran’s approach was that once its demands on [Arvand Rud] 
were satisfied, [the] parties could then turn to resolving [the] Kurdish problem. Iraq, 
conversely, wanted to settle [the] Kurdish problem first and then deal with [the] Shatt-al-
Arab. Furthermore, while Iraq would be willing to grant various unspecified facilities to 
Iran in [the] disputed region, it was unwilling to consider agreeing to Iranian sovereignty 
over the waters involved.”921 Despite significant disagreements, the Istanbul talks were 
successful as they set up to a meeting between the Shah and Saddam on the sidelines of the 
OPEC annual meeting in Algiers in March.922 Saddam knew that Iraq would not be able to 
unshackle itself from the Kurdish crisis without neutralizing Iran’s support for the Kurds. The 
final decision was to pay the price for Arvand Rud and ‘drink the cup of poison’. 
The U.S. and Israel were both suspicious of the Shah’s plan to deal with Baghdad 
and use the Kurds as the bargaining chip.923 However, neither Israel nor the U.S. was in a 
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position to support the Kurds without Iran’s consent. They knew that with the Shah’s 
termination of support for Barzani, the U.S. and Israel operations would immediately come 
to an end.924 In the meantime, the Shah gave the Kurds the last chance. In early February, 
the Peshmerga launched a counter-offensive to dislodge the Iraqi army; however, the 
campaign soon failed.925 The Kurds were not as potent in military offensives due to their 
defensive fighting tactics. Their failure to push back the Iraqis convinced the Shah to settle 
border disputes with Baghdad.  
In these circumstances, Kissinger met with the Shah in Zurich, Switzerland, on 19 
February 1975. Disappointed by the Kurds’ inability to resist the Baath military machine, 
the Shah informed Kissinger of his plan to meet with Saddam in Algeria to reach a deal 
and terminate backing the Kurds in return for a concession on Arvand Rud. He thought that 
the Kurds had “no guts left”; therefore, the Kurds would join the national unity government 
with Barzani’s failure and endanger Iran’s national security with the creation of “an 
autonomous Kurdish state which would be under the dominance of a communist Iraqi 
central government.” The Shah was also worried about a possible internationalization of 
the conflict and the intervention of the UN Security Council.926 Conversely, Kissinger 
asked the Shah not to abondon the Kurds, arguing that “any assurances by Saddam 
regarding the governance of the Kurdish area … would be worthless.” He added that any 
agreement with untrustworthy Baath leaders was a “bad idea--particularly the idea that he 
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believed the [Iraqis’] assurances that no Communist would be put in [charge of the 
autonomous Kurdistan].” Aware of Iran’s new oil export terminal on Kharg Island and 
Tehran’s lack of dependency on Arvand Rud for oil exportation, Kissinger highlighted a 
strategic gain from CIA-SAVAK cooperation in Iraqi Kurdistan against Iraqi-offered 
border concession. Kissinger reminded the Shah of his “own repeated warnings that the 
collapse of the Kurds would destabilize the entire area” and told him that any agreement 
with Baghdad would empower a pro-Moscow regime in the region and aid Iraqi 
communists to consolidate their power. He added that any agreement with Baghdad would 
prompt the Russian leaders’ “adventurism” since they would “view Iran’s retreat as 
symptomatic of the growing weakness of the West.” Nonetheless, the Shah knew that the 
Kurds would not survive without increased support and if Iran stepped up its assistance, it 
would instigate a full-blown war with Bagdad. At the end of the conversation, however, 
the Shah half-heartedly assured him that Iran would not terminate its support for the Kurds 
soon.927 
Despite the Shah’s change of heart, Kissinger was still hesitant to increase the 
American-Kurdish connections without the Shah’s consent.928 Earlier before, on 22 
January 1975, he had turned down Barzani’s request for more Sagger anti-tank missiles.929 
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Concerned with losing the Kurdish card in a geopolitical duel with Moscow, Kissinger had 
also warned Tel Aviv that the Shah “may begin a negotiation with the Iraqis if they meet 
at OPEC, in exchange for a veto over whom they put in if Barzani gets driven out.”930 In 
the same spirit, Barzani was not aware of the Shah’s plan to leave the Kurds alone. Facing 
an Iraqi onslaught, a constant barrage of air and artillery fire, he stated that “it was 
becoming impossible … to carry on fighting under existing circumstances” and pleaded 
with Tehran for more sophisticated weaponry and repeated his request to declare 
independence in late February 1975. Nevertheless, Barzani’s request to meet the Shah was 
declined. “I went to see general Barzani in 1975 to warn him about this. He would not 
speak at the house, in the palace that the Iranians had given him to stay in. Although it was 
chilly, he took me out for a stroll in the garden, and I told him this. He said, ‘Now I know 
why those scoundrels would not let me see the Shah.’ He said that the second day, the Shah 
came from his ski holiday, returned to Tehran, stayed less than 24 hours, and flew out to 
Algiers and signed the agreement,” Ahmad Chalabi recalled those days.931 On March 2, 
1975, Ashraf Marwan, Sadat’s advisor and Nasser’s son-in-law, met with the Shah right 
after his return from Baghdad with a message from Saddam. He informed the Shah that 
“Saddam Hussein was ready to pull Iraq out of the Soviet orbit if Iran would remove the 
military pressure which was forcing Iraq into the arms of the Soviets. Marwan expressed 
the view that it was almost certain that Saddam would pull away from the Soviets as 
promised.”932 The stage was set for the grand bargain. 
                                                
930 Kissinger, Henry. Years of Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999). p.593. 
 
931 In Interview with Dr. Ahmad Chalabi: How is it possible that Saddam Hussein is still in power in 
Baghdad? See http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saddam/interviews/chalabi.html. 
 
932 Tehran 2237 to the U.S. Department of State, “Iranian/Iraqi Agreement,” March 10, 1975 
(NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1975), p.1. 
250 
 
The 1975 Algiers Agreement 
On 3 March 1975, the Shah traveled to Algiers for the OPEC meeting. The meeting 
was hosted by President Houari Boumédienne who had close relations with the Shah. In a 
face-to-face meeting with Saddam after two days of intensive negotiations, the Shah agreed 
to freeze support for the Kurds while Baghdad recognized Iran’s sovereignty over the 
eastern half of Arvand Rud. The signed communiqué sealed the Kurdish fate and set the 
Thalweg Line in Arvand Rud.933 Interestingly, the Shah’s decision was made on the spot. 
Nobody was aware of his decision. Even Alam and senior SAVAK officials were kept in 
the dark.934 “We were totally surprised at how fast Iran and Iraq reached an agreement. We 
did not expect it,” Iran’s embassy in Beirut wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.935 The 
Shah permitted nobody to assess some provisions of the Algiers Agreement, including 
giving a little known oil-rich Iranian territory to Baghdad.936 Even after signing the 
Agreement, it was never given to the Iranian Parliament for ratification. Ambassador 
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Helms was also “uninformed” and “puzzled” of the Algiers Agreement.937 Only Jamshid 
Amouzgar and Nasrollah Entezam, the chief of Iran’s Oil Company, were allowed to 
accompany the Shah. More significantly, the Iranian troops fighting in Iraqi Kurdistan were 
not aware of the Shah’s decision. Right after the Agreement, “two and a half battalions of 
Iranian artillery and antiaircraft guns and their troops, stationed in Iraq, were abruptly 
ordered back across the frontier.”938 According to Alam, “one hundred pieces of field 
artillery, as well as anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, all managed by Iranian officers [in 
Iraqi Kurdistan], had to be destroyed because we do not have time to bring them back.”939 
After his return on March 7, the Shah told Alam that negotiations with Baghdad and OPEC 
had been so difficult that he slept only a few hours.940 Totally exhausted during the trip, 
the Shah had lost weight upon his return. Nevertheless, he was glad of his brilliant 
achievement in resolving the long-term dispute in Arvand Rud. In the Shah’s view, the 
1933 Agreement over Arvand Rud shamed for his reign. “I had been to some degree 
regretting my father’s two decisions, the [1933] Concession Agreement and Arvand Rud 
issue. Both could be criticized one day, though there might not be any possibility [not to 
sign those two agreements]. Thank God, I completely solved Oil issue and Arvand Rud. 
Although We have not observed [the Saad-Abad Agreement of 1933] for 12 years, I did 
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not want to remain a party to the agreement per se… Now at long last, I’ve been able to 
tear up the Arvand Rud treaty,” the Shah told Alam after the Algiers Agreement.941  
Hailed internationally and domestically as Iran’s foremost triumph, the Algiers 
Agreement cut off Iran’s non-state foreign policy in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Arab regimes did 
not hide their jubilation.942 There was no room for Barzani in the Shah’s strategic 
assessment. Two days after the official announcement of the Algiers Agreement, the Shah 
instructed Nassiri to tell Barzani that the Iraq-Iran border would be closed in two weeks 
and Iran would terminate its support for the Kurds.943 Barzani was informed by General 
Modarresi who was in Iraq at the time and was told he would have two options: either to 
settle with Baghdad or to take refuge in Iran where they would be given safe haven if they 
agreed to surrender their weapons to the Iranian Army.944 Amidst the Peshmerga’s 
desperate withdrawal to Iran before sealing the border,945 Barzani traveled to Tehran to talk 
to the Shah. According to Alam, the Pahlavi monarch was “embarrassed to meet him face 
to face.”946 On March 11, the Shah only reluctantly met Barzani and Mahmoud Othman.947 
He told them of his concern about a war with Iraq and pointed out that he had no choice 
                                                
941 Alam, Assadollah. Yad’dashtha-ye ‘Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam 
Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. IV: 1974-1975 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 1995), p. 341. 
 
942 Syrian Foreign Minister Abd al-Halim Khaddam told Kissinger that “solving that problem has left a lot 
of satisfaction with us.” Memcon, March 9, 1975, 01522, DNSA.   
 
943 Parsi, Trita, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States (Yale 
University Press, 2007) p.29. 
 
944 Helms to Scowcroft, March 8, 1975, (FRUS 1969-1976, XXVII, 275).    
 
945 CIA weekly summary 0013/75, March 28, 1975, CREST.    
 
946 Parsi, Trita, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States (Yale 
University Press, 2007) p. 57. 
 
947 Alam, Assadollah. Yad’dashtha-ye ‘Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam 
Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. IV: 1974-1975 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 1995), p. 346. 
 
253 
 
but to sign the Agreement with Saddam. He added that it was “temporary” and was sure 
that Saddam would not observe the terms of the agreement. Furthermore, the Shah offered 
Barzani refuge in Iran with full financial support and promised him to keep the border open 
for the Peshmerga. When Othman tried to talk to the Shah on the issue, the Shah interrupted 
him and said “I am telling you my decision. There is nothing to discuss.”948 Barzani “acted 
stoically” to the Shah’s orders.949  
Infuriated by the Shah’s decision,950 Barzani pleaded with Kissinger to help the 
Kurds. In his message, Barzani pointed out that “Our hearts bleed to see that an immediate 
by-product of this agreement is the destruction of our defenseless people in an 
unprecedented manner as Iran closed its border and stopped help to us completely and 
while the Iraqis began the biggest offensive they have ever launched and which is now 
being continued. Our movement and people are being destroyed in an unbelievable way 
with silence from everyone.” He begged Kissinger to back the Kurds “to help [the Kurds] 
in these historically tragic and sad moments.”951 Kissinger, however, himself “was shaken 
… by the Iranian decision … because we had participated in it too … the brutality of it”.952 
He was informed of the Agreement in the middle of his shuttle diplomacy trips to the 
region. On 8 March 1975, the Shah conveyed a message to Kissinger outlining the 
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background of his decision.953 In his message, the Shah argued that Saddam had promised 
“that Barzani and his people would have one week to decide whether they wanted to stay 
in Iraq or withdraw without bloodshed into Iran where they would find a haven and a decent 
life. They will be given until the end of the month for their withdrawal … The second 
promise was that the security services of the two countries would work together, briefing 
each other on which Kurds were good and which were bad (read communist). This will, I 
hope, prevent the establishment of a communist Kurdish community in Barzani’s 
territory.”954 Indeed, the Shah intelligently applied Cold War language to justify his 
decision when he wrote “… I feel that I had to take a chance since otherwise the Kurdish 
cause would be hopeless in the relatively near future and I might be accused of having 
destroyed a chance for getting the Iraqis out of the Soviet orbit.”955  
In contrast to both Helms and Lowrie who finally shared the same view towards 
Iran-Iraq disputes,956 Kissinger had no reason to hail the agreement. Stunned by the Shah’s 
decision and pressed by the Congress and American public opinion, he mentioned: “there 
was nothing I could say.”957 In his telegram to the Shah, Kissinger stated, “with respect to 
the Kurdish question, there is little I can add to what I have already said to you personally 
during our recent meeting. This is obviously a matter for His Majesty to decide in the best 
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interests of your nation. Our policy remains as always to support Iran as a close and staunch 
friend of the United States. I will, of course, follow with great interest the evolution of 
Iraqi-Iranian relations and of Iraqi policy in your area generally and toward the Soviet 
Union in particular.”958 The Shah did not respond.959 Kissinger knew that the fate of the 
Iraqi Kurdish Movement had been sealed. He had agreed with CIA Director Colby’s 
argument that “because American policy had been to channel aid through Iran … any direct 
aid to the Kurds now that resistance was crumbling would be even less defensible than it 
had been in the past. [I doubt] the Shah— having ended his own aid to Barzani—would be 
willing to continue to serve as a conduit for American funds.”960 Colby was right. Shortly 
after arriving back from Algiers, the Shah informed Helms “the cutoff of Iranian assistance 
to Barzani’s Kurdish insurrection would also entail terminating all American 
assistance.”961 After a week, Kissinger conveyed a message to Barzani, stating that “We 
appreciate the deep concern ... We can understand that the difficult decisions which the 
Kurdish people now face are a cause of deep anguish for them. We have great admiration 
for the courage and dignity with which those people have confronted many trials, and our 
prayers are with them. We will be talking with our Iranian friends and will be in contact 
with the General later.”962 It was the end of an era for the Iraqi Kurds. 
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Kissinger only asked Helms to secure U.S. interests, ordering him to “find a tactful 
way to mention the problem both the Iranian and U.S. Governments will face in the U.S. 
and elsewhere if there is a massacre and Barzani charges that he has been let down. The 
plight of the Kurds could arouse deep humanitarian concern. On the other hand, it would 
create an impossible situation if we were to be working at cross purposes with Iran.”963 
Helms had already recommended Kissinger “send [Barzani] some kind of comforting 
message, otherwise, and maybe anyway, we will get a batch of unpleasant publicity which 
we may be able to avoid” since “the Iranians clearly have blood on their hands and we to 
a lesser extent on ours.”964 The Shah had agreed with Helms and Callahan who were 
worried that “distressed and disconsolate” Barzani might unfold Iranian-American covert 
cooperation in Kurdistan. The best way to assuage the Kurds’ “undesirable indiscretion” 
was, as Colby suggested Kissinger, to give Barzani his last monthly payment.965 Kissinger 
approved his recommendation of “a pitiful Band-Aid considering the tragedy about to 
descend on the Kurds.”966 The Shah then instructed SAVAK to allocate Barzani’s March 
payment.967  
None of them, however, changed the fate of the Kurdish War. Shattered by the 
Shah’s sudden decision and then Kissinger’s letter, the traumatized Kurdish leader traveled 
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back to his headquarter in Haji Omran on March 18 1975. He told his Peshmerga that “It 
was a hopeless situation but if anyone wanted to take up the battle in his place, he would 
give that man his full moral support.” Without an open border and Iran’s support, it would 
be fruitless to continue the war, the majority of the Peshmerga soon concluded.968 Right 
after Barzani fled to Iran on March 27-28, with the Peshmerga and their families, the Iraqi 
Army launched its final offensive while the Peshmerga families had been waiting to cross 
the border to Iran. The Shah initially thought that the Algiers Agreement would temporarily 
freeze Baghdad’s military campaign against the Kurds. However, Saddam ordered an all-
out offensive against the Kurds. The Iraqi invasion “made the Shah ill.”969 He saw Saddam 
had “immediately [violated] the letter and spirit of their Algiers agreement by ordering an 
all-out attack on the Kurds on all fronts.”970 It took almost a week until the Shah was able 
to convince the Baath leaders to halt its offensive and arrange a ceasefire on March 13, two 
days before the Tehran meeting of Iran-Iraq foreign ministers to implement the 
Agreement.971 With the expiration of the cease-fire and Iraq’s offer of amnesty to the 
Peshmerga on 1 April 1975, Iraq conquered all the Kurds’ strongholds without facing a 
major threat and finally sealed the border with Iran for the first time since September 1961. 
The Iraqi Kurdish ambition finally came to an end.  
With the Shah’s approval, more than 200,000 Kurdish refugees crossed the border 
to take exile in Iran and joined the thousands of refugees already in camps. Although 
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thousands of the Iraqi Kurds were internalized and socialized within Iranian society, 
especially through learning the Persian language, the settlement process in Iran was not 
without any problem. As general Fardoust, the deputy chief of SAVAK and the head of 
Royal Inspection, pointed out, “A third of the budget [assigned for the Kurd refugees] was 
[properly] consumed; however, the rest of it was stolen by Iranian officers.”972 Alam also 
stated that “the Iraqi Kurds asked Iranian officials to keep the border open. Mullah Mustafa 
Barzani was concerned just about his own friends and family. The Shah, however, insisted 
on settling just Kurdish Peshmerga, not the civilians since Iraqis would never punish them. 
I replied to Your Majesty that we could not expect the Kurds to believe us. The Shah 
suggested that the Kurds could be supported by the International Red Cross.”973 Under the 
Shah’s request, Saddam extended the period for the return of the refugees in Iran to Iraq 
until the end of April--and then for an additional 20 days.974 When Baghdad granted 
amnesty to all of the Kurd refugees, except Barzani’s close Peshmerga, more than 70,000 
civilians returned to Iraq to face an uncertain future by May 1975.  
The Algiers Agreement made the Iraqi Kurds’ fate worse. They were forcefully 
resettled in southern Iraq. The Algiers Agreement accelerated Baghdad’s efforts to 
implement its assimilation policy, known as Anfal, towards the Kurds. The Baath leaders 
followed their brutal Arabization of Iraqi Kurdistan to set in place a demographic 
arrangement in favor of the Arabic speaking people. They also established a security belt 
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30 kilometers wide along Iraq’s borders with Turkey and Iran. To create this cordon 
sanitaire, Baghdad destroyed more than 1400 Kurdish villages by 1978 and 600,000 
ordinary Kurds were deported to resettlement camps975 while their houses were transferred 
to Arab families. Both Barzan and Rawandez villages were completely ruined.976 Around 
100,000 Kurdish Peshmerga, including Barzani and his family, remained in Iran. A 
beautiful, furnished house, costing around 40 million Rial, was bought for Barzani in Karaj, 
near Tehran. Forty houses were also prepared for his close families in Tehran and several 
furnished houses were provided for the Peshmerga commanders in Karaj.977 SAVAK, and 
particularly Colonel Manouchehr Hashemi, the head of the Eighth Office, was in charge of 
controlling and monitoring the Kurdish refugees. Though frustrated, Barzani and his 
Peshmerga escaped the rest of the Kurds’ fate. The deal was not as bad for the Barzanis as 
it was for the other Kurds. 
Betrayal or Necessity?  
The Algiers Agreement was the Shah’s siege of ‘Troy’. As in Homer’s Iliad, 
however, the heroes faced tragic lives. The Shah could not escape from the tragic fate of 
the Kurds. When he was asked by Alam about the fate of the Kurds’ “claims and 
autonomy,” the Shah cold-bloodedly replied “Nothing”, adding that “these people who 
have suffered defeat after defeat, they know very well that they could not survive ten days 
without our support in the face of the Iraqi offensive; what can they say now?” The Shah 
victoriously told Alam of Saddam’s own admission during their four and a half hours of 
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talks that Barzani’s Peshmerga would have been easily eliminated by the Iraqi Army long 
ago had it not been for Iran’s troops and artillery intervention. The Iraqi leader had told the 
Shah that “your unsparing sword cut down the flower of Iraqi youth.” However, Alam did 
not see the Algiers Agreement as Iran’s victory. He told the Shah that “the Kurds would 
have been given autonomy last year but you ordered them not to accept it and they obeyed 
you.” The Shah replied to him that both “the Kurds and the Iraqis knew that it was all an 
act and that the Iraqis had [an] intention of taking over Kurdistan.”978 The day after, Alam 
informed the Shah of the Western newspapers and the Kurdish campaign against him for 
selling out the Kurds. The Shah answered, “We could not station our troops there and keep 
fighting forever.” Alam responded back, “We had been practically transgressing Arvand 
Rud. We could have bargained more [with Iraq] on behalf of the Kurds because they have 
been under heavy Iraqi bombs and raids for recent 48 hours, though [Baghdad] declared 
amnesty.” The Shah went silent.979  The next day, he saw the Shah in “poor spirits and deep 
in thought.” “I think,” Alam thought, “it was because of the Kurds issue and accusations 
over our unfaithfulness and abandonment.”980  
The Shah was heavily criticized by the international media for abandoning the 
Kurds. Angered with the American press, the Shah told President Ford, “I had to make a 
quick agreement with Iraq. I have to say this in the face of all the press reports that I had 
abandoned them. They [the Kurds] weren’t fighting; we were. The Kurds weren’t fighting. 
Sadat, Hussein, Boudemiene said, ‘Give them [Iraq] a chance to cut loose from the Soviet 
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Union and adopt a more independent policy.’ At Algiers I had talks which settled the 
borders and opened the way for Iraq to be more independent of the Soviet Union. Now, 
Iraq is offering a treaty for joint defense against local or outside powers. This protects 
Kuwait against them. I was trying to promote this for 4-5 years to the Saudis.”981 The Shah, 
in fact, saw the Kurdish War as fruitless and infeasible. Even pessimist Alam thought that 
“Our Army was fighting there, rather than the Kurds who were harshly defeated… How 
could we keep such a place? However, the world does not know the issue and that is why 
they accused us of a betrayal [of the Kurds].”982 He also added, “It has been more than a 
year that they [the Kurds] could not resist. Only we were keeping them. It would be 
unreasonable to spend money for the war and keep their immigrants (more than 300,000) 
with heavy expenses. The world criticizes us because it does not know of the details. But 
we go silent because we have no explanation now.”983 These arguments did not make sense 
for the media, though.The Algiers Agreement also shook the Iranian-Israeli shared strategy 
of containment of Iraq. It made the eastern front more vulnerable for Israel. Although the 
Israelis had been informed of an imminent Tehran-Baghdad agreement, they did not expect 
the end of their operation in Iraqi Kurdistan in such a “dramatic and sad way.”984 They 
thought the Kurdish War would last much longer.985 While Kissinger was informed by the 
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Shah personally, Israel was kept in the dark about the details of the Agreement until 
SAVAK officials told Uri Lubrani on 9 March  1975.986 By ignoring them as a secondary 
partner, the Shah had added insult to injury for the Jewish state.987 A day before the 
withdrawal of Iranian troops, SAVAK officers in Iraqi Kurdistan informed the Israelis of 
their sudden return to Iran describing it as a routine replacement of troops. Iran’s decision 
exposed Mossad officers to risk in the face of the Iraqi Army advance. Israeli officers 
stationed in the north of Iraq, including Eliezer Tsafrir, David Kimche, and Zuri Sagy, had 
only two hours to flee to Piranshahr, a city in the northwest of Iran. “I was cursing Iran all 
the way to Tehran. I was terribly disappointed,” Tsafrir recalled when he was almost 
surrounded by the Iraqi troops.988 Despite the Iraqi Kurds’ request to Israel to support them 
through air force and deliver aid by parachute drops,989 Israel was aware of the brutal logic 
of geopolitics. They were not able to continue their cooperation with the Iraqi Kurds 
without the Shah’s consent. For a decade Israel saw Barzani as a valuable asset to contain 
Iraq. The Shah’s decision, however, cut off their unwavering support for the Iraqi Kurds. 
“The Shah sold out the Kurds”, Prime Minister Rabin bitterly reacted to the Agreement. “I 
warned the Shah against it and he did it anyway,” Kissinger expressed his sympathy with 
the Jewish leader.990 Though infuriated by Iran’s strategic shift, Israel did not criticize the 
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Shah publicly. Only Lubrani expressed the Israelis’ displeasure with it. However, his 
objection was bitterly rejected by a senior Iranian official who explained that Israel’s 
weakness “was that she allowed sentiment to interfere with politics.”991 In Israel’s view, 
the Shah’s decision in March 1975 was a betrayal that was reminiscent of “what [British 
Prime Minister Neville] Chamberlain did with Hitler in abandoning Czechoslovakia.”992 
The Algiers Agreement also hurt the U.S. and its geopolitical mastermind, Henry 
Kissinger. The U.S. covert Kurdish cooperation with SAVAK officially came to an end on 
4 June 1975.993 Without the Shah’s intervention, the U.S. would not have engaged “in a 
war so logistically difficult, so remote, and so incomprehensible to the American 
public.”994 After three years of dedicating money and ammunition, Kissinger lost the 
Kurdish card just because of the “cold-blooded realist” Shah’s policy.995 Besides, the 
Kurds’ view added insult to injury. Suffering from cancer, Barzani visited the U.S. in the 
summer of 1975 for medical treatment. In a meeting, he reminded Kissinger that he was 
held responsible for the situation in Kurdistan because he had been forced to accept Iran’s 
termination of the support for the Kurdish Peshmerga. But Kissinger refused Barzani’s 
accusation and said, “What do they say we should have done without the Iranians? How 
could we have supported him if we had had the means?”996 Indeed, Kissinger never 
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accepted blame for the failure of the U.S. policy in Kurdistan, blaming geography, history, 
and weakened U.S. power for the tragedy. The Shah himself considered the termination of 
Iran’s support as the only option for the country. Despite all critiques, his decision in 
Algiers was rational. The Shah’s preference was to keep Iran’s non-state foreign policy 
alive in the north of Iraq. Iran’s major goal in supporting the Kurds was to contain Iraq by 
pulling Baghdad away from Moscow’s orbit and then making it concede in Arvand Rud. 
With their successive defeats in 1974 and early 1975, however, the Shah was dissuaded of 
the hope that the Peshmerga would crush the Iraqi Army. Indeed, as historical evidence 
shows, the Peshmerga would not have survived without Iran’s direct interference and the 
Shah was right when he told Alam that “in truth we were the ones doing the fighting.”997 
As the Shah pointed out, Barzani’s Peshmerga “were making no progress in the war. They 
were running, not as fast as the South Vietnamese but nearly as fast. We Iranians would 
have to do the fighting. I decided I did not want a war with Iraq at the time when the Near 
East was a powder keg and the Russians supported Iraq and the United States suffered from 
a Watergate Complex”.998 In this situation, the Shah had little choice but to get ready for a 
regional war--even an international war in case of Soviet support for Baghdad--with Iraq. 
Thus, when Iraq showed their flexibility over Arvand Rud, the Shah did not waste time, 
pulled the rug from under the U.S. and the Israel, and reached the long-term goal of his 
reign. 
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Downfall: The Lebanese Shia 
“Nobody can trust these people [Shia Clerics],” the Shah stated.999  
 
“Do not expect me to act as Iran’s agent…In contrast to the others, I want nothing for myself. The only thing 
I want is the progress of the Shia,” Sadr to an officer of Iran’s embassy in Beirut.1000   
 
Anti-Sadr Campaign 
As it was getting closer to the mid-70s, Sadr’s prestige in Lebanese politics was 
weakened. His foe, ambassador Qadar, had rallied several Shia elites in the south of 
Lebanon, including Ja’far Sharaf al-Din, Kamel Asaad, and Seyyed Hassan Shirazi. As 
Abd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din al-Musawi’s elder son, Ja’far Sharaf al-Din had considered 
Sadr as a usurper of his title. Seeking power among the Shia community, Shirazi was an 
Iraqi-born clergy expelled from Najaf by the Baath forces. Having a “very close, friendly 
relation” with Qadar,1001 Asaad had been challenging Sadr since the early 60s to regain his 
past influence in Southern Lebanon.1002  
Besides, Qadar had been preparing anti-Sadr reports to Tehran in order to frame 
him as a clergy disloyal to Iran. When Sadr took a trip to the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms, 
Qadar accusing him of calling the Persian Gulf the ‘Arabian Gulf’ in an interview with the 
Arab newspaper al-Havadeth. In reality, however, Sadr had stated that “the Shia should 
support the Arabness of the Persian Gulf.”1003 Sadr argued that he had intended to highlight 
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the Shia identity and interest in the Persian Gulf.1004 However, his explanation fell on deaf 
ears. Qadar also attempted to frame Sadr as “the main supporter of the Iranian opposition 
in the region.”1005 In reality, however, the majority of the Iranian revolutionaries had tense 
relations with Seyyed Musa Sadr. 
Sadr, Ayatollah Khomeini, and the Islamist Revolutionaries  
The presence of Palestinian guerrillas, Sadr’s success in the formation of the Shia 
institutions, and Lebanon’s specific geography and state identity provided an excellent 
opportunity for the Iranian revolutionaries to wage their struggle against the Pahlavi 
regime. Since the early 70s, pro-Ayatollah Khomeini Islamist forces had built their 
connections to the PLO factions. Although nationalists-religious revolutionaries of the 
FMI, like Yazdi, Ghotbzadeh, and Chamran, expressed their interests and loyalties to 
Ayatollah Khomeini, his main disciples comprised of young Islamists who gradually left 
Iran to organize anti-Shah operations from abroad. As the Baath regime tightened the 
political atmosphere and put pressure on Shia clerics in Iraq, Sadr invited Ayatollah 
Khomeini to Lebanon. Although Sadr’s invitation was rejected by Ayatollah Khomeini, 
who preferred to stay in Najaf, some of Ayatollah Khomeini’s disciples left Iraq for Beirut 
in the summer of 1972. Chief among them were Seyed Ali-Akbar Mohtashamipour,1006 
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Sheikh Mohammad Montazeri,1007 Jalal ad-Din Farsi,1008 Seyed Mohammad Gharazi,1009 
and Sheikh Ahmad Nafari.1010 Mohtashamipour was a close follower of Ayatollah 
Khomeini who accompanied him in exile in Iraq and later France. He cofounded 
Rouhaniyoun-e Mobarez-e Kharej az Iran [the Combatant Clergies out of Iran], an armed 
group based in Syria and Lebanon, with Mohammad Montazeri, Mohammad Gharazi, and 
Sheikh Ahmad Nafari.1011 Gharazi was an Islamist revolutionary imprisoned by SAVAK, 
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he left Tehran for the Levant in 1976.1012 Inspired by Seyed Ali Andarzgoo,1013 he held ties 
with the revolutionaries in Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine. Jalal ad-Din Farsi was an alleged 
ideologue and theorist of this group who had close connections to Yasser Arafat and 
Muammar Gaddafi. 
As time wore on, these revolutionaries became Sadr’s major critics in Lebanon. 
These pro-Ayatollah Khomeini revolutionaries provocatively blamed Sadr for his meeting 
with the Shah. Ali-Akbar Mohtashamipour was disappointed with “Sadr’s political line” 
and his “non-revolutionary behavior.”1014 Indeed, pro-Khomeini revolutionaries blamed 
Sadr for refusing to provide a share of the dedication of his logistics to the Iranian 
revolutionaries in challenging Tehran. Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, then-president of 
the Islamic Republic, also pointed to a deep tension between a group of Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s supporters and Sadr. Rafsanjani himself was in Sadr’s class when he was in 
Qom. “Sadr held a specific point of view towards [Pahlavi] Iran. Due to his special position 
among the Lebanese Shia, he had been connected to the Pahlavi regime. At the same time, 
he had an intimate relation with the revolutionaries. Moreover, the House of Khomeini, led 
by Haj Mostafa, held a deep grudge against Sadr. The main reason behind this tension was 
Mostafa’s emphasis on Imam Khomeini’s religious authority which was not respected by 
Sadr. Sadr could not follow Imam officially due to his role in the SICS. On top of that, 
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Sadr could not ignore Iran’s regime. He tried to keep his connection with Iran’s embassy 
in Beirut. It was, of course, a type of struggle against the Shah; however, it was different 
with our strategy that was based on a clear objection against the regime… Some of the 
revolutionaries, like Mohammad Montazeri, were against Sadr and denounced him for 
being a conservative. They expected Sadr to oppose the Shah clearly. I tried to soften their 
position [towards Sadr]. When I went to Najaf, I talked to Imam and brought the issue to 
the fore.”1015 Sadr had attempted to justify his decision several times. He pointed out that 
his “cautious” decision not to highlight Ayatollah Khomeini in Lebanon was due to the 
Shah’s leverage among the Shai community of Lebanon, and especially among Tehran-
dependent clergies. “Pro-Shah clergies in Lebanon see the Shah in a different way you 
[pro-Khomeini revolutionaries] see. Due to the extensive propaganda launched by Qadar, 
the Shah has been portrayed as a respected Shia leader who is attempting to save the Shia 
from poverty and misery. The embassy [of Iran to Beirut] simultaneously accuses me of 
creating obstacles against the Shah’s support for the Lebanese Shia,” Sadr explained.1016 
Indeed, Sadr’s major goal was to revive the Shia collective identity through the removal of 
poverty and deprivation. He was well-aware that a confrontation with the regime of Tehran 
by backing the Iranian revolutionaries would destroy the Shia position in Lebanon. But his 
argument fell on deaf ears.  
A gap between pro-Ayatollah Khomeini elements and Sadr widened as Sadr 
expressed his condolences on the passing of Ayatollah Hakim to Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim 
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Khoie, instead of Ayatollah Khomeini, on 18 July 1970.1017 According to the Shia tradition, 
expressing condolences to an Ayatollah on the passing of a Marja meant the recognition of 
that Ayatollah as a new Marja. Sadr recognized Ayatollah Khoie as a new Marja and 
ignored Ayatollah Khomeini. Pro-Ayatollah Khomeini revolutionaries denounced Sadr for 
his intentional insult to their leader. One of the reasons that Sadr was close to these 
Ayatollahs, instead of Ayatollah Khomeini, was that they had agreed with Sadr’s 
suggestion on Zabiha.1018 Amidst his efforts to improve the Shia community relations with 
the Maronites and other non-Muslim communities, Sadr had requested Ayatollah Hakim 
to declare a non-orthodoxy fatwa on Zabiha. Like Ayatollah Hakim, Ayatollah Khoie 
accepted the fatwa but Ayatollah Khomeini rejected any change in this religious rule. 
Sadr’s controversial decision to approach Ayatollah Khoie also widened his relations with 
Mostafa Khomeini. In contrast to Ahmad Khomeini, Mostafa’s major goal was to 
legitimize Ayatollah Khomeini’s religious, rather than political-revolutionary, authority. 
Mostafa heavily criticized Sadr’s decision and cut off relations with him. Conversely, 
several of Sadr’s close friends believed that his religious endorsement of Ayatollah Khoie 
owed to Hakim’s and Khoie’s leverage in Lebanon. According to Seyyed Bagher 
Khosrowshahi, “Sadr was loyal to Imam Khomeini. Upon Sadr’s arrival to Lebanon, most 
Shia were Ayatollah Hakim’s followers. Imam [Khomeini] had not been as popular and 
therefore, Sadr could not ignore Ayatollah Hakim… Sadr had ordered to hang Ayatollah 
Hakim’s portrait in the SICS building. As Ayatollah Khoie’s reputation grew, Sadr put him 
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and then Imam Khomeini’s portraits there.”1019 Nevertheless, the majority of pro-Ayatollah 
Khomeini revolutionaries never forgot his siding with Ayatollah Khoie. 
More substantially, a root of these tensions also stemmed from different views 
towards the Palestinian guerrillas. In the aftermath of the Black September of 1970, the 
Palestinian guerrillas established their military camps in the south of Lebanon where they 
began launching operations against Israel. In retaliation, the Shia towns and cities in the 
South were showered with Israeli missiles and bombs. In such a miserable situation, Sadr 
changed his policy towards the PLO. However, his position was heavily criticized by pro-
Ayatollah Khomeini revolutionaries, including the Combatant Clergies out of Iran. Sadr’s 
blaming the Palestinian guerrillas for their unfortunate presence in the south of Lebanon 
caused Mohtashamipour “to worry.”1020 He also felt “the danger for the future of the 
Palestinians” because what he saw “would sour the minds of the people of the south and 
[would] create a situation where the Palestinians would not be able to attack Israel from 
the south of Lebanon.”1021 Shocked by Sadr’s position towards the Palestinians, 
Mohtashamipour decided to leave Lebanon because “the undesirable political situation in 
Lebanon was not proper for political inclinations of people like” him.1022  
In addition to Mohtashamipour, Jalal ad-Din Farsi and Sheikh Ahmad Nafari were 
against Sadr’s position on the Palestinian issue. Farsi was Sadr’s main foe among the 
Iranian revolutionaries in Lebanon.1023 “While we are fighting along with Palestinians 
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against Imperialism and the Israelis, Jalal ad-Din Farsi and Mohammad Saleh are 
denouncing us for being an anti-Palestinian group,” Chamran criticized Farsi’s position 
towards Sadr.1024 However, Farsi believed that Sadr was against revolutionary actions in 
Lebanon. “Mr. Sadr was worried about our presence in Lebanon [that could] weaken his 
position. Thus, he planned to deport us from Lebanon,” Farsi claimed.1025 In reality, 
however, both Farsi and Nafari had been arrested by the Lebanese police and were 
supposed to be deported to Iran but Sadr’s personal intervention released them.1026  Not 
only Sadr but also Chamran was denounced as a traitor to the Palestinians, especially after 
his trip to Paris on 10 August 1975.1027 “Chamran took a trip to Paris and gave such an 
incendiary speech there against the Palestinian guerrillas that I thought the Palestinians 
would assassinate him,” Farsi stressed Chamran’s anti-Palestine position.1028 Asghar 
Jamalifard, known as Abou Hanif, also criticized Sadr. “Although I had planned to go to 
Dhofar, Oman, to fight with the Shah’s Royal Army, I came to the south of Lebanon 
because Sadr convinced me to travel there… I participated in all Amal’s military operations 
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against the Phalanges. With Tel al-Zaatar,1029 wherein Sadr was responsible, I left 
Amal.”1030 Ironically, even anti-Sadr Qadar did not share the revolutionaries’ view towards 
Sadr. “The Shia in the south of Lebanon were never Israeli supporters. They were not fond 
of Israel; rather, they criticized the Palestinian guerrillas for provoking the Israelis to 
invade the South,” Qadar argued.1031 Sadr and Chamran believed in maintaining a balance 
between the Shia interests and support for the Palestinians, whereas pro-Ayatollah 
Khomeini revolutionaries insisted on making Lebanon a frontier zone in fighting with 
Israel. 
Although Sadr had expressed his respect to Ayatollah Khomeini and supported his 
Islamic struggle, pro-Ayatollah Khomeini elements were suspicious of Sadr’s allegedly 
insincere views towards the Palestinians, the Shah, and Ayatollah Khomeini’s religious 
authority. Sadr had praised Iranian clerics’, especially Ayatollah Khomeini’s, struggle 
against despotism in Iran and clarified that the Shia leaders were “influential among the 
[Iranian] people.”1032 However, pro-Ayatollah Khomeini revolutionaries tried to drag their 
leader into their fight with Sadr.1033 Farsi criticized Sadr supporters. “This man [Chamran] 
went to each corner of the World with Musa Sadr. They both went to Moscow and laid 
flowers at the Vladimir Lenin Monument. However, he never came to Najaf to express his 
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1030 Goftogo ba Asghar Jamalifard, Abou Hanif [A Conversation with Asghar Jamalifard, Abou-Hanif]. 
http://www.teribon.ir/archives/135456. 
 
1031 Interview with Major General Mansour Qadar, Oral History, Foundations for Iranian History. 
 
1032 SAVAK Documents, No. 213/5701, 29 March 1973. 
 
1033 Tabatabai, Mohammad Sadegh, Kahterat-e Siasi Ejtemai [Socio-political Dieries], Moassese Tanzim 
Nashr Asar Emam Khomeini, 1388, vol. 1, p. 173. 
 
274 
 
respect to Imam Khomeini,” Farsi claimed. He added, “Chamran never saw Imam 
Khomeini as a good politician and leader. Instead, he saw Sadr as an ideal, perfect 
leader.”1034 Even in Iraq, the anti-Sadr zeal was rising. “One night in early 1971, I think 
Mohtashamipour, Mohammad Taqi Shariati, Sadjadi, Seyyed Hamid Ziarati (Hamid 
Rouhani),1035 and I gathered in Sheikh Hasan Karoubi’s house. That night, Ziarati 
vehemently criticized both Imam Musa Sadr and his cousin, Seyyed Muhammad-Baqir 
Sadr, and accused Musa Sadr of being a secret mercenary of Imperialism and Zionism in a 
way that nobody could find out. Ziarati also hinted that Musa Sadr was Ayatollah Khoie’s 
follower, and not Imam’s … Following afternoon, I approached Imam and told him that 
“some of your students and followers have disrespected some Marjas and respectful Shia 
leaders, like Imam Sadr and Ayatollah [Mohammad-Baqir] Sadr. He got unexpectedly sad 
in a way that I thought I should not have raised the issue. Imam later warned his followers 
not to insult the Sadr.”1036 
Nonetheless, Ayatollah Khomeini never clarified his position in the dispute. There 
were some instances when the Ayatollah slightly expressed his disagreement with Sadr, 
particularly support for the Palestinian guerrillas. However, Sadegh Tabatabaie, Sadr’s 
nephew, believed that “Imam [Khomeini] was not against Sadr. The only time he 
discredited with Sadr was when Sadr insisted on supporting the Shias in Lebanon. Imam 
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[Khomeini] believed that this policy could not bridge a gap between two sects of Islam. 
Sadr, in response, asserted that the Shia should first change their position in the society of 
Lebanon from a marginal group to the central one.”1037 Besides, Ayatollah preferred to stay 
out of the quarrel. As a revolutionary leader, Ayatollah Khomeini was smart enough not to 
take a clear position on the issue that could have divided his followers. Similar to his 
position towards Ali Shariati, a main ideologue of the Islamic Revolution, he never put all 
his eggs in one basket.  
In the mid-70s, pro-Palestinian zeal was rising so much that some of the non-
clerical revolutionaries joined radical pro-Ayatollah Khomeini supporters. Jebheh Melli-e 
Sevom (The Third National Front) and his main figure, Abolhassan Banisadr, criticized 
Sadr for his ambiguous political position towards the Palestinians.1038 It seems that even 
Iranian Islamists were torn between supporting Sadr and radical PLO. Not only 
Islamists but also leftist and other major Iranian opposition groups saw Sadr as a threat to 
their guerrilla operations in the south of Lebanon. Indeed, there was a deep competition 
among revolutionary groups to show themselves with a rightful and impeccable position 
in supporting the Palestinians. Within this context, Sadr’s objection to Palestinian 
radicalism was framed as an anti-Islamist move. By the mid-70s, both SAVAK and the 
Iranian opposition groups, except the FMI, had framed Sadr as their scapegoat. 
 Escalated Enmity  
The outbreak of the October War of 1973 set a fertile ground opportunity for 
Qadar’s policy to make Tehran more suspicious of Sadr’s intentions. Amidst the war, Sadr 
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asked Tehran to intervene in favor of the Arab side. He dispatched a telegram to Ayatollah 
Milani, a major Marja in Qom, to convince the Shah’s regime to side with Arab “Muslims” 
and “provide the Arabs with weapons, planes, and military specialists.”1039 When Tehran 
did not support the Egyptians and Syrians,1040 Sadr publicly, yet slightly, criticized the 
regime of Iran in Ashura 1973. On 28 March 1973, Sadr regretted Iran’s policy in the War 
and stated that “Tehran could have cut selling oil to Israel.”1041 Qadar’s reports, however, 
exaggerated Sadr’s enmity towards Tehran. Nonetheless, some officials in SAVAK 
objected to this view, recommending that the Shah pursue a policy to regain the leverage 
among the Shia, particularly after the rising Iraqi influence in Lebanon. The Shah initially 
agreed and instructed to attract Sadr to Iran.1042 However, it was soon revealed that Iran’s 
embassy in Beirut did not intend to follow the Shah’s policy.1043 Qadar, in fact, insisted on 
pressing SAVAK to pursue the Shah’s instruction only “after Sadr proves his loyalty to 
Iran and improves his relations with Iran’s embassy.”1044 Qadar cunningly intertwined 
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issues of Sadr’s expressing loyalty to the Shah and serving as his own agent as the only 
pre-condition for the transformation of Iran’s policy towards the Lebanese Shia.  
Qadar claimed that Sadr had called the Shah an “Imperialist Stooge” and criticized 
him for the Shah’s refusal of joining the Arab oil embargo to gain an economic and political 
victory even at the expense of the Arabs.1045 He also rallied popular Lebanese newspapers 
against Sadr.1046 In early February 1974, al-Hayat, a famous Shia-oriented newspaper, 
criticized Sadr for his verbal attack on Tehran.1047 It highlighted the alleged Shia anxiety 
over possibly devastating consequences of Sadr’s radical move that might push Iranians to 
reconsider their decision to build a hospital in the South. Besides, he introduced Sadr as a 
major obstacle to deporting Iranian opposition from Lebanon territory. “Sadr threatened 
Nasser al-Khalil, Khalil al-Khalil’s brother (Lebanon ambassador to Tehran), that he would 
react to Beirut regime if the government extradited Iranian revolutionaries to Iran,” Qadar 
reported to Tehran.1048 In another report, Qadar informed Tehran that “while the Lebanon 
regime intended to oust all the Iranian opposition, Sheikh Bahiyaj Taqiaddin, the Minister 
of Interior Affairs, finally refused to do so after his meeting with Sadr.”1049 Within this 
context, Qadar suspended Iran’s dedicated money to build a hospital in Southern Lebanon 
on 4 February 1974. Qadar declared that Iran would not provide its financial support--
around 30 million dollars--to the Shia as long as Sadr remained the head of the Shia.1050 
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Tensions escalated as Prime Minister Hoveyda dispatched a telegram to Qadar on 11 
February and declared the Shah’s order that Iran would not support the Lebanese Shia as 
long as Sadr was their leader.1051 It was a turning point in Iran’s non-state foreign policy in 
Lebanon. 
Qadar had also highlighted Sadr’s connections with radical Arab regimes of the 
region. He reported that Gaddafi financially backed Sadr after the deterioration of Sadr’s 
relations with Tehran.1052 To urge Tehran against Sadr, Qadar claimed that Sadr had also 
received financial assistance from the Baath regime of Baghdad.1053 When Sadr traveled to 
Damascus in spring 1974, SAVAK thought that he might visit Baghdad to talk to Iraqi 
leaders to convince them not to close the Najaf Hawza.1054 On top of that, Qadar framed 
Sadr’s trip as a dangerous move against Iran’s national security, arguing that “this 
opportunistic Mullah” would travel to Iraq to reconcile Baghdad-Damascus relations 
[against Iran].1055 At the same time, Ambassador al-Khalil who had a close connection with 
Asadollah Alam complained of Sadr several times.1056 In a talk with al-Khalil, Alam 
disappointedly stated that “our common friend [Seyyed Musa Sadr] was, unfortunately, 
untrustworthy. He receives money from any country. Al-Khalil said that you Iranians 
should support the Shia. Why do you care about Sadr? He [al-Khalil] talked sense but I am 
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sure the Shah will not accept it.”1057 In another meeting with Alam, al-Khalil repeated “why 
the Lebanese Shia should pay off for Sadr who had been the head of the Shia community 
but made the Shah unhappy. He is going to gather all the Shia notables to prevent the 
destruction of the Shia [community] and their hope to His Imperial Majesty. The Shah told 
me he had talked sense and told me to negotiate with al-Khalil.”1058 
The Sadr-Qadar enmity grew when an aborted plan for the assassination of Qadar 
was announced. Iran’s embassy in Beirut quickly accused Sadr of leading the 
assassination.1059 “Pro-Bakhtiar elements planned to assassinate two Iranian security 
officers: general Pakravan and me. In the aftermath of Bakhtiar’s death, it was Sadr who 
managed the plot. I was informed by both Khansari, administrative deputy of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, and by SAVAK. The assassin had been recruited by Iraq’s ambassador 
to Kuwait and was then connected to Bakhtiar and finally Sadr,” Qadar claimed.1060 Sadr 
strongly rejected Qadar’s claim but the Iranian Ambassador intended to isolate his foe. In 
early April 1974, Sadr was invited by the U.S. government to take a trip to New York.1061 
Qadar attempted to convince George McMurtrie Godley, the U.S. new ambassador to 
Beirut, to withdraw his invitation to Sadr. He framed Seyyed Musa as a “dangerous, 
opportunist Mullah who has had built connections with different anti-Shah regimes and 
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actors, like the Baath regime of Baghdad, Teymour Bakhtiar, Khomeini, Seyyed Mousa 
Ayatollah-Zadeh Esfahani,1062 Gamal Abdel Nasser, and even the Kremlin.” Godley 
politely replied that the decision [of inviting Seyyed Musa Sadr] had been already made 
before his arrival to Beirut.1063 Although Sadr did not travel to the U.S., Qadar did not stop 
heading his anti-Sadr campaign.  
In addition to rallying its “trustworthy, pro-Shah clerics” in Tehran and framing 
Sadr as an “agent of foreign regimes,”1064 Qadar intended to weaken Sadr’s religious 
authority in Iran. He said that “Sadr went to Vatican to talk about the unity of the religion. 
He mentioned there that there was no dichotomy between Shia, Sunni, Christian, Judaism 
or any other religion; therefore, we should unite against blasphemy, including Zionism. At 
the end of the meeting, he stood in front of the Sacred Cross and took a photo. The photo 
was extensively distributed among the Shia clergies and used against him.”1065 SAVAK 
also prepared a plan to weaken Sadr’s position in Lebanon. The plan was supposed to 
bypass Sadr and provide financial assistance to the poor Shia in the South through anti-
Sadr clergies. With the support of anti-Sadr clergies, according to the plan, Iran could have 
built and managed a hospital without Sadr’s permission. As the next step, a chain of anti-
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Sadr articles was supposed to be published in different Lebanese newspapers and 
magazines, stressing Sadr’s ties with anti-Shah regimes of the region. The last step was 
supposed to invite anti-Sadr clerics to Iran.1066 Although the plan was not initiated, Sadr’s 
supporters blamed Qadar for rallying anti-Sadr propaganda in Lebanon and Iran.1067  
Sadr himself tried to convince Tehran to de-escalate the escalated tension. In a 
meeting with former president Kamil Chamoun, the Shah’s old ally in Lebanon, Sadr 
contended that Iran’s embassy in Beirut was his major enemy and blamed Qadar for 
inciting Kamel Asaad, Ja’far Sharf al-Din, and Seyyed Hasan Shirazi against him.1068 In 
early May 1974, Sadr met with several SAVAK officers in Beirut and strongly denied his 
disloyalty to the Shah. He told them that he was here [in Lebanon] as “a representative of 
the Shia in the World,” and he would be “insane to ignore a great power in the region like 
Iran.” He added that he could not reject invitations from anti-Shah regimes of the region 
since he, as a religious leader, must pursue such activities. “If Gaddafi invites me, I will go 
to Libya but if he wants me to insult the Shah and Iran, I will punch his face.”1069 For the 
next time, he blamed Qadar for causing trouble for the Shia in Lebanon and repeated 
pleading with Iran for financial support to build a hospital in the South. Sadr argued that 
“in the post-Nasser era, the Shah can lead the Middle East by deepening its leverage in 
Lebanon that will surrender Iran’s regional enemies, especially Iraq.” He finally promised, 
“I will do anything for Iran’s policy.”1070 Nobody considered his argument, though. 
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The Movement of the Deprived and Amal  
By the early 70s, Sadr had transformed the once-marginal Shia community to one 
of the critical players in the Lebanese politics. According to one of SAVAK’s reports, Sadr 
was “the only Lebanese leader who was attempting to improve Lebanon’s situation. In 
contrast to most of the Lebanese leaders, he lacked any weakness.”1071 He had successfully 
showed himself as a national, rather than sectarian, player in Lebanon. He had also pressed 
President Suleiman Frangieh for socio-economic reform in the South, including building a 
dam on the Litani River. As Sadr’s relation with Frangieh soured,1072 he was denounced 
for having secret relations with Tehran. Antonie Frangieh, the President’s elder son, 
claimed that Sadr had gathered opportunistic forces against Iran while simultaneously 
seeking Iran’s support.1073  
Amidst these pressures, Sadr and Hussein el-Husseini founded Harakat al-
Mahroumin [the Movement of the Deprived] in March 1974 in order to push for political 
reform of the Lebanese system and to urge Beirut to fight deprivation in Lebanon.1074 
Putting emphasis on peace and equality, as well as social justice, for all sectarian 
communities in Lebanon, the Movement had a non-sectarian message, crossing communal 
borders and uniting all Lebanese people. The Movement initially attracted supports from 
other sectarian leaders, like the Greek Catholic Archbishop, Mgr. Grégoire Haddad, and 
Father Yuakeem Mubarak. On 5 May 1974, more than 80 thousand of Sadr’s followers 
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rallied in Tyre to express their support for the Movement. On 14 December 1974, Yoakim 
Moubarak stated that Sadr had preserved the Arabic character of Lebanon with “an 
influential Islamic movement.”1075 In May 1974, Lebanon’s Sunni-dominated Supreme 
Official Islamic Council expressed its support for the Shia. In September 1974, the 
Executive Committee of the Islamic Associations asked the Maronites government to 
respect the demands of the Muslim community, including the Shia.1076 The formation of 
Harakat al-Mahroumin also crushed the hegemony of the Shia zuama. It was “the Shia’s 
first attempt to organize themselves independently of the traditional zuama.”1077  
As a next step, Sadr established a military wing of the Movement of the Deprived, 
the Afwaj al-Mouqawma al-Lubnaniyya [Lebanese Resistance Detachments, known later 
as its acronym, Amal, (‘Hope’ in Arabic)]. On 20 January 1975, in an inflammatory 
preaching Sadr promised his followers to establish a militia against Israelis and anti-Shia 
groups in Lebanon. “Everybody, and not only the government, should defend his country, 
nation, and home … and if the government ignores it, the nation should do it itself.” Earlier, 
a nascent Shia militia was trained and supplied with weapons by the PLO’s Fatah at their 
Beqaa military camps.1078 The formation of Amal was accidentally revealed on 6 July 1975 
five days after an explosion of an anti-tank landmine at one of the Fatah camps in Ain al-
Baniyya, a small town near Baalbek, that killed 24 and wounded 42 Shia trainees. The 
accident pushed Sadr to publicly announce the formation of Amal.1079 Amal soon became 
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so popular that it subsumed the Movement of the Deprived as both a military and political 
organization. Along with the Technical Institute of Burj al-Shimali and the Movement of 
the Deprived, Amal became the most significant symbol of Sadr’s leadership, helping him 
to gain greater respect and the allocation of a larger share of governmental resources for 
the Shia population.  
The formation of Amal shocked SAVAK. “We had no clue of this militia [Amal] 
before the accidental explosion,” Qadar claimed.1080 SAVAK officials had already 
predicted the formation of a militia to support the Shia against their foes in Lebanon.1081 
According to SAVAK, Sadr and Chamran had established a militia, called Janbaz, led by 
Qasim Mahdavi in Southern Lebanon.1082 However, SAVAK could not track down the 
formation of Amal. Worried about its connection with the Iranian revolutionaries, SAVAK 
began monitoring Amal’s activities in Lebanon. SAVAK claimed that “more than 6,000 
young men” were trained on Amal bases.1083 It also highlighted Chamran’s leading role in 
the formation of the Amal.1084 “The real head of the Movement of the Deprived with full 
authority is, in fact, Chamran who controls all military and financial issues. However, since 
he is an Iranian, he has been following his activities secretly.”1085 According to SAVAK, 
he was the main figure of Amal who trained both Sadr’s Shia followers and the Iranian 
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opposition.1086 “It was Chamran who established Amal. Chamran focused just on Lebanese 
domestic politics and Amal. Abu Sharif was also with Chamran.”1087 The formation of 
Amal and Chamran’s military leadership caused SAVAK to frame Amal as central 
headquarters for the Iranian revolutionaries.1088  
Despite Sadr’s prestige, the formation of Amal provoked both the Christians and 
the Leftists.1089 Earlier, a Shia armed group, the Fityan al-Ali [the Knights of [Imam] Ali], 
claimed an association with Sadr’s Movement of the Deprived. It had destroyed a Christian 
town in the north of Beirut. “While Sadr strongly rejected his connection with Fityan al-
Ali, Amal damaged Sadr’s prestige among the Christians.”1090 Besides, the Christians 
criticized Sadr’s key role in the reconciliation of Damascus and the PLO. Aware of their 
long-running competition in Lebanon, Sadr had attempted to de-escalate tensions between 
Assad and Arafat. On 14 May 1973, Sadr went to Syria in order to convince Assad to lessen 
tension with the PLO. According to Assad, Sadr’s trip was “better than any mediators from 
other countries.”1091 Sadr’s activities had escalated domestic tensions. 
 
                                                
1086 SAVAK Documents, No. 5152, 4 September 1974; SAVAK Documents, No. 213602, 17 July 1975; 
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The Lebanese Civil War of 1975 
In early 1975, the Phalanges (Kataeb), headed by Pierre Gemayel, and the Patriotic 
National Liberal (PNL), headed by Camille Chamoun, blamed the PLO and its Lebanese 
ally, the Lebanese National Movement (LNM),1092 for endangering Lebanon’s national 
security. They also called for a referendum on the presence of the PLO in the South. The 
situation escalated as Maarouf Saad, Secretary-General of Popular Nasserite Organization 
who was also Sadr’ ally, was assassinated by the Lebanese army on 6 March 1975. In 
retaliation, Sadr rallied its supporters a day later. Less than a week later, Sunni and Shia 
leaders called for the removal of the sectarian democracy; however, it was immediately 
rejected by the Maronites. On 13 April, tensions between the Maronites and the PLO 
escalated when unidentified gunmen killed two Phalangists. Hours later, the Phalanges 
massacred 30 Palestinian bus passengers. The ‘Bus Massacre’ soon transformed into a 
bloody, all-out war between the LNM and the PLO, on the one side, and the Kataeb militias, 
on the other side. Although the Shia become the cannon fodder for the PLO, Sadr had 
initially distanced the Shia from the war. With the resignation of the Lebanese military 
cabinet, Sadr began his political fast in a mosque in Beirut in order to prevent the extension 
of the civil war on 27 June 1975. After five days of fasting and meeting with Yasser Arafat 
and Syrian Foreign Minister Abd al-Halim Khaddam, Sadr finally broke the fast when 
Lebanese groups agreed to form a national unity cabinet and the new Prime Minister, 
Rashid Karami, met him. Sadr’s political fast and then his participation in the security 
meeting of Aramoun of 24 September 1975, SAVAK illustrated his “key” role in the 
termination of the first round of the Civil War.1093  
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The Shah had already warned the Maronites of the widening tension in Lebanon. 
“Make the Christian leaders understand that the era of your domination over other 
Lebanese minorities has finished. Tell them that the durability of your leadership would 
not be feasible anymore. Thus, you need to deal with the Muslims. Otherwise, a domestic 
political explosion would erupt,” the Shah instructed Qadar to convey his message to 
President Suleiman Frangieh in the early 70s.1094 In the heat of the War, the Shah advised 
President Elias Sarkis via Qadar that “the Muslims in Lebanon joined the Palestinians in 
fighting with you, the Christians, because you have not considered them in the politics.” 
Qadar conveyed the message to the President, as well as other leaders, like Prime Minister 
Rashid Karami and former prime ministers, Saeb Salam and Abdallah el-Yafi. 
Nonetheless, the Shah’s advice fell on deaf ears.1095  
By September 1975, Lebanon was entangled in a full civil war. Despite its initial 
decision to stay out of the war, Amal was gradually dragged into it as the Shia intensified 
their moderate cooperation with the LNM and Fatah. In spite of recognizing the Maronites 
insecurity and their need for holding the power monopoly, Sadr had been blaming them for 
ignoring the underdeveloped Shia regions in the South. Amal counted about 1,500 to 3,000 
armed militants backed by Arafat and Jumbalat. By early 1976, the LNM and PLO, along 
with their allies, controlled about 80% of Lebanon’s territory. It was a major blow to the 
Maronites. 
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As time wore on, however, Sadr’s relations with his allies turned sour. While the 
Shia were not heavily involved in the Civil War, they were among the major victims of the 
war. Amid the war, the South became the center of the PLO and therefore more Shia died 
in the fighting than members of any other communities in Lebanon. With the end of the 
first phase of the war, the South was under the full control of the PLO. To add insult to 
injury, several PLO guerrillas disrespected the Shia people, treating them in an uncivilized 
way, harassing the Shia inhabitants in ‘Fatah-land’ and raping Shia girls.1096 Though 
regularly expressing the sympathy of the Shia for the PLO, Sadr grew increasingly 
impatient with Fatah’s loose organization and Israeli on-and-off invasions of the South. 
The Palestinians were finally blamed by Sadr for the Shia plight by drawing Israeli 
retaliatory attacks in to the region. On top of that, Sadr gradually saw Arafat’s cooperation 
with Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt as a danger to the Shia community since the LNM 
competed with Amal to win Shia members. He also criticized the PLO for establishing a-
state-within-a-state in Lebanon.1097 It was within this context that Sadr changed Amal’s 
position in the war and sided with the Maronites.1098 Amal officially abandoned the LNM 
in May 1976 when Syria intervened in Lebanon on the side of the Maronites militias and 
against the LNM and the PLO. By 1976, minor clashes between the PLO militias and Amal 
had increased to the extent that Sadr pressed Hafez Assad to deploy the Syrian Army in 
Lebanon. In the meantime, the Maronites were on the verge of defeat, particularly after the 
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the aftermath of the Black September of 1970.  
 
1097 The Cairo agreement of 3 November 1969 gave the Palestinian guerrillas permission to launch anti-Israeli 
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1098 See also Interview with Major General Mansour Qadar, Oral History, Foundations for Iranian History. 
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Damour Massacre, convincing President Frangieh to call for Syria intervention. Assad 
ultimately unleashed the Army on 1 June 1976 in order to bring the PLO back under Syrian 
influence. The Syrian troops soon occupied Beirut and other major cities and easily brushed 
aside the LNM and the PLO. The imposed cease-fire did not last long as Syrian-backed 
Phalanges managed to break through the defenses of the Tel al-Zaatar refugee camp in East 
Beirut in August 1976 and killed about 2,000 Palestinians. The Tel al-Zaatar catastrophe 
prompted the Arabs against the Maronites, Syrians, and Sadr. Siding with the Christians 
and the Baath Syrian had shattered Sadr’s symbolic power in Lebanon.     
Seyyed’s Loneliness 
The outbreak of the civil war obliterated most, if not all, of Sadr’s achievements 
during the preceding years. For the Shia community, the war intensified tensions with the 
Maronites, the Druze, the Sunni Lebanese, and the Palestinians. Sadr’s only achievement 
was siding with Assad. Indeed, Sadr’s influence in Syria increased after his successful 
intervention in the termination of the civil war in Lebanon.1099 Nonetheless, he had been 
denounced as a Syrian mercenary and therefore, soon became the main target for several 
assassinations during summer 1976.1100 At the same time, the radical Maronite criticized 
Sadr and Amal for siding with the PLO in the initial round of the war.1101 His major Shia 
foes, like Kamel Asaad, accused Sadr of spreading leftism and Marxism among the Shia 
through his militias.1102 Interestingly, a majority of the Iranian revolutionaries criticized 
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his anti-PLO position. Amid the war, the Marxist Fadaiyan harshly denounced Sadr since 
they had supported anti-Syrian Abu Abbas,1103 the Sultat al-Majalis, and the Organization 
of Communist Action. The Fadaiyan were also against the Lebanese Communist Party 
because of its ties with the Iranian Tudeh party,1104 the Soviet, Libya, and Syria.  
Feeling deprived of a powerful ally, Sadr stretched his hands towards Iran. In the 
middle of the war, he asked Iran’s embassy to support the Shia, though he was well aware 
of Qadar’s personal enmity. In a meeting with an officer of Iran’s embassy in Beirut,1105 
Sadr repeated his loyalty to Iran and argued that he was “forceful to show himself neutral 
towards Iran’s policy because the Nasserist and the leftist had framed Iran as the Arab’s 
enemy;” therefore, he had not been able to support Iran directly. Sadr contended that he 
was never against the Shah and his talks with Bakhtiar had nothing to do with plotting 
against Tehran’s regime. In the same line, he claimed that his relations with the young 
Iranian opposition in the Europe were justified by the fact that he did not want “to see them 
fallen into the trap of the communism and he had, in return, called them for the priority of 
Islam.” He also explained that he had signed the anti-Shah statement during the Iranian riot 
of 1963 just “to keep his position among the religious figures in Iran.” Sadr also pointed 
out that his few radical speeches against Iran’s policy were becuase the Palestinian, 
Baathist, and communist all had accused him of being an Iran’s agent. He also mentioned 
that his interference in the recent bloody civil war had saved Lebanon from falling to a 
catastrophic situation. For the next time, Sadr raised the Shah’s promise of the financial 
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1104 The Fadaiyan had a tense relation with the Tudeh Party, Iran’s major Marxist party, denouncing the Party 
for its officer-agent relations with Moscow. 
 
1105 SAVAK Documents, No. 213/94, 28 April 1975. 
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support for the Shia in his last trip to Iran. He said that after his reelection as the head of 
the SICS, he pleaded Iran tof support of the Shia in Lebanon. More significantly, he noted 
that “Do not expect me to act as Iran’s agent,” asking Iranian officials to understand his 
delicate balancing policy in Lebanon. At the end, he said that he would “lead the Shia in 
the direction of Iran’s interests and facilitate its regional policy” as far as he could and 
repeated his request for Iran’s support of the Shia. “In contrast to the others, I want nothing 
for myself. The only thing I want is the progress of the Shia.”1106 Despite his limited power, 
Sadr was inclined to revive relations with Iran. Nonetheless, his request was disregarded. 
SAVAK had considered his headquarters in Tyre as a major hub for the distribution of 
revolutionary statements and declarations against the Shah.1107 But Sadr was still adamant 
in reviving relations with Tehran.  
The second round of the civil war broke out in April 1976 with Sadat’s support of 
the Palestinian groups and leftists against the Syrian army. The war finally halted in 
October 1976 when Damascus accepted the proposal of the Arab League summit in 
Riyadh. After his trip to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, Sadr met Qadar and reported result of 
his successful talks on the termination of the war in Lebanon. Sadr also asked Qadar to 
prepare a meeting with the Shah to convince the Pahlavi monarch to mediate between 
Assad and Sadat in Saudi Arabia.1108 Qadar reaffirmed Sadr’s “exceptional position within 
both Lebanon and Syria;” however, he argued that Sadr’s recent contacts with Iran’s 
embassy had to do with the Syrian leaders who saw “Your Majesty’s influence in the 
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Middle East.”1109 Rejecting Sadr’s requests, Qadar initiated his secret plan: Sadr’s 
replacement with a yes-man.  
Shirazi vs Sadr  
Qadar had been looking to demote Sadr from his leadership position since the early 
1970s. “Sadr was a very ambitious man who intended to be elected as a Lebanese president! 
Sadr once sent me a message to tell the Shah that the Shia were in the demographic majority 
in Lebanon and they would become more influential in case of free elections. When I 
reported his message, the Shah responded, "It seems Seyyed [Musa Sadr] is planning to be 
the President of Lebanon.’ The Shah then added, “there would be no problem if an Iranian 
is a president.” Sadr was pleased as I informed him of the Shah’s message,” Qadar 
claimed.1110 Qadar could not tolerate a strong leader.  
On 10 November 1976, David Kimche, Mossad’s Deputy Chief, met with SAVAK 
Director general Nasiri and told him “I have an offer for you: Musa Sadr is done … it is a 
good opportunity for you.”1111 Ten days later, Nasiri gave orders to find an alternative to 
Sadr. Qadar initially nominated Ja’far Sharaf al-Din to be Sadr’s substitute.1112 The next 
possible nominee was Ayatollah Mohammad-Taghi Qomi whose background would, 
according to Qadar, converge the Shia-Sunni interests in Lebanon.1113 SAVAK even 
recommended replacing Sadr with his deputy, Sheikh Mohammad-Mehdi Shamseddin, and 
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support his appointment as the leader of the Shia.1114 However, none of them was as 
charismatic as Sadr to lead the Shia community. Within this context, a militant Shia cleric 
came to the scene and soon became SAVAK’s candidate for Sadr’s substitute: Sayed 
Hassan Shirazi. 
Born and raised in a leading Iranian-Iraqi family of religious figures, Sayed Hassan 
al-Shirazi was one of the key figures of the Shirazis.1115 In the wake of rising Qasim and 
the Iraqi Communist Party in the late-50s, he launched an anti-communist campaign by 
founding a Shia organization, al-Shabab al-Hosseini, in Iraq. With the establishment of the 
first Baath regime, he left Iraq for Lebanon but soon returned to Karbala when Abdul Salam 
Arif purged the Baath Party. In the meantime, Ayatollah Khomeini left Bursa, Turkey, to 
Najaf in October 1965. Shirazi soon built up friendly relation with Ayatollah Khomeini 
and his older son, Mostafa. In contrast to Arif’s partial tolerance, the second Baath regime 
did not tolerate the Shirazis. In may 1969, Sayed Hassan’s inflammatory preaching in 
Karbala caused the Iraqi security service to arrest and to torture him. After his release from 
the Baath prison, Mostafa Khomeini suggested that he leave Iraq for Syria and Lebanon.1116 
In 1970, Shirazi left Karbala for Lebanon, where he began to gather followers and found 
different institutions.1117 In summer 1974, Shirazi left Lebanon and settled in 
                                                
1114 SAVAK Documents, No. 222/1182, 19 October 1977.  
 
1115 Sayed Hassan Shirazi’s father was Ayatollah Seyed Mahdi Hussaini Shirazi, and his brothers were 
Ayatollah Seyed Muhamad Shirazi, Ayatollah Seyed Mojtaba Shirazi and Ayatollah Seyed Sadegh Shirazi. 
Other members of the Shirazis were Grand Ayatollah Mirza Hassan Shirazi, leader of Iran’s Tobacco 
Movement, and Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi Shirazi, leader of the Iraqi revolution of 1920, Ayatollah 
Mohammad-Taqi Modarresi and Ayatollah Hadi Modarresi.  
 
1116 Tabatabaie, Fatemeh, Eqlim-e Khaterat [Region of Memories] (Emam Khomeini va Enghelab-e Eslami 
research Institute, Tanzim va Nashr-e Aasar-e Emam Khomeini Organization, 2001) Vol I. p. 298. 
 
1117 Shirazi founded a Hawza Ilmiyya--Hawza Ilmiyya is a seminary where Shia clerics are trained—and 
Madrasat [School] al-Imam al-Mahdi, in 1971. It was the first hawza in Lebanon founded by a non-Lebanese 
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Damascus,1118 where he established the Zaynabeyyah Hawza in 1974 close to 
Damascus.1119 Shirazi’s growing power in Syria convinced President Assad to consider 
him as a possible card to play against both Iraq and even Sadr in a case of his betrayal. 
Affiliation to Damascus could provide Shirazi a strong patron in the region. Within this 
context, Shirazi developed a close relationship with the Alawite community and followed 
the path already paved by Sadr in the approval of the Alawite as Twelver Shia Muslims. 
He soon became a champion of the Alawite community in Syria and Lebanon. Earlier 
before, on 17 December 1972, Shirazi had stressed conformity of the Alawite beliefs in 
every respect to those of their Twelver Shia brethren, stating, “two words, Alawite and 
Shia, have the same meaning. This means that a Shia is an Alawi and an Alawi is a 
Shia.”1120 Sadr’s and Shirazi’s decisive endorsement of the Alawite-Shia brethren provided 
religious legitimacy for Assad’s regime of Syria.  
Sadr-Shirazi relations seemed to be initially good.1121 As time wore on, however, 
their relations went downhill. Shirazi’s ambition to play a more decisive role in the Levant, 
as well as growing anti-Sadr sentiments among Lebanese leaders, brought up a widening 
tension between Seyyed Musa and Sayed Hassan. Shirazi was soon supported by the 
Maronites, Sunni, and Shia zuama.1122 He was “secretly supported by President Serkis 
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1119 The Zaynabeyyah Hawza was established in the vicinity of the shrine of Sayyidah Zaynab. It was the 
first Shia seminary in Sunni-majority Syria. 
 
1120 The pamphlet Al-Alawiyyun, Shi’at ahl al-Bayt (Beirut: 17 December 1972), preface. 
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Naoum” against Sadr.1123 The Maronites sided with Shirazi to remove Sadr from the SICS 
since “they have been angered by Sadr in the Civil War.”1124 It was the convenient context 
for the ambitious Shirazi to gain leverage in Lebanon. “Shirazi met with Bashir Gemayel 
and promised him to keep the unity and national integrity of Lebanon … The goal of these 
meetings is to empower Shirazi against Sadr who has been recently disgraced by the right-
hand Christian Maronite groups.”1125 Shirazi’s siding with the Maronites, Sunni, and anti-
Sadr Shia elites posed a threat to Sadr. After the title of ‘Imam’ was conferred on Shirazi 
by the Lebanon government,1126 the gap between Sadr and Shirazi became 
unbridgeable.1127 Chamran fervently criticized Shirazi for “gathering a bunch of orthodox 
Muslims, making us angry and ridiculing our martyrs. They do not believe in our martyrs 
since their alleged Marja [Shirazi] has not permitted fighting.”1128 Amidst a polemical 
                                                
1122 Shirazi was heavily supported by Maronite ‘Patriarch Khoraish (Anthony Peter Khoraish was the 75th 
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atmosphere in Lebanon, there was consensus among the Lebanese elites on the need to 
challenge Sadr.     
On 16 April 1977, relations between Sadr and Shirazi deteriorated as a bloody fight 
between Sadr’s supporters and Shirazi’s followers erupted in Sayyidah Zaynab 
Mosque.1129 The Syrian regime soon limited Shirazi’s activities and finally forced him to 
leave Syria for Beirut. Even Ayatollah Khomeini who had often avoided taking a clear 
position on internal cleavages among the Iranian opposition and the Shia condemned the 
Sayyidah Zaynab Mosque tragedy. In contrast to the majority of his followers,1130 
Ayatollah Khomeini, who “was already convinced by Sheikh Nasrollah Khalkhali, Sadr’s 
close friend,”1131 sided with Sadr and “declared a fatwa banning paying Sahm al-Imam 
(Share of Imam)1132 to Shirazi and Zeynabiyya in Summer 77.”1133 
Given the circumstances, SAVAK capitalized the rift between the two Shia leaders 
to weaken Sadr’s status in Lebanon and Syria.1134 SAVAK initially had no positive view 
towards Shirazi. For SAVAK, Shirazi was “an adventurous, non-trustworthy man who has 
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supported Khomeini’s treacheries. He has gathered adventurous gangs in Sayyidah 
Zaynab Mosque, Syria. Shirazi has a bad record and backing him would not be in Iran’s 
interest.”1135 Nevertheless, a drastic shift in Iran’s non-state foreign policy in Lebanon 
accelerated the question of Sadr’s replacement. “Two years ago, a SAVAK representative 
in Beirut held a negotiation with Shirazi. At that time, however, Sadr’s position was strong 
and the Christian supported him. However, now all forces and fronts saw him as a traitor 
and a foreigners’ stooge,” Qadar described Sadr’s position in the post-War era.1136 Despite 
the lack of trust, Iran’s embassy in Beirut began building a friendly connection with Shirazi 
to remove Sadr from Lebanon. In doing so, Qadar provided a well-prepared plan that was 
supposed to establish “an organization constituted of young, educated Shia to prevent the 
fall of the Shia community into the orbit of the Communism.”1137 To convince Tehran 
officials, the plan was framed as a part of the demands requested by the “right-hand 
Christian forces” of Lebanon. According to Qadar, “they begged Iran for backing the 
organization since the [current] Shia leaders [Sadr] have lost their position due to their 
demagoguery, corruption, and leftism.”1138 After negotiating with young Shia leaders, like 
Ezzeddin and Mohsen Salim, Qadar pressed for Sadr’s removal from the SICS and his 
replacement with Shirazi. As a next step, Qadar suggested that Bachir Gemayel and 
Mohsen Salim convince the Vatican and Patriarch Khoraish, Vatican representative to 
Beirut, to approve Sadr’s replacement. The Machiavellian ambassador also offered them 
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to grant Shirazi Lebanese citizenship by introducing him as “an inhabitant of a Shia town 
in the Christian-based Kasrawan region.”1139 Shirazi was then granted the Lebanese 
citizenship. The operation was soon approved by Patriarch Khoraish and then-president 
Sarkis Naoum. In the next step, Qadar met Sayed Hassan Shirazi to negotiate on his “future 
duties.” Shirazi, in return, expressed his loyalty to Iran and stated “he had been the Shah’s 
servant in the past and would be honored of this until his death.” He added that he would 
not be “unfaithful and ungrateful like Sadr.”1140 Constituted of “young, educated Shia 
without any connections to corrupt, socialist-demagogic Shia leaders [i.e., Sadr]” and led 
by Mohsen Salim, the Qadar-backed list was “broadly advertised by Lebanese 
newspapers.”1141 The operation was supposed to “launch a heavy propaganda in favor of 
Sayed Hassan Shirazi in Beqaa [Valley] and Baalbek” to change the power arrangement 
within the SICS and have Sadr lose its presidency. In a report, Qadar assured that “anti-
Sadr political-religious leaders will likely support the plan. After Shirazi’s appointment as 
the new head of the SICS, there would be an invisible Shia-Christian alliance… to prevent 
leftism among the Shia.”1142 For the next time, Iranian officials highlighted the communist 
threat to justify their activities. The report was ultimately submitted to the Shah. However, 
the Pahlavi monarch did not welcome the plan, stating that “Actually, nobody can trust 
these people [Shia Clerics].”1143 Nasiri agreed with the operation, yet moderatetly, stating 
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“in my view, none of these persons [Shirazi and Sadr] are trustworthy and we cannot trust 
them now and future. Shirazi’s [political] record is not better than Sadr’s; however, it 
would be great if they compete and then weaken each other.”1144 The Qadar-backed 
organization, the Shia Muslim Organization, was established; however, Sadr’s charisma 
was untouchable enough to avoid challenge. By May 1977, the operation had failed and 
Shirazi and Qadar did not manage to establish an effective anti-Sadr front.1145 
Nevertheless, Shirazi kept his ties with anti-Sadr forces in Lebanon, particularly the 
Maronites.1146 Iran’s embassy in Beirut was still playing with him against Sadr. In a 
meeting with Qadar, Shirazi stated that “both Christian and Shia religious-political elites 
in Lebanon had been very displeased with Sadr’s support for the Leftist and the Palestinian 
groups in the Civil War, of Sadr’s blood smeared hands of the innocent Shia, and of the 
formation of the Amal.” He informed Qadar of his candidacy, backed by these elites, for 
“the religious leadership of the Shia in Lebanon” as well as “the presidency of the SICS.” 
At the end of the meeting, “Shirazi expressed his deep respect for the Shah” and stated 
“serving the leader of the Shia World, the Shah, is necessary and an honor for every 
Shia.”1147 In another meeting with Qadar, Shirazi confirmed that “he had dedicated one 
hundred Lebanon Lira for his anti-Sadr campaign.” Soon, he expressed his loyalty to the 
Shah, accentuating that “he had been the Shah’s servant in the past and present and his 
view [towards the Shah] was different from his father’s and brothers’.” He contended that 
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“when he had been insulted and tortured at the Baath prison, when they had shaved his 
beard, he rejected talking against Iran and the Shah in Radio Baghdad.” Shirazi strongly 
rejected his past tensions with Tehran and contended that “he left his father’s house when 
Khomeini had been invited there and he had not returned there yet [to express his 
objection]. He hoped not to be seen responsible for their brothers and father’s activities—
Shirazi’s father and brother have no relations with Khomeini anymore.” He lastly put 
emphasis on his specific way [that] saw the Shah as the leader of the Shia World and he 
had never deviated from this path.”1148 Pleased with Shirazi’s obedience, Qadar attempted 
to convince SAVAK and Tehran to back Shirazi. “While he is not as smart and talkative 
as Sadr,”1149 “Sayed Hassan Shirazi is a talented, active young man who can be attracted 
to Iran [policy and interests] if he is well-supported by Iran”1150 and “the Christians and 
anti-Sadr Shia figures.”1151 Qadar insisted that “It is imaginable that Shirazi enjoys such 
power to be Sadr’s substitute… He has come to the Iranian embassy in Beirut for the 
support.”1152 Calling Shirazi a “friend of Iran’s embassy,”1153 Qadar used the Cold-War 
language to convince Tehran by highlighting his anti-communist background, claiming 
that “Shirazi plans to establish an organization to challenge Sadr. He has met with several 
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Lebanese leaders. Shirazi also stated that he had fought with Communism and now is 
interested in Iran and the Shah.”1154 
Shirazi, in return, provided information for Qadar on Sadr’s connection with the 
Iranian revolutionaries, informing him of “joining several young Iranians, already 
dispatched by some dissident clerics under the label of Mojtahed to Damascus where 
Iranian Seyed Ahmad Vahedi has sent them to Chamran for military training in Amal 
military bases under the supervision of the Palestinian Fatah officers.”1155 In another report, 
Shirazi informed Qadar of a group of young Iranians, tied with Fadayian, trained by the 
George Habash’s group in Amal military bases.1156 Despite this cooperation, Qadar did not 
manage to replace Sadr with Shirazi. Indeed, Sadr’s prestige within the Shia community, 
Lebanon, and the region was a major obstacle to the accomplishment of Qadar’s plan. On 
top of that, Iran’s change of heart in its policy towards Lebanon was a decelerator in taking 
an active role in Lebanon. Within this context, neither Qadar nor Shirazi was able to 
remove Sadr. Even after Sadr’s disappearance, Shirazi could not fill his void. “After Sadr’s 
disappearance, and despite his tension with Sadr, Shirazi intensified his activities. He has 
provided a proper opportunity to be Sadr’s substitute by participating in different 
interviews. He once stated that the Shia World had lost one of the greatest and most unique 
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leaders.”1157 Only a year later, on 1 May 1980, Shirazi was shot to death in Beirut by agents 
of the Iraqi regime.1158 Lebanon seemed to be doomed for the Iranian Shia clerics.  
Final Decision 
By early 1977, Qadar had successfully framed Sadr as a threat to Iran’s national 
security and therefore, accelerated a shift within Iran’s non-state foreign policy in Lebanon. 
Although the Civil War and siding with Syria had weakened Sadr’s image among the 
Palestinian, SAVAK still denounced him for having connections with the PLO.1159 With 
the collapse of Qadar’s plan aimed at replacing Sadr with Shirazi, SAVAK and Qadar came 
to a conclusion to paint Sadr with an anti-Shia brush. The main target was the religious 
part of the Iranian society, especially senior clerics and Shia Marja. With the outbreak of 
the Civil War, several Iranian clerics had been dispatched by Ayatollah Shariatmadari to 
support the Lebanese Shia financially. On 5 March 1976, these clerics entered Lebanon to 
assess the Shia casualties and demands.1160 At Qadar’s insistence, however, SAVAK and 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs pressed Ayatollah Shariatmadari to force them to return.1161 
Shortly after that, when a group of Lebanese Shia clerics entered Iran to gather money for 
the Shia in Lebanon, Qadar warned Foreign Minister Khalatbari of Sadr’s “hypocrisy” and 
pushed him to prevent their activities.1162  
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Surprisingly, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs took another direction and 
instructed all Iran’s embassies “to pursue a policy to attract Sadr [to Iran], especially after 
his reelection as the head of the SICS.”1163 Shapour Bahrami, Iran’s ambassador to Cairo, 
had supported Sadr. In his journey to Cairo, Sadr had reassured Bahrami of his loyalty to 
Iran and the Shah by writing out his comments in a letter and added that with his religious 
position he would not accept Qadar’s proposal [to be his agent]. Bahrami sent the letter to 
Tehran, and shortly after that, Nowzar Raz-Ara, SAVAK’s Chief of Station in Cairo, 
reported that Sadr’s loyalty to the Shah would be a great help to Iran if Sadr were allowed 
to operate without any limits.1164 While Iran’s non-state foreign policy had been managed 
by SAVAK since its very dawn, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected framing Sadr as 
a threat to Iran’s national security. “Other Iranian ambassadors, including Shapour 
Bahrami, Fereydoun Movassaghi, Abbas Nayyeri and Ahmad-Ali Bahrami, confirmed 
Sadr’s claim [that Ambassador Qadar had a key role in transforming Iran’s policy towards 
the Shia]. Shapour Bahrami prepared a letter to the Shah… However, the Shah never 
considered other ambassadors’ analyses and suggestions. Conversely, he was totally 
influenced by Qadar. Ardeshir Zahedi, former Foreign Minister, confirmed Qadar’s “bad 
qualities.”1165 According to another report, “Shirazi stated that Sadr has been still 
financially supported by the Iranian merchants and clerics. Unfortunately, Iran’s 
ambassador to Damascus [Mohammad Pour-Sartip] supports Sadr… He added that Sadr’s 
major financial route passes through Damascus, contending that all problems he had faced 
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were implicitly backed by Iran’s ambassador to Damascus. He added they still keep their 
secret relations.”1166 Indeed, SAVAK and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs challenged each 
other over Iran’s non-state foreign policy.  
With the rising disagreement between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and SAVAK, 
the Shah found himself obliged to interfere. Receiving mixed reports from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Mandour Qadar, general Hussein Fardust, and Seyyed Musa Sadr, the 
Shah could not devise a clear strategy towards the Lebanese Shia. With the Shah’s 
permission, ultimately, Parviz Sabeti held the ‘Commission on Musa Sadr’ to make a final 
decision over Sadr since “to gather information on Sadr, Qadar needed SAVAK full 
support; otherwise he would not be able to fight with Sadr.”1167 The Commission consisted 
of elements in both SAVAK and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including Manouchehr Zelli 
[former Ambassador to Lebanon], Foreign Minister Abbas-Ali Khalatbari, Hamid Nasseri 
[the first SAVAK Chief of Station in Beirut], and Parviz Sabeti to make the final decision 
on Sadr. Arguing that the issue concerned Iran’s national security, instead of foreign policy, 
Nasseri whose views on Lebanon were considered by the Shah turned the issue to Sabeti. 
At this historical juncture, the commission decided that Sadr must work with Qadar. The 
decision was a stamp of approval of Qadar’s long-term goal to have Sadr act as his agent 
in Lebanon. It was the end of an era in Iran-Lebanese Shia relations. 
Radical Sadr  
In June 1977, Ali Shariati, the most influential Iranian intellectual and the ideologue 
of the Islamic Revolution, died in London.1168 At Sadr’s direct request, President Assad 
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permitted the Iranian revolutionaries to bury Shariati in the mausoleum of Sayyidah 
Zaynab. Sadr officiated at Shariati’s funeral ceremony of 26 June 1977. Shariati’s 
ceremony turned into a political gathering of the Iranian revolutionaries.1169 Though held 
in peace without any fiery speeches against Tehran, Sadr’s key role in managing the 
ceremony was criticized by Tehran.1170 SAVAK officials suggested a revival of Sadr’s 
replacement plan by backing Shirazi. “Sayed Hassan Shirazi, who used to control 
Zeynabiyye for years, was forced to leave Syria due to Sadr-Assad strong relations. the 
Shrine of Sayyidah Zaynab has now become the center of several [anti-Iran] gangs, 
particularly [Mohammad] Montazeri and his gangs. It would be great if there is a way to 
empower Shirazi in a way that he could return to the Shrine of Sayyidah Zaynab and, in 
return, foul Montazeri’s subversive activities.”1171 However, the substitution plan was 
never revived. 
The Shariati’s 40th Day, held in Ameliya School, grew into an anti-Shah meeting. 
Despite recent clashes between the PLO and Amal, Arafat participated in the 
commemoration and publicly proclaimed that “Amal is Fatah and Fatah is Amal; if Amal 
does not support Fatah there would be no Fatah.”1172 Additionally, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh and 
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Mostafa Chamran praised Shariati’s achievements and lashed out at the regime of Tehran, 
accusing SAVAK of the assassination of Shariati. While Seyyed Musa moderatetly 
criticized Tehran, Qadar immediately prepared a report, claiming that Sadr led 
“inflammatory speeches against Your Majesty” in the ceremony.1173 Sadr tried to de-
escalate tensions with Tehran. On 18 August 1977, he sent a letter to Ambassador Pour-
Sartip,1174 stating that “since Qadar’s appointment to [Iran’s embassy in] Lebanon, he has 
been causing trouble, urging mercenaries and the Maronites against me. He has distorted 
and falsified reports about me because he has a personal problem with me. Thus, I have no 
option but to attack him and not anyone else. You know that I cannot put up with this 
situation anymore,” Sadr bitterly complained of Qadar.1175 Sadr’s earnest request fell on 
deaf ears. Conversely, when Qadar’s report reached Tehran, the Shah ordered that Sadr be 
stripped off his Iranian passport on 27 August 1977.1176 It was the last nail in the coffin of 
Iran’s non-state foreign policy in Lebanon.  
Made highly-overconfident by the Shah’s decision, Qadar convinced Nasiri to 
launch an anti-Sadr propaganda in Iranian newspapers. They distributed anti-Sadr reports, 
documents, and articles against Sadr, highlighting his “weaknesses, like Teymour 
Bakhtiar’s direct intervention in dispatching Sadr to Lebanon as Abd al-Husayn Sharaf al-
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Din’s substitute, having Marxist attitudes, connecting with Islamist-Marxist forces like 
Shariati’s followers, siding with Leftists in Lebanon, urging the Shia to participate in the 
bloody Civil War of Lebanon, misusing financial aid mainly coming from Iran and 
dedicating them to establishing the communist Amal militia led by Chamran and building 
a center for his regalement in Paris by Ghotbzadeh, smoking opium, cooperating with 
radical leftist Palestinians that urged the Christians [Maronites], and finally his lack of 
fluency in speaking Arabic.”1177 When religious clerics asked for the mediation, Tehran 
did not show any flexibility. In response to Jordanian Sheikh Talib, the Shah contended 
that “Sadr’s policies in Lebanon have resulted in killing and wandering many Shias.”1178 
On 27 September 1977, Sheikh Abdel Amir Qablan, then Vice-President of the SICS, sent 
a letter to the Shah and asked him to “save the rest of the miserable Shia people of the south 
of Lebanon from the Israeli bombardment.”1179 The Shah, however, responded “the path 
the Shia are now taking is against Iran’s policy.”1180 It was the Shah’s final decision. 
Deeply disheartened, Sadr blamed Qadar for the transformation of Iran’s policy 
towards the Shia. In an interview with al-Hawadeth, Sadr rejected any tension with the 
regime of Tehran and, in return, blamed “SAVAK and Qadar for building a network of 
both Shia and non-Shia elements” against him. Sadr pointed out that this network had 
caused trouble for him in order to weaken his influence among the Shia and Lebanese.1181 
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Interestingly, Qadar dispatched a different report to Tehran. He claimed that in his 
interview, Sadr had mentioned that “Iran’s ambassador, supported by some of the Lebanese 
politicians, has been trying to politically connect the Shia with Tehran which I do not accept 
since it is against both national and religious interests... The Shia are Muslims and any 
relations with a non-Arab state [i.e., Iran] would be wrong and dangerous.”1182 Qadar still 
insisted on framing Sadr as the Shah’s enemy in the Levant. 
Meanwhile, Qadar tried to antagonize Sadr and Iranian clerics. Earlier, the Shia 
Marja’iyyah had financially supported Sadr. According to SAVAK, Ayatollah Ashtiani 
had donated 1.7 million Lebanese Lire to Sadr. SAVAK also reported that despite Sadr’s 
recently weakened status in Lebanon, the Iranian Ayatollahs had donated 271 million Lire 
to Sadr.1183 The Shah instructed SAVAK to see who supported Sadr. Parviz Sabeti, head 
of the SAVAK Third Office, prepared a list of pro-Sadr Ayatollahs.1184 Qadar’s plan aimed 
at weakening these connections by painting Sadr as a political demagogue. Sabeti added to 
the report that “We should frame Sadr among the Iranian clerics as the main reason of the 
Shia backwardness in Lebanon.”1185 In doing so, Qadar proposed that Tehran invite Ja’far 
Sharaf al-Din and his allies to Iran to “reveal Sadr’s hypocrisy” and to prove to Iranians 
how Sadr had been wasting Iran’s financial aid by providing weapons for Amal.1186 Prime 
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Minister Jamshid Amouzegar agreed with the plan.1187 Upon their arrival to Tehran, Sharaf 
al-Din and his fellows claimed that Sadr had not dedicated financial aid, gathered from 
Iranian clerics, to proper goals.1188 Qadar-Sabeti’s core plan was to frame Sadr as a corrupt 
leader who had stolen money provided by Tehran and collected by senior Iranian clerics, 
but the Shah did not support Sharaf al-Din’s financial request.1189 The second group of Shia 
clerics, headed by Sheikh Ali Faqihi, visited Iran. They focused on riling Ayatollahs 
Shariatmadari, Golpayegani, and Khansari against Sadr. Tehran then ordered the Lion and 
Sun to support the Lebanese people injured in the South by providing financial assistance 
via anti-Sadr clerics.1190 Later, Sheikh Hussein Dabouq, an anti-Sadr Shia cleric,1191 
criticized Sadr’s leadership and accused him of wasting 60 million Lire donated by the 
Shia Marja to the SICS.1192 He called Sadr a “demagogue” and called Amal “a group of 
bandits” in Lebanon.1193  
Qadar’s anti-Sadr policy also consisted of distributing a few books against him in 
Iran. SAVAK had reacted to an article on Sadr published in the Rastakhiz Newspaper in 
Tehran.1194 In early 1978, a book and a pamphlet, written in Farsi, were widely distributed 
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among Iranians living in Beirut. In these books, Sadr was introduced as “a foreigners’ agent 
and the Christian’s collaborator.”1195 The book and the pamphlet were submitted to the 
Pahlavi monarch. He instructed, “the book and pamphlet should be distributed here [in 
Iran], too.”1196 With the Shah’s direct intervention, Qadar prepared a sufficient number of 
books and pamphlets and distributed them in Qom, Tehran, and other cities of Iran.1197 It 
was a blow to Sadr’s image. 
The worst was yet to come. On 14 March 1978, Israel launched Operation Litani, 
occupying the area south of the Litani River, excepting Tyre. Nevertheless, the Israeli 
Defense Forces (IDF) were not able to crush the PLO conclusively as the Palestinians 
withdrew to the North and avoided engaging with the Israelis. The major victims of the 
invasion were the civilian Shia. After a week, the IDF agreed to withdraw from the South. 
Nonetheless, Tel-Aviv turned over the occupied territory to its new ally, the South Lebanon 
Army (SLA), led by Major Saad Haddad. In the rest of the country, the UN Interim Force 
in Lebanon (UNIFIL) set its bases. Part of the UNIFIL was constituted by Iranian soldiers. 
While Iran did not dispatch its troops to Lebanon at Sadr’s request, Sadr welcomed it. He 
told his followers “My long-term goals had been finally accomplished.”1198 It was too late, 
though.  
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VIII. Chapter 7 
Resurrection: Iran’s Non-State Foreign Policy in 1977-1979 
 
With the termination of Iran’s support for the Iraqi Kurds and the Lebanese Shia, 
Iran’s non-state foreign policy apparently came to an end. Nevertheless, Pahlavi Iran 
unsuccessfully tried to revive its connections with the both Kurdish and Shia non-state 
actors. Convinced by SAVAK and the Israelis, the Shah planned to contain the rising Iraq 
by reallocating supplies to the Iraqi Kurds. At the same time, he tried to revive his relations 
with Sadr. Nonetheless, the waves of the Islamic Revolution forced the Shah to abort these 
plans. 
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Resurrection—The Iraqi Kurds 
“Have the Kurdish people committed such crimes that every nation in the world should be against them?” 
Mullah Mustafa Barzani told the American media. 
 
 The Shah’s Strategic Misstep?   
The Algiers Agreement of 1975 was Mohammad Reza Shah’s victory in the Middle 
East. For the Shah, it was a testament to his wise policies. On 15 March 1975, Iranian and 
Iraqi foreign ministers met in Tehran to talk about the final terms of the Agreement. Later, 
Prime Minister Hoveyda visited Baghdad, and in return, Saddam met the Shah in Tehran. 
These visits finally led to signing the Baghdad Treaty of 13 June 1975 that reaffirmed the 
Thalweg principle and gave Iran the east half of Arvand Rud. Iraq’s concession in Arvand 
Rud was a major step in establishing an Iranian hegemony in the Persian Gulf. By pressing 
Baghdad to sign the Agreement, the Shah thought, he could restrict the Baath in the Persian 
Gulf and cut off Baghdad’s covert support for the separatist parties in Iran as well as 
Marxist rebels in Dhofar in Oman.  
Nevertheless, the region lacked a strong collective security institution to legitimize 
Iran’s hegemony. In doing so, the Shah initially established the Persian Gulf Collective 
Security System to embody his idea of the regional leadership. He knew that to the extent 
that he “pushes for a reduction of [the] Soviet influence in Iraq, he will come under pressure 
to demonstrate to Baghdad and other Arabs that Iran is not a tool of U.S. policy in the 
region… Therefore, insisting that Persian Gulf security is the responsibility of littoral 
states” would be the best strategy for the embodiment of his regional primacy.1199 Even 
Saddam in his press interviews had referred to the possibility of a collective security 
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arrangement in the Persian Gulf. According to Saddam, the Algiers Agreement ushered in 
a new-founded Iran-Iraq security cooperation in the Persian Gulf.1200 In this situation, there 
would be neither an Iranian-Iraqi nor an Arab-Persian clash. Earlier, in the Rabat summit 
of October 1974, Saddam had told Prince Fahd that “Iraq’s major concern is to preserve 
the Arab identity of the Persian Gulf and is ready to cooperate with other Arab regimes to 
determine a legal framework for Iran’s role, not to deter Tehran’s threat since Iran is a 
legitimate power in the Persian Gulf.”1201 The 1978 Persian Gulf Security Conference in 
Masqat was the main manifestation of the post-1975 regional power arrangement.1202 The 
Saudis feared that Iraq, whose leaders had considered them “as inimical to Arab solidarity,” 
would “be able to turn its attention to Persian Gulf affairs.”1203 As the Shah correctly 
predicted, competition among Arabs popped up over the number-two position in regional 
matters. The establishment of a collective security system would be based on the 
withdrawal of both the Russian and the American naval forces from the Persian Gulf that, 
in turn, could leave Iran as the only significant naval force in the Persian Gulf. A final 
communique issued following Hoveyda’s visit to Baghdad in late March 1975 stated that 
the “Persian Gulf should be spared all foreign interference.”1204 The U.S. was, in fact, 
worried that “the Shah might be willing to state public opposition to the U.S. naval role in 
the [Persian] Gulf more forcefully in exchange for greater regional cooperation on security 
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matters or for concrete examples of a lessened Soviet influence in Iraq.”1205 It seemed that 
the Shah had finally reached his long-term ambition to lead the Middle East. 
Despite the Shah’s efforts, the Agreement never alleviated the Arab suspicion of 
Iran’s regional policy. Right after the announcement of the Algiers Agreement, the 
Americans were skeptical about a “lasting reconciliation.”1206 They saw Iran and Iraq as 
“natural competitors in the Persian Gulf,” “the most populous states,” and “rich in natural 
resources” with “large well-equipped army.” More substantially, “both   the  Shah   and   
Saddam   Husain   have widely  differing   views   of   how   the   region should  evolve  
politically  and  both  aspire  to regional  leadership  and  dominance.”1207 Besides, in the 
minds of some conservative Arab leaders, especially the Omani Sultanate and the Iraqi 
Shia, Iran’s abandonment of the Kurds raised doubts about the Shah’s potential to keep the 
region secure from the revolutionary movements.1208 After the Agreement, Sultan Qaboos 
of Oman was worried about the Shah’s steadfastness to support the Muscat regime against 
the Iraqi-backed rebels in the Dhofar. Although the Shah did not withdraw Iran’s Army 
from Oman until the complete suppression of the Dhofari rebels, his pragmatism was 
framed among his allies’as Iran’s selfishness.  
The Shah achieved his symbolic victory in the Algiers Agreement. As time wore 
on, though, doubts about the consequences of the Agreement raised. Although the 
Agreement forced Baghdad to concede in Arvand Rud, it destroyed Iran’s non-state foreign 
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policy in Iraqi Kurdistan and stripped the country of its Kurdish lever over Iraq. The Shah 
“in effect, traded performance for promises in Algiers, and there were few assurances that Iraq 
would want to honor all those promises once it had mastered its Kurdish problem.”1209 
According to the U.S., Iran would not be able to revive an effective Kurdish uprising inside 
Iraq if the Baath regime chose to back away from of the Agreement. Indeed, by pulling the 
rug from under Iraqi Kurds, the Shah made Iran’s western border more vulnerable. On the 
contrary, the Agreement won time for the Bath regime. In the post-Algiers Agreement, 
Baghdad’s resources were all channeled to economic development and military armament, 
enabling Iraq to increase the size of its Army and double its military spending between 
1975 and 1980. The Agreement also enabled Saddam to consolidate his position in 
Baghdad. In spite of conceding to the Shah in Arvand Rud and partially damaging Iraq’s 
national pride, the Agreement allowed Saddam to unchain Iraq from its Kurdish cause and 
to lessen the danger of war with Iran. In the aftermath of the Agreement, Saddam initiated 
an anti-communist campaign and suppressed the ICP. Even President al-Bakr’s power was 
limited.1210 
Besides, the terms of the Algiers Agreement were mainly perceived to be at the 
expense of Baghdad. With the Kurdish threat gone and empowered by a rapid growth of 
Iraqi oil income, Baghdad could now attempt to subvert the Persian Gulf states. Although 
Arab moderate leaders, particularly Anwar Sadat, had argued that the Agreement would 
lead to a more moderate Iraq, the Arab conservative sheikhdoms were worried about Iraqi 
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capability in sponsoring subversion and Arab radicalism. The U.S. State Department also 
argued that “the Iraqi Baathist leadership remains revolutionary in outlook and committed 
to trying to overturn conservative and moderate regimes in the [Arab] Peninsula and the 
[Persian] Gulf.” In the U.S. view, Baghdad had “adopted a two-tiered policy. It actively 
courts its neighbors on the diplomatic level, while it continues to interfere in their 
affairs.”1211 In other words, the Agreement provided Baghdad an opportunity to “build its 
clandestine assets by quietly expanding Baathist cells in the small [Persian] Gulf countries 
and increasing support for local dissidents.”1212 In short, Saddam could enter the Arab 
world stage under the banner of pan-Arabism without any fear of a Kurdish uprising.  
As the Shah himself pointed out, Iraq remained a threat to Iran. He feared that 
Baghdad would attack Iran with the full support of the Arab states of the region and 
Moscow. According to the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The volume of Iraqi 
armaments with regards to its population and territory are much more than Iran’s.”1213 The 
Shah himself witnessed the increasing Russian sales of Scud missiles with offensive 
capabilities to Baghdad. In his interview with Newsweek in the November 1977, the Shah 
revealed Iran’s apprehension towards Iraq: “We have settled our differences with Iraq, but 
their military buildup continues. And I wonder how many of your editorial writers and 
congressmen realize that Iraq has more planes, tanks, and guns than we do-[even] ground-
to-ground SCUD missiles.”1214 The Shah was right that Saddam merely considered the 
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Algiers Agreement to be a truce, rather than a definite settlement, and waited for an 
opportunity to contest it. The opportunity for Iraq came just five years after the Agreement. 
However, it was too late for the Shah to take an effective alternative strategy towards Iraq. 
More significantly, the Agreement damaged Iran’s image among the Kurds. Earlier, 
in the middle of Tehran’s heavy support for the Iraqi Kurds, the Kurds saw the Shah as an 
Aryan King and supporter of Kurds who would help them to gain their independence. 
However, the Shah’s brutal decision in Algiers killed their dream. Initially, some die-hard 
Peshmerga were hopeful of Iran’s change of heart to resume its military support for the 
Kurds. As the dust settled on the battlefields of Iraqi Kurdistan, the harsh reality set in. 
Besides, what fueled the Kurds’ anger was the way the Shah treated them after signing the 
Agreement. Amid Tehran’s pressure to either surrender to Baghdad or flee to Iran, the 
Kurds were attacked by a sudden Iraqi offensive. It seemed that the Iraqi had crossed the 
border with Iran and launched their invasion from Mehran, a western city in Iran. Pejman 
claimed that the Shah had not permitted Iraqi army to use Iran’s territory to crack down the 
fighting Peshmerga; rather, it was Nasiri who had not informed the Shah of the Iraqis’ 
transgression of Iran’s territory.1215 Nonetheless, Barzani and the Kurds blamed the Shah 
for Iran’s brutal decision against the Kurds. He claimed that “Isa Pejman sold us out to the 
Shah and the Shah sold us out to the U.S.”1216 The Kurds could not digest why the Shah 
cooperated with an Arab leader whose lifelong hatred of Iran and the Kurds was evident.  
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The Algiers Agreement also brought up what the Shah had been worried about since 
1946--it revived the Kurdish question in Iran. In the aftermath of the Agreement, Iraqi 
Kurdish refugees had become the main source of insecurity in western Iran. Although Iran’s 
Army had disarmed the Peshmerga and isolated them from the civilian refugees, Baghdad 
knew that the Kurdish refugees would pose a greater potential national security threat to Iran 
than to Iraq. Besides, the majority of Iran’s own Kurds expressed dismay at Tehran’s 
abandonment of support for the Iraqi Kurds. Shortly after the Algiers Agreement, anti-Shah 
declarations were secretly disseminated in major Kurdish cities, particularly Mahabad.1217 
The Shah himself was sensitive to the Iranian Kurds’ reactions to the Agreement. “It seems 
that the Kurds expected us to ignore our national interests just because of them,” the Shah 
reacted to SAVAK report on the Kurds’ dissatisfaction of the agreement.1218 In the 
meantime, the young urbane Kurds joined radical, leftist, and separatist Kurdish parties. 
The Marxist Tudeh Party also revived its influence in Iranian Kurdistan. The growing 
formation of these groups revived a separatist threat to Iran’s national security and unity. 
The debacle of the Pahlavi monarchy gave the Kurds a fertile ground to challenge the 
revolutionary Iran.  
The Last Efforts in the Last Days 
The Algiers Agreement divided the Iraqi Kurds for almost a quarter of a century. 
Although there had been deep internal tensions between the Kurdish factions since 1964, 
the Agreement deepened an unbridgeable conflict within the Kurdish leadership. The 
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Agreement damaged Barzani’s prestige and authority and left the Kurds without an 
effective rebel commander. As Barzani bitterly accepted terms of the Agreement and fled 
to Iran with his sons, Idris and Masoud, Talabani and Ahmad objected to his decision and 
chose to keep fighting.1219 They criticized Barzani for poor leadership and blamed him for 
a naïve trust in the Shah. When Iraq launched its last offensive, the rest of the KDP elites 
left the north of Iraq to Syria and joined Talabani who had left Beirut where he had been 
posted as the KDP representative since the early 70s. Backed by Hafiz Assad, whose Baath 
regime had been questioning Saddam’s leadership of the Arab people in the post-Nasser 
era, Talabani and his friends founded the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) on 1 June 
1975. The PUK guerrillas launched their attacks on Iraqi positions in late 1975 and 
continued through 1976. In spite of moderate Syrian support, the PUK Peshmerga were 
only able to operate in the highest regions of the south Kurdistan Mountains.1220 When the 
clashes between the Iraqi Army and the PUK escalated, Saddam invited both Ahmad and 
Talabani to settle the crisis. However, their request for autonomy was immediately rejected 
by Baghdad. Despite its initial successes, the Iraqi air force heavy bombardment of their 
strongholds and a rising tension with the Barzanis weakened the PUK operations. In 
August 1976, Idris and Masoud Barzani, together with Sami (Muhammad Mahmud) Abd 
al-Rahman, formed the KDP-Provisional Leadership (KDP—PL). In July 1976, a long-
running feud between two groups was rekindled as Barzani’s Peshmerga ambushed and 
assassinated several PUK guerrillas.1221 Talabani vowed revenge and thus minor 
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skirmishes took place in winter 1977. However, a full-blown war erupted in the Baradust 
area in April 1978, when Talbani’s allies, Askari and Khaled Saeed, were killed by 
Barzani’s Peshmerga. Other PUK leaders, like Bab Sheikh Yazidi, were also killed by 
Barzani’s Peshmerga who were recently supported by Turkish MIT and Iraqi Istikhbarat. 
The Iranian SAVAK’s position was still confused.  
The Algiers Agreement formed a détente between Iran and Iraq and temporarily 
calmed their long-term rivalry. Tehran-Baghdad relations improved in 1978 to the point 
that SAVAK agents in Iraq informed Iraqi Istikhbarat of a pro-Moscow plot against the 
Baath regime. Saddam immediately executed dozens of Iraqi Army officers. As a sign of 
total reconciliation, he expelled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Shah’s major exiled 
leader, from Iraq to Paris1222--a decision that accelerated the emergence of the Islamic 
Revolution. In the aftermath of the Baghdad Treaty, the Shah initially took a counter-
revolutionary stance against the Iraqi Kurds. SAVAK participated in the suppression of the 
PUK whose leader, Talabani, spelled out that “Iraq, Iran, and the KDP-PL are all our 
enemies.”1223 As time wore on, though, Iran’s strategy changed. With the rising Iraqi threat, 
the Shah was worried that the U.S. would see the upcoming war with Iraq as a local, remote 
crisis and leave Tehran to fight alone the Soviet-backed Iraq. By 1978, SAVAK officials 
asked the Shah to shift his strategy towards the Iraqi Kurds. Indeed, SAVAK’s request was 
a quiet admission of Tel-Aviv’s argument that the Algiers Agreement had lifted a heavy 
burden from Baghdad. The Mossad had already sensed the Shah’s suspicions of Baghdad’s 
rearmament. With both SAVAK and the Mossad’s insistence, the Shah planned to revive 
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Iran’s non-state foreign policy in Iraqi Kurdistan. The cooperation between Israel, Iran, 
and the Barzanis renewed, though gradually, in 1978. SAVAK also held secret negotiations 
with the PUK. Although SAVAK tried to convince both the KDP-PL and the PUK to 
cooperate against Baghdad, Talabani approved Iran’s offer of support only if SAVAK 
broke with Idris Barzani and the KDP-PL.1224 However, SAVAK took a neutral stance on 
the issue and stayed away from the Kurdish competition. Only four SAVAK agents, 
including Colonel Pejman, were aware of and involved in the operation to reopen the 
Kurdish corridor. “When the Shah asked me how to revive the connection with the Kurds, 
I offered him to put emphasis on a long-term propaganda to change their hearts and minds 
towards Iran. I also argued that the plan should not be implemented by SAVAK since the 
Kurds hate SAVAK after the Agreement … the Shah asked me to write a detailed plan and 
submit it to Director Pakravan. I did it; however, the plan was never implemented.”1225 
Although Tehran considered the proposal, the Iranians never offered a definite reply, 
according to the Israelis.1226 Indeed, the Shah had been concerned by the consecutive 
demonstrations in Tehran and Iran’s major cities. In the meantime, Barzani, who had been 
diagnosed with lung cancer, travelled to the U.S. He died on 1 March 1979, and was then 
buried in Eshnavieh in Western Azarbaijan, Iran’s North Western province.1227 By this time 
the Islamic Revolution had occurred in Iran. 
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Resurrection--The Lebanese Shia 
“The thought that the Imam Moussa had gone into concealment to re-emerge transcendent had also occurred 
to us,”1228 Richard Parker, U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon reported. 
 
Waves of the Islamic Revolution 
In late 1977, the situation was bleak for the Lebanese Shia. Syria had occupied the 
heartland of the Shia in Lebanon, Beqaa Valley, while the PLO were fighting against 
Israelis in the south of Lebanon. Although Tel-Aviv had forced the PLO and LNM 
guerrillas to withdraw from the South, many Shia civilians were savagely killed by Israeli 
shelling and air strikes. Despite his Amal militia, Sadr was not a warlord. Sadr pleaded the 
Arab leaders of Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria to support the Shia. However, 
anti-Sadr resentment had been growing. The Civil War had already shakened Sadr’s 
reputation in the region. According to Qadar, “Amir Turki,1229 the deputy Defense 
Minister, criticized all Lebanese leaders, including Sadr. He contended “this man [Sadr] 
has a fallacious appearance, talking rightly while acting in contrast to what he said. He is 
fickle, joining new gangs every day.”1230 On top of that, major Lebanese groups, as well as 
the PLO, were against him. Tehran had clearly cut off its connections with the Shia. Even 
Iranian revolutionaries, i.e., pro-Ayatollah Khomeini, the Mojahedin, and the Fadaiyan 
were lashing out at his stance in the middle of the Civil War. Sadr was alone. 
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Amidst these dark days, an event two thousand kilometers further from Lebanon 
transformed the fate of the Lebanese Shia: The Islamic Revolution of 1979. “Iran, because 
of the great leadership of the Shah, is an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas 
of the world,” President Carter raised a toast to the Shah at a state dinner in the Niavaran 
Palace on 31 December 1977 and praised him as a great leader who had won “the respect 
and the admiration and love” of his people. However, Iran’s stability did not last long. 
Within weeks of Carter’s visit, massive waves of demonstrations broke out in the religious 
city of Qom and then Tehran and other cities of Iran. The growing waves of 
demonstrations, the Shah’s apparently inflexible policy towards the Lebanese Shia, and his 
friends’ key roles in leading the Revolution convinced Sadr to take a more radical policy 
towards Tehran.1231 In his interview of 4 March 1978, Sadr pointed out that the Shah was 
supporting the U.S. policy in the region stirring the Muslims against the Palestinians.1232 
Sadr’s pro-Revolution policy was followed with his efforts to assuage the Arab 
conservative regimes’ suspicion over the rise of a Shia-Islamic revolution in Iran. He told 
Prince Abdollah that “there is an imminent revolution in Iran, led by Ayatollah Khomeini. 
The Revolution is neither Shia nor Iranian. This is a pure Islamic Revolution. I want you 
not fall in an American trap and instead, have a good relation with the Revolution.”1233 On 
23 August 1978, Sadr wrote an anti-Shah article, ‘the Call of the Prophet’, published in Le 
Monde, arguing that “Iran’s revolution is different than all other movements in the world.” 
He pointed that this movement was related to neither right nor left, adding that “the Iranian 
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revolutionaries are not representative of a specific social class … The motive of this 
movement is Faith … that reminds the call of the Prophet.”1234 Less than a week later, he 
traveled to Libya to a mysterious fate. 
A Mysterious Journey 
On 25 August 1978, Sadr traveled to Tripoli at Gaddafi’s invitation with two 
members of the SICS, Sheikh Muhammad Yaacoub and journalist Abbas Badreddine. 
Though scheduled to leave Tripoli on an Italian Alitalia flight, Sadr and his companions 
never arrived at Rome. Despite facts to the contrary, Tripoli insisted that Sadr and his 
companions had departed Tripoli bound for Italy. The Libyan claimed that “the imam 
[Sadr] and his two companions departed Tripoli on Alitalia flt 881 for Rome august 31. 
The Italians, however, maintain that the persons traveling under the names of the three 
Shi’a personalities did not meet the description of the imam and his companions.”1235 
According to Qadar, “Sadr never entered to Rome. Somebody else entered Rome with 
Sadr’s passport.”1236 Sadr’s supporters argued that his baggage was found in a hotel in 
Tripoli without any sufficient evidence for his trip to Italy. It was the beginning of Sadr’s 
disappearance. 
Although Richard Parker, the U.S. Ambassador to Beirut, claimed that “few people 
will mourn him, even if he has disappeared permanently” since “the Imam is notoriously 
corrupt even by Lebanese standards,”1237 the Beirut cabinet held an emergency meeting on 
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September 14 to discuss his disappearance after the SICS pressed Prime Minister Selim 
Ahmad al-Hoss. Al-Hoss told the press that “the information obtained so far had been 
‘negative’ and added that an official delegation, including Omar Musayki, the secretary 
general of the Prime Minister’s office, would be sent to Libya and other countries to search 
for Sadr.”1238 Rumors soon spread. Initially, many guessed Sadr’s return would be likely. 
According to Lebanese officials in Tripoli, “Imam left Tripoli on September 2 for ‘quiet 
week in Paris.’”1239 In the middle of “Sadr’s followers’ hunger strike,” “the Italian interior 
ministry was reportedly asking authorities on Malta to search for the imam to see if he had 
flown there from Rome.”1240 According to another report, it was believed that Sadr “was 
alive and well and was either in Malta or near Lake Como. He was being kept under house 
arrest by Gadhafi agents who were teaching him a lesson.”1241 However, nobody found 
him. 
The immediate suspect in Sadr’s abduction was Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. 
Tripoli’s relation with Sadr was ambiguous. Right after the outbreak of the Civil War, 
Gaddafi launched an anti-Sadr campaign in May 1975. In Gaddafi’s view, Sadr’s 
Movement of the Deprived had weakened the leftist position among the Shia in the south 
of Lebanon.1242 After the formation of Amal, however, Sadr traveled to Libya in September 
1975 and, according to SAVAK, was promised by Gaddafi to support his policies in 
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Lebanon.1243 Their relations went again downhill as Sadr sided with the Syrian Army and 
the Maronites in cracking down on the PLO. Besides, it seems that Sadr had refused to 
follow Gaddafi’s demands. There were accounts that the money Gaddafi had donated to 
Sadr was missing. Rifaat al-Assad, the head of Syrian security and Hafiz Assad’s 
brother, told Brigadier-General Ali Motazed, Iran’s Ambassador to Syria and former 
Deputy of SAVAK,1244 that Gaddafi had been planning to kill Ṣadr. Qadar claimed that 
“Gaddafi had donated about 12 million dollars to Sadr to organize Amal forces and the 
Palestinian guerrillas under the name of Amal. Initially, both Amal and Palestinian ran two 
or three successful terrorist operations. Shortly after that, Sadr unexpectedly refused to 
follow the plan… When the word reached Gaddafi, he asked for the payback, but Sadr 
objected to Libyan’s intervention in Lebanon internal politics. Since then, Gaddafi was 
looking for a proper moment to punish him.”1245 SAVAK also prepared a report based on 
the Syrian sources, arguing that “Colonel Gaddafi had disagreed to Sadr’s policy in the 
south of Lebanon and his strong opposition to the Palestinian groups. Gaddafi also 
considered Sadr as a fanatical, religious, and dependent on the right wings [of Lebanese 
parties]. It also seems that Sadr has spent money donated by Gaddafi on the Shia, instead 
of Gaddafi’s political goals. Therefore, Gaddafi intended to punish him by arresting 
him.”1246  
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Whether true or not, it was obvious that Gaddafi expected Sadr’s full obedience. 
Additionally, the Libyan leader’s anti-Shia attitude might have driven Gaddafi to kill Sadr. 
Colonel Joloud, the second strongest man in Tripoli, had claimed that the Shia were all 
Iran’s spies when he was in the UAE.1247 According to SAVAK, Gaddafi had “become 
pessimistic about Shiism.”1248 Additionally, Sadr’s disappearance might have to do with 
his criticism of Gaddafi over Libyan dictator’s superficial knowledge of Islam. According 
to Abdel Rahman Shalgham, Algerian President Houari Boumediene had convinced Sadr 
to travel to Tripoli. At the time, Gaddafi had announced his strange view towards Quran 
and Islam. Upon Sadr’s arrival to Tripoli, the Shia leader criticized Gaddafi and told him, 
“You know nothing of Islam. You insult Islam and the Prophet.” Sadr’s points made 
Gaddafi very angry.1249 Mostafa Chamran also pointed to a discussion over Islam between 
Sadr and Gaddafi. According to Chamran, Sadr told Gaddafi that “if you transgress the 
sacred Islamic Sharia, your wife would be religiously prohibited for you since your 
marriage was based on Islamic Sharia. It would be a catastrophe if you transgress the sacred 
Islamic Sharia.”1250 According to Qadar, “after giving a speech in a religious institution, 
Sadr met with Gaddafi. In the meeting, Gaddafi insulted him and then gave orders to kill 
Sadr and his two companions in a barrack 30 kms South-West from Tripoli. A Libyan 
diplomat handed this information to the Lebanese ambassador to UN.”1251 Succinctly put, 
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Sadr’s refusal to enter agent-officer relations with anti-Shia Gaddafi who had already 
provided Sadr a huge amount of money and his discussion about Gaddafi’s Islamic 
knowledge had paved the way to his disappearance or death. 
The American officials were also suspicious of Gaddafi’s claim. According to both 
Beirut and Tehran offices, Nizar Farhat, the Lebanese charge’, “suddenly left Tripoli on 
sept 19… We suspect he knows more than he has told anyone locally... Embassy Beirut 
might find that Farhat has left behind in Lebanon additional information on the increasingly 
mysterious case of the missing imam.”1252 The American officials also approached the 
Lebanese Foreign Minister Boutros. “Boutros said he had summoned Farhat to hear what 
he had to say. He would be returning to Tripoli. From what he and others reported, it 
appeared imam had not gone to Rome as Libyans claimed. He did not understand what 
Gadhafi had in mind.”1253 The Lebanese Shia were still unconvinced by these arguments. 
“Shia deputy Abdul Latif Zein told me later that Shi’a are convinced Libyans are lying. 
Leaders of the massive procession …were received by Gadhafi who gave them some 
reassurance, but not enough. Muammar told them he was very disturbed that his official 
guest, Imam Moussa, had left without being able to call on him because he had been busy 
with September 1 festivities… Facts were, however, that Libyan story full of holes. For 
instance, imam’s effects, and those of his companions, had been left at hotel in Tripoli. 
They would not willingly have left them behind. Hotel was still claiming they were there 
three days after they were supposed to have left. Imam was compulsive telephoner and if 
he was at liberty he would have been on telephone long before this. He was either prisoner 
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or dead, and deed had been done in Libya. Zein said one reason Shi’a had taken conform 
from Gadhafi’s remarks was that latter had said he had intended help imam Moussa with 
his projects for south Lebanon but had never given him a cent. Alleged motive for 
Gadhafi’s doing away with him was that imam had embezzled $150,000,000 given him by 
Libyans. That rationale, at least, seems ill-founded.”1254  
The Palestinian groups were also among the suspects. Immediately, some 
allegations emerged that Sadr was killed by Libya over Sadr’s relations with the PLO. Shia 
deputy Abdul Latif Zein suspected Palestinians might have done him in.1255 It was obvious 
that the PLO leaders, even Arafat, criticized Sadr’s opposition to the PLO military bases 
in Southern Lebanon. Right after Sadr’s disappearance, the Lebanese leftists and the 
Palestinians launched an anti-Sadr campaign. As Chamran wrote in his letter to Yazdi, 
“They spread rumors every day. On a wall of Sour (Ture), they wrote, “Sadr embezzled 
and [then] escaped.”1256 Another stronger rumor was related to George Habash’s role in 
killing Sadr. Habash had begun challenging Sadr’s position since Sadr was against a plan 
to demilitarize the Palestinian guerrillas in the south of Lebanon that could have 
deteriorated the Shia socio-economic situation.1257 It seems that Gaddafi had killed Sadr at 
the request of the Palestinians. 
Interestingly, some rumors highlighted the role of Damascus in Sadr’s 
disappearance. These accounts argue that Hafez Assad had increasingly considered Sadr’s 
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influence, though diminished after the Civil War, as an obstacle to its leverage over 
Lebanon, in general, and the Shia, in particular. According to Qadar, Syria played a direct, 
decisive role in Sadr’s disappearance. “In early 1978, Rifaat Assad asked me to come over 
to Damascus. In the meeting with him and President Assad, they stressed Syrian enmity of 
Iraq and their plan to overthrow the Baath regime of Baghdad. They emphasized that only 
the Shah could help them to accomplish the mission. They said, “we know that you Iranians 
have agents and networks in Karbala and Najaf. We also know that you are still supporting 
the Iraqi Kurds. We are going to join you in the support for the Kurds. However, Syria has 
no border with the rebel-controlled territory in the North of Iraq. So, we want you to permit 
us to load armament in Khorramshahr and then deliver it to the Iraqi Kurds [Jalal Talabani’s 
PKK]. By intensifying the support for the Kurds and pinning down the Iraqi Army in 
Kurdistan, we can lead a coup to overthrow the Baath regime with your agents’ support in 
Najaf and Karbala. We, in return, can compensate your favor.” I reminded them of Iran-
Iraq détente in the Algiers Agreement of 1975. But they insisted on the cooperation with 
Iran and promised to close the Hawza Zainabiyya and to arrest the [anti-Shah] clerics. More 
interestingly, they clearly claimed that “Musa Sadr would not be in the Lebanese politics 
by summer 1978.” Shocked by their claim, I asked them, “What do you mean by Sadr’s 
issue?” They responded, “the Shah himself knows.” Due to the urgency and significance 
of the issue, I did not return to Beirut and left Damascus to Tehran with the British Airways. 
When I met the Shah and explained him the details of the meeting, he strongly rejected 
Syria’s offer and stated, “We have already settled down the issue of the Kurdish rebels and 
the border disagreements with Iraqis.” But when I raised Sadr’s issue, he immediately 
interrupted me and said, “well, they [the Syrian regime] wants to kill Seyyed Musa.” After 
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a short period of silence, the Shah told me, “let them know that we can close our eyes at 
loading the weapons in Khorramshahr. We will not interfere.” Right before leaving the 
Palace, the Shah added, “Inform this foolish Seyyed [of the Syrian plan].” Despite all 
troubles Sadr had caused [for Iran], the Shah was an emotional man who did not want to 
hurt anybody. Upon my arrival to Damascus, I informed Rifaat Assad of the Shah’s 
response. In the wake of demonstrations in Iran, they quickly sent weapons to 
Khorramshahr. Nevertheless, the Syrian armament was surprisingly seized by the Iranian 
officials. The Syrian leaders strongly reacted. I told them that it had been a mistake since 
the Shah had already instructed.” In the meantime, Sadr was planning to visit Libya. Right 
before his trip, I asked Ja’far, an Iraqi businessman who often connected me with Sadr, to 
set a meeting. I had intended to make him aware of Damascus plan, but, in the wake of the 
Revolution, Sadr did not accept to see me. While I insisted to Ja’far to convince him to 
meet me, Ja’far responded, “Seyyed can not see you since he leaves Beirut to Damascus 
and then to Tripoli tomorrow.”1258 According to Qadar, Syrian leaders planned to kill Sadr 
and, at the same time, intended to make Tehran agreed to this move by facilitating the 
support for the Kurds. Damascus thought that Sadr’s removal would be rewarded by the 
Shah. As Qadar claimed, “It was Damascus plan to kill Sadr, but due to Sadr’s leverage 
among the Syrian Alawite, they let the Libyan kill him.”1259 “Assad,” he added, “used the 
rising tension between Sadr and Gaddafi by framing Seyyed Musa as a traitor who had 
connections with the Americans. Assad pushed Sadr to travel to Tripoli to reconcile his 
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relations with Gaddafi, but in reality to be killed by Gaddafi.”1260 Thirty years later, after a 
bloody debacle of Gaddafi’s regime, Hannibal Gaddafi ambiguously claimed that Hafez 
Assad had played a key role in Sadr’s disappearance.1261 More interestingly, Qadar claimed 
that the Shah had asked him to inform Sadr of the Syrian plot. Was it because of the Shah’s 
emotion or did he have his own plan with Sadr? 
The Shah-Sadr Secret Deal? 
The Pahlavi regime of Tehran was gradually blamed by the Shia community for 
Sadr’s disappearance. The Maronites Kataeb claimed that Sadr had entered Najaf to see 
Ayatollah Khomeini to increase their cooperation against the Shah.1262 According to 
Ambassador Parker, Tehran had denounced Sadr for embezzling funds donated to Lebanon 
for the benefit of the Shia community.1263 A-Safir, a major leftist Lebanese newspaper, 
claimed that the Shah had been behind Sadr’s disappearance, asserting that Sadr was 
kidnapped by the Iranian security services because of his support for Ayatollah Khomeini 
and the Iranian revolutionaries.1264 Another rumor was that it was Tel-Aviv or the CIA that 
kidnapped Sadr and surrendered him to Tehran.1265 Sadr’s mysterious disappearance was 
extensively framed as an Israeli “plot to split the ranks of Lebanese Muslims.”1266 The CIA 
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was also accused of kidnapping Sadr. Parker reported that “this affair grows mysteriouser 
and mysteriouser. To date, we have not been blamed, but that will not last. we will shortly 
be hearing [a] story that only an intelligence service like CIA could have done such a neat 
job… On September 25, Shia mufti of Baalbek told reporters that “the disappearance of 
the imam was arranged in cooperation with U.S. intelligence.”1267 According to 
Ambassador Parker, “Most Muslims to whom we have talked believe he is still in Libya or 
has been kidnapped by Iranians, CIA, or someone else.”1268 In fact, blaming Iran and his 
allies of Israel and the U.S. for Sadr’s disappearance fit a growing Anti-Shah sentiment in 
the late 70s. “When Sadr was disappeared, the Lebanese Shia attacked to Iran’s embassy 
in Beirut since they thought Sadr’s major enemy was Iran’s embassy. But Sadr’s son 
pacified the angry people and asked them to leave the place and instead gathered around 
Libyan embassy,” Qadar stated.1269 As time wore on, though, the theory of Iran’s 
participation in Sadr’s disappearance was downgraded. As Zein stated, “Had he [Sadr] 
gone to Iraq or Iran, as alleged by some, he would have surfaced by now.”1270 
In reality, however, both the Shah and SAVAK had been shocked by Sadr’s 
disappearance. Despite rising tension between Sadr and SAVAK, it seems that unrelenting 
waves of demonstrations had prompted Tehran to reconsider its policy towards the Shia 
ulama. Although the Shah had tightened the political domain for both Marxists and 
Nationalists since the coup of 1953, his main opposition emerged from the Shia clerics. As 
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demonstrations spread across the Iranian cities other than Tehran, the necessity of 
approaching more moderate ulamas, including Sadr, became more apparent. In contrast to 
Qadar’s reports, SAVAK had considered Sadr’s gradual closeness to Ayatollah Khomeini 
and his radical followers due to his urgent need for the financial support.1271 SAVAK was, 
in fact, well aware of tensions between powerful pro-Ayatollah Khomeini elements and 
Sadr. In addition to their disagreement over the Palestine cause, Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
Marja’iyya, and dealings with the Shah, Sadr’s view towards Velayat-e Faqih (the 
Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist) was also a controversial issue. It seems Sadr did not 
believe in Ayatollah Khomeini’s doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih. With the escalation of crisis 
in Iran, Tehran instructed Qadar to abandon his animosity to Sadr. SAVAK officials 
suggested that it would be better to approach Sadr by sending him a Quran. The suggestion 
was immediately rejected by Qadar.1272 However, Qadar was not as powerful enough 
anymore to prevent an unexpected shift in Iran’s policy towards Sadr. In a surprising report, 
less than three weeks before Sadr’s mysterious disappearance, Ambassador Qadar finally 
changed, or was forced to change, his mind and reported to Tehran that “it would be better 
to work with Sadr, in spite of fighting against him.”1273 It seems there had been a grand 
deal between Tehran and Sadr in the middle of demonstrations in Iran.  
In a meeting of 2 October 1978 with William H. Sulivan, the last U.S. ambassador 
to Tehran, and Anthony Parsons, the UK ambassador to Tehran, Iranian Prime Minister 
Ja’far Sharif-Emami claimed that “his government had been in contact with Imam Musa 
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Sadr shortly before latter’s disappearance in Libya. He claimed that Musa Sadr had agreed 
to break with Ayatollah Khomeini and announce his support for the Shah. At one point, he 
used the phrase “we had brought him off.” Sulivan added, “If the wily imam had indeed 
made a deal with the GOI [Government of Iran], while at the same time allegedly acting as 
a channel for Libyan funds being sent to Khomeini, this fact could be a contributing 
element in his disappearance. I would imagine that colonel Gaddafi does not appreciate 
being double-crossed.”1274 There have been narratives of Sadr’s efforts aiming at diverting 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s “momentum.”1275 Despite the fact that he had been stripped of his 
passport, Sadr had been seen by several religious figures, including Jafar Shahidi, as a 
major scholar in Persian literature and historian of Islam, a month before his disappearance. 
Whether there was a secret deal between the Shah and Sadr, neither Tehran nor Seyyed 
Musa revealed it. Indeed, SAVAK and Tehran were optimistic that they might make an 
effective breach among the revolutionaries by the revival of Iran’s non-state foreign policy 
in Lebanon.  
Sadr’s Disappearance and the Iranian Revolutionaries 
Sadr’s long-running tension with several Iranian revolutionaries endangered his 
life. Interestingly, most of the anti-Sadr’s revolutionaries had been heavily supported by 
Gaddafi. Mehdi Firouzan, Sadr’s nephew and his son-in-law, accused Gaddafi’s 
supporters, particularly Jalal ad-Din Farsi, of playing a key role in Sadr’s disappearance. 
“Some of Gaddafi-allied Iranians during the Revolution still have key information on 
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Imam’s Sadr’s disappearance.”1276 Firouzan believes that what happened to Sadr was 
related to Tripoli’s plan to gain leverage in revolutionary Iran. “Mummer Gaddafi tried to 
gain leverage among high-ranked positions [among the revolutionaries] to usurp the 
Revolution. However, he could not penetrate the Council of the Revolution. His allies 
belonged to the second generation of the Revolution, rather than popular figures, like 
Mottahari and Beheshti. Threfore, Gadhafi-backed Jalal ad-Din Farsi ran for the presidency 
[after the establishment of the Islamic Republic] but he was later disqualified by the 
Council of the Revolution and Gaddafi’s plot was thwarted.”1277 According to Firouzan, 
“Farsi is one of the closest Gadhafi’s allies. He is proud of this relationship.”1278 As Sadegh 
Tabatabaie stated, “in response to Sadr’s fate, Jaloud himself had said, ‘Go and ask Jalal 
ad-Din Farsi’.”1279 It seemed Sadr’s disappearance was intertwined with the power struggle 
among the revolutionaries.  
In addition to the Libyan plot, pro-Sadr Iranian revolutionaries argued that Sadr 
was kidnapped or killed for his possible role in the Islamic Revolution of Iran. According 
to Chamran, “Regarding Mr. Khomeini and Iran’s Revolution, I should say that all the 
Arabs, the leftists, and the Palestinians are all frightened of Iran’s Revolution and we hear 
they are insulting Khomeini and Iran’s Revolution. Some believe that Algieria, Syria, and 
Palestine are all united with Libya over Sadr… They are all frightened of Iran’s Revolution. 
They all know that Sadr is the active instigator of the Shia in Arab states and with 
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Khomeini’s victory, the Shia victory would be impending. That is why they prefer not to 
have Sadr and prevent the spillover of Iran’s Revolution into Arab countries. Thus, they 
would remove Sadr if they could.”1280 Al-Osboa al-Arabi newspaper also argued that 
“Among many reasons, Sadr’s kidnapping is because of his possible, predictable position 
in the [Iran’s] Revolution after victory… Imam Sadr’s connection [with the Islamic 
Revolution of Iran] was strong, deep, and almost spontaneous. That is why he had become 
a guide for leaders of the Revolution as such that Iran’s first deputy of prime minister was 
Dr Sadegh Tabatabaie, Imam Sadr’s nephew… With a victorious revolution, Sadr’s 
position and status would be more dynamic and effective since he could be Iran’s major 
channel with Arab states and nations. He could be also a mediator between Islamist liberals 
and Imam Khomeini’s movement. This role would enable him as a leader (a role that could 
be taken by Sadr) to make consolidate the cooperation among forces and prevent the crisis 
formation.”1281 In short, Sadr’s possible key role in the new-founded revolutionary Iran 
played a decisive role in his disappearance.  
More significantly, it seems that Sadr’s fate was intertwined with Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s succession. “Before the Islamic Revolution, Imam Khomeini was an old man. 
There were several discussions on Imam’s substitution among the revolutionaries in 1977-
78, wondering how to continue their Islamic movement after him. Some revolutionaries 
backed Ayatollah Montazeri, the other group believed in Ayatollah Beheshti, and the third 
group supported Imam Sadr. Nevertheless, none of these candidates themselves were aware 
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of these discussions. Sadegh Tabatabaie pointed to the fourth group that backed Ayatollah 
Muhammad-Baqir Sadr to lead the Islamic movement after Ayatollah Khoemini. He stated 
that the issue of Ayatollah Khomeini’s substitution had been raised in Beheshti-Sadr’s 
talks. “Imam Musa respected his cousin, Ayatollah Muhammad-Baqir Sadr, as such that 
he named him as the best Ayatollah Khomeini’s substitute in a conversation with Ayatollah 
Seyyed Mohammad-Hussein Beheshti.”1282  
Even before the formation of the Islamic Republic, tensions among these groups 
had erupted. In fact, Sadr had been challenged by the Gaddafi-backed, pro-Montazeri group 
over several issues. Some pro-Montazeri elements, like Mohammad Montazeri, Jalal ad-
Din Farsi, Abu Hanif, Abu Sharif, and Ahmad Movahhedi, Iran’s first representative in 
Lebanon after the Revolution, argued that CIA was behind Sadr’s disappearance, claiming 
that CIA agents, i.e., Ahmad Khomeini, Ayatollah Beheshti, Ebrahim Yazdi, Sadegh 
Ghotbzadeh, and Mostafa Chamran, ran the operation [of Sadr’s disappearance].”1283 In an 
interview with an-Nahar, Mohammad Montazeri strongly rejected Libyan intervention in 
Sadr’s disappearance, accused Zionist and American mercenaries of kidnapping Sadr in 
Italy, and claimed that “if Libyan had intended to kill Sadr, they could have done that in 
Beirut, Sour or Seida.”1284 Abou-Hanif also claimed that “Mr. Musa Sadr left Libya for 
Rome to see his wife who had been in a hospital in Paris. Mossad spies then kidnapped 
him in a hotel [in Rome] and sent him to a prison in Israel. Seyyed Musa Sadr was then 
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martyred by Israelis after heavy tortures.”1285 In the meantime, Ayatollah Hossein-Ali 
Montazeri, then-Ayatollah Khomeini’s deputy, claimed that “within this context, raising 
Sadr’s issue would be in the U.S. favor!”1286  
Indeed, pro-Sadr revolutionaries, mainly stationed in the Interim Government of 
the Revolution, were shocked of Ayatollah Montazeri’s support of the pro-Gaddafi group, 
including his son, and Ayatollah Khomeini’s meeting with Jaloud. As Chamran stated, “I 
do not know why the leader of the Islamic Revolution of Iran [i.e., Ayatollah Khomeini] 
put his hands in the criminal’ hands. Did not we revolt because of God? How do not we 
want to tarnish the Revolution with the criminal’ dirt?” Interestingly, Pro-Gaddafi 
revolutionaries were inexplicably certain of Sadr’s fate. There have been also controversial 
claims over Ayatollah Beheshti’s ambiguous role in killing Sadr.1287 All in all, Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s substitution played a major role in determining Sadr’s fate.  
The Iranian Search 
With Sadr’s mysterious disappearance, religious clerics and revolutionary leaders 
of Iran began searching for him. From his exile, Ayatollah Khomeini made efforts to find 
Sadr. Ayatollah Khomeini wrote letters to both Yasser Arafat and Hafez Assad,1288 
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requesting Tripoli to reveal the mystery on 18 October 1978.1289 Ayatollah himself never 
trusted the Libyan dictator. As Ali Jannati, then-Minister of Culture and Guidance, 
narrated, “We offered Imam [Khomeini] to travel to Libya after the termination of his exile 
in Paris. We thought he would accept the offer but Imam did not accept it. He told us that 
Gaddafi was not trustworthy.”1290 In a meeting with Jaloud, Ayatollah pressed him to 
“follow up Sadr’s fate” after his arrival to Libya.1291 He told Jaloud that “the Tragedy of 
Mr. Sadr” would destroy relations between two nations and states.1292 “Imam was under 
heavy pressure to accept Gaddafi. Had he not asked Jaloud to bring Imam Musa Sadr back, 
Libya’s allies [in Iran] would have gained high-ranked positions,” Firouzan claimed.1293 
“Very upset at his disappearance, which is generally regarded as a mark of disrespect to 
the community,”1294 the Lebanese Shia community also asked Ayatollah Khomeini to 
support efforts to search for Sadr. In meetings with Mohammad-Mehdi Shamseddin, the 
vice-president and then-president of the SICS, as well as Sadr’s family and Amal’s 
members, Ayatollah Khomeini stressed that, “Mr Sadr is a man whom I raised” and “He is 
one of my respected children.”1295 
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Beyond Ayatollah, other religious ulama, including Ayatollah Marashi Njafi, 
Ayatollah Tabatabai Qomi, Ayatollah Golpayegni, Ayatollah Abdullah Shirazi, Ayatollah 
Shariatdmadari, and Ayatollah Taleqani were seeking Sadr. A body, consisted of three 
clergies, Sheikh Abdol-Qasem Rouhani, Haj Seyed Fazel Milani, and Sheikh Abdol-Hasan 
Asadi, was sent to Jordan and Syria on behalf of Ayatollah Seyed Abdullah Shirazi to 
negotiate with the Jordanian and Syrian leaders. “three clergymen reportedly flew to 
Damascus September 26 to seek [an] audience with president Assad and ask for assistance. 
They also planned to visit Amman and appeal to King Hussein. Iranian Shiite spokesman 
said no government has yet responded positively to hierarchy's request for aid in locating 
Sadr.”1296 From the city of Qom, Ayatollah Muhammad Kazem Shariatmadari also sent 
Gaddafi a telegram that “People in all lands know that Imam al Sadr was invited to your 
country and had gone there… Thus all Muslims ask the Libyan government, whom they 
consider responsible for this disappearance, for information about the health and well-
being of the Imam.”1297 A Shia leader in Europe Seyed Mehdi Rouhani asked President 
Giscard D’estaing “to order a thorough investigation of Sadr’s disappearance.”1298 
Furthermore, Iranian government Pars Broadcasting reported that Sefoddin Nabavi, the 
speaker of Islamic Liberalizers Party (Hezb-e Azidik-Khahan-e Eslami), claimed that Sadr 
was probably alive.1299 “According to both actions taken by [the] Islamic Liberalizers Party 
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and specific telegrams received by President Carter, and Abdul-Salam Joloud, the prime 
minister of Libya, Imam Sadr has been controlled under Libyan security service”, Nabavi 
claimed.1300 He added that Sadr had been living on the floor of an apartment in Tripoli, 
under the restricted control. 
Along with the Iranian revolutionaries and religious figures, some non-
revolutionary groups and parties were concerned with Sadr’s fate. Chief among them was 
Mohsen Pezeshpour, the leader of the Pan-Iranist Party and a member National Parliament 
(Majles-e Melli).1301 Though non-religious, Pezeshpour made a well-publicized appeal to 
Prime Minister Sharif-Emami’s cabinet on 24 September 1978 to take all possible steps to 
find Sadr.1302 “Iran should fight with such anti-human actions since it has signed the 
declaration of the UN. More importantly, becuase Iran is the only Shia country and Shia 
Islam is the legal religion of this country, Iran has legal and ethical responsibilities to 
defend the Shia interests in each part of the world. Additionally, since Imam Musa Sadr 
was an Iranian born-leader of the Lebanese Shia, the Iran government must struggle to 
solve this problem by communicating with the regional states and international 
associations,” Pezeskpour emphasized Iran’s both religious and patriotic duty to find Sadr. 
In Tehran, the anti-Shah Association for Defense of Freedom and Human Rights, 
associated with the National Front, asked the International Association of Human Rights 
in New York to set up a committee to inquire into Sadr’s disappearance.1303 None of these 
efforts were fruitful.  
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Interestingly, the main person who was looking for Sadr was neither his supporter 
nor an Iranian revolutionary. Rather, it was Mohammad-Reza Shah. As the word of Sadr’s 
disappearance reached Iran, the Shah immediately instructed both SAVAK and Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs to pursue Sadr’s fate. Eleven days after Sadr’s disappearance, SAVAK 
reported that “Seyyed Musa Sadr, the leader of Lebanese Shia, was kidnapped by unknown 
men during his visit to Libya.”1304 Another secret SAVAK document, sent from Israel to 
the SAVAK Second Office, reflected dominant theories proposed by the Lebanese 
newspapers.1305 The document put forward that “in addition to his travel to Libya and 
receiving necessary financial support, Imam Sadr might be secretly sent to Iraq to instigate 
a revolution in Iran.”1306 Two days after SAVAK’s theory on Sadr’s secret travel to Iraq, 
Baserinia, SAVAK chief in Qom, sent a telegram to the SAVAK Third Office, reporting a 
call between Reza Sadr, Seyyed Musa’s older brother, and Ayatollah Shariatmadari.1307 
The telegram showed that Musa Sadr had not left Libya. It also illuminated that the 
interference of Iran, Israel, and the Christian Lebanese in the Sadr’s disappearance was not 
true and added that “it is possible that Libya has kidnapped Imam since a terrorist group 
cannot abduct him.” According to the telegram, Reza Sadr had asked top Iranian officers 
to contact foreign security services and even the Russians in pursuing Sadr’s strange case. 
He also added that [Ayatollah] Khomeini sent a “cold” and “spiritless” telegram to Arafat 
on Sadr’s issue. Conversely, Arafat sent a “warm” response, calling Sadr “his brother.” 
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The telegram finally concluded that “Iran’s crucial moves to free a Shia leader like Sadr 
[from Libya’s prison] would have good impact on Tehran’s ties with the Shia.”1308 In the 
following days, SAVAK monitored the Middle Eastern leaders as well as Iranian and 
Lebanese religious figures, especially Ayatollah Khomeini’s conveys. In the meantime, 
Tehran began accusing Ayatollah Khomeini and his supporters, though indirectly, of Sadr’s 
disappearance. In addition to SAVAK, an Iranian special emissary and former ambassador 
to Amman, Fereydoun Movassaghi, was dispatched by the Shah to Jordan in late 
September 1978. He informed King Hussein of the Shah’s anxiety over Sadr’s fate. Shortly 
after, Iran’s embassy in Amman issued a statement on 29 September 1978, stating that 
“Iran was increasingly worried about Sadr’s fate. Iran had a right to interfere in this issue 
since Sadr is an Iranian-born and the leader of one million Shia in Lebanon.”1309 King 
Hussein of Jordan then sent a private letter to Gaddafi. Calling Sadr as a “luminary of the 
Muslim world,” King Hussein warned Tripoli of “sectarian dimensions” of the issue if Shia 
Sadr was arrested or killed by a Sunni Leader. Pointing to the interconnection of Sadr’s 
mystery with the Palestinian situation, King Hussein stated in the letter that the issue had 
made “sensitive and difficult times” for the Palestinians and all Lebanese and proposed 
that Gaddafi “Help us so we can help you, with God’s permission.”1310 When Gaddafi 
traveled to Amman, King Hussein asked him again to cooperate on Sadr’s issue. He also 
added that “the Shah has been worried about Sadr’s situation.”1311 Gaddafi, in response, 
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assured King of Jordan that Sadr had already left Libya. Despite his claim that Libya Tripoli 
respected Iran as one of the main Islamic countries in the East of Islamic World and Libya, 
Gaddafi strongly denied Sadr’s presence in Libya after his disapperance. After submitting 
the Shah’s message to King Hussein, Movassaghi went to Damascus and delivered the 
Shah’s private message to Hafiz Assad. He claimed that “Libya, Syria, and a third country 
have attempted to find Imam Musa Sadr and I am happy to say that Sadr’s hiding place 
will be soon discovered.”1312 It seemed Movassaghi was not at liberty to disclose the third 
country.1313 After talking with Hafiz Assad, Movassaghi stated that Sadr was not in Libya 
anymore; a claim soon rejected by diplomatic and security reports of both SAVAK and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Assad told me that in spite of some misunderstandings 
between the Shah and Imam Sadr, Imam Sadr had a permanently positive attitude towards 
the Shah and Iran. Assad believed that some politicians’ negative interference [i.e., 
Ambassador Qadar], as well as the withdrawal of Sadr’s citizenship, had widened a tension 
between Sadr and the Shah. Assad added that Sadr had looked at Iran as the Shia harbor 
and sanctuary. General Assad, finally, promised me to redouble his efforts to lessen tension 
between the Shah and Imam Sadr after Sadr’s return to Iran.”1314 It was all a mirage, 
though. The Shah had privately dispatched his personal emissary to inquire about Sadr’s 
fate. Ali-Naghi Kani, former general secretary of the Mardom [People] Party, Alam’s close 
friend, and Sadr’s childhood friend, 1315 was summoned to the Court. “I was surprisingly 
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1314 Etelaat Newspaper, 3 October 1978. 
 
1315 Kani had recently resigned from politics due to his objection to the Shah’s domestic policy. For more 
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called by Shah,” Kani said. “He respected me unbelievably. Due to my relations with Shia 
clergies and Arab countries, the Shah asked me to travel to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and 
Egypt, as his special emissary and to ask those rulers to “find and then safely turn” Sadr to 
Lebanon. I went then to Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Unfortunately, none of their kings helped 
me. However, President Sadat gave me a shocking information.” Kani claimed that Sadat 
had told him that “Seyyed Musa Sadr was executed by Gaddafi and his corpse was thrown 
into the Mediterranean.” When Kani told the Shah of Sadr’s fate, the Pahalvi monarch 
became “very, very upset. He sat in his chair for 10 minutes.”1316 
The End 
Sadr’s disappearance was a fiasco for the Lebanese Shia. There had been several 
Shia influential figures to lead the community after Sadr, including Ayatollah Mohammad-
Mehdi Shamseddin, Seyyed Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, pro-Baath Soleyman 
Yahfoufi, and Sayed Hasan Shirazi. Although Shamseddin, Sadr’s deputy in the Majlis 
Aala and a moderate cleric without major connection to Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
followers,1317 became the head of the SICS, neither he nor other Shia figures could fill 
Sadr’s shoes. Other Lebanese Shia also warned of devastating consequences of Sadr’s 
disappearance for Lebanon and the region. Hussein Quwatli, the personal representative of 
the Sunni mufti, said that Sadr’s disappearance was “a link in the chain of conspiracies 
aimed at drowning Lebanon and the region in the terror of mystery.”1318 The Shia mufti of 
Baalbek, Sulayman Yahfufi, said that the Shia had concluded that behind the Imam’s 
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disappearance was “a conspiracy aimed at pushing through the capitulationist settlements 
which are being proposed in the Arab arena.” Yahfufi said that Sadr’s disappearance had 
“diverted Lebanese attention in particular and Arab attention in general...from what was 
happening at Camp David.”1319 Indeed, Sadr’s mysterious disappearance increased his 
reputation, making him a disappeared Imam to the Shia. His followers saw him as a martyr. 
Ambassador Richard Parker brought up a theory, arguing that “the thought that the Imam 
Moussa had gone into concealment to re-emerge transcendent had also occurred to us. 
Indeed, that was an early theory, i.e., that he had stage-managed a disappearance. Local 
opinion is divided on the subject.”1320 In the same line of thought, William Eagleton, the 
U.S. ambassador to Tripoli, noted that “Though we have no evidence on which to base 
additional speculation, is it possible that, as provided for by Shi’a tradition, the Imam Musa 
Sadr might have been “taken into concealment”; and, if so, should we await his 
Parousia?”1321 By the late 70s, Syyed Musa Sadr’s disappearance had revived the 
belief of the ‘Hidden Imam’ for the Shia. More significantly, Sadr’s disappearance 
caused a drastic, yet late, shift in Iran’s non-state foreign policy in Lebanon. On 8 October 
1978, Ambassador Qadar was finally replaced with Sharaf whose relations with the 
Lebanese Shia and Arabs were much better. It seemed that the Shah had blamed Qadar for 
the destruction of Iran’s connection with the Lebanese Shia. After his return to Tehran, and 
in the middle of Sadr’s mysterious disappearance, Qadar was called by the Shah. In 
response to Shah’s question on Sadr’s fate, Qadar stated, “as Your Majesty found out well, 
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Sadr was executed. In fact, Sadr’s issue has finished.”1322 Qadar was then sent to London. 
Interestingly, Pahlavi officials were still optimistic of finding Sadr. In early October, 
Ahmad Bani-Ahmad, Iran’s former Parliament member, claimed “from Rome that he had 
“learned Sadr was safe and well in Libya. According to Bani-Ahmad, Sadr’s eldest son, 
Sadreddin Sadr, had confirmed "his father’s whereabouts.”1323 In early November, 
SAVAK reported that Sadr would be released soon following Elias Serkis, Hafiz Assad, 
and Yasser Arafat’s efforts to convince Gaddafi. “Sadr”, the report claimed, “will go to 
Malta and then to Beirut with a prestigious welcoming ceremony. However, it should be 
taken into account that Colonel Gaddafi is not reliable.”1324 SAVAK Director Pakravan, 
had a positive view towards the report since “1. According to the source of this news, we 
can trust to the content of news. 2. With regards to our previous information, this 
information should be acceptable, and Sadr is still in Gaddafi’s prison.”1325 The high-
ranked decision-makers in Iran still believed that Sadr was alive, yet under Gaddafi’s 
control. When Tripoli proposed to send a representative to Iran on Sadr’s case, Tehran 
eagerly accepted the idea. SAVAK was still looking for Sadr’s miraculous reappearance. 
By the time, however, unrelenting waves of the Islamic Revolution had shakened the 
Pahlavi monarchy. At the end, SAVAK provided its last report, claiming that “Seyyed 
Musa Sadr is still alive.”1326 
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IX. Conclusion: 
 
Iran’s Non-State Foreign Policy and the Shah’s Legacy 
 
“We are in a really terrible situation since Moscow’s twin pincers coming down through Kabul and Baghdad 
surround us,” The Shah shared his concern with Alam.1327  
 
In the early 16th century Shah Ismail I (1501-1524) established the Safavid Empire 
(1501-1736 BC) and reunited Iran for the first time after the Arab conquest of Iran. More 
substantially, he reasserted the Iranian identity based on the Twelver Shia Islam. It was his 
crucial decision to inject Shiism onto the Iranian plateau that retooled Iran for the modern 
era. The formation of a Shia empire in the Middle East had a tremendous repercussion on 
other Shia communities in the region, particularly the Shia Turks in Minor Asia. Shah 
Ismail Safavi had been framed as both their Shah and Morshed-e Kamel (Complete Sufi 
Master) for the Middle Eastern Shia. Harshly persecuted by the Ottoman Sultans, the Shia 
Turk welcomed the Safavi shah’s sequential victories. Led by Shahkulu (Servant of the 
Shah in Persian),1328 the Anatolian Shia launched a widespread insurgency in Spring 1510. 
The Safavi Shah was aware of the power of his Shia supporters; however, he was 
preoccupied with fighting with the Sunni Uzbek Khans in Khorasan, North-Eastern Iran, 
at the time. Furthermore, he did not want to have Iran surrounded by two Sunni powers of 
the Uzbek and the Ottoman; therefore, he refrained from inciting Ottoman Sultan, Bayezid 
II (1481-1512), by siding with the Shia rebellion. After on-and-off skirmishes, Shahkulu 
decided to cross Euphrates River--the Ottoman-Safavid border at the time—in order to join 
his spiritual leader, Shah Ismail. However, Shahkulu and his 3,000 followers were killed 
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1328 Shahkulu’s real name was Karabiyikolu. He became the religious leader of the Anatolian Shia after his 
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in a decisive battle on 2 July 1511. Although Shahkulu was later praised as a holy figure 
among the Shia Alevi in Anatolia and modern Turkey, the Ottoman Sultans had 
successfully suppressed the Shia Turks.1329 In the wake of Shahkulu Rebellion, the Shah 
Ismail had defeated the Sunni Uzbek and killed their leader, Muhammad Shaybani Khan, 
in the Battle of Marv. However, the other Ottoman Sunni leader, Sultan Selim I, attacked 
Iran in less than three years after the suppression of the Shahkulu Rebellion. Selim defeated 
Ismail in the Battle of Chaldiran on 23 August 1514 and Tabriz, Iran’s capital at the time, 
was temporarily captured and then destroyed by the Ottoman Jeni Seri forces. Indeed, Shah 
Ismail’s lack of ability and intention in the support for a non-state entity of the Shia 
Shahkulu Rebellion led to the defeat of Iran’s army and the permanent loss of Eastern 
Kurdistan—modern Turkey’s Kurdistan. 
More than four centuries later, the Islamic Revolution of 1979, led by Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini, overthrew the Pahlavi regime and established a Shia regime in Iran. 
The formation of the Islamic Republic was a watershed in the region, prompting other Shia 
communities, particularly the Iraqi Shia, to challenge their Sunni, autocratic regimes. 
Mainly led by Ayatollah Muhammad-Baqir al-Sadr, the Iraqi Shia gradually organized 
anti-Baath activities. Though rhetorically backing the Iraqi Shia, the newly-founded 
Iranian Republic was not able to effectively support them due to domestic power struggles 
and civil war in Iranian Kurdistan and Turkmen Sahra, in the north-east of Iran. Al-Sadr 
was brutally executed by the Baath regime and the Shia dissidents were suppressed. Only 
less than a year later, Saddam Hussein attacked Iran and temporarily occupied 
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Khorramshahr in 1981. One more time, Iran’s lack of ability and intention in the support 
for a non-state entity of the Iraqi Shia movement ended with a defeat in a bloody war. 
In the period between the formation of the Shia Safavid and the Shia Islamic 
Republic, it was Mohammad-Reza Shah Pahlavi who effectively crafted a non-state foreign 
policy in the south of Lebanon and, particularly, in the north of Iraq and successfully 
stopped an Iraqi—backed by Egyptians and Russians--threat. A cursory historical survey 
of Pahlavi Iran’s ties with the Iraqi Kurds and the Lebanese Shia shows the continuity and 
durability of Iran’s non-state foreign policy.  
Iran’s non-state foreign policy under the Shah’s reign was part of Tehran’s broader 
strategy of Containment. Designed to stop adversaries’ expansions in the region, Iran’s 
non-state foreign policy targeted a set of threats, i.e., the Red, the Arab, the Kurd, the Black, 
and the Palestinian. Iran’s support of the Kurdish Peshmerga prevented Iraq from possibly 
launching invasion of Khuzestan and halted its ambitions in the Persian Gulf. Tehran 
effectively used “the Kurdish issue” as pressure on “the [Iraqi] domestic stability and the 
Arab Unity,”1330 to keep Iraq “weak, divided, and separate from Nasser,”1331 and to “pin 
down two-thirds of the Iraqi army and deprive the Baath of a secure base from which to 
launch sabotage and assassination teams against Iran.”1332 Iran’s support for the Iraqi Kurds 
also contained Kurdish separatism. As Tehran’s support for the Iraqi Kurds grew, Kurdish 
nationalism in Iranian Kurdistan slowed down and, in return, pushed Barzani to abandon 
the idea of siding with the Iranian Kurds against Tehran since he did not want to lose Iran’s 
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strategic support.1333 He warned both Iranian and Syrian Kurds not to take any step against 
their central regimes,1334 and his Peshmerga kept the border with Iran safe.1335 According 
to SAVAK, the KDP stopped following its propaganda against Iran’s national unity.1336 
This shift finally led to ousting the radical Iranian Kurd leaders of the PDKI, including 
Ahmad Towfiq.1337 The Shah was also careful not to perturb the Iranian Kurds. In a meeting 
with the U.S. Ambassador Armin Meyer, the Shah revealed his strategy not to antagonize 
Iran’s Kurds by colluding with Iraq against Barzani.1338 In the same line, Iran’s support for 
the Lebanese Shia targeted the rising Nasserism on the far east coast of the Mediterranean. 
While never provided with Iran’s military aid, the Lebanese Shia functioned as an anti-
Pan-Arab bulwark through dismantling pro-Nasser elements’ plans to join the UAR or 
another larger Arab entity.  
Iran’s non-state foreign policy was not primarily shaped for territorial annexation. 
Interestingly, Iran’s regional opponents, as well as the U.S. State Department, highlighted 
Iran’s intention to annex Iraqi Kurdistan. Iraqi Foreign Minister Shathel Taqa had warned: 
“if the Shah or anyone else has [an] idea of a new Bangladesh in Iraq he is very 
mistaken.”1339 The U.S. State Department had also reported that “Barzani had approached 
the Shah on a number of occasions to seek assistance against Iraq. He made grand promises 
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of incorporating Iraqi Kurdistan into Iran in return.”1340 In another report, the State 
Department framed Iran’s interference in Iraqi Kurdistan as “comparable to that of Indian 
involvement with the Bengalese rebels in East Pakistan just prior to the 1971 war.”1341 
According to the Americans, Tehran might be “tempted [to] support [the] Kurdish rebels 
in [an] effort [to] divert hostile Kurdish action from its territory.”1342 Contrary to these 
claims, the Shah never supported the territorial annexation policy. His primary goals were 
to contain Iraq and then to force the Iraqi leaders to concede in Arvand Rud. The Shah 
gradually related the Kurdish and Arvand Rud issues. According to Qadar, it was SAVAK 
Director Pakravan who first suggested that the Shah use the Kurds in order to gain the 
concession in Arvand Rud.1343 In the mid-60s, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs had 
argued there were “three issues that escalated tensions between Iran and Iraq: Arvand Rud, 
the Kurdish War, and the Iranian minority in Iraq … Tehran cannot be indifferent towards 
the Kurds … However, Iran has interestingly intertwined these issues in a way that none 
of which can be mutually settled down between Iran and Iraq.”1344 Since the late 60s, the 
Shah had revealed his preparation to abandon the Kurds to gain the concession in Arvand 
Rud.1345  
                                                
1340 Tehran 136 to the U.S. Department of State, August 2, 1962 (NARA/RG59/R2/787.00/8-162), PP. 1-2. 
 
1341 Intelligence Note prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, November 18, 1974, FRUS 1969-
1976, XXVII, 267, Tab B.      
 
1342 White House, Memorandum, Saunders to Bundy, April 2, 1963 (JKF/NSF/RKF/Box426/Iraq-1961-63-
White House Memoranda, p.1. 
 
1343 Interview with Major General Mansour Qadar, Oral History, Foundations for Iranian History. 
 
1344 Cologne to Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. No number, no date. 
 
1345 Tehran A-607 to the U.S. Department of State, “The Iran-Iraq Crisis of December/January: An Analysis,” 
March 5, 1966 (NARA/RG59/CFPF/1964-66/Box2339/POL 13-3–Ethnic Minorities), p.3. 
 
354 
 
Pahlavi Iran’s non-state foreign policy demonstrated Tehran’s willingness and 
desire to accept the regional status quo. Despite support for the Iraqi Kurds, Iran refrained 
from supporting the disintegration of Iraq and the creation of an independent Kurdish state. 
The Sjaj had pressed Barzani to “adhere to the line that they consider themselves a part of 
Iraq.”1346 In an interview with the Kuwaiti newspaper a-Siasat, the Shah clearly contended 
that “We do not approve an independent [Iraqi] Kurdistan.”1347 In Vienna, he repeated his 
argument that “the autonomy for Kurdistan should be authorized under Iraq’s 
sovereignty.”1348 For the Shah, the state disintegration policy in the region would lay a 
fertile ground for Russian infiltration that would, in turn, endanger Iran’s state survival. 
The Shah himself was, in general, against the disintegration of regional states. “The era of 
territory occupation has passed, and it is not acceptable anymore,” he objected to state 
collapse in the region.1349 He was also against the disintegration of Pakistan as well as 
Israeli occupation of the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights. “Any territory occupation by 
force of arms shall not be recognized,” the Shah stated in an interview with a Yugoslavian 
newspaper in 1967.1350  
Iran’s non-state foreign policy was Tehran’s major tool to legitimize its regional 
role and stability. The Shah was well aware that a state’s role was the currency of power, 
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granted to a state by its neighbors by recognizing the legitimacy of the state’s interests.1351 
Although the Saad-Abad summit of 1972 granted Iran a role as the gendarme of the Persian 
Gulf, it was the Algiers Agreement of 1975 that legitimized it among states of the region. 
Given the fact that Iran’s support for the Kurds ultimately coerced Baghdad to accept the 
Algiers Agreement, Iran’s non-state foreign policy played a critical role in granting the 
leading role in the region to Iran. On top of that, the Shah considered Iran’s non-state 
foreign policy as a tool to keep Iran’s and the Middle East’s stability. As he claimed, Iran 
was the “only nation capable of maintaining peace and stability in the Mideast.”1352 Pahlavi 
Iran secured its stability by limiting the threat of Pan-Arab, Moscow-backed regimes of the 
region by supporting the Iraqi Kurds and to some degree, the Lebanese Shia. It was Iran’s 
‘special stability’, a combination of Iran’s power and role, that convinced the White House 
to see Iran as its key ally in the Middle East.  
Iran’s non-state foreign policy under the Shah’s reign was a manifestation of Iran’s 
efforts to disentangle itself from super power politics. Since the coup of 1953, the Shah had 
been seeking to show his independence from external powers. By the mid-70s, Tehran’s 
growing military and economic power transformed Iran from an underdeveloped, weak 
state to a major power in the region. As Iran’s petrodollar income increased, the Shah’s 
self-confidence grew and that in turn, changed the nature of its relation with the U.S. from 
a client-master one to a regional partner in the Cold War. He implicitly supported Egypt 
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and Syria in the Yum Kippur of 1973,1353 and followed a moderate détente policy with 
Moscow in the 1960s. More substantially, he challenged his American ally with Iran’s non-
state foreign policy in Iraqi Kurdistan. In a period between September 1961 and May 1972, 
his policy towards the Iraqi Kurds stood in sharp contrast with the U.S. strategy in Iraq and 
the region. It was only after the Saad-Abad summit of 1972 that the U.S. was dragged into 
the Kurdish War and sided with Iran and Israel in support of Barzani. Furthermore, the 
Shah tried to control and manage the triangular cooperation of SAVAK-CIA-Mossad in 
Iraqi Kurdistan. “I told His Imperial Majesty that the Americans and the British are 
separately working there [Iraqi Kurdistan]. Is not it better to make them work together? 
The Shah replied back: ‘It is better they work separately’.”1354 Finally, Iran’s unilateral 
decision to sign the Algiers Agreement, without informing Israel and the U.S., 
demonstrated Iran’s independence. The Shah pulled the rug from under the Americans’ 
and Israelis’ feet. “When he got an offer, he grabbed it, completed it, came back, gave the 
orders and let the United States and Israel know that the game was over.”1355  
The Shah employed Cold War language to justify Iran’s non-state foreign policy, 
particularly in Iraqi Kurdistan. Cold War language was designed to exaggerate the Soviet 
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plan in the region by portraying the Iraqi regime as a Kremlin partner and interconnecting 
major sensitive issues in the region for the U.S., i.e., the security of the Persian Gulf 
oilfields and Israel and the national integrity of the U.S. regional allies. The Shah’s prudent 
use of this language was mainly rooted in the fact that the U.S. viewed regional conflicts 
through a Cold War lens. From this analytical angle, the geopolitical contest with the 
Kremlin covered the globe and, therefore, there was no room for regional-local conflicts 
per se. It was within this context that the Shah relentlessly employed the Cold War language 
and painted the Kurdish conflict as a significant Cold War front, rather than a regional 
competition between Tehran and Baghdad or local fighting between Baghdad and the KDP. 
In the Saad-Abad meeting of May 1972, his well-designed Cold War language successfully 
transformed the Kurdish War from a hardly-noticed regional crisis in the distant Zagros 
Mountains to a war between the Soviet camp and the West and ultimately dragged the U.S. 
into the Kurdish War. 
Pahlavi Iran lacked specific discourse or ideology to articulate its non-state foreign 
policy. Under the Shah’s reign, official propaganda partially highlighted a vague 
‘Aryanism’ or ‘Pan-Iranism’, demonstrating his ambition to revive the Persian Empire. In 
the aftermath of the Iraqi coup of 1958, the core of Iran’s hearts-and-minds campaign 
towards the Iraqi Kurds was premised on the view that the Kurds were, in the Shah’s words, 
“the purest Persians, pure Aryans, from their tradition, their language and their history.”1356 
When he was asked if there was any ‘Kurdish question’ in Iran, he quickly responded back, 
“Absolutely not. It may be in other countries, but not in Iran. The Kurds are ‘pure Aryan’, 
                                                
1356 Memcon, April 13, 1962, FRUS 1961-1963, XVII, 247; Tehran 1044 to State, January 20, 1966, FRUS 
1964-1968, XXI, 179. 
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like us.”1357 The Iraqi Kurds had also tried to consolidate their ties with Iran by emphasizing 
the discourse of Aryanism. In the middle of the war with Baghdad, Barzani wrote a letter 
to Mohsen Pezeshkpour, the head of the pro-Kurds Pan-Iranist Party, and expressed his 
gratitude to the Party for its support for the Kurdish movement. He also stated that “The 
superficial division among branches of a race [the Iranians] cannot remove their 
inseparable links… You [the Pan-Iranist Party] has [rightly] introduced the Kurds as a true 
heir of the Median Empire… Indeed, when all branches of our race had been united 
together, our World, especially our Arian [World], was prospering and creating.”1358  
In the same line, yet in a less significant view, the Shah tried to frame himself as 
the guardian of the Shia communities. Indeed, several elements in SAVAK and Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs considered the Shia communities in the region as Iran’s ‘natural’ allies. 
After the Iraqi coup of 1958, the Iraqi Shia became SAVAK’s initial targets for plotting 
against Baghdad. Throughout the 60s and 70s, SAVAK kept its ties with the Iraqi Shia 
elites. In his speech in front of President Abdul-Salam Arif, Mehdi Pirasteh, Iran’s 
ambassador to Baghdad, had recklessly stated that Iran, as the major Shia country of the 
region, would support all the Shia and must keep this policy in the world. Pirasteh’s speech 
infuriated Arif so much that he left the meeting.1359 When the Iraqi Army killed 40 Iranian 
border guards in Badrah in early 1974, Iran intensified its support, yet inconsequentially, 
for the Shia dissidents in the south of Iraq.1360 In Lebanon, the SAVAK Green Plan was 
                                                
1357 Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No Number. 
 
1358 Barzani wrote this letter for the fifth annual meeting of the Pan-Iranist Party, Hakemiyyat-e Mellat 
(Nation’s Sovereignty), No. 96-97. 
 
1359 SAVAK Documents, 215/36967-m/6/8609, 22 February, 1965.  
 
1360 Al-Samarrai, Wafiq, Hottam al-Bawabat al-Sharqi [The Destruction of the Eastern Gate], translated in 
Farsi (Tehran, Markaz Asnad va Tahghighat-e Defa-e Moghaddas) p. 56. 
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primarily framed around Tehran-Lebanese Shia ties. Even after growing tension between 
Tehran and Sadr, the Shah refrained from expressing direct enmity towards Sadr. Amid the 
Civil War, “Bachir Gemayel1361 who was in close relations with the Shah came to Tehran 
three times and pleaded with the Shah for military support. Although the Shah had 
promised him to support his Phalange forces in all three meetings, he changed his mind at 
the last minute. When I asked the reason, he replied: ‘Imagine if one of these weapons 
received by the Lebanese Christians, would not they say that the only Shia king in the 
world pays money to the Christian to kill the Shia?’ I answered: ‘Your Majesty, the Shia-
Christianity division is not important anymore. What is important is ideology. If the 
Christian forces are defeated by the Shia and the Palestinians, Iran will face an enemy in 
Lebanon.’ But the Shah strongly rejected and said, ‘We cannot treat the Lebanese Shia in 
this way.’ The Shah then rejected Gemayel’s financial request. There was a ‘hidden’ factor 
within the Shah’s behaviors. I think he might be influenced by some of his aides,” 
Ambassador Qadar recalled his talk with the Shah.1362 In reality, though, the Shah’s ‘hidden 
factor’ refers to his view towards the Shia people and Iran’s central status--as the ‘Shia 
Hub’—for the Shia communities since the rise of the Safavid Empire.  
The ideas of a ‘greater Iran’ and ‘the Shia hub’ could have provided ideational bases 
for Iran’s non-state foreign policy. However, both narratives were vague and remained 
disarticulated. While he was fully aware of the threatening ideologies of Communism and 
Pan-Arabism--and to a less significant degree, Kurdish separatism and Islamism--he could 
not articulate a strong ideology to justify, expand, and consolidate his rule as well as Iran’s 
                                                
1361 A senior member of the Phalange Party and then-supreme commander of the Lebanese Force militia in 
the Second Civil War 1975–90. 
 
1362 Interview with Major General Mansour Qadar, Oral History, Foundations for Iranian History. 
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non-state foreign policy. In fact, the Shah’s realist views devalued the significance of 
ideational forces in Iran’s non-state foreign policy.  
Iran’s non-state foreign policy was primarily handled by its security apparatus. It 
was SAVAK, rather than Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that managed connections 
with the Iraqi Kurds and the Lebanese Shia. SAVAK elements, particularly Colonel 
Pejman, played a decisive role in convincing the Shah to side with the Iraqi Kurds against 
Baghdad. SAVAK also played a critical role in making connections and then terminating 
Iran’s ties with the Lebanese Shia. Ambassador Mansour Qadar was mostly connected to 
SAVAK, instead of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to Nraghi, “Qadar had 
attracted the Shah and other top country officials’ attentions with jugglery. I believe after 
1964, the Shah left all matters relating to Shia clerics to SAVAK. In addition, all matters 
relating to Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon were managed by SAVAK. All reports 
relating to these countries and prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had to be 
monitored by Qadar and SAVAK.”1363 Sadr had called SAVAK the main obstacle to 
improving relations between the Arabs and Tehran.1364  
Contrary to popular perceptions, Iran’s non-state foreign policy was not framed by 
the Shah’s megalomaniac perception of Iran’s status as not only the hegemon of the region 
but also a major power on the world stage. In reality, the Shah’s megalomania and 
aspiration for regional suzerainty emerged with the termination of Iran’s non-state foreign 
policy. In a period between 1974-76, the Shah changed the trajectory of Iran’s non-state 
foreign policy, cutting off his support for Barzani and framing Sadr as an enemy. It was 
                                                
1363 Fars News Agency, Interview with Ehsan Naraghi, 
http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8711240772.    
 
1364 SAVAK Documents, No. 213/5701, 29 March 1973. 
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within this context that his megalomania reached an absurd level as he turned his attention 
to areas beyond the Persian Gulf. He insisted on Iran’s necessary presence to keep sea roads 
open in the Indian Ocean. In doing so, he planned to build a military base in Mauritius and 
engaged in the crisis in the Horn of Africa by supporting Somalia against Soviet-backed 
Ethiopia. “My policy is honest and straightforward, and I have no hidden agenda. I say 
quite openly that I wish Iran to play a role in the Indian Ocean. I have no objection to 
America being present; indeed I shall actively defend your interests,” the Shah told the 
U.S. Vice President Nelson Rockefeller on 24 March 1976.1365 When Americans increased 
the cost of a military navy supposed to be purchased by Iran, the Shah instructed Alam to 
tell the U.S. ambassador that “In this situation, we cannot buy these ships. [Tell the 
Americas that] within this situation a [power] vacuum would emerge in the Indian Ocean 
and you would be left with Diego Garcia Island. Without Iran’s rise, there will be no navy 
force, except the Indian force, other than the Russian force in the Indian Ocean. You do 
not want to trust India. Pakistan has no power to purchase them. With a limited power of 
our navy force, we will not be able to come out of the Persian Gulf. Therefore, you will be 
alone against the Russians there.”1366 Although the Western powers reminded him of their 
sufficient power to secure the Indian Ocean, the Shah never considered their points. Indeed, 
the termination of Iran’s non-state foreign policy coincided with the Shah’s rising 
megalomania.    
                                                
1365 Alam, Asadollah, The Shah and I, ed. Alinaghi Alikhani (New York: St. Martin’s, 1991), p. 152. 
 
1366 Alam, Assadollah. Yad’dashtha-ye ‘Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam 
Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. III: 1973-1974 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 1995), p. 328. 
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More substantially, the Shah terminated Iran’s non-state foreign policy when he 
abandoned the idea of the balance of power in the region to lead the Middle East. Although 
he knew that the collapse of the Kurdish resistance would release Baghdad from a long-
term crisis and would then enable the Baath leaders to deploy its army in the Persian Gulf 
and threaten Khuzestan, he abandoned backing the Iraqi Kurds. The Shah’s main idea was 
to abandon the classic regional balance of power and to take up instead a policy of “winning 
Arab recognition for Iran’s regional leadership.”1367 Elements in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, particularly Foreign Minister Abbas Aram, as well as Prime Minister Hoveyda, 
had suggested that the Shah approach Arabs to lead the region.1368 After building close 
friendship with Sadat, the last step for the Shah to receive the Arab acceptance of Iran’s 
regional hegemony in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East was to turn Baghdad, Iran’s 
sole remaining foe with an aspiration to lead the region, docile. In his interview of April 
1975 with Muhammad Hassanein Haykal, the Shah stated clearly his idea of leading the 
Middle East, pointing that “We followed the principle ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend,’ 
and our relations with Israel began to develop. But now the situation has changed … I 
occasionally think of a new equilibrium in the region … Perhaps [it] can be integrated into 
an Islamic framework.”1369 Iraq’s concession in Arvand Rud was interpreted by regional 
states as the recognition of Iran’s paramount power. According to Iran’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Algiers Agreement had ushered in “the Arabic-Islamic Unity.”1370 In 
                                                
1367 Parsi, Trita, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States (Yale 
University Press, 2007) p.80.  
 
1368 Interview with Major General Mansour Qadar, Oral History, Foundations for Iranian History. 
 
1369 Joseph Alpher, “Israel and the Iraq-Iran War,” in The Iraq-Iran War: Impact and Implications, Efraim 
Karsh (New York: St. Martin’s, 1989), 157. 
 
1370 Beirut 4264 to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 March 1975. 
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the Shah’s view, the Agreement would eliminate the image of Iran as an implacable foe of 
the Arabs. The U.S. Department of the State reported that “Iran perceives the accord with 
Iraq as contributing to its effort to draw closer to the Arab states. The Shah, who aspires to 
regional leadership, does not wish to be classified as hostile to Arabs and a supporter of 
Israel. Moreover, it may be his perception that the power balance has shifted in favor of 
the Arabs. He might also anticipate an eventual modification of U.S. policy toward Israel. 
The Shah does not want to be caught short.”1371 In short, the termination of Iran’s non-state 
foreign policy was rooted in the Shah’s plan to keep Iran’s bid for regional leadership safe.         
Iran’s non-state foreign policy under the Shah’s reign left a huge legacy for the 
post-Revolution era. Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran’s connections with non-
state entities in the region intensified. In reality, however, when the revolutionaries came 
to power, Iran’s connections with the Iraqi Kurds were still there. Despite the Algiers 
Agreement of 1975, the Barzanis kept fighting with Talabani and the PUK. Right after the 
Islamic Revolution, they sided with the revolutionaries. Baghdad’s long-standing enmity 
towards Iran, as well as Tehran’s new revolutionary tones, put Baath Iraq as a major threat 
to the Islamic Republic and thus, facilitated the revival of Tehran-Iraqi Kurds connections. 
Tehran later attracted Talabani’s PUK and established a potent Kurdish front in the middle 
of war with Iraq. In fact, the extension of Tehran-Kurdish connections was durable enough 
to outlive the transformative events of the Algiers Agreement of 1975 and the Islamic 
Revolution of 1979. 
Tehran-Lebanese Shia connections had a tremendous impact on Iran’s non-state 
foreign policy. When the Iranian revolutionaries came to power, there was already a 
                                                
1371 The implication of the Iran-Iraq Agreement- DCI/NIO 1039-75, 1 May 1975. 
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history, though a weak one, of Tehran’s connections with the Lebanese Shia. Contrary to 
popular perceptions, Pahlavi Iran’s connections with the Lebanese Shia were potent 
enough that one could counterfactually argue that without the decline of Nasserism and 
Ambassador Qadar’s destructive interventions, the Shah might have built a stronger 
relation with the Lebanese Shia the Islamic Republic has built with Hezbollah and Amal. 
Moreover, the presence of the Iranian revolutionaries in Southern Lebanon 
prepared fertile ground for the Islamic Republic to expand its connections with the Shia 
Lebanese. Mohammad Montazeri, Seyed Ali-Akbar Mohtashamipour, and particularly 
Mostafa Chamran were the three key revolutionaries who solidified Iran’s commitment to 
Lebanese Shia. According to Amal deputy, Ali Kharis, “Musa Sadr and Chamran were the 
backbone of the Iranian revolution and one cannot speak of the Iranian revolution without 
mentioning these two person.”1372  
Furthermore, Sadr’s support for Assad’s Syria and his fatwa in favor of the 
Alawites planted the seeds of a broader strategic triangular alliance among Tehran, 
Damascus, and the Lebanese Shia. After the Revolution, the Baath regime of Syria sided 
with the Islamic Republic of Iran and became the only Arab state—along with Libya--that 
supported Tehran against the Baghdad Baath. More significantly, Damascus eased Iran’s 
presence in Lebanon and empowered Tehran’s connections with Hezbollah. In return, 
Tehran turned down Syrian Sunni Muslim Brotherhood’s pleas against secular Hafiz 
Assad. Recently, it was Tehran who sided with Bashar Assad’s regime against ISIS, al-
Nusra, and the militant rebels backed by the Turks, Saudis, Qataris, and Americans.  
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Iranian-born Sadr’s message of modern Islam and his efforts to revive the Shia 
identity was followed in Iran and then emulated in other Shia communities in Iraq, Bahrain, 
and Yemen. As Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah stated, “Imam Sadr established the Moqawama 
[Resistance]. He also founded major institutions on behalf of Lebanese, in general, and the 
Lebanese Shia, in particular…Whatever Imam Sadr emphasized is now implemented in 
Hezbollah. He believed in support for Palestine and in resistance as the only way to free 
Palestine and Lebanon [from Israeli occupation] … I have been impressed by four major 
figures: Imam Khomeini, Ayatollah Khamenei, Imam Sadr and Ayatollah [Mohammad-
Bagher] Sadr.”1373 Along with Ayatollah Khomeini, Sadr has been a seminal figure who 
initiated the revival of the Shia in the region. 
On top of that, deep conflict among the Iranian Revolutionaries over Sadr’s 
leadership in Lebanon soon emerged in Iran’s domestic power struggle after the Islamic 
Revolution. On one side, the pro-Sadr revolutionaries, including Mostafa Chamran, Sadegh 
Ghotbzadeh, and Sadegh Tabatabaie, established the interim government, led by Mehdi 
Bazargan. On the other side, the anti-Sadr revolutionaries, including Jalal al-Din Farsi, Ali-
Akbar Mohtashamipour, Mohammad Montazeri, and Mohammad Gharazi, gathered in the 
Islamic Republic Party, SATJA, and the IRGC. Within this context, supporting and 
criticizing Sadr became a major, though indirect, fault line among the revolutionaries. The 
pro-Sadr group criticized the isolation of Iran after the Revolution while anti-Sadr forces 
intended to radicalize Iran’s foreign and domestic policy. Indeed, the clash between these 
two groups over Sadr’s policies in the late-70s continued in the 80s and the 90s and shaped 
the trajectory of both domestic and foreign policy of revolutionary Iran. The issue of siding 
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with or criticizing Sadr was, in fact, as determinant as an ideological split within the 
Mojahedin of 1975 in forming the trajectory of foreign and domestic policies of new-
founded Islamic Republic.1374 Sadr’s presence in Iranian politics is still strongly felt.1375 
Iran’s non-state foreign policy in the Middle East is a sensitive subject which makes 
it difficult to propose a theory as a unifying framework. More significantly, it offers 
something different from, but complementary to, the current crop of textbooks related to 
Iran’s foreign policy and the geopolitics of the Middle East. My hope is to embolden others 
to study Iran’s foreign policy, in particular, and the geopolitics of the Middle East, in 
general, that have been ignored by scholars for generations by opening up new questions 
and new areas of research. The present study is also a research project which has to 
continue. The next project could be on the Islamic Republic’s non-state foreign policy 
which was much broader than what I elaborated here. It could be also extended to the 
Shah’s ‘counter-insurgency foreign policy’ in Dhofar, Oman, and North Yemen. Above 
all, I hope I have inspired those who read this study to look at history in a different way. 
 
                                                
1374 In October 1975, the MEK experienced an ideological split between Marxist and Islamist members. 
While the remaining primary members of MEK, including Masoud Rajavi, were imprisoned, some of the 
early members of MEK, like Bahram Aram, Torab Hghshenas, Taghi Sharam and Foad Rohani, formed a 
new Marxist organization. They declared this ideological split in a book entitled Manifesto on Ideological 
Issues, arguing that “that after ten years of secret existence, four years of armed struggle, and two years of 
intense ideological rethinking, they had reached the conclusion that Marxism, not Islam, was the true 
revolutionary philosophy.” Most of the Iranian clerical revolutionaries, including Ali-Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani, felt deep sympathy with the Islamist Mojahedin. They were frustrated with this split. This event 
had a huge impact on the power struggle and then bloody civil war after the Islamic Revolution.  
 
1375 Sadr maintained strong family relations with political leaders in Iran, Lebanon, and Iraq. Sadegh 
Tabatabaie, Sadr’s nephew, Sadegh Tabatabaie, became the first spokesman of the government after the 
Revolution. Ahmad Khomeini, Ayatollah Khomeini’s second son, married with Fatemeh Soltani Tabatabaie, 
Seyyed Musa’s niece. Yaser Khomeini, Ahmad’s second son, also married with Houra Sadr, Seyyed 
Mohammad Sadr’s daughter. Seyyed Mohammad was Musa Sadr’s nephew. Former President Mohammad 
Khatami’s wife, Zohreh Sadeghi, is Sadr’s niece. Sadreddin, Sadr’s son, was also married to Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s granddaughter. In Iraq, Seyyed Musa’s cousin, Ayatollah Seyed Muhammad-Baqir Sadr was a 
major political leader of the Shia. His son-in-law, Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of the Sadrist Movement, still 
claims to lead the Shia in Iraq. In the after math of his mystic disappearance, Sadr’s family has been a 
prestigious semi-royal family within the larger Shia community. 
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